ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY

Totalitarian Dictatorship

New Histories

Edited by
Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele
and Giuseppe Finaldi

ROUTLEDGE

Totalitarian Dictatorship

This volume takes a comparative approach, locating totalitarianism in the vastly complex web of fragmented pasts, diverse presents, and differently envisaged futures to enhance our understanding of this fraught era in European history. It shows that no matter how often totalitarian societies spoke of and imagined their subjects as so many slates to be wiped clean and rewritten on, older identities, familial loyalties and the enormous resilience of the individual (or groups of individuals) meant that the almost impossible demands of their regimes needed to be constantly transformed, limited, and recast.

Daniela Baratieri is an Honorary Research Fellow in History at the University of Western Australia.

Mark Edele is Professor of History at the University of Western Australia.

Giuseppe Finaldi is Associate Professor of History at the University of Western Australia.

Routledge Studies in Modern European History

1 Facing Fascism
The Conservative Party and the European dictators 1935–1940
Nick Crowson

2 French Foreign and Defence Policy, 1918–1940
The Decline and Fall of a Great Power
Edited by Robert Boyce

3 Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament
1919–1934
Carolyn Kitching

4 British Foreign Policy 1874–1914
The Role of India
Sneh Mahajan

5 Racial Theories in Fascist Italy
Aaron Gilette

6 Stormtroopers and Crisis in the Nazi Movement
Activism, Ideology and Dissolution
Thomas D. Grant

7 Trials of Irish History
Genesis and Evolution of a Reappraisal 1938–2000
Evi Gkotzaridis

8 From Slave Trade to Empire
European Colonisation of Black Africa 1780s–1880s
Edited by Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau

9 The Russian Revolution of 1905
Centenary Perspectives
Edited by Anthony Heywood and Jonathan D. Smele

10 Weimar Cities
The Challenge of Urban Modernity in Germany
John Bingham

11 The Nazi Party and the German Foreign Office
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Arthur L. Smith, Jr.

12 The Politics of Culture in Liberal Italy
From Unification to Fascism
Axel Körner

13 German Colonialism, Visual Culture and Modern Memory
Edited by Volker M. Langbehn

14 German Colonialism and National Identity
Edited by Michael Perraudin and Jürgen Zimmerer

15 Landscapes of the Western Front
Materiality during the Great War
Ross J. Wilson

16 West Germans and the Nazi Legacy
Caroline Sharples

17 Alan S. Milward and a Century of European Change
Edited by Fernando Guirao, Frances M. B. Lynch, and Sigfrido M. Ramírez Pérez

18 War, Agriculture, and Food
Rural Europe from the 1930s to the 1950s
Edited by Paul Brassley, Yves Segers and Leen Van Molle

19 Totalitarian Dictatorship
New Histories
Edited by Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Giuseppe Finaldi

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Totalitarian Dictatorship

New Histories

Edited by Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Giuseppe Finaldi

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
NEW YORK LONDON

First published 2014
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Simultaneously published in the UK
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Totalitarian dictatorship : new histories / edited by Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele and Giuseppe Finaldi.
pages cm. — (Routledge studies in modern European history ; 19)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Totalitarianism—History—20th century. 2. Italy—Politics and government—1922–1945. 3. Fascism—Italy—History—20th century. 4. Germany—Politics and government—1933–1945. 5. National socialism. 6. Spain—Politics and government—1939–1975. 7. Fascism—Spain—History—20th century. 8. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1936–1953. 9. Communism—Soviet Union—History. I. Baratieri, Daniela, editor of compilation. II. Edele, Mark, editor of compilation. III. Finaldi, Giuseppe, editor of compilation.
JC480.T66 2013
320.53—dc23
2013015919

ISBN13: 978-0-415-83705-7 (hbk)
ISBN13: 978-0-203-48220-9 (ebk)

Typeset in Sabon
by IBT Global.

Essays in Honor of R.J.B. Bosworth

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Contents

Acknowledgments

The three editors would like to thank, first of all, all the contributors for their hard work, patience, and willingness to communicate. Early in the project James Curry assisted in assembling a bibliography for Chapter 1 and toward the end Robert Stuart read the final product with his usual care and insight. Max Novick of Routledge was encouraging and supportive when disaster struck, which it did during the gestation of this book in a more devastating way than is usual. We are all grateful for the happy ending.

The editors are indebted to R.J.B. Bosworth, whose scholarship we celebrate in this collection. We are, because of Bosworth, in beautiful Perth, at the University of Western Australia, this far-flung outpost of historical endeavor from which for many years he pored over the problems thrown up by dictatorship, war, and totalitarianism. We have been inspired to collect some excellent history writing by colleagues touched in different ways by Bosworth's oeuvre, but we have also been inspired by something he mentioned in his preface to *Mussolini*. Thinking back over the Australian summer of 2000–2001, "a time of special joy," he describes that moment with his usual virtuosity:

> Can there be anything better than waking up every morning in the endless series of brilliant sunny Perth days to head for the computer and find that an ancient research technique provides the information and that the mystery of literary creation somehow produces the words?[1]

It has not always felt like that for us perhaps, but sometimes it has, and in those moments one can glimpse and feel, understand, and joyfully experience precisely what Bosworth meant.

Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele, and Giuseppe Finaldi

NOTES

1. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2002), xiv.

Page Intentionally Left Blank

1 Beyond the Delusion
New Histories of Totalitarian Dictatorship

Daniela Baratieri, Mark Edele, and Giuseppe Finaldi

> "Aspiring to write the total history of a totalitarian society is a delusion."
>
> R.J.B. Bosworth[1]

Totalitarianism is dead: even those who admit that the word might be "useful" are still adamant that the theory is "defunct."[2] The concept's "utility for propaganda purposes" obscures "whatever utility" the term may once have had,[3] and its "limitations" are "more obvious" today than when the theory was formulated in the shadow of the Second World War.[4] Specialist studies of Nazism have "emphatically questioned" the monolithic nature of the state implied by the theory of totalitarianism,[5] and the model is inadequate to "account for the differences between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist USSR." The "total control of totalitarianism was never that total," and the fact that the Soviet Union "did change over time" further undermined the concept's usefulness.[6] For Italy (let alone Spain, Portugal, or the dictatorships of Latin America) the term had been fitfully but never convincingly employed in the first place.[7] It seemed ridiculous to imagine that the rigor and ruthlessness required of a totalitarian society could be found under those sunny skies. According to Hannah Arendt, Italian Fascism had not even aspired to be totalitarian but had merely been a tool for nation and state building in a backward and "Latin" society.[8] Although valiant efforts were made by some historians to cram Italy into the model,[9] the Roman empire of the "Sawdust Caesar"[10] was not a serious contender in the totalitarian stakes. It remained for Germany and Russia to uphold the validity of the concept, but even their ability to do so rapidly ran its course. "If good scholarship has any bearing on political discourse," wrote one reviewer of a recent endeavor at empirical comparison of Nazism and Stalinism, "this volume should bury once and for all the Cold War concept of totalitarianism."[11]

Just as it was being declared dead by commentator after commentator, the deceased rose from its grave. We can locate four birthplaces of neototalitarian theorizing in the 1970s, approaches which all took their critical edge from a critique of the Soviet system and of Communist politics more

broadly: Eastern Europe, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent Germany. As they were groping for ways to describe the system of oppression they were subjected to, Polish or Czech dissidents, later also followed by their Russian colleagues, began to see the utility in the term even as they struggled with obvious differences between the regimes they lived under and not only Nazism but also and most importantly Stalinism.[12] As Václav Havel wrote somewhat confusingly in his influential essay *Power of the Powerless* (1978), Soviet bloc societies were "post-totalitarian" not in the sense "that the system is no longer totalitarian," but that "it is totalitarian in a way fundamentally different . . . from totalitarianism as we usually understand it."[13] Soon, post-Soviet scholars began a systematic exploration of the term and its uses. A real glut of dissertations (both *kandidatskie* and *doktorskie*) and monographs attest to the appeal of the term in contemporary Russia and the other successor states of the Soviet Union. Scholars from a variety of fields explore the use of the term "totalitarianism" in American,[14] French,[15] or simply "foreign"[16] historiography and its evolution in "western" discourse more generally[17]; some compare its application in Russia and the West.[18] Others investigate its status in Hannah Arendt's larger philosophical agenda[19] or even the "fate . . . of the Soviet opera singer in the epoch of totalitarianism."[20] Historians study, besides historiography, the "sources of left-wing totalitarianism" during the Russian civil war,[21] "resistance to totalitarianism" in the history of Soviet society,[22] or Stalinism in Azerbaijan as an example of totalitarianism.[23] Since the 1980s, a series of conferences on totalitarianism were flanking such groundwork,[24] and the revival of the term in English- and German-language scholarship also entered Russian-language debate through both translations[25] and review essays.[26]

Meanwhile and in parallel, French intellectuals, driven by their own concerns but inspired by the Eastern European dissidents, also began to embrace the term, largely as a descriptor for authoritarian forms of communism.[27] Historians took an active role in this evolving discourse. François Furet's 1978 reevaluation of the French Revolution and its relationship to the Russian equivalent was one important signpost in this new antitotalitarian literature. "I am writing these lines at the end of the spring of 1977, during a period when the critique of Soviet totalitarianism," Furet noted, "has ceased to be the monopoly or the quasi-monopoly of right-wing thought, and became the central theme of reflection on the left."[28] What was still implicit here became explicit in his 1995 sweeping history of communism: the return of the link of Stalinism and Nazism, the two prime examples of *régimes totalitaires*.[29]

In Italy, even more than France, communism was no distant "other" hidden beyond the iron curtain. The Italian Communist Party was the biggest in the western world and since 1945 had provided the great alternative to the Christian Democratic hegemon. By the 1960s it was a party embedded in the day-to-day life of millions of Italians in trade unions, clubs, and

sporting associations as well in the burgeoning university faculties. The left saw the idea of totalitarianism as liberal-capitalist propaganda aiming to associate communism (and perhaps its more moderate social-democratic flankers) with the evils of Nazi Fascism. Fascism was the "other" against which the healthy forces of the country had united during the resistance; among these, communism had played a distinguished part. "Totalitarianism" returned to Italy therefore via the backdoor of what came to be called anti-anti-Fascism—that is, the campaign beginning in the 1970s to challenge the so-called orthodoxy of the resistance myth. It was historian Renzo De Felice who, as he published his consecutive volumes of a massive Mussolini biography, argued that not only had Fascism gained significant support among the Italian population by the 1930s but also, even more controversially, that the resistance had involved tiny minorities and its communist faction was hardly representative of a vigorous culture of democracy.[30] Without overtly using the "t" word, De Felice appeared to be suggesting that Black and Red were as bad as each other, and the latter probably worse.[31] His definition eschewed the complexities of political science and stated blandly but effectively in the mid-1970s that Italy should wake up to the fact that the difference between fascism and communism was the equivalent of the choice between being thrown into the sea or a lake—"rather academic," he added, "if you don't know how to swim."[32] With De Felice drawing the line, "totalitarianism" provided a new dimension in studies of Italian Fascism, and doubters were swept aside in the 1990s with the catastrophic collapse of communism worldwide. The idea of the Italian Communist Party being a bastion of democracy was challenged and much Italian historiography on Italian Fascism crossed the floor from the study of "fascisms" to that of "totalitarianisms." Emilio Gentile, a student of De Felice's, now uses the term with abandon and in the meantime linked this newly rediscovered "political religion" with the old totalitarian verities.[33]

The English-language literature took a while to react to the continental rediscoveries. There were always historians who continued to find the concept useful—Robert Conquest, Richard Pipes, and Geoffrey Hosking come to mind. However, their approach was challenged at exactly the time totalitarianism rose to prominence elsewhere. American historians of Stalinism, in particular, became embroiled in what became known as the revisionist struggle over Soviet history in the 1980s and early 1990s, which ended in a curious stalemate: the "totalitarians" continued to dominate public discourse while the "revisionists" controlled the academy.[34] Soon, however, Martin Malia imported the French and Eastern European debate to American shores and was subsequently credited with having "resurrected the term."[35] It soon took root in the post–1991 historiography, quickly contaminating fields well beyond the study of Stalin's regime. Today we can find endorsement of "totalitarianism" among scholars not only of Stalinism[36] but also of the Soviet experience more generally[37]; historians of Nazism use the term again as a matter of course[38]; and even the

once slighted Italian inventor of the word is now acknowledged by that name.[39] Recent histories of Eastern Europe also see Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union as "two totalitarian states" intent on "the total altering of their respective domains."[40] Comparative and transnational study of totalitarian dictatorship has become a serious empirical enterprise—mostly focusing on Germany and the Soviet Union alone[41] but sometimes encompassing Italian Fascism as well.[42] From the court of oral historians came a more nuanced understanding. The idea of the "masses," as containers to be filled with content from the top down, was never attractive to oral historians, whose central assumption is that people always have something autonomous to say on what is proposed to or even imposed on them. In the first volume of the *International Yearbook of Oral History and Life Storie*s, dedicated to "Memory and Totalitarianism," Luisa Passerini cautiously used the concept but only to "remember that there have been similarities of oppression among systems of thought and power that were in many ways very different."[43]

Meanwhile, the German debate proceeded on its own track. Ernst Nolte tried to breathe new life into the concept in the 1980s, an effort at transnational history of totalitarianism, which, because of its political implications, triggered a storm of indignation in the *Historikerstreit*.[44] More successful abroad than at home, Nolte's thought eventually transformed the German discussion by stealth while also influencing debate elsewhere. Most consequentially, Furet was critically inspired by Nolte's approach, a commonality leading to a prolonged, respectful exchange of letters between the two scholars.[45] Although few of the participants noticed (and those who did usually protested the association), it was by way of Furet's work—translated into German in 1998 and into English in 1999[46]—that Nolte's thought influenced the coming debate. After haunting the halls of first French and then American universities, his specter returned to Germany in a form no longer recognizable as connected to the old polemic: it was the reception of the French discussion and its American adaptation, purged not only of the name but also the spirit of Nolte, that allowed acceptance of the concept of totalitarianism in the German academy. Today, gestures to the term are everywhere: Stalinism was a regime with "totalitarian claims"[47] that engaged in "totalitarian extermination terror"[48]; Hannah Arendt's insights are "epochal" and quite compatible with social history[49]; and the German-Soviet war of 1941–1945 was an "existential struggle between the two big totalitarian movements of the twentieth century."[50] The new ubiquity of the concept also inspired systematic team efforts: from 1992 to 2002 an interdisciplinary group at the University of Munich explored theoretically, empirically, and historically the twin ideas of "totalitarianism" and "political religion," culminating in a three-volume collection of essays and debates.[51] Nolte's books, in translation, were also influential in the Italian debate. Renzo De Felice not only studied the German's work and

commented on it as well as on the *Historikerstreit* but also met him personally several times from 1969 onward. There was also an intense interaction with Augusto Del Noce.[52]

BOSWORTH ON TOTALITARIANISM

This volume reacts in empirical ways to the resurgence of the concept of totalitarian dictatorship. The contributions cover a wide range of topics, but they all circle around certain shared preoccupations, informed by implicit or explicit engagement with the least of the totalitarianisms: Italian Fascism. The reason for this shared vantage point is both historical and personal: this book began as a Festschrift for one of the premier historians of Italian Fascism, R.J.B. Bosworth. As we canvassed interest among colleagues, however, a shared agenda soon emerged and the project became something else altogether: not just a celebration of a colleague, scholar, and friend but also a collective rethinking of dictatorship from the perspective not of the dominant German-Russian duality but rather the vantage point of what Hannah Arendt had declared to be a minor, lesser, and not completely total regime. From a phenomenological perspective, Arendt might well be right. But the authors in this volume are historians, not philosophers or political theorists. To us it is exactly the incompleteness, contradictoriness, and messiness of the regime first called "totalitarian" by friend and foe alike that sharpens the glance on what was incomplete, human (and all too human), or contradictory in its more muscular cousins.

Bosworth reached the study of dictatorship itself relatively late, only to continue on to other things soon thereafter. Once a diplomatic historian,[53] he remade himself, first into a biographically inclined historiographer of totalitarianism and then into a biographer of Mussolini as well as a social and cultural historian of Fascism.[54] Meanwhile, he also accumulated a growing shelf of studies of Italian migration to Australia and the Italian community "down under."[55] These studies were an expression of his delight in "multiple histories." This systematic eclecticism continued. His latest incarnation is both as a historian of antipodean golfing and as an interpreter of the many-layered nonreducible histories of Rome, a city real and imagined, dreamed and experienced.[56] This interest in diversity and multiplicity also implied a nearly postmodern appreciation of "histories" instead of the Hegelian (and post-Hegelian) "History," whose unity he discarded as limited and limiting: unitary, totalizing, even "totalitarian." Again, it was Italy that sharpened his glance and his irony—a totalitarianism that allowed not only the king to continue in office but even the Catholic church to run a state within the state, in the Vatican, and claim the hearts, minds, and souls of Italian "Fascists."[57]

All the while, Bosworth played his own research off against the term, which has rightfully been taken to encapsulate "the inner history of the Cold War." There are many excellent overviews of the uses and abuses of "totalitarianism," and we will not add another.[58] A basic sketch will have to suffice. We focus here on four aspects: (1) the totalizing aspirations or claims of the regimes' ruling elites, (2) the centrality of ideology and terror, (3) the role of the dictator, and (4) war. All of these were central in the classical attempts to grapple with the new dictatorships of the twentieth century; all of them played a role in the oeuvre of Bosworth; and all of them preoccupy in one way or another each of our contributors.

TOTALITARIAN ASPIRATIONS

To begin with the aspect giving the beast its name: Totalitarian dictatorship is defined by the far-reaching ambitions and aspirations of rulers seeking to remake society, human nature, history, and the future. "What was totalitarian about Stalinism," wrote a prominent critic of the totalitarian model in Soviet studies, "was not the actual achievements of the system but the intentions of the ruler."[59] Likewise, Ian Kershaw, also no friend of the term, noted that the "more modest" version of the concept—a regime with a "total claim" on its subjects—might well be "heuristically useful."[60] We should not fool ourselves about the sophistication of the original theorists, though: few assumed that such goals were actually achieved and only the most simplistic popularized versions claimed that totalitarianism was actually exerting total control, driving total change, and commanding the total loyalty of its subjects. Most serious attempts to theorize "totalitarianism" saw it as the expression of a vision of the rulers rather than as a social reality. Even for Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, a caricatured version of whose "totalitarian syndrome" became the "totalitarian model" of much of the critical literature, the aspirations of the totalitarian rulers to oversee, guide, and control every aspect of human existence were never realized completely. Theirs was a theory of totalitarian government, not totalitarian society, and in a frequently ignored part of their book they explicitly discussed "islands of separateness." In particular the family, they wrote, "has been a true oasis in the sea of totalitarian atomization."[61] For the much more complex Arendt, the totalitarian aspiration was realized, only to a degree, in the extermination camps, where the systematic production of corpses dehumanized the inmates to such an extent that they lost all human agency. Everywhere else, totalitarian ideology was so far removed from reality that it could be stabilized only by the organization of the movement in concentric circles of decreasing radicalism: the most radical members of the inner core would talk only to similar or slightly less radical members of the elite of the movement, which in turn was embedded not in "normal" society but in another layer of radicals—and so on. The result

of these concentric circles was threefold: it allowed the most radical inner circle to avoid recognizing how far removed they were from the worldview of normal citizens; it allowed normal citizens to avoid recognizing how extreme the views of the political leadership were; and it allowed individuals, when their ideas changed, to move in and out of the center without destabilizing the totality.[62] In our collection of essays, Robert Gerwarth's description of Heydrich's radicalization being due to his "immersion" into the milieu of the SS and of his career as a quest to prove himself a better Nazi than those around him fits well into this model. Colonel-General Blaskowitz, according to Christopher Clark, would have been located further from the ideological core, at the service of a regime regarding which he harbored deep reservations but that he served faithfully none the less.

Empirical social scientists, likewise, had no doubt that totalitarianism was not without its fissures. For Franz Neumann, "totalitarian monopoly capitalism" was made up not of one unified structure but of four "pillars" held together only by precarious arrangements between their respective elites. Hitler's job in this system, according to the theory, was merely to embody and express "the compromises" of the four elite groups. Raul Hilberg, Neumann's student, developed this model in a different direction, stressing the extreme decentralization of the German "machinery of destruction" engaged in the "destruction process"—what came to be known as the Holocaust. The antitotalitarian approaches of a Martin Broszat or a Hans Mommsen stand squarely in this tradition.[63]

Something similar is true for research on Stalinism. While a whole cohort of social historians honed their skills in debunking "the totalitarian model," those who had done empirical investigations into Stalin's dictatorship under this framework usually saw more complexity than their critics allowed. The Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, based on mass interviews with displaced Soviet citizens after World War II, defined the Soviet Union under Stalin as totalitarian insofar as it was a society "in which those who hold political power attempt to coordinate for the attainment of their goals all the material and human resources of their society."[64] These scholars anticipated later research by their interest in what they conceptualized as "informal adjustive mechanisms": spontaneous ways to work the system to one's family's and one's own least disadvantage.[65] Sharing this "aspirational" definition of "totalitarianism," the first archival investigation into Stalinism concluded that it was the very inefficiency of the "totalitarian machine" which made its rule "tolerable" to a society of "infinite complexity."[66] And Geoffrey Hosking, one of the few dissenting voices in the later consensus that "the totalitarian model" was politically corrupt and empirically wrong, likewise combined an appreciation of the totalitarian aspects of Stalinism with a serious history of Soviet society.[67] The recent revival of "totalitarianism" in Soviet studies, then, can be located in the tradition of sophisticated investigations of a complex society. Insofar as we embrace the term "totalitarianism"—and contributors to this

volume do not agree on its usefulness or otherwise—we stand in this line of explorations of complexity within societies whose antiliberal ruling elites display totalitarian pretensions.

Such subtleties, however, were lost during anxious public debates in the Cold War, when many on the academic right saw any attempt at detente as akin to "appeasement," while the left came to understand "totalitarianism" as an ideological weapon of the enemy, which fused not only socialism and Stalinism, but also made the Soviet Union into a "red fascism" to be defeated only by force.[68] Bosworth stood quite self-consciously on the left and hence always critically and often ironically engaged "totalitarianism" in both his teaching and writing. One prong of attack was to show that "totalitarianism" was, in practice, far from totalitarian: it did not manage to excise existing social and cultural forms, which continued to exist or were transmogrified into new and surprising entities.[69] The second prong was to stress the extent to which "nontotalitarian" political movements—liberalism, nationalism—harbored totalitarian tendencies of their own—that is, that Stalinism-Fascism-Nazism must be located in the wider continuum of the practices of modern states. This determination to cast the net beyond the usual comparisons was one of the reasons he wrote a book that pondered efforts to explain Hiroshima as well as Auschwitz. Totalitarianism shared much of its genetic code with liberal democracy rather than being an unfathomable other to it. This thesis was reminiscent of the use of the term by critical theorists past and present.[70]

In our collection, Nicholas Doumanis takes up both these prongs by exploring how the totalitarian aspirations of ethnic nationalism in the (nontotalitarian) Balkans led to effects contrary to the totalizing project of homogenization and excision. On the one hand, nation building was a much more violent process than the metaphor of the "awakening" of the nation suggests. Indeed, "nationalism had to unravel" the histories of multiethnic worlds "and destroy these multiethnic environments through sustained violence" during the continuum of wars and civil wars of 1912 to 1922. This violence was not the result of preexisting intracommunal ethnic tensions. Rather, it was brought to functioning multiethnic communities from the outside. It was only this violence, not a discursive or cultural process, that nationalized Muslims and Christians into Turks and Greeks. "The cumulative effect of the political violence that traumatized the whole of Anatolia," concludes Doumanis, "was to ensure that cultural groups that had been conditioned to see difference as normal to now see difference as destructive." Yet, such nation building was incomplete. Indeed, Doumanis uncovers a serious streak of nostalgia—on both sides of the national divide—for the prenational, ethnically diverse Ottoman state. Thus, both Turks and Greeks "resisted" the "totalitarian demands made upon them by the nation." Omer Bartov's essay, likewise, puts the violence of the Holocaust in Galicia into the larger context reaching back to World War I, where, again, violence was brought to a multiethnic community from

the outside—the Tsarist army—with similarly far-reaching destructive results: non- or pretotalitarian violence displays some of the features of its totalitarian successors. Giuseppe Finaldi brings totalitarians and nontotalitarians even closer together: by comparing Mussolini's speeches not with Hitler's but with Churchill's, he challenges the clear boundaries between the authoritarian and the democratic instantiations of modernity. Indeed, one could read him as suggesting that Churchill was far more effective than Mussolini, the supposed founder of a new political religion, at the quintessentially totalitarian endeavor of mobilization through propaganda.

The second Bosworthian prong—the stress on the multiplicity of histories within the same historical terrain—forms the jumping-off point for Mark Edele's essay on the contradictory results of "entanglements" between the Germans and the Soviets during the 1941–1945 war in the east. Edele has repeatedly argued that the Soviet regime—like the German—had totalitarian aspirations and that these matter. At the same time, his account of the Stalinist social formation was both implicitly and explicitly inspired by Bosworth's work on Italy.[71] Consistent with this line of reasoning, he questions whether the clash of the Stalinist Behemoth with the National Socialist Leviathan led to a totalizing dynamic. The entangling of two totalitarianisms did not lead to totalitarian war pure and simple: an ever-expanding and radicalizing field of violence, terror, and ideological overdrive. Rather, he shows multiple and contradictory processes at work—many "entangled histories" rather than one "entangled History." As both societies were not totalitarian through and through, the results of interactions differed according to context and actual historical detail.

IDEOLOGY AND TERROR

Multiple histories can also be found with regard to ideology, a central concern of first-wave "totalitarians": what made modern dictatorships different from classical tyrannies was not only the use of more advanced policing technologies but also—and essentially—an ideology that attempted to remake fundamental aspects of the human condition. Critics of the approach thus typically focused on nonideological aspects—from social mobility to the workings of the bureaucratic apparatus. Given the nature of these regimes, however, it was only a question of time until ideology returned as a serious concern—and it did so with a vengeance, as a corollary to the rise of new cultural history since the 1980s. In the 1990s and 2000s, scholar of the German, Soviet, and Italian dictatorships emphasized consent of the population to the regime. This ideological integration of the majority was explained either by the regime simply expressing deeply held views of long standing in the host culture,[72] by commonality of interest between the rulers and the ruled,[73] or by the total saturation of the discoursive field by the state's messages.[74] The infrequency, during times of peace, of organized,

armed, and explicit resistance to the regimes was then a logical result of cultural factors rather than of compulsion or terror, the existence of which nobody denied but which nevertheless played a surprisingly negligible role in explaining conformity.

Bosworth—like Sheila Fitzpatrick, Jeffrey Rossman, or Lynne Viola for Stalinism and Ian Kershaw, Dick Geary, and Richard Evans for Nazism—was a consistent critic of this literature. He pointed not only to the regime's brutality towards real or presumed critics but also to the complexity of the cultural universe, what he liked to express as the "many histories" haunting Fascism. The former line of reasoning is taken up by Geary, Doumanis, and Daniela Baratieri in their contributions to this collection. Geary, a historian of Germany as well as of Brazil, uses the parallel of the historiography of slavery in order to drive home the point that absence of outright rebellion (rather than everyday forms of *Resistenz* or the "weapons of the weak") cannot be seen as evidence of consent of those subjugated in a violent form of rule. Doumanis looks at the central role of physical violence in the partial but still far-reaching elimination of prenational forms of solidarity. Baratieri's examination of psychiatry during Fascism in Italy, finally, shows that the debate about consensus has mistakenly tended to ignore the means of social control inherited from liberal-democratic societies, as if they merely continued along their pre-Fascist trajectories throughout Mussolini's time in power. Psychiatry served the dictatorship, sometimes modifying its very definition of normal psychology to continue to play a prominent role in its containment of difference among the Italian population.

THE ROLE OF THE DICTATOR

The return of totalitarianism also coincided with the reinvention of biography as a serious scholarly genre—a revival in which Bosworth's *Mussolini* has played a central role. As Gerwarth points out in his contribution, social and cultural history originally displaced biography, despite early examples indicating that writing biography does not necessitate a "great men make history" approach to the past.[75] Once the innovative potential of both social and cultural history had run its course, biography reemerged as a field of close study seeking to show how social and cultural forces intersect in individual lives. Biography also allowed the exploration in depth of a topic that preoccupied many at the turn of the millennium: "agency." In German, Soviet, and Italian history, the coincidence of this revival with the reevaluation of the concept of totalitarianism worked in two ways: the kernel of the idea of totalitarianism is that it is a dictatorial form of government, so interest in the dictator and his entourage should be conditioned by the approach; second, there is a persisting popular interest in the lives of dictators and their henchmen, which tended to nudge historians (or the editors commissioning their work) to focus on Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, rather

than, say, Konrad Jarausch, the middle-aged German soldier[76]; Stepan Podlubny, the kulak's son turned Stalinist social climber[77]; or Mario Piazzesi, the Fascist lad from Florence.[78]

A central aspect of most biographies of the dictators was and is their critical stance toward their object of study—Bosworth described himself as an "anti-Fascist biographer" of Il Duce.[79] Historians took delight in dissecting the state-sponsored leadership cult, questioning the self-serving myths of the dictators and uncovering, more often than not, an insecure personality under the bombastic projections of grandeur.[80] Another approach was to investigate the cultural work that went into the creation of the image by delving into the origins, transformations, functions, and reception of the leadership cult, which all dictators of the twentieth century developed: it was no longer enough to be the strong man; one now also had to be loved.[81] Even Franco, whose status as a fascist (let alone as a totalitarian) is often questioned, expended enormous energy in building his own public persona. Paul Preston's contribution combines both of these research strategies in an account of the Spanish dictator's public relations efforts. They show him to be a modern strongman, closer to the bona fide totalitarians than is sometimes assumed. Far from being a simple tyrant, Preston's Franco was a sophisticated manipulator of his own public image. More akin to Hitler than to Stalin, however, he fell for his own propaganda, partially because it was in the first place driven by his vanity. Propaganda and the fashioning of a public self-image were part and parcel of wider preoccupations of totalitarian dictators with the world of culture. As Sheila Fitzpatrick points out in her contribution, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini each had personal experience in the arts (as painter, poet, and violinist, respectively), had strained relations with cultural elites, and meddled in one way or another with cultural production in their societies. Stalin, in his final years, refashioned himself as an intellectual while striking such terror into bona fide *intelligenty* that cultural production suffered accordingly.

But the biographical method need not be restricted to the dictator himself, as two of our contributors make plain. The methodologies developed first for the totalitarian leaders extend to work on their henchmen as well. Gerwarth's notion of "cold empathy" explicates theoretically what Bosworth advocated in his own study of Mussolini: the anti-Fascist historian of Fascism seeks to understand the dictator without identifying with him. Clark, likewise, practices "cold empathy" in his contribution to this collection: Blaskowitz emerges not as the resisting general, the representative of the "other Germany," the "clean" part of the Wehrmacht; but he also does not become the caricature of the recent countermyth of the thoroughly Nazified army. His failings, in Clark's reading, are neither a genocidal mindset nor the surrender to the official worldview but a narrow-minded professionalism, precluding political and moral considerations of his own actions. Like Arendt's Eichmann, Bosworth's Mussolini or Preston's Franco, then, Clark's Blaskowitz is both more banal and more human but therefore possibly also

more frightening for us other moderns who are also enmeshed in an ethos of professionalism.[82] Finaldi looks at the words of "great men" in their public performance speeches, contrasting Mussolini's and Churchill's abilities to generate consensus (or failing in their attempts) by the power of oratory. The two men were not as distant from each other as might be presumed and were quite able to engage in meaningful public debates across the totalitarian dividing line. What mattered most was not the purity and consistency of their outlooks but that their words should resonate with people's sense of what was happening and what was needed at specific times. Churchill and Mussolini's ability to provoke a positive response among their listeners was never guaranteed by the power of words alone.

WAR

In George Orwell's totalitarian dystopia *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, war between three superpowers had become permanent. It was, he allowed "Goldstein" to explain, a necessary part of the political system, having the function not only of avoiding overproduction and maintaining a low standard of living but "preserv[ing] the special mental atmosphere that a hierarchical society needs."[83] War is a central aspect of most of our essays: Bartov and Edele, Christopher Duggan and Finaldi, Geary and Doumanis, Clark and Gerwarth, as well as indirectly Preston, John Foot, and Baratieri all deal with war in one way or another. This preoccupation with war reflects the centrality of armed conflict to all real—as opposed to Orwell's imaginary—totalitarian regimes (which, in the first instance, were born out of war and organized or purported to organize their societies for warfare). Liberal democracies were no strangers to the martial art either—after all, Fascism and Nazism were defeated on the battlefield and not by Stalin's regime alone. Yet their legitimacy in peacetime was less bound up with fighting and winning wars. Moreover, it is far from clear that the reasons why "totalitarian" subjects fought were always those of their regimes. Bosworth was always conscious that the Second World War may well have been fought with the ideological overtones espoused by totalitarian regimes, but he also noted that traditional motivations drove people to fight, to die, and to kill. Certainly in its totalitarian guise the "Least of the Great Powers" (a term launched by Bosworth more than thirty years ago to highlight the ambiguity of Italy's Great Power status) made war less effectively than it had done as a mere liberal democracy during World War I. The deep transformation purported to have been carried out by Mussolini to drive Italy into the conflict was hardly a requirement in following the opportunistic and expansionist drives that had been there in liberal Italy.[84]

In our collection a successful Fascist war provides the backdrop for Duggan's close reading of diaries written by Italians during the Italian-Ethiopian conflict of 1935–1936. He notes the pleasure taken by normal Italians

in the conquest and the difficulty of seeing alternatives to the agendas established by Fascism; at the same time, however, his chapter highlights that these tightly held views were often traditionally motivated: bringing civilization and Christianity to Ethiopia and the need to acquire land for Italy's "excess" population were ideas that Fascism had hardly invented. Duggan says it was obedience that was new, compared with the multiplicity of views that would have been in contention in a democracy. Duggan's concentration on this successful war, however, as Finaldi's contribution in this volume might suggest, shows how important victory (and low casualties) were in causing people to go along, apparently deeply convinced, with the ideologies sustained by the regime. The Second World War was to prove that when an easy war was fought and won, the gushing in the tens of thousands of letters sent to Mussolini was perhaps more due to context than ideology. In Foot's contribution the extraordinary malleability of ideology, if it is examined as public and private memory, is brought to the fore by looking at the story of the Italians expelled from (or made to flee) Istria, Fiume, and Dalmatia in the aftermath of the Second World War. War creates displacement, induces migration, creates diasporas—topics Bosworth explored in particular with reference to Australia's Italians. People are relocated in places where the demarcations of collective memory are forcibly renegotiated with the sometimes very different agendas of the changing society around them. The plight of these refugees became directly bound up with the contested memory of Italy's Second World War, Fascism, and what the resistance had supposedly stood for. In an evocative passage, Foot tells the story of the flotsam of belongings brought to Italy by the refugees. The precious pots and pans, blankets, clothes, and mattresses that had been hurriedly brought over the border by the refugees were studiously preserved but hidden away for decades in warehouses by the Italian state. The passing of time emptied these things of the meaning and value to the refugees that they had once possessed. In Foot's essay this jumble of belongings slowly rotting away in locked storage containers becomes a metaphor for the enormous difficulty of locating the refugees' story in the greater narrative of Italy's Second World War. The refugees fitted into no easy story Italy wished to console itself with in the postwar years, and their ability to construct a "usable past"—again an issue that has been central to all Bosworth's writing—only became possible when the dynamics of the order established after the Second World War were no longer relevant.

Doumanis and Bartov both examine the way in which war exacerbates and concentrates preexisting fault lines that were kept under control, albeit with the input of immense cultural and social energy, by peoples determined to coexist despite the preaching of totalizing nationalisms. The way in which war and these preexisting differences—be they of religion, nationality, class or ethnicity—interact comes across as an immensely complicated and tragic drama where slippage into massacre and eventually genocide is neither inevitable nor predictable. Edele, in his analysis of totalitarian

war, also draws attention to the way in which preexisting ideas are energized by the sudden onset of armed conflict. He again points to the highly complicated relationship between the specific dynamics of war and their lubrication by previously held beliefs, policies, and norms, arguing that the self-sustaining dynamic of "totalitarian" war in itself can only partially explains the barbaric character of the conflict between Nazi Germany and Stalin's Russia. In Geary's discussion of repression and consent in the Third Reich war features heavily, conditioning the relationship between people and regime and effectively misleading, he argues, historians into interpreting the desire to ward off the Soviet menace or foreign invasion as fanatical support for Hitler and the National Socialist German Workers Party. The war allowed the Nazi regime to turn on its own people with a ferocity that makes arguments about assent to the regime among ordinary Germans highly problematic. Baratieri's chapter in part examines the way in which war shifted resources away from the mentally ill, highlighting the role of the mental hospital as a collector of the unwanted and again posing questions about how far war transformed or merely exacerbated agendas that had already been established in peacetime.

TOTALITARIANISM AS HISTORY

In teaching first year university students at the University of Western Australia, Bosworth lured them into one of his courses with the title "Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians," only to set them as required reading E. H. Carr on the nature of history. In *What Is History?* Carr defined the subject as "a continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts, an unending dialogue between the present and the past," indeed a debate between "the society of today and the society of yesterday." As such, it is by necessity "a constantly moving process, with the historian moving within it."[85] These words still seem as true as ever. Thus, we cannot agree with critics bemoaning the fact that volumes exploring totalitarian dictatorship do not provide a historiographical final solution to the problem of totalitarianism. We have no solution either, and in a Bosworthian sense give a wry smile as we refuse to attempt one. Instead, we simply suggest that read together, our essays provide a strong argument that historians of antiliberalism should read broadly in comparative dictatorships. Such comparison would go beyond the notion that the only correct comparisons are between the dualities Stalinism and Nazism (because they were "totalitarian") or Nazism and Mussolini-ism (because they were "Fascist"). At the same time, however, our frame of reference would also avoid dissolving dictatorships within a rather abstract notion of "modernity." Such comparative reading does not have the goal of reaching a totalizing theory of dictatorship but rather aims to foster cross-fertilization between the histories of regimes that can be broadly conceived of as militantly antiliberal. Despite his dislike of

the politics of using the term "totalitarianism," Bosworth, too, in setting out to write *Mussolini*, instinctively reached for the literature not on Margaret Thatcher or Ronald Reagan but of the dictatorships explored in this volume: Franco's Spain, Hitler's Germany, and Stalin's Soviet Union.[86] Such comparative reading can not only inspire new vantage points for thinking about dictatorship but also allow a firm grounding for exploring the extent to which their antiliberal utopian authoritarianism suffused other, apparently liberal regimes.

NOTES

1. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy. Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915–1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), xxii.
2. John Connelly, "Defunct Theory, Useful Word," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 11, no. 4 (2010), 819–835.
3. Herbert J. Spiro, "Totalitarianism," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* in David L. Sills, ed., vol. 16 (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968), 112.
4. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent. Europe's Twentieth Century* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 250–251.
5. Martin Broszat, *Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung*, 15th ed. (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), 9.
6. Ronald G. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment. Russia, the USSR, and the Successor States*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 395.
7. Alberto Aquarone's *L'organizzazione dello stato totalitario* (Turin: Einaudi, 1965) used the term in its title but showed that Italy had been anything but totalitarian.
8. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 7th ed. (Cleveland, OH: Meridian, 1962), 258.
9. Dante Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1959).
10. George Seldes, *Sawdust Caesar: the Untold History of Mussolini and Fascism* (New York and London: Harper, 1935).
11. Wendy Goldman in *The American Historical Review* 116, No. 3 (2011), 758–761, quotation: 761.
12. Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism. The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 9 and epilogue.
13. Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in John Keane, ed., *The Power of the Powerless. Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1985), 23–96.
14. E.g., E. V. Moroz, "Fenomen totalitarizma v amerikanskoi istoriografii: 1930–1980-e gody," dissertation for *doktor istoricheskikh nauk*, Kemerovo State University, 2006; S. A. Butorov, "Sovetskii totalitarizm v sotsial'no-politicheskoi mysli SShA: istoriko-filosofskii analiz," dissertation for *doktor filosofskikh nauk*, Tadzhikistan Academy of Sciences, Dushanbe, 2006.
15. N. G. Kostromina, "Teoriia i praktika totalitarizma v otsenke frantsuzskoi istoricheskoi i politicheskoi mysli v XX veke," disseration for *kandidat istorickeskikh nauk*, Kemerovo State University, 2006.

16. E. V. Serdiuk, "Evoliutsiia zarubezhnoi istoriografii totalitarizma, 20-e gg.–pervaia polovina 90-kh gg.," dissertation for *kandidat istoricheskikh nauk*, Tomsk, 1997.
17. O. N. Ruzzova, "Evoliutsiia zapadnykh kontseptsii totalitarizma: Sotsial'no-filosofskii analiz," dissertation for *kandidat filosofskikh nauk*, Pomorskii State Pedagogical University, Arkhangel'sk, 1999.
18. E. G. Solov'ev, *Fenomen totalitarizma v politicheskoi mysli Rossii i Zapada* (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 1997).
19. A. V. Glinskii, "Ponimanie i politika: teoriia totalitarizma Khanny Arendt v kontekste ee filosofsko-germenevticheskoi programmy," dissertation for *kandidat filosofskikh nauk*, Moscow Pedagogical State University, 2010.
20. A. A. Panchuk, "Sud'ba i tvorchestvo sovetskogo opernogo peftsa v epokhu totalitarizma," dissertation for *kandidat iskusstvovedeniia*, State Pedagogical University of Iaroslavl', 2006.
21. S. V. Fefelov, "Diktatura bol'shevikov i krest'ianstvo v 1918–1921 gg: U istokov levogo totalitarizma. Na materialakh Tsentral'nogo Chernozem'ia Rossii," dissertation for *doktor istoricheskikh nauk*, Orel State University, 2000.
22. Iu. F. Lukin, "Soprotivlenie totalitarizmu, aktivnost' i protest v istorii sovetskogo obshchestva," dissertation for *doktor istoricheskikh nauk*, Pomorskii State Pedagogical University, Arkhangel'sk, 1992.
23. Shalala Mamedova, *Interpretatsiia totalitarizma: stalinizm v Azerbaidzhane: 1920–1930* (Baku: Adilogly, 2004).
24. E. g., "A. A. Kara-Murza et al., eds., *Totalitarizm kak istoricheskii fenomen* (Moscow: Filosofskoi obshchestvo SSSR, 1989); A. V. Suslov, ed., *Totalitarizm i lichnost': Tezisy dokladov mezhdunarodnoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferentsii, Perm 12–14 iiulia 1994 g.* (Perm: Permskii gos. pedagog. institut, 1994); Bernd Bonwetsch and Iu. V. Galaktionov (eds), *Totalitarnyi mentalitet –problemy izucheniia, puti preodoleniia: materiali mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Kemerovo, 18–20 sentiabria 2001 g.* (Kemerovo: Kuzbassvuzizdat, 2003).
25. Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Za ramkami totalitarizma: sravnitel'nye issledovaniia stalinizma i natsizma* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2011).
26. E.g., Lev Gudkov, "'Totalitarizm' kak teoreticheskaia ramka: popytki revizii spornogo poniatiia," *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 5 (55) (2001), 20–29.
27. Michael Scott Christofferson, *French Intellectuals against the Left. The Anti-totalitarian Moment of the 1970s* (New York and Oxford, UK: Berghahn Books, 2004).
28. François Furet, *Penser la Révolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1978), 24–25.
29. François Furet, *Le passé d'une illusion. Essay sur l'idée communiste au XXe siècle* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1995), 216.
30. Renzo De Felice *Mussolini,* 8 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1965–1997).
31. Renzo De Felice, *Rosso e nero* (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1995).
32. Quoted in R.J.B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (London and New York: Arnold, 1998), 137.
33. Emilio Gentile *La via italiana al totalitarismo. Il partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista* (Rome: Carocci 1995); *Contro Cesare. Cristianesimo e totalitarismo nell'epoca dei fascisni* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 2010). He was prominent in the founding in 2000 of the journal *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions,* now known as *Politics, Religion & Ideology.*
34. Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Revisionism in Soviet History," *History and Theory* 46 (2007), 77–91; id. "Revisionism in Retrospect: A Personal View," *Slavic Review* 67, no. 3 (2008), 682–704.

35. Z. (= Martin Malia), "To the Stalin Mausoleum," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (1990), 295–344; David R. Shearer, "From Divided Consensus to Creative Disorder. Soviet History in Britain and North America," *Cahiers du monde russe* 39, no. 4 (1998), 559–592 (quotation: 569).
36. For example: Orlando Figes, *The Whisperers. Private Life in Stalin's Russia* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007).
37. For example: Peter Holquist, "State Violence as Technique. The Logic of Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism," in Amir Weiner, ed., *Landscaping the Human Garden. Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
38. For example, Michael Burleigh, *The Third Reich. A New History* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2000).
39. E.g., MacGregor Knox, *To the Threshold of Power, 1922–1933, Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
40. Alexander V. Prusin, *The Lands Between. Conflict in the East European Borderlands, 1870–1992* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 125. See also Timothy Snyder's Hannah Arendt–inspired *Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin* (London: Bodley Head, 2010).
41. Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin. Parallel Lives* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); Ian Kershaw, "Totalitarianism Revisited: Nazism and Stalinism in Comparative Perspective," *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte* 23 (1994), 23–40; Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, eds., *Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships in Comparison* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Richard Overy, *The Dictators. Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia* (New York and London: Norton, 2006); Robert Gellately, *Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler. The Age of Social Catastrophe* (New York: Vintage, 2007); Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Michael David-Fox, Peter Holquist, and Alexander Martin, eds., *Fascination and Enmity. Russia and Germany as Entangled Histories, 1914–1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 2012).
42. Paul Corner, ed., *Popular Opinion in Totalitarian Regimes: Fascism, Nazism, Communism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); David Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe: Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2006).
43. Luisa Passerini, ed., *Memory and Totalitarianism* (*International Yearbook of Oral History and Life Stories,* vol. 1) (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1992), 5–6.
44. Defiantly, he restated his case: Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg 1917–1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Munich: Herbig, 2000).
45. Furet, *Le passé*, 195–196, fn. 2; Tsvetan Todorov (ed.), *Fascism and Communism. François Furet and Ernst Nolte* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2001).
46. François Furet, *Das Ende der Illusion: Der Kommunismus im 20. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Piper, 1998); id. *The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).
47. Jörg Baberowski, *Der Rote Terror. Die Geschichte des Stalinismus* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 2007), 10.
48. Jörg Baberowski, *Verbrannte Erde. Stalins Herrschaft der Gewalt,* 2nd ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012), 26. Cf. also ibid., chapters 13–32.
49. Karl Schlögel, *Terror und Traum. Moskau 1937* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2008), 29.

50. Christian Hartmann, *Unternehmen Barbarossa. Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941–1945* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2011), 8.
51. Hans Maier, ed., *Totalitarianism and Political Religions: Concepts for the Comparison of Dictatorships*. 3 vols. (London and New York: Routledge, 2004–2007) (German original: 1996–2003).
52. Daniel Schönpflug, "*Histoires croisées*: François Furet, Ernst Nolte and a Comparative History of Totalitarian Movements," *European History Quarterly* 37, No. 2 (2007), 265–290, here 268.
53. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before the First World War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979); id., *Italy and the Approach of the First World War* (London: Macmillan, 1983); id., *Italy and the Wider World 1860–1960* (New York: Routledge, 1996).
54. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993); id., *Italian Fascism: History, Memory and Representation* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); id., *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2002; paperback: 2010); id. *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship 1915–1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2005); id., (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Fascism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009).
55. Janis Wilton and R.J.B. Bosworth, *Old Worlds and New Australia: the Post-War Migrant Experience* (Ringwood, Vic.: Penguin Australia, 1984); Bosworth, *War, Internment and Mass Migration: the Italo-Australian Experience* (Rome: Gruppo editoriale internazionale, 1992); id., *Fremantle's Italy* (Rome: Gruppo editoriale internazionale, 1993).
56. R.J.B. Bosworth, *From Humble Beginnings: The Mount Lawley Golf Club, Perth Western Australia* (Inglewood, WA: Mount Lawley Golf Club, 2011); id., *Whispering City: Rome and Its Histories* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).
57. For example: R.J.B. Bosworth, "*L'Anno Santo* (Holy Year) in Fascist Italy 1933–34," *European History Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (2010), 436–457.
58. Good historiographical introductions, which each cover totalitarianism extensively, are the three companion volumes on the three dictatorships: Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (London and New York: Arnold, 1985; 4th ed.: 2000); R.J.B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (London and New York: Arnold, 1998); and Chris Ward, *Stalin's Russia* (London and New York: Arnold, 1993; 2nd ed.: 1999). For a broad perspective, see Gleason, *Totalitarianism*; and Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, "After Totalitarianism—Stalinism and Nazism Compared," in *Beyond Totalitarianism*, 1–37; see also the bibliography in ibid., 443–516.
59. Suny, *The Soviet Experiment*, 395.
60. Cf. Kershaw, *Nazi Dictatorship*, 39.
61. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (New York: Praeger, 1961, first published 1956), 239–289 (quotation: 247).
62. Arendt, *Origins*, chapters 11 and 12. Compare also to Primo Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 31.
63. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1942), esp. 468–469; Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961); Martin Broszat, *Der Staat Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inneren Verfassung* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1969); Hans Mommsen, "Hitler's Position in the Nazi System," in his *From Weimar to*

Auschwitz: Essays in German History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991), 163–188.

64. Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works. Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), 20.
65. Ibid., chapter 8 and the companion volume "from below": Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen. Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961). For reevaluations of this scholarship half a century later, see Mark Edele, "Soviet Society, Social Structure, and Everyday Life. Major Frameworks Reconsidered," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 8, no. 2 (2007), 349–373; and David C. Engerman, *Know Your Enemy. The Rise and Fall of America's Soviet Experts* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), chapters 2 and 7.
66. Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), 449–450.
67. Mark Edele, "Stalinism as a Totalitarian Society. Geoffrey Hosking's Socio-Cultural History," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 13, no. 2 (2012): 441–452.
68. Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s," *The American Historical Review* 75, no. 4 (1970), 1046–1064.
69. Richard Bosworth, "War, Totalitarianism and 'Deep Belief' in Fascist Italy, 1935–43," *European History Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (2004), 475–505. The theme is also central to both *Mussolini* and *Mussolini's Italy*.
70. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1995); Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991); Daniel Dagenais, ed., *Hannah Arendt, le totalitarisme et le monde contemporain* (Saint Nicholas: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2003).
71. Mark Edele, *Stalinist Society 1928–1953* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011).
72. Daniel J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).
73. Robert W. Thurston, *Life and Terror in Stalin's Russia 1934–1941* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 1996); Götz Aly, *Hitlers Volksstaat. Raub, Rassenkrieg und Nationaler Sozialismus*, 2nd rev. ed. (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006).
74. Igal Halfin and Jochen Hellbeck, "Rethinking the Stalinist Subject: Stephen Kotkin's 'Magnetic Mountain' and the State of Soviet Historical Studies," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44, no. 3 (1996), 456–463; Jochen Hellbeck, "Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan Podlubnyi (1931–1939)," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 44 (1996), 344–375. In reply to criticisms more nuanced: id. *Revolution on My Mind. Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2006).
75. For a Marxist example, see Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
76. Konrad H. Jarausch and Klaus Jochen Arnold, eds., *"Das stille Sterben . . ." Feldpostbriefe von Konrad Jarausch aus Polen und Russland 1939–1942* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2008).
77. Jochen Hellbeck, ed., *Tagebuch Aus Moskau 1931–1939* (Munich: dtv, 1996).

78. Mario Piazzesi, in Renzo de Felice, ed., *Diario di uno squadrista toscano, 1919–1922* (Roma: Bonacci, 1981).
79. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, 11.
80. An early example is Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929: A Study in History and Personality* (New York; Norton, 1973); see also his *Stalin in Power. The Revolution from above 1928–1941* (New York: Norton, 1990).
81. Benno Ennker, *Die Anfänge des Leninkults in der Sowjetunion* (Cologne: Böhlau, 1997); Nina Tumarkin, *Lenin Lives! The Lenin Cult in Soviet Russia*, enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1997); Ian Kershaw, *The "Hitler Myth": Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001); Balazs Apor, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees, eds., *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Klaus Heller and Jan Plamper, eds., *Personality Cults in Stalinism—Personenkulte im Stalinismus* (Göttingen, Germany: V&R Unipress, 2004); Benno Ennker, ed., *Der Führer im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Marburg, Germany: Herder Institut, 2010); Jan Plamper, *The Stalin Cult: A Study in the Alchemy of Power* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012).
82. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1992). On narrow-minded professionalism as central to participation in the Nazi machinery of destruction, see also Hilberg cited above n. 63, as well as Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000).
83. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983), 173.
84. Richard Bosworth, "Benito Mussolini: Bad Guy on the International Block?" *Contemporary European History* 18, No. 1 (2009): 123–134.
85. Edward Hallet Carr, *What Is History?* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 35, 68–69, 177.
86. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, 4–7. For a comparison of Stalin with Thatcher, see J. Arch Getty, "Stalin as Prime Minister: Power and the Politburo," in Sarah Davies and James R. Harris, eds., *Stalin. A New History* (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 83–107.

2 Cold Empathy

Perpetrator Studies and the Challenges in Writing a Life of Reinhard Heydrich[1]

Robert Gerwarth

INTRODUCTION

Of the numerous appalling figures within the Nazi leadership, few have attracted more posthumous interest from filmmakers, journalists, and writers as Reinhard Heydrich. Countless TV documentaries, spurred on by the fascination of evil, have offered popular takes on his intriguing life, and there is no shortage of sensationalist accounts of his 1942 assassination in Prague and the unprecedented wave of retaliatory Nazi violence, which culminated in the vengeful destruction of the Bohemian village of Lidice.[2] Arguably the most spectacular secret service operation of the entire Second World War, Heydrich's assassination and its violent aftermath have inspired the popular imagination ever since 1942, providing the backdrop to (among others) Heinrich Mann's novel *Lidice* (1942), Bertolt Brecht's film script for Fritz Lang's 1943 Hollywood blockbuster *Hangmen Also Die*, and Laurent Binet's recent Prix-Goncourt-winning novel *HHhH* (an acronym for the alleged Göring quote: "Himmler's Hirn heisst Heydrich," or "Himmler's Brain is Heydrich").[3]

The continuing popular fascination with Heydrich is easily explained. Although only thirty-eight years old at the time of his violent death in Prague in June 1942, Heydrich had accumulated three key positions in Hitler's rapidly expanding empire. As head of the Nazis' vast political and criminal police apparatus, which merged with the powerful SS intelligence service—the SD—into the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) in 1939, Heydrich commanded a sizable shadow army of Gestapo and SS Security Service (SD) officers directly responsible for Nazi terror at home and in the occupied territories. In this capacity he was also the chief organizer of the infamous SS mobile killing squads, the *Einsatzgruppen*, during the military campaigns against Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Second, in September 1941, Heydrich was appointed acting Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, a position that made him the undisputed ruler of the former Czech lands and the only leading Nazi with dual responsibilities in the center and the periphery of the Third Reich. Third, in 1941 Heydrich was given the order, by Hitler via Göring, to find

and implement a "Total Solution of the Jewish Question" in Europe, a solution which, by the summer of 1942, culminated in what is today known as the Holocaust: the indiscriminate and systematic murder of the Jews of Europe. With these three positions, Reinhard Heydrich undoubtedly played a central role in the complex power system of the Third Reich.

Yet despite his major share of responsibility for some of the worst atrocities committed in the name of Nazi Germany and the continuing interest of both historians and the general public in Hitler's dictatorship, Heydrich long remained a remarkably neglected and oddly nebulous figure in the extensive literature on the Third Reich. Although nearly 40,000 books have been published on the history of Nazi Germany, scholars shied away from writing a life of one of its most intriguing protagonists. The only exception to this remarkable neglect was Shlomo Aronson's pioneering 1967 doctoral dissertation on Heydrich's role in the early history of the Gestapo and the SD, which unfortunately ends in 1936 when the SS took full control over the German police.[4] Written in German and never translated into English, Aronson's research has left a mine of material on Heydrich's early life that no later historian in the field can ignore. But Aronson's study is not a biography.

Arguably driven by the desire to reveal sensational aspects of the life of "Hitler's most evil henchmen" or the "face of evil," journalists attempted to fill the gap left by professional historians until 2011.[5] In the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, popular accounts of Heydrich's life—such as Charles Wighton's *Hitler's Most Evil Henchman*, Joachim Fest's short biographical essay "The Successor," and Günther Deschner's *In Pursuit of Total Power*—reached out to a general readership. They were followed in the 1980s and 1990s by Edouard Calic's *Man Who Masterminded the Nazi Death Camps* and Mario Dederichs's *Face of Evil*, first published as a series of essays in the German weekly *Der Stern*.[6] Although not without merit, particularly in gathering postwar testimonies of Heydrich's former SS associates and childhood friends, these earlier Heydrich biographies reflect a by now largely obsolete understanding of Nazi leaders as either depraved criminals or perversely rational desk killers.

One key reason for the seemingly inexplicable neglect of Heydrich's life story by professional historians lies in the nature of post-WWII historiography of Nazi Germany rather than in the subject itself. Whereas bookstore shelves around the world have never ceased to prominently display best-selling popular life-and-letters biographies, notably of Nazi perpetrators, the genre became less popular among academic historians during the Cold War decades. From the 1960s onward, historians of Nazi Germany in particular viewed biography as a misleading way of writing about the past. Concentration on an individual life, it was argued, distorted complex historical processes. The focus was instead shifted from individual historical actors in high politics to impersonal social structures such as class, gender, or economic development. The prevalent historiographical trend of

the 1970s and 1980s remained strongly antibiographical. Reconstructing socioeconomic structures, institutions, and organizations or the daily lives and attitudes of "ordinary people" and marginalized groups seemed more intriguing and rewarding to professional historians than the lives and times of "great men."

In the past two decades, however, the genre of biography, now transformed and enriched by social and cultural history, has experienced a major revival, notably in the historiography of Nazi Germany, where structuralist approaches to Hitler's rule—looking beyond and away from biographical interest in the Nazi dictator—were long dominant.[7] Groundbreaking new biographies such as Ian Kershaw's *Hitler,* Peter Longerich's *Himmler*, or the seminal group biographies by Christopher Browning, Michael Wildt, and Ulrich Herbert have powerfully demonstrated that it is possible to combine the study of individual lives in Hitler's Germany with broader analytical frameworks.[8]

This is not to say, of course, that Nazi perpetrators were completely ignored in previous decades—on the contrary. However, the premises of historical investigations into the motivations and mind sets of SS killers have changed dramatically since the end of World War II. The following sections of this essay trace the evolution of "perpetrator studies" from the Second World War until the present day in order to demonstrate how progress in the field has eroded older perceptions of Heydrich and created the need for a fresh biographical approach to the chief organizer of the Holocaust.

BIOGRAPHICAL RESEARCH ON NAZI PERPETRATORS: PAST AND PRESENT TRENDS

During the first two decades after the Second World War, the SS and its leadership were widely perceived as a criminal organization of fanatical Nazis with few connections to mainstream German society—an interpretation powerfully presented in the 1946 book *Der SS-Staat*, written by the political philosopher and former Buchenwald concentration camp inmate Eugen Kogon. The image of the SS perpetrators sketched by Kogon proved highly influential until the mid-1960s. Kogon portrayed his former captors as brutal, poorly educated, primitive, and socially deprived individuals, unable to hold down normal jobs in civilian society.[9]

Even when the Nuremberg trials revealed that the German elites—lawyers, physicians, officers, and entrepreneurs—were deeply involved in the state-sponsored mass murders committed during the 1930s and 1940s, a majority of Germans continued to believe that the Nazi perpetrators constituted a pathologically disturbed, criminal minority, partly because this interpretation helped German postwar society to view SS perpetrators as extremists operating *outside* the boundaries of an otherwise "innocent" German society that had itself become a victim of Hitler's deviousness.

This interpretation was rightly dismissed by the American journalist Gerald Reitlinger in the mid-1950s as the "alibi of a nation."[10] But the image of Nazi perpetrators as a group of pathological criminals on the fringes of German society was also widely held outside Konrad Adenauer's conservative Federal Republic, notably in Western Europe and the United States. And here, too, it served as a kind of self-protective mechanism: if the Nazi perpetrators were not the mindless thugs of Hollywood movies but part of the elites of an otherwise "normal," culturally sophisticated and industrially advanced western society, the Third Reich and its policies of exclusion toward minorities was suddenly too close for comfort.

Within that general interpretive framework, the SS leadership played a peculiar role. Both Himmler and Heydrich were considered fascinating figures, albeit for primarily voyeuristic reasons. Early biographies portrayed them as devious seducers, modern-day Mephistos who were morally corrupting others to commit unspeakable atrocities. The earliest popular Heydrich biography, Charles Wighton's *Hitler's Most Evil Henchman,* was published in 1962 on the twentieth anniversary of Heydrich's death and the subsequent destruction of the village of Lidice, to whose murdered inhabitants the book is dedicated.[11] Wighton's book reflects the then fashionable understanding of the Nazi leadership as a group of demonic psychopaths—an interpretation that built on the postwar testimonies of Nazi victims and former SS men alike. Carl Jacob Burckhardt, the Swiss League of Nations' commissioner in Danzig and envoy of the International Red Cross, who had met Heydrich in the summer of 1935 during an inspection tour of Nazi concentration camps, famously described him in his memoirs as the Third Reich's "young evil god of death."[12] Postwar recollections of former SS subordinates were similarly unflattering. His deputy of many years, Dr. Werner Best, characterized Heydrich as the "most demonic personality in the Nazi leadership," driven by an "inhumanity which took no account of those he mowed down."[13] Karl Wolff, Himmler's personal adjutant, described Heydrich as "devilish," while Walther Schellenberg, the youngest of the departmental heads in Heydrich's Reich Security Main Office, remembered his former boss as a ragingly ambitious man with "an incredibly acute perception of the moral, human, professional and political weakness of others. . . . His unusual intellect was matched by the ever-watchful instincts of a predatory animal," who "in a pack of ferocious wolves, must always prove himself the strongest."[14]

Such testimonies of former SS officers were not coincidental. With Heydrich, Himmler, and Hitler dead and the Third Reich in ruins, Best, Wolff, Schellenberg, and other senior SS men in Allied captivity were keen to whitewash their own responsibility and to "prove" that they had merely followed orders from their superiors, who were too powerful to be disobeyed. Yet their character sketches of Heydrich stuck in the popular imagination, fueled by books such as Wighton's biography. Wighton also perpetuated a powerful myth about another "character flaw" in explaining Heydrich's murderous

zeal: the myth of his alleged Jewish family background, which originated in Heydrich's early youth and, despite the best efforts of his family to refute it, continued to resurface both during and after the Third Reich. After 1945, it was cultivated by former SS associates such as Wilhelm Höttl, who maintained in his autobiographical book *Die geheime Front* (1950) that Heydrich sent out SD agents to remove the gravestone of his "Jewish grandmother."[15] Others jumped on the potentially lucrative bandwagon of "exposing" the organizer of the Holocaust as a Jew—an essentially antisemitic reading of Heydrich's actions, suggesting that "only a Jew" could come up with plans to eradicate an entire people. Presumably also to boost his book sales with sensational "revelations" about the SS leadership, Felix Kersten, Himmler's Finnish masseur, maintained in his highly unreliable memoirs that both Himmler and Hitler had known about Heydrich's "dark secret" from the early 1930s onward but chose to use the "highly talented, but also very dangerous man" for the dirtiest deeds of the regime.[16]

Wighton was not alone in falling for the myth of Heydrich's Jewish origins. In his preface to the Kersten memoirs, Hugh Trevor-Roper confirmed "with all the authority that I possess" that Heydrich was a Jew.[17] Even Karl Dietrich Bracher, in his important book *The German Dictatorship* (1969), uncritically adopted the tale of Heydrich's non-Aryan family background, as did the Hitler biographer Joachim Fest.[18] Fest's brief character sketch of Heydrich—characteristically brilliant in style but unconvincing in content—added fuel to the popular debate about Heydrich's allegedly split personality. Fest uncritically reiterated the rumors about Heydrich's Jewish family background and described his deeds as the result of a self-loathing antisemitism. As a schizophrenic maniac, driven by self-hatred, Heydrich wanted to prove his worth and became a "man like a whiplash" who ran the Nazi terror apparatus with "Luciferic coldness" and was driven by the ambition to become "Hitler's successor."[19]

The long dominant perception that "something had to be wrong" in the upbringing or psychological makeup of Nazi perpetrators has since been called into question by historians of Nazi Germany, but it continues to play an important role in public debates and in the media. The same applies to a second influential image of the perpetrators of Nazi crimes, which turned the notion of the "demonic" SS officer on its head and is captured in the iconic photograph of Adolf Eichmann in his glass booth in the Jerusalem District Court. Those contemporaries who had expected a human monster in black uniform, defiant in the face of a Jewish judge, were surprised: Eichmann turned out to be the epitome of a subservient and boring bureaucrat, prompting Hannah Arendt's famous dictum about the "banality of evil."[20] For many years, the bureaucratic "technocrat of death"—the armchair culprit—became the dominant image of Nazi perpetrators. These perpetrators focused on their duties, accepted the administrative tasks assigned to them, and carried them out "correctly" and "conscientiously" without feeling responsible for the outcomes.[21]

Such views shaped the way in which a whole generation of historians conceptualized the Third Reich. Influenced by sociological accounts such as Zygmunt Bauman's book *Modernity and the Holocaust*, the mass murder of the Jews was seen as not so much a throwback to barbarism but as the zenith of modern bureaucracy and dehumanizing technology, which found its ultimate expression in the anonymous killing factories of Auschwitz. Nazi Germany was a supercentralized modern hierarchical state in which power and authority flowed from the top down and officials decided the fate of millions. Mass murder was represented as a "sanitized" impersonal process implemented by doctors, lawyers, demographers, and agronomists who carried out their duties on the basis of amoral but seemingly "rational" decisions derived from racial eugenics, geopolitical considerations, and economic planning.[22]

The SS personnel involved in this production-line killing process were correspondingly seen as "unsentimental technocrats of power" or technicians of death, an image that strongly impacted on another popular Heydrich biography, first published in 1977: Günther Deschner's *In Pursuit of Total Power*. Deschner, a former journalist working for the conservative daily *Die Welt,* rightly dismissed the pseudopsychological demonizations of Wighton and Fest. Instead he followed the prevalent trend of the 1970s and 1980s in describing Heydrich as the archetype of a high-level Nazi technocrat primarily interested in efficiency, performance, and "total power." Based on newspaper articles and interviews conducted with contemporaries rather than archival sources, Deschner's book characterized Heydrich as a ruthless technician of power for whom Nazi ideology was first and foremost a vehicle for careerism. Ideology, it was suggested, was something Heydrich was too intelligent to take seriously.[23]

The precise role of ideology in bringing about the largest genocide in history remained a highly controversial issue for a very long time. In the decades immediately after the Second World War, the Third Reich was often pictured as a rigid totalitarian system, a police state based on ruthless orders from above and blind obedience from below.[24] Within this system, the persecution of Jews, which culminated in the Holocaust, followed a blueprint essentially laid out in Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. This interpretation was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s, when historians of the Holocaust became caught up in the fierce debate between "functionalists" and "intentionalists." For leading intentionalists like Eberhard Jäckel und Klaus Hildebrand, the Holocaust was the realization of a long-held plan put into practice by a strongly hierarchical system in which Hitler made every decision. Functionalists such as Martin Broszat und Hans Mommsen, by contrast, insisted that the Nazi dictatorship was anything but a smoothly hierarchical dictatorship. Instead, they described the Third Reich as a complex and deformed political system of competing party and state agencies over which Hitler presided erratically and in which a "cumulative radicalization" (Hans Mommsen) in certain policy areas emerged as a result of

tensions and conflicts between powerful individuals and interest groups who sought to please their Führer by anticipating his orders. Instead of assuming that Hitler, Himmler, and Heydrich personally directed every act of terror, these studies demonstrated that the Third Reich was characterized by a dynamic interplay between the actions of leaders and those of the rank and file who, without always awaiting detailed orders, believed that that they were acting in accordance with Hitler's wishes.[25]

Most historians today would side with the functionalists and agree that persecution of "community aliens" in Nazi Germany did not follow a detailed master plan.[26] It is now generally accepted that the decision-making process that led to the Holocaust was prolonged and that it developed through several stages of radicalization. The gradual development from a policy of exclusion and intimidation toward the German Jews in the 1930s to increasingly genocidal measures from the summer of 1941 onward initially took place without a comprehensive set of commands from the center. The leaders—Hitler, Göring, Himmler, and Heydrich—were informed and usually involved in this radicalization by providing a climate in which genocide became possible because radical initiative was encouraged or recommended.[27] However crucial the role of Hitler, Heydrich, and Himmler in the radicalization of anti-Jewish policies, the Holocaust cannot be explained without examining the role of the military, the civil administration, the ministerial bureaucracy, economic planners, and local collaborators, who were driven by a whole range of motivations for participating in the Nazi genocide, from ideological commitment and hypernationalism to fear, careerism, greed, sadism, weakness, or—more realistically—a combination of more than one of these elements.[28]

These findings renewed scholarly interest in the men who were actively "working towards the Führer" (Kershaw) by implementing his dystopian fantasies of a Greater German Reich cleansed of all real or perceived enemies. Christopher Browning's groundbreaking study *Ordinary Men* examined a Reserve Police Battalion involved in mass shootings in Poland and seriously challenged the long-held belief that the genocide was bureaucratic, impersonal, and sanitized—after all, a substantial number of those murdered in the Holocaust were killed by "ordinary men" in face-to-face shootings rather than in the SS-controlled death factories of Auschwitz.[29]

Since the publication of Browning's book, the renewed interest in the perpetrators of Nazi Germany's genocidal policies has triggered a wave of important studies on the men who worked in Heydrich's terror apparatus, including the leadership corps of the Security Police and the SD.[30] These studies, published from the 1990s onward, reveal important features of the chief Nazi perpetrators: it is now well documented that many of the individuals in question were shockingly "normal" and sociologically representative of the different spheres of German society. If anything, SS perpetrators tended to be *more* educated than the average German citizen. More often than not, they were socially mobile and ambitious young

university graduates from perfectly intact family backgrounds, by no means part of a deranged minority of extremists from the criminal margins of German society.[31]

A further challenge to older interpretations of the Holocaust came from the now blossoming field of "comparative genocide studies." Through comparative research, scholars such as Götz Aly, Donald Bloxham, and others have made a strong case for viewing the Holocaust in the wider context of Nazi plans for a radical unweaving and reordering of Europe's ethnic makeup, usually referred to as the Nazi project of "Germanization." Recent scholarship has illuminated the different ways in which large parts of Nazi-occupied Europe—including the former Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia, parts of Poland, the Ukraine, or indeed Alsace—were subjected to the Nazi project of making entire countries, peoples, and economies German. This was to be achieved partly through expulsions, expropriations, and resettlements and partly through a conscious policy of starvation and—ultimately—through the extermination of those deemed "un-Germanizable."[32]

Such contextualizations of the Holocaust have a major impact on any attempt to write a life of Heydrich, as of the SS in general; and Heydrich, in particular, was fundamentally involved in this megalomaniac and murderous project of Germanization. He was head of the twin agencies responsible for expulsions and resettlements in East-Central Europe—the Central Immigration Agency (EWZ) and the Central Emigration Agency (UWZ)—and he was Reich Protector in Prague. As Hitler's envoy to Prague between September 1941 and his death in June 1942, Heydrich's ambition and ability to implement SS Germanization fantasies were unrivaled. In his first official speech as Hitler's representative in German-occupied Prague, on October 2, 1941, Heydrich elaborated on his long-term policy aims for the Protectorate and Europe more generally. After picturing for his audience a Europe rid of the Jews and asserting that the German occupation of the continent "will not be temporary, but permanent," the thirty-six-year-old SS general raised the crucial question of what the future postwar European order would look like. A growing, vibrant German Lebensraum in the middle of Europe would incorporate all Germanizable people (notably Norwegians, Dutch, Flemish, Danes, and Swedes but also the "racially better" parts of the "lesser races" of Europe) and expel (or exterminate) the rest.[33]

Heydrich's speech, which was praised by Goebbels as "refreshingly clear" and "exemplary for the occupied territories," drew on the latest ideas on the "reordering" of Europe within the Nazi leadership, most notably those articulated in the *Generalplan Ost* (General Plan East) of July 1941.[34] Armed with the pseudoscientific knowledge provided by SS population planners, Heydrich confidently talked about racial hierarchies in the newly conquered territories, hierarchies in which the Poles, East Ukrainians, and Belorussians, which had been "contaminated" by mixing with

various Soviet peoples and Bolshevik ideas, assumed the lowest positions, while some Baltic peoples were deemed less inferior than others: "The best racial elements are found among the Estonians," he stated with absolute certainty, "because of the Swedish influence, then come the Latvians with the Lithuanians being the worst of them all."[35] For the Protectorate, too, Heydrich announced that after the German victory in the ongoing war, "racially good" and "well-intentioned" Czechs, would become Germans while "ill-intentioned" but "racially good" Czechs, the "most dangerous of them all," would be "put up against the wall." Those found to be neither racially desirable nor well disposed toward Germany would be shipped off to Russia's Arctic regions, creating space for healthy Germanic settlers. Two thirds of the population would immediately fall into one category or another. The remaining, less easily labeled people in the middle would be sorted out in a few years' time.[36]

The traditional historiographical emphasis on Heydrich as the chief planner of the Holocaust therefore misses a crucial point: the genocide of Europe's Jews was intended to be the beginning, not the end of a comprehensive process of "cleansing" the new German living space from everyone considered "inferior."[37] Heydrich was fully aware that the complete realization of this plan would have to wait until the Wehrmacht achieved victory over the Red Army. It was simply impossible from a logistical point of view to expel, resettle, and murder an estimated minimum of 30 million Slavic people in the conquered East while simultaneously fighting a war against a numerically superior alliance of enemies on the battlefields. The destruction of Europe's Jews, a much smaller and more easily identifiable community, posed considerably fewer logistical problems. For Heydrich and Himmler, the swift implementation of the "final solution" also offered a major strategic advantage vis-à-vis rival agencies in the occupied territories: by documenting their reliability in carrying out Hitler's genocidal orders, they recommended themselves to the Führer as the "natural" agency to implement the even bigger postwar project of Germanization.[38]

For a biographer of Heydrich, the important findings and debates of the past decades pose a whole series of difficult questions. If the conception of Nazi Germany as a monolithic, perversely rational state that implemented a smoothly unfolding, centralized genocide perpetrated by bureaucratic desk killers has been eroded, where does that leave Reinhard Heydrich? If he and Himmler were not responsible for every aspect of the persecution and mass murder of the Jews, what exactly was Heydrich responsible for? If the Holocaust was merely a first step toward the bloody unweaving of Europe's complex ethnic makeup, what role did Heydrich play in Nazi Germanization plans? If Heydrich was not a misfit with a damaged childhood and deep-rooted psychological problems, who compensated for his "Jewish blood" with extreme cruelty, what motivated him? If he was not primarily driven by careerism, what did he believe in? And more fundamentally: how does a twenty-first-century historian, born long after the end of Hitler's

dictatorship, approach the numerous challenges of writing a biography of a man who was directly responsible for the planning of the most murderous genocide of history?

Yet the challenge of writing a modern biography of a man like Heydrich goes even beyond the need to master the vast and ever-growing body of literature on Hitler's dictatorship and the peculiar problem of having to penetrate the mind of a person whose mentality and ideological universe seem both appalling and strangely distant, even though the Nazi dictatorship ended only less than seventy years ago. But the major challenge lies in the fact that any kind of life writing requires a certain degree of empathy with the subject, even if that subject is Reinhard Heydrich.

Biographers often use the contrasting images of "autopsy" and "portrait" to describe their work: while the "autopsy" offers a detached, forensic examination of a life, the "portrait" relies on the biographer's empathy with his subject.[39] In the case of Nazi perpetrators of genocide, and particularly in the case of Heydrich, it might be best to combine both of these approaches in a novel way best described as "cold empathy": an attempt to reconstruct Heydrich's life with critical distance but without succumbing to the danger of confusing the role of the historian with that of a state prosecutor at a war criminal's trial. Because historians ought to be primarily in the business of explanation and contextualization, not condemnation, they should try to avoid the sensationalism and judgmental tone that tended to characterize early accounts of Nazi perpetrators. As the outstanding biographies of Hitler and Mussolini by Ian Kershaw and Richard Bosworth have demonstrated, it is possible to write biographies of deeply unpleasant men without resorting to the sort of demonization characteristic of many biographies published immediately after the end of the Second World War.

A further challenge in writing a biography of any prominent Nazi lies in the danger, always inherent in biographical writing, to exaggerate the part played by an individual, however powerful, in complex historical processes. Heydrich was deeply involved in the gradual transition of Nazi policies of persecution from random terror to systematic mass murder, but it would be unduly limiting and historically inappropriate to portray him, as has often been the case, as the "evil mastermind" of the Third Reich whose ability to "play" an intellectually and organizationally inferior Himmler secured his rapid ascent through the ranks. Any attempt to explore Heydrich's (and indeed any Nazi perpetrator's) personality and the motivation behind his deeds has to place his actions in the wider context of the intellectual, political, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts that conditioned his life and must do so without succumbing to the danger of reading history backward—say, from his post-1933 position of power and his genocidal decisions of early 1942.[40]

At the same time, it is self-evident that Heydrich's life is not an "exemplary" German life of the early twentieth century. It is extraordinary in

more ways than one: very few people, if any at all, acquired comparable powers at such a young age, and just as few people, however convinced of Nazism, made the same radical decisions. Heydrich therefore constitutes an interesting case, precisely because he was both a typical and atypical representative of his generation. Born in 1904 into a privileged Catholic family of professional musicians in the Prussian city of Halle, Heydrich's path to genocide was anything but straightforward. Coincidences played a remarkable role in his life—a fact that cannot adequately be captured by structural histories that tend to overlook personal life trajectories. Not only was his life conditioned by several unforeseeable—indeed accidental—events that were often beyond his control, but his actions can fully be explained only by placing them in the wider context of the intellectual, political, cultural, and socioeconomic conditions that shaped German history in the first half of the twentieth century. Heydrich unquestionably shared in many of the deep ruptures and traumas of the "war youth generation": namely the First World War and the turbulent postwar years of revolutionary turmoil, hyperinflation, and social decline that he experienced as a teenager. Yet while these events made him and many other Germans susceptible to radical nationalism, Heydrich in fact refrained from political activism throughout the 1920s. And although he joined the staunchly nationalist German Navy in 1922, he was ostracized by his fellow naval officers for not being nationalist *enough*. The great turning point of his early life came in early 1931, when he was dismissed from military service as a result of a broken engagement promise and his subsequent arrogant behavior toward the military honor court. His dismissal at the height of the Great Depression roughly coincided with his first meeting with Lina von Osten, his future wife, who was already a committed Nazi and who convinced him to apply for a staff position in Heinrich Himmler's small but elite SS.[41]

Right up to this moment, Heydrich's life might have taken a very different direction, and indeed he initially possessed few obvious qualifications for his subsequent role as head of the Gestapo and the SD. Crucial for his future development were the experiences and personal encounters he made *within* the SS after 1931 and in particular his close relationship with Heinrich Himmler. In other words, the most significant contributing factor to Heydrich's radicalization was his immersion in a political milieu of young and often highly educated men who thrived on violent notions of cleansing Germany from its "internal enemies" while simultaneously rejecting bourgeois norms of morality as weak, outdated, and inappropriate for securing Germany's national rebirth.[42]

Yet his immersion in this violent world of deeply committed political extremists does not in itself explain why Heydrich emerged as arguably the most radical figure within the Nazi leadership. At least one of the reasons for his subsequent radicalism, it can be argued, lies in his lack of early Nazi credentials. Heydrich's earlier life contained some shortcomings, most notably the persistent rumors about his Jewish ancestry, which led to a

humiliating party investigation in 1932, and his relatively late conversion to Nazism. To make up for these imperfections and impress Heinrich Himmler, his superior, Heydrich fashioned himself into a model Nazi, adopting and further radicalizing key tenets of Himmler's worldview and SS ideals of manliness, sporting prowess, and military bearing. Heydrich even manipulated the story of his earlier life to shore up his Nazi credentials. He supposedly fought in right-wing militant *Freikorps* units after the Great War, but his involvement in post-1918 paramilitary activity was at best minimal. Nor do any records exist to prove that he was a member of the various anti-semitic groups in Halle to which he later claimed to have belonged.[43]

By the mid-1930s, Heydrich had successfully reinvented himself as one of the most radical proponents of Nazi ideology and its implementation through rigid and increasingly extensive policies of persecution. The realization of Hitler's utopian society, so he firmly believed, required the ruthless and violent exclusion of those elements deemed "dangerous" to German society—a task that could best be carried out by the SS as the executioner of Hitler's will. Only by cleansing German society of all that was alien, sick, and hostile could a new "national community" emerge and the inevitable war against the Reich's archenemy, the Soviet Union, be won. In this context I should emphasize that Heydrich's life and radicalization process further undermines the assumptions of the intentionalist school, which argues for a line of continuity between the early 1930s and the Holocaust. The means of "cleansing" envisaged by Heydrich were to change dramatically between 1933 and 1942, partly in response to circumstances beyond his control (such as the outbreak of World War II) and partly as a result of the increasing *Machbarkeitswahn* (fantasies of omnipotence) that gripped many senior SS men, policy planners, and demographic engineers after 1939: the delusional idea that a unique historical opportunity had arisen to fight, once and for all, Germany's real or imagined enemies inside and outside the Reich. Whereas the mass extermination of Jews seemed inconceivable even to Heydrich before the outbreak of war in 1939, his views on the matter became more radical over the following 2½ years. A combination of wartime brutalization, frustration over failed expulsion schemes, pressures from local German administrators in the occupied East, and an ideologically motivated determination to solve the "Jewish problem" led to a situation in which he perceived systematic mass murder to be both feasible and desirable.[44]

The apparent paradox between the cultivated, musically talented middle-class boy from Wilhelmine Germany on the one hand and the fanatical SS ideologue and organizer of historically unprecedented mass murder in the Third Reich on the other might seem like a paradox unless one reconstructs the changing historical contexts and evolving "moral universe" that guided and seemed to "justify" Heydrich's actions. The "ethics of Nazism," particularly under conditions of war, were obviously not universalist but highly selective: they were based on the notion of radical racial inequality

combined with the idea that the allegedly stronger Germanic race had a moral duty to permanently suppress, and if necessary exterminate, the existentially threatening "subhuman" races of the East.[45] The insistence on Germany's natural right to self-defense against a ubiquitous Jewish enemy and the explicit formulation of a moral duty to subsequent generations to solve the "Jewish problem" once and for all were articulated most pointedly in Himmler's infamous Posen speech of 1943. In this speech to a gathering of senior SS officers, who had collectively been responsible for the murder of several million people, Himmler offered them praise for having carried out their "difficult" but "historic" task with "decency."[46] What Himmler meant was that his men had fulfilled their "duty" toward their people without feeling pleasure or enriching themselves. They had killed without becoming killers.

By reconstructing this logic—however perverted it may seem—it becomes possible to move beyond generic and historically unspecific arguments such as Daniel J. Goldhagen's explanatory model of a ubiquitous and specifically German "eliminatory antisemitism," an antisemitism that allegedly long predated Hitler's seizure of power before becoming institutionalized in 1933. In Heydrich's case, antisemitism did not play a major role in his life until he entered the SS in 1931 and even then (and perhaps as late as 1939) the idea of indiscriminately murdering every Jew in Europe would have seemed absurd to him. It was only over the following years and under conditions of total war, that the boundaries of the permissible changed dramatically to the point that genocide seemed like a logical solution to the "Jewish problem."

CONCLUSIONS

Writing a life of Reinhard Heydrich that incorporates the latest trends in perpetrator research and addresses the appalling subject with cold empathy is not an easy or pleasant task. Yet, if we wish to *understand* why perfectly "normal" people can become monsters under certain conditions, we have to move beyond simplistic notions of innate "evil" and look at the conditions under which people choose to act in certain ways. It goes without saying, however, that empathy and sympathy are not the same—on the contrary: *tout comprendre c'est n'est pas tout pardonner.*

More generally speaking, the revival of historical biography in Third Reich historiography has opened up new possibilities to synthesize research areas that are often disconnected in the highly specialized literature on the Nazi dictatorship. The medium of biography, and in this case a biography of Heydrich, offers uniquely privileged, intimate, and organic access to a whole range of thematic issues at the heart of Nazi rule: the rise of the SS and the emergence of the Nazi Police State; the decision-making processes that led to the Holocaust; the interconnections between anti-Jewish and

Germanization policies; and the different ways in which German occupation regimes operated across Nazi-controlled Europe.

On a more personal level, only a biographical approach can capture both the historical and individual circumstances under which young men from perfectly "normal" middle-class backgrounds could become political extremists determined to use ultraviolence to implement their dystopian fantasies of radically transforming the world.

NOTES

1. Many of the ideas and observations of this article underpin the author's recently published biography of Heydrich: Robert Gerwarth, *Hitler's Hangman: The Life and Death of Reinhard Heydrich* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2011). Yale University Press's permission to reproduce previously published material is gratefully acknowledged.
2. The most widely known popular accounts of the Heydrich assassination are as follows: Callum MacDonald, *The Killing of SS Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich: 27 May 1942* (London: DaCapo, 1992); Hellmut Haasis, *Tod in Prag—Das Attentat auf Reinhard Heydrich* (Reinbek, Germany: Rowohlt, 2002); Miroslav Ivanov, *Der Henker von Prag: Das Attentat auf Heydrich* (Berlin: Edition q, 1993). For a helpful survey of the extensive Czech literature on the assassination up until 1991, see Zdeněk Jelínek, "K problematice atentátu na Reinharda Heydricha." *Historie a vojenství* 40 (1991), 65–101.
3. Heinrich Mann, *Lidice* (Mexico City: Libro Libre, 1943). On Brecht's involvement in Lang's movie, see: Gerd Gemünden, "Brecht in Hollywood: *Hangmen Also Die* and the Anti-Nazi Film," *The Drama Review* 43 (1999), 65–76. The English translation of Binet's book, *HHhH* was published in 2012.
4. Shlomo Aronson, "Heydrich und die Anfänge des SD und der Gestapo. 1931–1935," Ph.D. thesis, FU Berlin, 1967; subsequently published as Shlomo Aronson, *Reinhard Heydrich und die Frühgeschichte von Gestapo und SD* (Stuttgart: Oldenbourg, 1971).
5. Charles Wighton, *Heydrich—Hitler's Most Evil Henchman* (London: Transworld, 1962); Mario Dederichs, *Heydrich: The Face of Evil* (London: Greenhill Books, 2006).
6. Günther Deschner, *Heydrich: The Pursuit of Total Power* (London: Orbis, 1981); Edouard Calic, *Reinhard Heydrich: The Chilling Story of the Man Who Masterminded the Nazi Death Camps* (New York: William Morrow, 1985). See too the shorter essays of Charles Sydnor, "Reinhard Heydrich: Der 'ideale Nationalsozialist,'" in Ronald Smelser and Enrico Syring, eds., *Die SS: Elite unter dem Totenkopf: 30 Lebensläufe* (Paderborn, Germany: Schoeningh, 2000), 208–219; idem, "Executive Instinct. Reinhard Heydrich and the Planning for the Final Solution," in Michael Berenbaum and Abraham Peck, eds., *The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, The Disputed and the Re-examined* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998), 159–160; Joachim Fest, "Reinhard Heydrich: Der Nachfolger," in his *Das Gesicht des Dritten Reiches. Profile einer totalitären Herrschaft* (Munich: Piper, 1963), 139–155.
7. For the historiographical debate on the genre of biography, see, for example, Volker R. Berghahn and Simone Laessig. eds., *Biography between Structure*

and Agency: Central European Lives in International Historiography (Oxford, UK, and New York: Berghahn 2008).

8. Ian Kershaw, *Hitler 1889–1936: Hubris* (London: Allen Lane, 1998); id., *Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis* (London: Allen Lane, 2000); Browning, *Ordinary Men*; Peter Longerich, *Heinrich Himmler: Biographie* (Munich: Siedler, 2008); Ulrich Herbert, *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft*, 1903–1989 (Bonn: Dietz, 1996); David Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes and Trial of a Desk Murderer* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2006); Michael Wildt, *Generation des Unbedingten: Das Führungskorps des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002); see also Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, eds., *Karrieren der Gewalt: Nationalsozialistische Täterbiographien* (Darmstadt, Germany: Primus, 2004).
9. Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat: Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager* (Munich: Heyne, 1946).
10. Gerald Reitlinger, *The SS: Alibi of a Nation 1922–1945* (New York and London: Heinemann, 1956). See also: Robert L. Koehl, "The Character of the Nazi SS," *Journal of Modern History* 34 (1962), 275–283.
11. Charles Wighton, *Heydrich: Hitler's Most Evil Henchman* (London: Transworld, 1962).
12. Carl Jacob Burckhardt, *Meine Danziger Mission* (Munich: Callwey, 1960), 57.
13. Statement on Heydrich by Dr Werner Best, October 1, 1959, in Copenhagen, in IfZ (Munich), ZS 207/2.
14. Wolff's postwar testimony, in IfZ, ZS 317, Bl. 34f; Schellenberg, *Memoiren,* 36. For a similar account, see Walter Hagen (alias Wilhelm Höttl), *Die geheime Front: Organisation, Personen und Aktionen des deutschen Geheimdienstes* (Linz and Vienna: Nibelungen Verlag, 1950), 27; on Höttl and his account, see Thorsten Querg, "Wilhelm Höttl—Vom Informanten zum Sturmbannführer im Sicherheitsdienst der SS," in Thorsten Querg et al., eds., *Historische Rassismusforschung: Ideologie—Täter—Opfer*, (Hamburg and Berlin: Argument, 1995), 208–230.
15. Hagen (Höttl), *Die geheime Front*, 21.
16. Felix Kersten, *Totenkopf und Treue—Heinrich Himmler ohne Uniform* (Hamburg: Robert Mölich Verlag, 1952), 128. See also the memoirs of the former *Abwehr* officer and member of the military resistance, Hans Bernd Gisevius, *Bis zum bitteren Ende: Bericht eines Augenzeugen aus den Machtzentren des Dritten Reiches* (Hamburg: Bertelsmann, 1954), who maintained, on p. 118, that Hedrich was an "anti-Semitic descendant of Jews."
17. Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Introduction," in: Kersten, *The Kersten Memoirs*, 1940–1945 (London: Macmillan, 1956).
18. Fest, "Nachfolger," 139–155; Karl Dietrich Bracher, *Die deutsche Diktatur: Entstehung, Struktur, Folgen des Nationalsozialismus* (Cologne: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969), 60. Although the myth of Heydrich's alleged Jewish family background has long been disproven by painstaking genealogical research, it continues to resurface periodically in TV documentaries and journalistic Heydrich biographies. See, for example, the most recent account of Heydrich's alleged Jewish family background in Dederichs, *Gesicht*, 69. The myth of Heydrich's Jewish descent has been convincingly disproven by Aronson, *Frühgeschichte,* 18–19, 24, 63–64; and Karin Flachowsky, "Neue Quellen zur Abstammung Reinhard Heydrichs," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 48 (2000), 319–327.

19. Fest, "Nachfolger," 139–155. On the idea that Heydrich wanted to succeed Hitler, see also: Naudé, *Politischer Beamter*, 145; and Gisevius, *Bis zum bitteren Ende*, 264.
20. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1963).
21. The most influential interpretation along these lines was Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (London: W.H. Allen 1961).
22. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
23. Günther Deschner, *Reinhard Heydrich: Statthalter der totalen Macht. Biographie* (Esslingen am Neckar, Germany: Bechtle, 1977); since 1977, Deschner's book has been republished in five editions, most recently in 2008 with a revised subtitle: idem, *Reinhard Heydrich: Biographie eines Reichsprotektors* (Vienna: Universitas, 2008). The myth of Heydrich's lack of ideological conviction originated in Werner Best's postwar statement on Heydrich of October 1, 1959, in IfZ (Munich), ZS 207/2.
24. See, for example, Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The German Dictatorship: The Origins, Structure, and Consequences of National Socialism* (New York: Penguin, 1970); Tim Mason, "Intention and Explanation: A Current Controversy about the Interpretation of National Socialism," in Gerhard Hirschfeld and Lothar Kettenacker, eds., *The "Führer State": Myth and Reality*, (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981), 23–40.
25. Hans Mommsen, "The Realization of the Unthinkable: The 'Final Solution of the Jewish Question' in the Third Reich," in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., *The Policies of Genocide: Jews and Soviet Prisoners of War in Nazi Germany* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die 'Endlösung': Aus Anlaß der Thesen von David Irving," *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 25 (1977), 739–775; Peter Hüttenberger, "Nationalsozialistische Polykratie," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 2 (1976), 417–442. Ian Kershaw, "'Working towards the Führer': Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship," *Contemporary European History* 2 (1993), 103–118.
26. On "community aliens" see Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, *The Racial State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus, eds., *Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); and Robert Gellately, "Social Outsiders and the Consolidation of Hitler's Dictatorship," in Neil Gregor, ed., *Nazism, War and Genocide: Essays in Honour of Jeremy Noakes* (Exeter, UK: Exeter University Press, 2005), 56–74.
27. For clear and carefully argued syntheses, see Christopher R Browning, *Origins of the Final Solution;* Longerich, *Politik der Vernichtung*; Saul Friedländer, *Nazi Germany and the Jews,* 2 vols. (New York: Harper, 1997 and 2007).
28. See, for example, Dieter Pohl, *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944: Organisation und Durchführung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996); Christian Gerlach, *Kalkulierte Morde: Die deutsche Wirtschafts- und Vernichtungspolitik in Weißrußland 1941–1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1999); Christoph Dieckmann, "The War and the Killing of the Lithuanian Jews," in Ulrich Herbert, ed., *National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies*, (New York and Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2000); Bogdan Musial, *Deutsche Zivilverwaltung und Judenverwaltung im Generalgouvernement: Eine Fallstudie zum Distrikt Lublin 1939–1944* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag,

1999); Bernhard Chiari, *Alltag hinter der Front: Besatzung, Kollaboration und Widerstand in Weißrußland 1941–1944* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1998).

29. Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper, 1992); see also the much more controversial book by Daniel Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (London: Vintage, 1997).
30. Banach, *Elite*; George C. Browder, *Hitler's Enforcers: The Gestapo and the SS Security Service in the Nazi Revolution,* (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Friedrich Wilhelm, *Die Polizei im NS-Staat* (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 1997); Wildt, *Generation.*
31. Herbert, *Best;* Paul, *Täter;* Wildt, *Generation;* Banach, *Elite;* Ceserani, *Eichmann.*
32. The burgeoning literature on Germanization plans and the Holocaust in Nazi-occupied Europe is too vast to be listed here in detail. A pioneering contribution to the field was Götz Aly and Susanne Heim, *Vordenker der Vernichtung: Auschwitz und die deutschen Pläne für eine europäische Ordnung* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993); see also Karl Heinz Roth, "Konrad Meyers erster 'Generalplan Ost' (April/Mai 1940)," *Mitteilungen der Dokumentationsstelle zur NS-Sozialpolitik* 1 (1985), 45–52; Czeslaw Madajczyk, "Besteht ein Synchronismus zwischen dem 'Generalplan Ost' und der Endlösung der Judenfrage?" in Wolfgang Michalka, ed., *Der Zweite Weltkrieg: Analysen, Grundzüge, Forschungsbilanz*, 2nd ed. (Munich: Seehamer, 1990), 844–857; Wendy Lower, *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Isabel Heinemann, *"Rasse, Siedlung, deutsches Blut": Das Rasse- und Siedlungshauptamt der SS und die rassenpolitische Neuordnung Europas* (Göttingen, Germany: Wallstein, 2003); Chad Bryant, *Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); and Mark Mazower, *Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).
33. Heydrich's speech in Černin Palace on October 2, 1941, in: National Archives, Prague, 114–6–4, carton 22.
34. Goebbels had read a draft of the speech and commented on it in writing. See his letter to Heydrich of September 28, 1941, in: National Archives, Prague, 114, carton 1140.
35. Heydrich's speech in Černin Palace on October 2, 1941, in: National Archives, Prague, 114–6–4, carton 22. For the SS racial surveys of March 1940 on which Heydrich's opinion was based, see: B.A. Berlin, NS 2/88, 30–38.
36. Heydrich's speech in Černin Palace on October 2, 1941, in: National Archives, Prague, 114–6–4, carton 22.
37. In this respect, my study can build on a sizable scholarship published in German, English, and Czech. Apart from two impressive older studies, Vojtech Mastny, *The Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939–1942* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and Detlef Brandes, *Die Tschechen unter deutschem Protektorat*, 2 vols. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1969 and 1975), a number of key studies on the Protectorate have been published since the end of the Cold War. For a useful overview of Czech scholarship on the years 1938–1945 that emerged in the 1990s, see Jan Gebhart, "Historiography on the Period 1938–1945," *Historica* 7/8 (2000/2001), 145–163; Miroslav Kárný, Jaroslava Milotová and Margita Kárná (eds.), *Deutsche Politik im "Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren" unter*

Reinhard Heydrich 1941–1942 (Berlin: Metropol, 1997). The best recent overview is offered in: Bryant, *Prague in Black*.

38. Gerwarth, *Heydrich*.
39. Hermione Lee, *Biography: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford, UK, and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1–5.
40. Peter Longerich, "Tendenzen und Perspektiven der Täterforschung," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 14–15 (2007), 3–7; Michael Wildt, "Blick in den Spiegel: Überlegungen zur Täterforschung," *Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 19 (2008), 13–37.
41. Gerwarth, *Heydrich*, 45–49.
42. Gerwarth, *Heydrich,* 54–60.
43. Gerwarth, *Heydrich*, 30–31.
44. Browning, *Origins*; Longerich, *Holocaust*.
45. Welzer, *Täter*.
46. See Omer Bartov, "Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust" in Amir Weiner, ed., *Landscaping the Human Garden. Twentieth-Century Population Management in a Comparative Framework* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 135–147.

3 The Life and Death of Colonel-General Blaskowitz

Christopher Clark

On the morning of February 5, 1948, the day on which his trial was to begin, Colonel-General Johannes Blaskowitz climbed over the security barriers in the military prison at Nuremberg and threw himself down a stairwell. His suicide prompted shock and astonishment. Blaskowitz had little to fear from the tribunal. The prosecution's case against him was weak and his defense counsel had been given to understand that an acquittal was highly likely. It was a characteristically mysterious end to a career spent in the gray zone between courage and obedience.

Today, Johannes Blaskowitz is chiefly known for his official protests against the atrocities committed by German police formations in Poland during the winter of 1939–1940. Late in November 1939, scarcely a month after his appointment as Oberbefehlshaber Ost—commander of the German military units in German-occupied Poland—Blaskowitz submitted a report to Supreme Army Command complaining of the disruptive impact of police unit activity. In the weeks and months that followed, he fired off several further reports with detailed lists of crimes committed against civilians. As a consequence, Blaskowitz forfeited the confidence of the regime's leadership and with it any prospect of further professional advancement. He was relieved of his post in May 1940 and relegated to the "command reserve" in Dresden. In October 1940, he was appointed commander of the First Army stationed in occupied France, where he was responsible for overseeing the training of troops destined to fight in the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Blaskowitz's outspoken early stand against the ascendant SS empire is that it remained an episode. Blaskowitz never joined the resistance, even after he became aware that the atrocities he had protested against were not individual "excesses" committed by "psychically disturbed" police personnel but the logical consequence and expression of the regime's policy. And yet in 1944, when he took on an active command role in the withdrawal from France, Blaskowitz again made strenuous efforts to ensure that his troops complied with the traditional "laws of war," in particular by interdicting reprisals against French civilians during operations against the resistance. Drawing inspiration from Richard Bosworth's attention to the many different kinds of

relationship that Italians established with the Fascist regime, this chapter uses Blaskowitz's story—reconstructed from archival documents—to explore the ambiguous space between resistance and full compliance in a totalitarian dictatorship.

*

Johannes Albrecht Blaskowitz was born on July 10, 1883, in Peterswaldau in the district of Wehlau, East Prussia. His father, a pastor in nearby Walterkehmen, was known, on account of his penitential sermons, as the "thundering conscience" of his congregation. The son was admitted at the age of eleven to the cadet school at Köslin, from which he subsequently transferred to the Central Cadet School (*Hauptkadettenanstalt*) in Berlin-Lichterfelde. He was sixteen when he was accepted as ensign into the 18th Infantry Regiment (von Grolman) in Osterode, East Prussia. Two years later, the family suffered a tragedy that attracted wide notice in Germany and beyond. Blaskowitz's elder brother, Lieutenant Kurt Blaskowitz, was serving in the garrison at Insterburg, East Prussia, when he fell victim in 1901 to a duel forced upon him by a fellow officer after a drunken altercation. The case became the subject of a Reichstag interpellation and was widely noted as an example of the "antiquated German code of military honor."[1] After this blow, Blaskowitz senior supported Johannes's military ambitions with redoubled zeal. A letter of 1902 entreating the military authorities to promote his son ahead of his cohort and reminding them of his recent bereavement conveys a sense of the intense paternal emotion invested in Johannes's early career.[2]

During the First World War, Blaskowitz saw action on several fronts. After a spell on the western front, he was assigned in the summer of 1915 to the Third Jäger Regiment of the Alpine Corps, where he commanded a machine gun company in the Dolomites and subsequently led the 1st Battalion in the Serbian campaign. Early in 1916, having proved himself as a front officer, he commenced general staff training with the Tenth Army Corps in France. It was as a staff officer that he took part during 1916–1917 in the battles of Kowel and Riga. When the war came to an end he was serving as a liaison officer with the Imperial and Royal First Honvéd Infantry Division.

During the Weimar years Blaskowitz served in various command roles in Stuttgart, Ulm, and (from 1930) Konstanz, where he took over as commander in chief of the Fourteenth Baden Infantry Regiment. The association with Baden dated back to the years before the World War, when he had requested a transfer to the south on health grounds.[3] As the most senior officer possessing Badensian nationality, he was also appointed Kommandant of the State of Baden, a post he held until the beginning of 1933. He would later view his years in Konstanz as the happiest of his professional life.

Blaskowitz was popular with the officers and men of the Konstanz regiment, who appreciated the clarity of his character and the informality of his dealings with subordinates. In a memorial essay of 1955, members of the regiment recalled his "warmth," his Christian commitment, and his "combative attachment to unconditional justice." "We 'lumpfish' [*Seehasen*—thus the pet name for members of the Fourteenth Regiment] didn't just defer to him as the superior officer who determines the destinies [of his subordinates]: we loved him!"[4] A capacity to win not just the respect but also the affection of the men committed to his charge remained one of his most conspicuous attributes. The "compelling and transformative power" of his speeches at public occasions and his "mastery of the right word at the right time," a legacy, no doubt, of his preacher father, earned him an excellent reputation among the civilian population of Konstanz, the Baden civil authorities, and even the provincial press. For a man whose exotic East Prussian diction must at first have jarred in southern ears, this was no small achievement.

His charisma and personal authority helped Blaskowitz to make a success of his posting (from February 1, 1933) as inspector of the Berlin Weapons Schools, with responsibility for the education and training of aspiring army officers. Blaskowitz was known for the emphasis he placed on fitness and physical education—an area in which, as an outstanding gymnast and horseman, he had always excelled.[5] Blaskowitz oversaw the introduction of reformed ensign training courses and the new Schools of War, which would permit the faster and more intensive training of officer aspirants in all weapon types. In Berlin and later (from April 1, 1935) as commander of Military District II stationed in Stettin, Blaskowitz made an important contribution to the establishment and expansion of the young Wehrmacht. As late as May 1, 1944, an appraisal by his superior officer General Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt described him as an "outstanding trainer of troops." [6]

Little is known of Blaskowitz's political orientation during the Weimar Republic. Hellmuth Stieff, who would later play a key role in the anti-Hitler resistance, reported to his wife in August 1932 that Blaskowitz believed the parties of the Weimar parliamentary system to be "Germany's misfortune" because they had impeded, through their egoism, any stable and useful governmental work. But this did not imply any admiration for the National Socialists: on the contrary, Blaskowitz saw the rise of the Nazis as symptomatic of the republic's malaise. "If the Nazis try anything on," he declared at an exercise for his troops in 1932, "it will be necessary to take action against them with all force and not to shy away even from the bloodiest confrontations." To "lead Germany out of its misery," he proposed, the government would have to be "freed from the fetters of parliamentarism in order to operate independently." The key prerequisite for such independence was "the confidence of the Reich President and the Reichswehr."[7]

In short, Blaskowitz was an exponent of that Reichswehr ideology which viewed the army as a kind of foreign body within the republic whose loyalty was not to the currently existing political authority but to the German Reich, understood as an imperishable and transcendent entity. According to a letter from the former "lumpfish" Hans Gies, Blaskowitz believed so fervently in the principle that the Reichswehr must remain "above politics" that he refused, even at home in the company of his family, to discuss the political questions of the day. Gies recalled an occasion during Blaskowitz's Konstanz command in 1932 when the latter's wife Anneliese had come to him with questions about Hitler and his party "because she was unable to discuss these matters with her husband."[8] Blaskowitz shared this commitment to a supposedly transcendent and apolitical state authority and the wish to see the Reichswehr take a more independent role in managing the destiny of the nation with many of his fellow officers. In an essay published in 1928, the sometime chief of the Reichswehr Command General Hans von Seeckt set out his views on the status of the military within a republican state. He acknowledged that the "supreme leadership of the state" must control the army but also insisted that "the army has the right to demand that its share in the life and being of the state be given full consideration." The meaning of these rather obfuscating reflections was made somewhat clearer at a later point, when Seeckt observed that the German army was subordinate only to "the state as a whole" and "not to separate parts of the state organization."[9] Blaskowitz's hostility to the NSDAP thus lay above all in the party's demand for political power—a demand whose realization was irreconcilable with the notion that the state occupied a place above politics.

The reorientation of the Reichswehr leadership after the March elections of 1933 toward a policy open to an alliance with the Hitler government and an ideological rapprochement with the Nazi movement can also be discerned in Blaskowitz, although here, too, the evidence is fragmentary and indirect. On the occasion of the unveiling of a memorial for the fallen of the World War in March 1935, Blaskowitz delivered a speech in which he depicted Adolf Hitler as God's answer to Germany's moment of need:

> And when the need was greatest, God's help was closest. It gave us our Führer, who gathered together all the national forces in a mighty movement and allowed the true people's community [*Volksgemeinschaft*] to emerge anew, who yesterday restored the military sovereignty of the German people and thereby fulfilled the legacy of our dead heroes.[10]

The reference to the "gathering" of "national forces" and the resumption (in contravention of the Versailles peace treaty) of universal military service suggest a primarily instrumental and limited approval of the goals of National Socialist domestic and foreign policy rather than a genuine affirmation of the ideology of National Socialism. Blaskowitz's fundamental

outlook was and remained that of an—in his own eyes—"unpolitical" conservative. He felt, one contemporary recalled, an instinctive and abiding commitment to "tradition, to what had naturally grown from the past."[11]

When he moved to Stettin in 1935, the fifty-two-year-old lieutenant general and military district commander could afford to be satisfied with his progress. In his new post he was the successor of Fedor von Bock, who would later ascend to the rank of fieldmarshal-general. He enjoyed the full confidence of his superiors. However, he was soon to fall from favor with the political leadership. At a military exercise attended by Hitler, Blaskowitz's views on the deployment of tank units were vehemently rejected by the dictator. Instead of seeing that "the operative deployment of tanks brings impetus to forward movement and thereby assures superiority," Blaskowitz had supposedly characterized the tank as a mere "heavy weapon of the infantry."[12] Hitler immediately came to the conclusion that Blaskowitz was unsuited for higher command tasks. But for the moment, it was Blaskowitz's military superiors rather than the regime that determined his prospects of promotion. His ascent through the ranks continued: at the end of 1938, he was appointed supreme commander of Army Group Three. He now occupied one of the seven highest command posts of the army.[13] On March 15, 1939, he led the deployment of German troops in the occupation of Bohemia, where he wielded executive authority for a time in the name of the Army Supreme Command. At this point, Blaskowitz's relations with the Nazi regime appear to have been cordial. In a letter of May 14, 1939—signed "Heil Hitler!"—Blaskowitz thanked the officials of the Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Enlightenment who had supported his army command for their "comradely collaboration" in the fulfillment of his military tasks.[14]

In the Polish campaign, Blaskowitz commanded the Eighth Army as the northernmost unit of Army Group South. He was assigned the task of providing offensive flanking cover for the left wing of the Tenth Army against Polish units believed to be encamped around Łódź-Kalisz and in Poznań Province. In order to achieve this objective, Blaskowitz was required to keep pace with the neighboring army as it passed through the attack zone from Gross-Wartenberg via Sieradz on the Warta and Łódź toward Warsaw, all the while remaining prepared to meet an expected Polish attack from the north. The main task, to break the troop masses of the Polish Cracow Army and thereby clear the path for an advance on Warsaw, was assigned to the Tenth Army under Walter von Reichenau. But as the campaign progressed, it was Blaskowitz's Eighth Army that gradually became the focal point of military operations.[15]

On September 9, when Polish units attacking the Eighth Army near Łęczyca came close to achieving a breakthrough in the direction of Łódź, Blaskowitz decided to turn his army, which was still making for Warsaw at speed, around to the northwest and mount a counterattack against the Polish forces threatening his flank. In the Battle of the Bzura that followed—the

largest of the Polish campaign—Blaskowitz's Eighth Army played a central role in achieving a German success. Casualties on the Polish side were 20,000, including three generals; the corresponding German figure was around 8,000. On the other hand, the encirclement and destruction of the Polish forces on the Bzura had delayed the German advance on Warsaw by several days, giving the Polish armies around Warsaw time to improve their defensive preparations. Once again, there was a confrontation with the political leadership. During a visit to the front, Hitler expressed his dissatisfaction with Blaskowitz's handling of operations, but he did not countermand the army's decision to place him in command of the final assault on the Polish capital.

For his contribution to the Polish campaign, Blaskowitz was promoted to General (Generaloberst—a rank with no direct English equivalent that denotes a senior general) and awarded the Knight's Cross. He was assigned at first to the command of the Second Army, which had been earmarked for future action on the western front. Blaskowitz later reported that Hitler himself had assured him that he would follow his staff to a western command role.[16] Blaskowitz was already on his way west in a staff car when he was stopped by an officer near Eisenach and told to call General Felber, his chief, who ordered him to return east immediately.[17] On October 23, Blaskowitz's western command was terminated and he was appointed Supreme Commander East (Oberbefehlshaber Ost, widely known as "OberOst"), a post that placed him in command not only over the troops stationed in Military District I (East Prussia) but also over all German units remaining in conquered Poland. Despite the impressive title, Blaskowitz viewed the reassignment as a career setback. Hitler's attention had already turned to the west, now the focal point of German military planning. Not for the last time, Blaskowitz was to be kept at arm's length from the central theater of events. His sidelining can be attributed to the continuing hostility of the dictator due to Blaskowitz's handling of the Polish campaign, although his candor in communications with his superiors no doubt also played a part. Blaskowitz later recalled a conversation with Hitler that had taken place at the end of the Polish campaign. Hitler asked him how the SS regiment Leibstandarte, commanded by Sepp Dietrich, one of Hitler's personal favorites, had fought in Poland. Blaskowitz, who had found it difficult to control the impetuous Dietrich, replied that the Leibstandarte was "an average unit, still inexperienced, warranting no special mention."[18] A diary entry of November 18, 1939, by Hitler's wing-adjutant Major Engel, noted that the dictator's "long-harbored aversion" to Blaskowitz was starting to manifest itself. Hitler, it seemed, had "never been confident [in Blaskowitz]. And he had been against entrusting him with the command of an army."[19]

In accepting his new post, Blaskowitz acquired authority as Supreme Commander East over all German troops stationed in occupied Poland. But he exercised no direct authority over the civilian administrative organs or over the police units (*Polizeiverbände*) and deployment groups

(*Einsatzgruppen*) that were increasingly active in the occupied area. Relations between the military commanders and the special police formations in Poland had cooled since the middle of September. With the successful completion of the campaign and the formal cessation of hostilities, it became increasingly clear that the police units were overstepping their formal remit to see to security and order behind the front. A number of commanders expressed their outrage at the brutal measures taken against the Polish population by the police formations without any prior consultation with the military authorities.

Hitler's response to the growing friction between military and police units in Poland was to impose a narrower definition of military executive authority in the occupied zone. On October 25, 1939, two days after Blaskowitz's appointment as Supreme Commander East, the military administration in Poland was formally dissolved. In his Order of the Day for October 26, the new OberOst announced that the army would henceforth be confined to "purely soldierly tasks" in the eastern occupied zones—"it is freed from administrative and political tasks."[20] But this measure did not discourage Blaskowitz from continuing to condemn the activities of the police units in the sharpest terms.

After only three weeks in his new post, he confided in Lieutenant Colonel Helmuth Stieff, a staff officer at Army Supreme Command, urging him to bring the issue to the attention of his military superiors. Blaskowitz and Stieff had known each other since at least the early 1930s. Stieff shared Blaskowitz's skepticism of party politics and his praetorian understanding of the army's political role. The army alone should be "carrier of the movement" to restore German integrity and independence, Stieff had written in 1930, and must never subordinate itself to the interests of any one party, not even to the National Socialists.[21] Even after the Nazi seizure of power, Stieff remained privately hostile to what he called "the madness of one-party rule."[22] Most importantly, Stieff shared Blaskowitz's sense of outrage at the atrocities committed by the police units against the civilian population in occupied Poland. "The wildest fantasies of atrocity propaganda look pale beside the crimes committed by an organized band of murderers, thieves and plunderers, approved, it seems, at the highest level," he wrote to his wife in November 1939. "This extermination of entire family groups with women and children can only be the work of subhuman elements that no longer deserve the name of German. I am ashamed to be a German!"[23]

When Stieff"s representations to Army Supreme Command failed to have any effect, Blaskowitz had a formal report prepared for the Supreme Commander of the Army, Walther von Brauchitsch. Signed on November 27, 1939, the report referred to the "rather disturbed" relationship between the German army and "the organs of the Security and Order Police." So far, Blaskowitz pointed out, the police had made "no visible contribution to the establishment of order, but had merely spread terror among the population." Since police actions were carried out in military uniform, they

represented an "intolerable burden" for the army. "It can be said, in summing up, that conditions in the occupied areas are in need of fundamental reform." Blaskowitz justified his critique primarily by reference to the growing threat to the security of German troops in Poland. The "current state of affairs," he warned, would sow the seeds of a Polish military uprising and thereby "render impossible the exploitation of the country for the benefit of the [German] troops."[24] The incorporation of this rationalization was crucial, because Blaskowitz's right, as Supreme Commander East, to intervene in administrative and "interior political" questions was strictly confined to cases in which "military security" was affected.

To this report, Blaskowitz appended an anonymous communication forwarded to his command on November 18. Signed "the population of Łódż and Warsaw," this document referred to the "horrific cruelties" meted out by the SS and SD units to the "Jewish and Polish population." That elements of the Polish population in the occupied area should have seen in Blaskowitz an appropriate recipient for such a complaint is itself of some significance, since it suggests that local Poles were aware of the frictions between the German military and police. It is also striking that Blaskowitz should have been ready to offer himself, as it were, as the advocate of the Polish population vis-à-vis the organs of the Reich Security Main Office. When the report was placed on Hitler's desk by Major Engel, however, the dictator flew into a rage, making "trenchant attacks" on the "childish attitudes" harbored by the military leadership. It was impossible, he vociferated, "to wage a war with the methods of the Salvation Army."[25] Whether Hitler's allusion to "Salvation Army methods" was a reference to Blaskowitz's Christian piety, seen by other contemporaries as a conspicuous feature of his personality, is impossible to confirm but highly likely.

Scarcely two weeks later, Blaskowitz compiled another report, no longer extant, in which further "offenses of the police, SS and [civil] administration" were listed. Blaskowitz went further: he had six copies made of the report and forwarded by Chief Quartermaster Erwin Jaenecke to the Army Supreme Command in Berlin. According to Blaskowitz's own later recollections, this report incorporated a list of criminal actions by German police units in Poland, including "arrests of Jews, the forming of ghettos and the resulting local unrest." It was particularly critical of Hans Frank, chief of the civil administration in what was then known as the "General Government of the Occupied Polish Areas." Frank, Blaskowitz argued, had repeatedly authorized criminal actions in the Polish cities, with the result that discipline among German troops was negatively affected, the threat of insurrection raised, and the productive capacity of the Polish population compromised.[26] By this point, it seems, Blaskowitz was no longer merely informing his superiors of developments in the occupied zone—he was trying to effect a change in the attitude within the officer corps as a whole. The moment was well chosen. A decree issued by Himmler on October 28, 1939, declaring that the SS would support the illegitimate children of SS-men and that it was the high

calling of German women to bear the children of departing SS-men, "even outside the boundaries of bourgeois rules and customs," had caused deep irritation in the military, which saw in it a "charter" to the SS and police for illicit "sexual activity on the home front."[27]

On December 18, 1939, Helmuth Groscurth, a Military Intelligence (*Abwehr*) officer, traveled to the western front to distribute copies of the second Blaskowitz report (together with other materials) to the staffs of the three army groups. Among those who certainly saw the document were Generals von Witzleben, von Rundstedt, and von Bock; Groscurth also took it to the Frankfurt Headquarters of General Ritter von Leeb, commander in chief of Army Group C, who passed the news to General Franz Halder, chief of Army General Staff, with the comment that the conduct of German units in Poland "did not accord with the values and standards of a cultivated nation like Germany."[28] The news of events in Poland threw an unflattering light on the comportment of Supreme Commander von Brauchitsch, who hoped by tolerating such excesses to achieve a harmonious relationship between the army, SS and police. In this way, Blaskowitz contributed to the "crisis of confidence" that undermined relations between the staff at the front and the supreme commander of the army toward the end of 1939.

When incidents of arbitrary violence against Jews and Poles continued to accumulate in the General Government, Blaskowitz resolved to compile and submit a third report on the German occupation and its impact on the defeated population. In his notes for a presentation to the Army Supreme Command at Spala, scheduled for February 15, 1940, Blaskowitz depicted the consequences of German terror in uncompromising language. Several features of this complex document deserve emphasis. First, Blaskowitz did not merely accuse the police units in general terms of bad behavior but listed specific "acts of violence" (*Gewaltakte*). These included thefts committed by members of the SS during house searches; the mistreatment of Jews and Poles on the streets and in shops; the illegal "requisitioning" (in fact theft) of horses, with the result that the beet harvest had almost failed; the "mistreatment of Jews and Jewesses"; and the cohabitation of a certain SS-Untersturmführer Werner with the Jewish actress Johanna Epstein, who had changed her name to Petzold and was passing herself off as an ethnic German. The language was not sensationalist, but no effort was made to mute the horror and perversity of police actions. There was an account, for example, of the "investigation of genitals" that frequently took place when young women and girls were arbitrarily stopped and searched by German police. One particularly shocking item reported the case of two young Poles, a man and a woman, who were publicly beaten as they were made to dig their own graves in Tomaszow-Lublin. Traumatized, the woman began to menstruate, eliciting from a police official in a German police uniform with a standard-issue military steel helmet the words: "Damn, now she's got her period—the fuckfest is canceled." It turned out that the couple had been seized in error, in a case of mistaken identity.[29]

Second, Blaskowitz did not frame his report as the protest of an individual officer but in the name of a broad stratum of German Wehrmacht commanders in occupied Poland, some of whom were named. The Wehrmacht liaison officer to the general governor, Major von Tschammer und Osten, for example, was cited as reporting illegal death sentences issued by police officials, including some against Wehrmacht personnel. And the report included a letter from General Wilhelm Ulex, the commander of Front Sector South, who had written to OberOst protesting against police atrocities and demanding the immediate dissolution of the police units. The appearance of Ulex's name will have surprised no one at Army Supreme Command. Ulex, a committed member of the Confessing Church, had already been removed from the active service list on account of political unreliability in March 1939 and was reinstated only when the invasion of Poland was imminent and candidates for senior commands were scarce.

It has sometimes been noted that in building his case against the SS and police units, Blaskowitz made no appeal to notions of humanity of universal rights but focused primarily on utilitarian arguments. From this, the Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg inferred that Blaskowitz was "not outraged by the idea of drastic action, but only by the amateurish way in which the SS attempted to deal with such a massive body as 200,000 Jews."[30] The Blaskowitz protest did not imply, Jochen Böhler has argued, a "general rejection" of the regime's ethnic measures.[31] And Omer Bartov has emphasized that Blaskowitz's chief concern was not to prevent atrocities as such but to keep the Wehrmacht uninvolved, "so that the military did not have to get their hands dirty." In this sense, Bartov suggests, Blaskowitz "was actually legitimizing murder, just as his colleagues had done during the brutal 'purge' of the SA in 1934."[32]

Certainly the moral compass of Blaskowitz's protest appears narrow from a present-day perspective. Among the reasons he offered for halting such police activity was the risk posed to the security of German troops by an increasingly hostile Polish population. Blaskowitz observed near the beginning of the report that the existence of an "extensive insurrectionary and sabotage organization" supported by former cadres of the Polish army had recently been established in the Kamienna industrial district. It was "the danger posed by this discovery" that "obliged" Blaskowitz to "formulate a general view on the question of the treatment of the Polish people."

> Violent acts committed in public against the Jews arouse among the deeply religious Poles not just the deepest revulsion, but an equal measure of sympathy for the Jewish population, towards whom the Pole had previously adopted a more or less hostile attitude. In a very short time it will come to pass that our arch enemies in the east—the Pole and the Jew—supported, what is more, by the Catholic Church, will come together against Germany across the board in their hatred for their tormentors.[33]

Blaskowitz returned to this theme later in the document, noting that further terrorist measures would transform the Poles into a nation of resisters. It would be especially regrettable if the lower-middle-class Poles, who, "with sensible treatment and effective German administration would peacefully and contentedly have worked for us" were to be "driven, as it were, into the enemy camp." In short, the main argument against the arbitrary and terrorist form of rule unfolding in German-occupied Poland appeared to be that it was and would continue to be an ineffective way of controlling Poland. If one were to "slaughter several tens of thousands of Jews and Poles, as is currently taking place," Blaskowitz warned, this would neither kill off the idea of a Polish state nor "eliminate" the Jews. "On the contrary, the manner and means of the slaughter incurs the greatest damage, complicates the problems and makes them much more dangerous than they would be in the face of considered and target-oriented action."[34]

In addition to these domestic worries, there was reason to fear the effect of the Polish outrages on international opinion. It was hard to imagine better material for enemy propaganda than the behavior of the German police in Poland—and what the foreign broadcasters had already reported was "but a tiny fraction of what has actually transpired." "We must expect," Blaskowitz warned, "that the howls of foreign protest will constantly increase, and work their damage, all the more so as these horrors really have occurred and cannot be disproven."[35] Blaskowitz may or may not have been aware that he himself had already figured in foreign coverage of the Polish occupation. A short *New York Times* article of January 30, 1940, reporting on developments in Poland, noted in a subtitle that "Even General Blaskowitz Balks at Tactics Held Aimed at Virtual 'Racial Extermination,'" but provided no details on the source of this information.[36]

A recurrent theme in Blaskowitz's representations was the argument that police outrages undermined both the "standing" (*Ansehen*) and ethos of the Wehrmacht, which was "forced to look on" as crimes and atrocities unfolded. It was not just a question of the reputation of the Wehrmacht in the eyes of the Polish population and of other outsiders but of its internal values and standards. Particularly menacing, in Blaskowitz's eyes, was the prospect that the brutality of police behavior might communicate itself to the troops of the regular army.

> The worst damage wrought by the current conditions to the German ethnic organism (*dem deutschen Volkskörper*), is the measureless crudification (*Verrohung*) and ethical degradation that will swiftly spread like a plague through valuable German human material (*Menschenmaterial*). When senior officials of the SS and police call for violence and brutality and praise them in public, then power will very soon pass to the most violent individuals. With surprising speed, like-minded persons with disturbed personalities will gather, as has been the case in Poland in order to ventilate their bestial and pathological instincts.

> There is scarcely any means of restraining them, since they must feel, with some justification, that they have been officially authorised and entitled to commit any atrocity.[37]

The only solution, Blaskowitz insisted, was to immediately place the guilty individuals under the authority and jurisdiction of the military.

All this suggests that Hilberg and Bartov were right to emphasis the limited quality of Blaskowitz's protest. There was a tendency to stress what Blaskowitz himself called the "manner and means of the slaughter" rather than the politicoethnic objectives underlying it. Particularly striking is Blaskowitz's own reference, as if in passing, to Jews and Poles as "our arch-enemies in the east." Even so, a degree of caution is in order. Blaskowitz's official remit and his own emphatically soldierly understanding of his role as OberOst encouraged him, as we have seen, to focus on issues of military security and effectiveness. But the details provided in the reports—such as the eyewitness account of German policemen torturing and mocking the young Polish woman—went beyond a merely utilitarian rationale; they were intended to awaken the rage and disgust of the reader. And although there was no principled appeal to human rights of the kind we would now expect, the invocation of humanitarian standards was implicitly present, especially in the text of the letter from Ulex, incorporated in Blaskowitz's report, which interpreted German crimes as indicative of "an incomprehensible lack of humane and moral sensibility." These were not the words of someone who condoned the mass murder of men, women, and children and merely wished to see it carried out in a more decorous way. And Blaskowitz presumably knew enough of his military superiors and of their political masters, whom he must have assumed would be reading his report over the shoulders of the military commanders to whom it was addressed, to understand that humanitarian arguments would be less effective than utilitarian and prudential ones.

The report was a plea for a return to a "traditional" order of war and occupation focused on harnessing the conquered areas for German military and economic purposes. This did not preclude the unprovoked invasion of Poland or the ruthless bombardment of densely inhabited districts in the Polish capital on the threadbare pretext that Polish troops were continuing to defend the city. Nor was it an argument against authoritarianism and draconian discipline. On the contrary: Blaskowitz was a hard-liner in disciplinary matters and he was anxious that his superiors should understand this. Since the conquest of German-occupied Poland, he announced in the report of February 15, German courts martial had ordered "around one hundred executions by firing squad" for acts of sabotage and the illegal possession of weapons. Strict "justice" of this kind was not, he asserted, incompatible with orderly rule in the occupied zone. The Polish population "accepts this as our proper right." By contrast, the ethnopolitical war of extermination pursued by the SS and police would inevitably produce unending disruption and insurrection. Nowhere was his

opposition to this paradigm more sharply expressed than in the proposal, at the close of Ulex's report to OberOst, that "the entirety of the police units, together with *all their higher leaders and including all the leaders holding posts in the General Government,*" be dissolved and replaced by "honorable and intact units."[38] As these words suggest, Blaskowitz's ire extended beyond Poland to the metropolitan apparatus of the SS and the police empire. For all the narrowness of its moral compass, then, his protest amounted to more than a procedural critique—it was a comprehensive rejection of the terrorist exterminationism of the SS, articulated from within the boundaries of a narrowly military political consciousness and doubtless sustained to some extent—who can say for sure?—by a Christian conviction that was "no dusty paternal inheritance" but "a vital force that sought practical expression."[39]

At the time when he composed his reports, Blaskowitz still hoped by this means to achieve change at the highest political level. He appears to have been unaware of the increasingly radical objectives of the political leadership, of Hitler's support for Himmler and his activities, and of von Brauchitsch's almost unlimited willingness to bend the army to the will of its political masters. According to the later recollection of General Hollidt, his staff chief in Poland, the eastern command was "at first poorly informed" about the development of policy for the eastern zone.

> Only bit by bit did it become clear from incoming reports that excesses were occurring on a large scale, but it remained unclear which acts were in accordance with orders and which were the crimes of demoralised units and groups. . . . Only after some time did the people around OberOst acquire the impression that all of these measures were ordered from above.[40]

On February 7, 1940, however, only a day after Blaskowitz had compiled his third report, Walther von Brauchitsch circulated a statement to senior command posts that left readers in little doubt as to the attitude of the Army Supreme Command. "Criticisms," Brauchitsch warned, "that endanger the unity and striking power of the troops," should be forbidden, since "the solution ordered by the Führer of ethnopolitical tasks leads by necessity to otherwise exceptional and harsh measures against the Polish population of the occupied area."[41] By the second week of March at the latest, it must have become clear to Blaskowitz that the atrocities committed in Poland were not excesses but the logical consequence of the occupation policy of the SS leadership, supported by Hitler himself. On the evening of March 13, 1940, Himmler agreed, at the invitation of von Brauchitsch, to hold a lecture on racial-political measures in the occupied zone. Himmler was at first reluctant to speak on such an awkward theme in the presence of skeptics like Blaskowitz and Ulex, but he ultimately agreed, with Brauchitsch's encouragement, in the interests of a fuller understanding between the army and the SS.

That the address took place at all is evidence of how seriously Himmler took the deepening alienation of the military command in Poland, how anxious Brauchitsch was to restore his authority within the army, and how eager the regime leadership was to close the fissure between the army and SS in time for the assault on France.[42] The speech was a characteristically rambling and incoherent performance by the Reichsführer-SS, but it delivered a very clear picture of the regime's intentions, as Himmler's own surviving notes reveal: "Executions—of the leading members of the resistance—very drastic but necessary—been present myself—no wild accusations by subordinates—none by me. Know exactly what is going on."[43]

It was on this occasion that Himmler made the famous assertion, noted by Ulex, that "I do nothing that the Fuhrer does not know of" ("Ich tue nichts, was der Führer nicht weiß").[44] From this moment on at the latest, Blaskowitz, who was present at this event with three colleagues from OberOst, could be in no doubt about the coresponsibility of the political leadership for the events in Poland. He later recalled that he had been "unconvinced" by Himmler"s address.[45] Yet the meeting also made it clear that there would be no final reckoning between the army and the SS, for the generals, far from confronting or challenging Himmler's right to act as he did, failed to question him at all on the Polish events. It was clear that, private expressions of solidarity aside, there would be no support for Blaskowitz or his arguments from the most senior military commanders.

Yet Blaskowitz continued to compile dossiers on SS crimes in Poland. He was on the worst possible terms with General Governor Hans Frank, who resented the general's activities as an affront to his own authority and an "infringement of his rights." On April 24 he even appeared before the desk of Wilhelm Keitel, chief of Wehrmacht Supreme Command, with two further dossiers, one of which contained shocking photographic evidence of Polish atrocities. Keitel refused even to open them on the ground that these were matters for the SS that did not concern the military command.[46] A visitor to the "General Government" of Poland reported in late April 1940 that the Supreme Commander East continued to feel that he was still on top of the situation, that he was "the man who in reality commands."[47] But the truth was that Blaskowitz was now completely isolated within the top echelons of the German army.[48] On May 14, 1940, he was removed from his command. There was no protest from his military superiors.

Blaskowitz initially received the supreme command over the Ninth Army, a reserve unit being prepared for the French campaign. But after only two weeks, he was removed from this post and transferred, on May 30, 1940, to the Command Reserve in Dresden. On June 9, 1940, came the appointment as Military Commander Northern France, but this posting, too, was terminated—apparently on the urging of Himmler—after only two weeks. From Brauchitsch came an evasive condolence letter announcing that Brauchitsch had decided to take on the role of Military Commander Northern France himself and that no post remained that was suitable for a general of Blaskowitz's rank and seniority.

> I fully understand that this change, after such a short space of time, will be painful to you. I hope that the awareness that you rendered great service to the Fatherland at a decisive moment in this war will help you to cope with the fact that after the cessation of hostilities the possibility of an appointment of comparable significance no longer exists.

The letter ended with the assurance that only "professional considerations" and "no other interventions of any kind" had prompted this decision.[49]

Brauchitsch was lying: it was now evident that Blaskowitz's chances of further advancing in the service had been ruined by the Polish protests. What this meant became clear on July 19, 1940, when twelve other Generalobersten were promoted to the rank of General Field Marshal. Each received from Hitler in person an opulent baton worth 6,000 Reichsmarks paid for from the Führer's discretionary funds. In an address delivered at the ceremony, Hitler emphasized the importance of the unity of the German people and how "absolutely necessary" it was "that the Wehrmacht too declare itself completely for National Socialist thought." Blaskowitz's absence was hard to overlook—he was the only Generaloberst not to receive promotion to General Field Marshal and he would remain in this position until the collapse of the regime. This was scarcely tantamount to personal ruin: as Generaloberst, Blaskowitz continued to receive from the regime the monthly tax-free gift of 2,000 Reichsmarks assigned to officers of his rank, an arrangement introduced by Hitler in August 1940 on the model of the emperors of ancient Rome, who had doled out gifts to their generals as a means of purchasing their loyalty. Nevertheless it was a clear sign that Blaskowitz had fallen from favor.[50]

Not until October 25, 1940, was a proper appointment found for Blaskowitz, this time as commander in chief of the First Army stationed in occupied northern France. This was scarcely the kind of job Blaskowitz was looking for. On November 11, 1942, shortly after the Allied landing in Northern Africa and following an agreement with the leaders of the Vichy government, the units of his army marched into unoccupied France without encountering any resistance. But apart from that, the Commander of the First Army was mainly concerned with running the military side of the occupation. Blaskowitz threw himself into training work with his usual commitment. He was tasked above all with preparing men who were destined to serve in Russia for the "particular conditions of combat in the East." These called for careful preparations in a range of areas, from "practical instructions on winter hygiene" and "the habituation of man and beast to the effects of cold and temperature change" to the special training of antitank troops, whose indispensability had been demonstrated by the fighting in the Soviet Union.[51]

For an officer stationed in the south of France, it was difficult, as Blaskowitz well knew, to stay abreast of the latest developments in Russia. In addition to the official reports of the Army Command, he drew on his correspondence with former colleagues now fighting in the east. In a letter

of September 15, 1943, for example, Blaskowitz thanked Generaloberst Jaenecke, his former quartermaster, who had supplied him with "candid" descriptions of the situation in Russia.

> For me, having been kept away for years from the conflict, it is of course extraordinarily valuable to hear from well-informed sources how the conditions of combat have been shaped and changed with the passing years. Only [with this help] can I possibly provide my men with an approximate picture of how it may one day be with us.[52]

In France, Blaskowitz attempted, as—under much less advantageous conditions—he had done in Poland, to build a constructive relationship with the local population. In the summer of 1941, Blaskowitz urged the German troops deployed to support French agriculture to "think selflessly" about their task. It was "not a matter of harvesting for the army itself, but far above and beyond this necessity of helping the country and its population."[53] Here again, Blaskowitz invoked a principle he had formulated eighteen months before in his first Poland report, namely that "acts of violence alone will not suffice to guarantee the safety and peace of the [occupied] country," which could only be secured "through the creation of a pacified population supplied with the most necessary goods."[54]

The first 3½ years in France were relatively uneventful. In May 1944, Blaskowitz was assigned the command of Army Group G, recently formed from the First and Nineteenth Armies. The appointment coincided with an upsurge in resistance activity across the Massif Central. After the Allied landings in Normandy, resistance activity expanded dramatically. The German leadership responded with brutal countermeasures. On June 17, Blaskowitz received three letters from prefects in the Toulouse region protesting crimes committed against French civilians by German soldiers involved in "counterterrorist" repressions. In his answer, Blaskowitz insisted on the right of the German army to defend itself against terrorism "with all the means available to it." If fighting methods had to be applied that were "new for western Europe," Blaskowitz went on, it should be borne in mind that terrorist methods of combat also represented a novelty for western European conditions. In such a "treacherous struggle, where friend cannot be distinguished from foe," it was inevitable that "from time to time innocent individuals would be among the victims." The prevention of this "shedding of innocent blood" would thus only be possible "if the French authorities and population themselves make the terrorist campaign impossible."[55]

Although it remained unlikely that the French population would assist the German forces in this way, Blaskowitz continued to insist that German counterinsurgency activity (*Bandenbekämpfung*) in the south of France be conducted as far as possible in compliance with the norms of international law.[56] In his army order of June 17, 1944, for example, he publicly distanced himself from the behavior of those SS units that only a week before had

murdered six hundred men, women, and children in Oradour-sur-Glane on the pretext of a counterterrorist campaign.

Army Group G was responsible for defending the southern French coast after the massed landings in the north. But Blaskowitz lacked the men, weapons, and munitions needed to make a success of this task. For years—first for the east and now for the Normandy front—he had been deprived of all available reserves. Only on August 16, 1944, a day after the Allied landing on the French Mediterranean coast and much too late to make a difference, did Hitler approve the necessary resources. Blaskowitz was now tasked with leading his armies back to the border of Alsace-Lorraine. Despite the efforts of the Americans to encircle the Blaskowitz armies through an outflanking pursuit, the retreat was a success.[57] Blaskowitz was rewarded with the Oak Leaves to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. But at almost the same time, against Rundstedt's recommendation, he was relieved of his command and transferred once again (on September 21, 1944) to the command reserve, only to be reassigned on Christmas Eve 1944 to the command of Army Group G on the southern flank of the western front, and then transferred on January 28, 1945, to the command of Army Group H on the northern flank. Blaskowitz demonstrated impressive skill in managing large-scale withdrawals under heavy pressure and without air cover, but this did not suffice to earn him the respect of Hitler and his cronies, who concluded that the general lacked the fortitude to "stand and fight."[58]

Motivated by the belief that "we must prevail for the future of our people,"[59] Blaskowitz sought to maintain the discipline of his numerically and materially inferior forces through the threat of draconian punishments. An order of March 5, 1945, signed by Blaskowitz, announced that soldiers who removed themselves from their units would be "summarily condemned and shot" by newly created field courts martial.[60] While the armies of Army Group H were driven apart by units of the British-Canadian Twenty-First Army Group and Holland was cut off from the Reich, Blaskowitz was appointed—on April 7, 1945!—Supreme Commander of the Netherlands, now known as "Fortress Holland," comprising two very damaged general commands and the remains of the Twenty-Fifth Army. On May 2, he collaborated with the local Allied commanders in measures designed to alleviate the subsistence crisis afflicting the civilian population of the Netherlands. But he remained strictly opposed to a separate capitulation for as long as there was still resistance in Germany. He surrendered to Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, commander of the First Canadian Corps, on May 5, 1945, five days after Hitler had committed suicide in his bunker. His first act on returning from his meeting with Foulkes was to cancel the execution of thirty Dutch civilians who had been arrested after a skirmish with Dutch resistance fighters and were about to be shot.[61] Yet even after the hostilities had ended and his army's weapons had been handed over to the Allies, Blaskowitz continued to order the execution of soldiers found guilty of deserting their units. On May 17, 1945, using borrowed Canadian

rifles and ammunition, he ordered the execution of ten German soldiers who had tried to escape in civilian clothes.[62]

It may perhaps seem strange in retrospect that Blaskowitz neither approached the circles of the military resistance after his experiences in Poland nor was approached by them. When he learned of the failed assassination attempt of July 20, 1944, he had a note sent to "Führer HQ" assuring the dictator that the soldiers of Army Group G would "gather all the more closely around him after this appalling crime."[63] Why he did this is now impossible to say—he may have feared that the memory of his stance over Poland would give rise to suspicion that he had been involved in the conspiracy or he may simply have hoped to retain the monthly discretionary payments he was still receiving from the regime in the last year of the war.[64] There is no evidence to suggest that Blaskowitz ever protested against the deportation of Jews from occupied France. The army appraisal forms filed on Blaskowitz in May 1944 and April 1945 characterized his political outlook as "National Socialist," but Rundstedt, who compiled both appraisals, may simply have been trying to protect his subordinate from further humiliating transfers—Blaskowitz certainly never joined the party.[65] In any case, it is unlikely that the reason for Blaskowitz's continuing loyalty to the regime lay in any ideological attachment to National Socialism. Much more significant was his conception of his calling as a German officer.

Blaskowitz's military professionalism enabled him to act in accordance with his principles even when this placed him at odds with the political *Zeitgeist*. But this same professionalism also implied a narrowness of vision. Blaskowitz's avowedly apolitical stance and his military rigor made him unsuitable for any form of political resistance. The diplomat Ulrich von Hassell, a key figure in the civilian resistance, recognized this when he visited Blaskowitz in France in October 1943 with a view to sounding out the author of the famous Polish dossiers. The result was disappointing: "Discussion with Blaskowitz not very fruitful," von Hassell noted in his diary. "[He] essentially sees things from a purely soldierly point of view."[66] From this very bounded standpoint, questions about the moral character of the regime were inevitably overshadowed by duty—to his military superiors, to the troops under his command, and to the "German people" whose fate, whatever one thought of the regime in Berlin, now hung in the balance.

Blaskowitz spent the last three years of his life in prison camps, initially at Dachau, where he spent time in a windowless isolation cell, later in the Steinlager Allendorf near Marburg, and finally in the prison complex at Nuremberg. In February 1948 he was summoned to be heard as part of the "Generals' Trial," in which "Ritter von Leeb and Consorts" were to be tried for waging aggressive war and for war crimes committed in Poland and France. While in confinement, Blaskowitz was repeatedly interrogated on a range of questions relating to the prosecution case—his presence at summit meetings where aggressive campaigns were planned, the use of civilian forced labor on the fortifications in France, the techniques deployed in the battle against the French resistance, and the shootings of

commandos and prisoners of war by units under his nominal command.[67] The charge sheet against Blaskowitz included "crimes against the peace" (the waging of aggressive and illegal war), the forwarding and distribution of orders authorizing criminal acts against Allied military personnel (such as the "Commando Order" of October 18, 1942, which stipulated that enemy commandos were to be shot on capture), and the illegal employment of civilian laborers for fortification works. Blaskowitz was also accused of distributing to the units of Army Group G an order from Rundstedt stating that in sectors where resistance forces had been observed, all able-bodied men from eighteen to fifty-five years of age should be arrested for deportation to Germany. The prosecution cited the case of sixty French citizens who had been arrested in the summer of 1944 by the sixty-second Reserve Corps of the Army Group for deportation to Germany as laborers.[68]

Hans Müller-Torgow, Blaskowitz's defense counsel, got busy drumming up testimony in support of his client. Although there were witnesses prepared to testify to the Polish protests, the dossiers themselves could not be found. Supportive witnesses provided affidavits affirming Blaskowitz's deep Christian faith, his humane interventions on behalf of the civilians in the occupied zones under his control, and his "inner distance" from the political leadership. Müller-Torgow had assured character witnesses for the defense that statements addressing these three themes were most likely to help his client.[69] But Blaskowitz was in any case regarded as a "comparatively light" case and was advised by the American counsel appointed to oversee his defense that he could expect to be acquitted.

Even greater was the shock, then, when Johannes Blaskowitz, on the way back from a visit to the barber on the morning of the first day of his trial, leapt over the barrier and threw himself down the stairwell of the Nuremberg prison annex. Friends and acquaintances puzzled over the reasons for the suicide. Some speculated that he sought by this means to avoid giving testimony that might have compromised fellow officers before the court; others suggested that even the prospect of an acquittal could not offset Blaskowitz's repugnance at the idea of acknowledging a court whose legitimacy he did not accept.[70] But these were pious projections. The defense counsel Hans Müller-Torgow, who saw more of Blaskowitz than anyone else during the last days of his life, surely hit the mark when he observed that his client had fallen prey during the last days before the trial to "a pronounced pessimism that was out of all proportion to his actual prospects."[71] We can trace this mood in a remark from one of the prisoner's last letters: "Thinking of myself, I now see how kind God means to be when he hides our destiny from us."[72]

*

In his partial and conditional rejection of specific features of the National Socialist regime, General Johannes Blaskowitz exemplifies the inadequacy of any paradigm that identifies "compliance and resistance as the two

distinguishable attitudes of the [German] population toward the Nazi state."[73] Blaskowitz was not a resister, in the sense of someone who globally rejected and opposed the regime (by contrast, both Helmuth Stieff and Helmuth Groscurth later joined the resistance and were executed for their role in it). Nor, on the other hand, does his comportment in Poland fall into the diffuse category of *Resistenz*, a term coined by Martin Broszat to capture fragmentary expressions of everyday discontent, the "many 'small' forms of civil courage that could be expected from every contemporary."[74] Richard Löwenthal's concept of "refusal" (*Verweigerung*), denoting a restricted resistance grounded not in principle but in less spectacular forms of nonconformity, comes closer.[75] But Blaskowitz's protest was not formulated in the idiom of everyday noncompliance; it was conspicuous and even provocative. Nor was it "value free," since it both embodied and invoked a specific system of military values.[76] Although we can discern certain continuities of principle in Blaskowitz's behavior, such as his concern to operate wherever possible within the norms of a traditional "order of war," the episodic quality of his protest against the regime's ethnopolitical policies reminds us that the relationship between compliance and noncompliance was not linear. Many individuals "zigzagged back and forth" between compliance and various forms of dissent, exhibiting "the permanence of different modes of behavior."[77]

Rather than cutting the salami of noncompliance into ever thinner taxonomical slices, we should perhaps inquire after the broader impact of such partial rejections of regime policy. One of the distinctive features of Richard Bosworth's work on Fascist Italy has been its attention to the myriad alliances of convenience and modes of interaction that linked Italians with "their" regime.[78] The Nazi regime, like its Italian counterpart, depended for its stability and effectiveness less on the backing of fanatical adherents than on the acquiescence and conditional support of a majority whose interests and worldviews overlapped only partly with that of the political leadership. It has long been understood that "dissension and conflict" filled the lives of "ordinary people" in the Third Reich, who were content to draw the benefits from certain Nazi policies without wholeheartedly absorbing or endorsing the party's doctrines, policies, or propaganda.[79] Udo Klausa, district commissioner of Będzin, just twenty-five miles from Auschwitz, was neither a perpetrator nor "engaged in active resistance"; his ambivalence toward the regime's racial policy, expressed in private letters, was masked by an outward conformity to the expectations of the regime—a conformity that, as Mary Fulbrook has suggested, may be "part of the explanation for the unfolding tragedy of the Holocaust."[80] Nicholas Stargardt's study of the letters sent by German soldiers who witnessed atrocities on the eastern front reveals a similar landscape of doubts, acquiescence, resignation, and troubled conscience.[81]

Far from undermining the cohesion of National Socialist rule, such conditional modes of conformity were a crucial condition of its success. The same observation can even be made in a general sense of many of those who served the regime from positions of high authority. In a suggestive passage of his

"diary," Joseph Goebbels observed of the thuggish Waffen-SS commander Sepp Dietrich that his value to the regime lay precisely in the fact that he thought outside the margins of the NSDAP program and was thus capable of appealing to a constituency beyond the narrower confines of the party faithful.[82] Perhaps an analogous claim can be made—notwithstanding all the differences—for Johannes Blaskowitz, a charismatic educator and leader of troops whose name remained a byword among officers throughout the war for his determined defense of traditional military norms in the face of the most radical expressions of regime policy. Whether his bold stand in Poland actually weakened the regime may be doubted. The contrary may sadly be true—namely, that individuals who were known for their principled objection to specific features of the regime but continued to serve it loyally nonetheless had an important and underrecognized regime-stabilizing effect.

NOTES

1. Kurt Blaskowitz was about to be married and the altercation with two artillery officers took place after his bachelor's party. He was summoned to a military "court of honor" at Insterburg on the day of his wedding, which was postponed so that the duel could be held. Blaskowitz was killed by his antagonist's first shot. See "The Fatal German Duel. Lieut. Hildrebrand, Who Slew Lieut. Blaskowitz, Sentenced to Two Years' Imprisonment," *New York Times* November 19, 1901; also the editorial piece in the *New York Times* November 28, 1901, 9, col. D.
2. Pastor Blaskowitz of Walterkehmen to Wilhelm II, February 7, 1902 (petition requesting the "*Vorpatentierung*" of Johannes Blaskowitz; same to Karl Dietrich Graf von Hülsen-Haeseler (adjutant-general to the Kaiser), February 7, 1902, in which the father mentions the death of his older son at the age of only twenty-five and notes that the fulfilment of his request would represent "a ray of light in my unspeakable anguish." German Federal Military Archive, Freiburg i. Br. [hereafter: BA-MA], Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz, Pers. 6/20, fos. 7, 11.
3. See Gesuchsliste des Infanterie-Regiments von Grolman (1. Posenschen) Nr. 18, Osterode, July 1, 1912, signed v. Karger (Oberst and CiC of Regiment) et al., which requests, on Blaskowitz's behalf, "transfer into one of the larger garrisons of the Grand Duchy of Baden on account of his daughter's illness and his own persistent inflammations of the ear and nose." BA-MA Freiburg, Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz, Pers. 6/20, fo. 24.
4. [General Gustav Seitz], "Blaskowitz," in *Der Seehase. Nachrichtenblatt der Kameradschaft ehemaliger 114er and 14er*, No. 66 (Easter, 1955), [4].
5. See, for example, personnel report of December 1, 1913, which notes his "always outstanding physical agility" and his skills in horse riding, gymnastics and armed combat. BA-MA Freiburg, Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz, Pers. 6/20, fos. 6–7.
6. OB West (Oberkommando Hgr D) Beurteilung zum May 1, 1944, signed Rundstedt, Generalfeldmarschall Ob. d. Hgr. D und OB West, BA-MA Freiburg, Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz, Pers. 6/20, fo. 66.
7. Hellmuth Stieff to his wife, Parade Ground Ohrdruf, August 21, 1932, in Horst Mühleisen, ed., *Hellmuth Stieff: Briefe* (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), letter nr. 36, 71; F. L. Cartsten, *The Reichswehr and Politics, 1918–1933* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1966), 374.

8. Hans Gies (Infantry General Retd.) to Anni Blaskowitz (B's daughter), Konstanz, December 17, 1965, BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814 Schriftwechsel von Hans Gies mit Kameraden u. Anna Blaskowitz, Presseartikel und Ausarbeitungen 1935–1967 (unfoliated).
9. Hans von Seeckt, "Heer im Staat," in id., *Gedanken eines Soldaten* (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1929), 101–116, here 116.
10. Speech by Johannes Blaskowitz, Bommelsen cemetery, Sunday March 17, 1935 (copy), BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814.
11. Seitz, "Blaskowitz," 4.
12. Nicolaus von Below, *Als Hitlers Adjutant 1937–1945* (Mainz: Von Hase und Koehler, 1980), 116.
13. Hanns Möller-Witten, "Darstellung des Lebenslaufs von Blaskowitz," BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1931.
14. Blaskowitz to Fischer (Reich Propaganda Chief), Prague, May 14, 1939, BA Berlin Lichterfelde, R 55/30181, Personalakten betr. Ebert, Karl Verwaltungsmann, Reichspropagandaamt Mark Brandenburg.
15. Major-General Erwin Jaenecke, "Die Armee Blaskowitz im Polenfeldzug" (1939), [typescript], BA-MA Freiburg, RH 20–8/46, esp. ff. 1–2; see also Friedrich-Christian Stahl, "Blaskowitz," in Bernd Ottnad, ed., *Badische Biographien*. New Series, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1987), 41–44.
16. Richard Giziowski, *The Enigma of General Blaskowitz* (London: Leo Cooper, 1997), 147.
17. Ivo V. Giannini, Detailed Interrogation Report: Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz, Special detention Centre "Ashcan," July 28, 1945, TNA WO 208/3154, 4.
18. Giannini, Detailed Interrogation Report, 4.
19. Engel, diary entry of November 18, 1939, in Hildegard von Kotze, ed., *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler 1938–1943. Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), 68.
20. Order of the Day of October 26, 1939, cited in Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, *Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges. Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD 1938–1942* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 96.
21. Stieff to his wife, Jüterbog, October 10, 1930, excerpted in Helmut Krausnick, ed., "Ausgewählte Briefe von Generalmajor Helmuth Stieff," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 2/3 (1954), 291–305, here 295–296.
22. Same to same, Stuttgart, August 12, 1934, Krausnick, ed., "Ausgewählte Briefe," 297–298.
23. Same to same, Headquarters, November 21, 1939, Krausnick, ed., "Ausgewählte Briefe," 288–300, here 300.
24. Report of Supreme Commander East General Blaskowitz to Army Supreme Command Łódż, November 27, 1939, BA-MA Freiburg, N 104/3. Parts of this document are reprinted in Helmut Krausnick, Harold C. Deutsch, and Hildegard von Kotze, eds., *Helmuth Groscurth. Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers* (Stutgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), doc. nr. 43, 426–427.
25. Kotze (ed.), *Heeresadjutant bei Hitler*, 68.
26. Thus Blaskowitz's account of the contents of the lost report during an interrogation by the American army on July 28, 1945; see Giziowski, *Enigma*, 179. But in view of the similarity between the three reports Blaskowitz is known to have submitted on police activities, the dates are uncertain and he may have confused the reports with each other.
27. For the text of Himmler's decree, which was formally secret but quickly became notorious, see "Geheimerlass des Reichsführer-SS für die gesamte SS und Polizei" (October 28, 1939), in Norbert Westenrieder, "*Deutsche*

Frauen und Mädchen!" Vom Alltagsleben, 1933–1945 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1984), 42; on army alienation on account of the degree, see Groscurth, *Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers*, 78.
28. Krausnick, *Truppe des Weltanschaungskrieges*, 98.
29. Vortragsnotizen für Vortrag OberOst (Generaloberst Blaskowitz) beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres am 15.2.1940 in Spala (Abschrift), BA-MA Freiburg, RH 53–23/23.
30. Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews* (London: W.H. Allen, 1961), 127.
31. Jochen Böhler, *Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2006), 238; the same point is made in id., *Der Überfall. Deutschlands Krieg gegen Polen* (Frankfurt am Main: Eichborn, 2009), 223–224.
32. Omer Bartov, "Soldiers, Nazis and War in the Third Reich." *Journal of Modern History* 63/1 (1991), 44–60, here: 57.
33. Vortragsnotizen für Vortrag OberOst, fo. 11.
34. Ibid., fo. 11.
35. Ibid., fo. 11
36. "Nazis Admit 'Firm' Polish Policy; Cardinal Sees National 'Disaster'; Even General Blaskowitz Balks at Tactics Held Aimed at Virtual 'Racial Extermination,'" *New York Times* January 30, 1940; see also "Iron Hand in Poland," *New York Times*, January 31, 1940, 7, col. A, which refers to Blaskowitz under the subtitle "A General Objects."
37. Vortragsnotizen für Vortrag OberOst, fo. 12.
38. Vortragsnotizen für Vortrag OberOst, fo. 13.
39. Text of the speech held by Pastor Schrader at Blaskowitz's funeral in Fallingbostel, February 16, 1948, BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814.
40. Hollidt to Krausnick, August 5, 1957, cited in Helmut Krausnick, "Hitler und die Morde in Polen. Ein Beitrag zum Konflikt zwischen Heer und SS um die Verwaltung der besetzten Gebiete," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 11 (1963),196–209, here 204, n. 43.
41. Army Supreme Command to Commanders in Chief of Army Groups and to OberOst, February 7,1940, cited in Krausnick and Wilhelm , *Die Truppe des Weltanschaungskrieges*, 103–104.
42. Klaus-Jürgen Müller, "Zur Vorgeschichte und Inhalt der Rede Himmlers vor der höheren Generalität am März 13,1940 in Koblenz," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgschichte* 18/1 (1970), 95–120, esp. 100–103, 106.
43. Ibid., 105.
44. Krausnick, "Hitler und die Morde in Polen," 205.
45. Interrogation protocol, October 25, 1945, cited in Giziowski, *Enigma*, 211.
46. Giziowski, *Enigma*, 213.
47. Thus the impression recorded in the interim report by SS-Brigadeführer Berger, see Head of Erganzungsamt of the Waffen-SS, Tgb. Nr. 178/40 geh. An Reichsführer-SS and Head of German Police, Berlin, April 25, 1940, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 53–23/23, fo. 31.
48. Hermann Graml, "Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgschichte*, 45/3 (1997), 365–384, here 375.
49. Brauchitsch to Blaskowitz, HQ, June 26, 1940 (copy), BA-MA Freiburg, Pers 6/20, fo. 52.
50. Norman J.W. Goda, "Black Marks: Hitler's Bribery of His Senior Officers during World War II," *Journal of Modern History* 72/2 (2000), 413–452.
51. See Blaskowitz's training guidelines for units earmarked for service on the eastern front, Armeeoberkommando 1, January 16, 1942, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 20–1/109, fos. 25–27.

52. Blaskowitz to General Erwin Jaenecke, (no location given), September 15, 1943, BA-MA Freiburg, N761/4.
53. Supreme Command First Army to commanding generals and divisional commands, June 27, 1941, signed Blaskowitz, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 20–1/100 (AOK I: Addenda to Activity Report Ia), vol. 1, fo. 12 (copy of copy).
54. Report of Supreme Commander East, General Blaskowitz to Army Supreme Command, Łódż, November 27, 1939, BA-MA Freiburg, N 104/3.
55. Supreme Commander Army Group G to Commandant of H. V. St. 654 Toulouse (for forwarding to the regional prefects of Toulouse), secret, HQ, June 17, 1944, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 19 XII/3 (addendum 243), fo. 327.
56. On this measure and its later disavowal by OB West, see Peter Lieb, *Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg? Kriegführung und Partisanenbekämpfung in Frankreich* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2007), 392.
57. On Blaskowitz's impressive management of the withdrawals from southern France, see Joachim Ludewig, *Der deutsche Rückzug aus Frankreich 1944* (Freiburg: Rombach, 1994), esp. 70, 73, 318.
58. See, for example, the discussion at Führer HQ on January 27, 1945 in H. Heiber, ed., *Hitlers Lagebresprechungen. Die Protokollfragmente seiner militärischen Konferenzen 1942–1945* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962), 855; also Ludewig, *Rückzug*, 319.
59. Letter to Anneliese Weitz (no location given), February 17, 1945, BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/2603.
60. Cited in W. Denis Winter and Shelagh Whitaker, *Rhineland. The Battle to End the War* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989), 267.
61. Giziowski, *Enigma*, 403.
62. "10 Germans Executed by Blaskowitz," *New York Times* May 18, 1945, 4, col. B.
63. Kriegstagebuch (Army Daily Reports) Army Group G (Command Department), July 21,1944.
64. On the political pressure on Blaskowitz to demonstrate conformity, see Lieb, "Konventioneller Krieg oder NS-Weltanschauungskrieg?" 87; on the continuation of payments to Blaskowitz, see Goda, "Black Marks."
65. Appraisals: BA-MA Freiburg Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz, Pers. 6/20, fos. 66, 67; on Blaskowitz's nonmembership of the NSDAP, see his Personal Data Sheet of October 15, 1947, completed when he arrived at Nuremberg, which states under the rubric "political history:" "As a professional soldier not a party member." BA—Aussenstelle Ludwigsburg, B 162/ Rep. 502 XA 13 and XA 155.
66. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, ed., *Die Hassell-Tagebücher 1938–1944. Aufzeichungen vom anderen Deutschland* (Berlin: Siedler, 1988), 365.
67. See for example, the text of an interview conducted by a Mr. Fred Kaufman—probably in the Steinlager Allendorf—on October 17, 1947, and the questionnaire requested by a Mr. Walter H. Rapp on November 17, 1947, both in BA-MA Freiburg Personalakte General-Oberst Blaskowitz Pers. 6/20.
68. "Anklageschrift gegen von Leeb und andere, hier gegen Generaloberst Blaskowitz" (copy), in BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814 Schriftwechsel von Hans Gies mit Kameraden u. Anna Blaskowitz, Presseartikel und Ausarbeitungen 1935–1967; the arrest of sixty French citizens in the course of "counterterrorist" actions near Nice is also reported in the War Diary of Army Group G, entry of July 3, 1944, BA-MA Freiburg, RH 19 XII/5, fo. 9.
69. See, for example, Heinz Mueller-Torgow to Hans Gies, Nuremberg, January 20, 1948; Hans Gies, "Eidesstattliche Erklärung zur Anklage gegen Gen.

Obst. Blaskowitz;" Pastor Scriba, "Bekundung . . . zur Benutzung und Vorlage als Beweismaterial beim Internationalem Gerichtshof im Justizpalast zu Nürnberg," March 10, 1948, excerpted in Gert Steuben, "Wie sie starben. Todesfälle jener Jahre. So blieb er ohne Marschallsstab," *Das Neue Blatt* 1953, 12, all in BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814.

70. Pastor Scriba, "Bekundung . . . zur Benutzung und Vorlage als Beweismaterial beim Internationalem Gerichtshof im Justizpalast zu Nürnberg," op. cit.
71. Hans Müller-Torgow to Hans Gies, Nuremberg, February 25, 1948, BA-MA Freiburg, MSg 1/1814.
72. Letter from Blaskowitz (recipient unnamed), Nuremberg, December 27, 1947, cited in "Porträts großer Soldaten," *Kampftruppen* (June 1967), 94.
73. On this problem, see Frank Trommler, "Between Normality and Resistance: Catastrophic Gradualism in Nazi Germany," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (Supplement: Resistance against the Third Reich), (1992), 82–101.
74. Martin Broszat, "Resistenz und Widerstand: Eine Zwischenbilanz des Forschungsprojekts," in M. Broszat et al., eds., *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* (4 vols., Munich: Oldenbourg, 1981), vol. 4, 691–709, here 693; id., "Zur Sozialgeschichte des deutschen Widerstandes," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 34 (1986), 300–334.
75. Richard Löwenthal, "Widerstand im totalen Staat," in Richard Löwenthal and Patrick von zur Mühle, eds., *Widerstand und Verweigerung in Deutschland, 1933–1945* (Berlin: Dietz, 1982), 11–24.
76. On "value-freedom" as a feature distinguishing mere *Resistenz* from resistance, see Klemens von Klemperer, "'What Is the Law That Lies behind These Words?' Antigone's Question and the German Resistance against Hitler," *Journal of Modern History* 64 (Supplement: Resistance against the Third Reich), (1992), 102–111.
77. Alf Lüdtke, "The Appeal of Exterminating 'Others': German Workers and the Limits of Resistance," in ibid., 46–67, here 49.
78. See especially Richard Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy. Life under the Dictatorship, 1915–1945* (London: Allen Lane, 2005); id, *The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (London, 1998); id., "War, Totalitarianism and 'Deep Belief' in Fascist Italy 1935–1943," *European History Quarterly* 34/4 (2004), 475–505; id., "Everyday Mussolinism: Friends, Family, Locality and Violence in Fascist Italy," *Contemporary European History* 14/1 (2005), 23–43.
79. Ian Kershaw, *Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich: Bavaria, 1933–1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983), 374.
80. Mary Fulbrook, *A Small Town Near Auschwitz. Ordinary Nazis and the Holocaust* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), vii, x.
81. Nicholas Stargardt, "The Search for Subjectivity in the Second World War," keynote address at the German Historical Studies Conference, Edinburgh, September 15, 2012.
82. Joseph Goebbels, Diary entry July 15, 1942, in Elke Fröhlich, ed., *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Part II, *Diktate 1941–45* (15 vols., Munich: K. G. Saur, 1993–1995), vol. 5, 126.

4 Stalin and the World of Culture

Sheila Fitzpatrick

Totalitarian dictatorships are interested in high culture (so goes the conventional wisdom) both for its propaganda potential and because of their need to control every aspect of human life. But if we look more closely at the three major personifications of totalitarian dictator in mid-twentieth-century Europe—Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini—it seems that something more needs to be said about the dictators' relationships with the cultural world. All three of them had their own early personal involvement with the arts: Hitler as a painter, Stalin as a poet,[1] Mussolini as a violinist. All three had youthful connections, albeit of varying degrees of marginality, with the cultural elites of their own societies, which they simultaneously aspired to and disdained. For all three youthful future dictators, the cultural milieu was one of the first milieus that beckoned as way to escape from humble origins into a different life—the other being, of course, radical politics. In all three cases, long-standing familiarity with some aspects of the cultural world coexisted with equally well-entrenched resentment. As political figures, all three developed a critique of decadence that was intimately connected with their own personal observations of their national cultural worlds.

These personal connections with high culture have generally been seen as a matter of secondary interest by historians of their respective regimes, perhaps rightly as far as Hitler and Mussolini are concerned. Richard Bosworth begins his classic biography of Mussolini with a peroration on his protagonist's status as an intellectual:

> Which European politician of the first half of the twentieth century could be relied on to read the philosophical and literary works of his co-nationals and send their authors notes of criticism and congratulation? Who . . . kept on his desk a copy of the works of Socrates and Plato, annotated in his own hand? . . . Who, in his table talk while he was entrenched in power, was fascinated by the task of tracing his intellectual antecedents? Who at least said that he admired contemporary historians for their professionalism and their refusal to bow to fashion and urged that his party's line should be "indulgence towards professors"? Who seemed almost always ready to grant an interview

> and, having done so, was especially pleased by the prospect of talking about contemporary political and philosophical ideas? Who left more than 44 volumes of his collected works? . . . [2]

Bosworth's subsequent text has weightier matters to deal with than Mussolini's pretensions as an intellectual or his contacts with the world of culture, and little more is said on the subject. Hitler's biographers and historians of Nazi Germany, similarly, have usually relegated Hitler's artistic inclinations and contacts with the cultural world to a minor position. In contrast to the scholarship on Fascist Italy, which is relatively sparse with regard to cultural policy, there exists an extensive literature dealing with Nazis' relations with specific cultural areas, and scholars like Eric Michaud and Birgit Schwarz[3] have stressed the importance Hitler attached to the arts, even suggesting that he saw the Nazi reconfiguration of the state as something akin to an artistic project. As Michaud notes, Hitler was not the only Nazi leader to have had cultural aspirations: the government of the new Germany was "composed of members half of whom are men who originally intended to devote themselves to some kind of creative work."[4] Nevertheless, for Hitler's and Mussolini's regimes, coming to terms with *Bildungsbürgertum* in Germany and *intellettuali* in Italy was simply not a major problem or high-priority issue: in the first place, neither the German nor the Italian cultural elites were oppositionally disposed, and, in the second, these societies had other elites (aristocratic, political, landowning, industrialist, military, clerical) whose political salience for the new rulers was much greater.

Stalin and the Soviet intelligentsia was another matter. In Russia, the intelligentsia, with its long-established tradition as moral critic of power and alternative authority, had mattered politically since the latter part of the nineteenth century in a way it did not in Germany and Italy. It mattered even more after the revolution, since the now-ruling Bolshevik party was initially led primarily by revolutionaries who were also members of the radical wing of the intelligentsia. Taking power by revolution, the Soviet rulers had a confrontational attitude to old political, social, and economic elites that was unmatched in either Germany or Italy; as a result of the confrontation, the old elites were largely destroyed, their members either emigrating or doing their best to conceal their pasts. In effect, the intelligentsia was the only real survivor of Russia's old elites, and it was—and remained—a real competitor with the Bolsheviks for moral authority. All this meant that Stalin's dealings with the world of culture were more important in the larger picture of his rule than Hitler's or Mussolini's. This is reflected in the scholarly literature. No biographer of Stalin would treat his dealings with the intelligentsia as something secondary, nor would Stalin himself have perceived it in that light.[5]

Recent archive-based scholarship has greatly expanded our knowledge of Stalin as an intellectual and reader, editor, and viewer of cultural

products.[6] One rather unexpected discovery is that there are actually *two* possible answers to Bosworth's question: Stalin, no less than Mussolini, could be relied on to read and comment on contemporary philosophical and literary works, and he accumulated a large library of heavily annotated books covering the spectrum of the humanities and social sciences. He took his intellectual antecedents seriously, occasionally suggested the equivalent of "indulgence to the professors" (although in Stalin's case this was done comparatively rarely and perhaps in a spirit of perversity).[7] He liked holding forth on abstract and theoretical questions and turns out to have been a compulsive editor (for style as well as substance) of any manuscript that came his way. Finally, he left a respectable corpus of collected works (only sixteen published volumes in Stalin's case, but they are far from a comprehensive collection of his writings). This essay, however, will focus primarily neither on Stalin's personal intellectual and cultural interests nor on Soviet cultural policy under his leadership. The focus will be on his relations and those of his closest Politburo associates with the producers of high culture, that is, with that peculiar Russian entity the "creative" intelligentsia.[8] I see this as a contest for moral authority conceptualized by Lenin in his famous question *Kto-kogo?* (literally, "Who-whom?"), meaning "which side will triumph in the struggle between the revolutionary proletariat and the bourgeoisie?" Twenty years ago, I looked at this issue in the context of the 1920s.[9] In this essay, I will shift the focus to the Stalin period, exploring the *social* relations of political leaders and the leaders of the intelligentsia with a view to finding out who exercised what kind of authority over whom and how this evolved over time from the late 1920s to the early 1950s.

BOLSHEVIKS AND INTELLIGENTSIA

"Intelligentsia" is a slippery word. As coined and used in the late Imperial period, it applied not to all educated Russians (many of whom were from the noble estate) but also to those who embraced the idea of service to the people rather than service to the regime and constituted themselves as moral critics of government. Many of the first generation of Bolshevik leaders, including Lenin, came from the radical intelligentsia, although the party styled itself as the vanguard of the proletariat. Before 1917, party activists were often informally divided into two categories: émigrés (mainly from the Russian intelligentsia, educated in academic gymnasia and universities) and *komitetchiki* (mainly lower class, educated at best in a seminary or trade school). Lenin, Trotsky, and almost all the leaders of the Left and Right Opposition—in other words, Stalin's political rivals in the 1920s—fell into the first category. Stalin, despite his early poetic aspirations and lifelong status as a serious reader and self-made intellectual, fell into the second, and so did most of those who joined his political faction. The Stalinist leadership of the 1930s consisted almost entirely of men who, in the party

context of the 1920s, were seen as *non*-intelligentsia. In terms of the party leadership struggle after Lenin's death, it was one of their strengths, since the great majority of rank-and-file party members were workers or peasants with little education who felt more kinship with the "crude" men of Stalin's group than with the cultivated and cosmopolitan intellectuals who led the Left and Right Oppositions. In terms of dealing with the old Russian intelligentsia, however, it constituted a definite weakness.[10]

The old intelligentsia, despite its radical tendencies, stayed true to the prerevolutionary tradition of critical distance from government, maintaining an arms'-length attitude to the new Bolshevik rulers, and vice versa. The Bolsheviks used the derogatory term "bourgeois" in speaking of the old intelligentsia (as contrasted with a still embryonic "proletarian" or Communist intelligentsia). But, as Lenin recognized, the regime could not do without "bourgeois specialists" to provide technical expertise in industry, railroads, agriculture, and so on—and, under the prodding of Lunacharsky and Gorky, even the humanists and artists found themselves comparatively privileged in the new society. By the same token, the experts could not do without the regime: they needed jobs and material support. Around the mid 1930s, the new category of "Soviet intelligentsia" came into use, embracing both the old "bourgeois intelligentsia" and a new, upwardly mobile "worker-peasant intelligentsia" created by affirmative action policies in the previous fifteen years.[11] To complicate matters further, Stalin in 1936 identified this Soviet intelligentsia as one of the basic building blocks of Soviet society, now described as consisting of two nonantagonistic classes (workers and the collectivized peasantry) and a "stratum," the intelligentsia, a residual category which included the entire white-collar group, from office workers to administrators and professionals.[12]

One way of circumventing these definitional thickets would be to accept an individual's self-definition and work with the circular definition of the intelligentsia as the community of people who self-identified as intelligentsia. This takes us some of the way, but not all. We need to add the factor of recognition by insiders (other intelligentsia members) and perception by outsiders, notably Communists. An *intelligent/intelligentka* was someone who not only made a claim to intelligentsia status that was plausible to others making the same claim but who could also readily be recognized as such in the broader society by markers of dress, demeanor, and speech. The dichotomy of *intelligentsia* and *vlast'* (political power) was ubiquitous in Soviet discourse. In the 1920s, the categories were really relatively separate: comparatively few members of the intelligentsia were party members and, outside the party leadership, comparatively few Communists were of intelligentsia origins. The separation diminished in the 1930s, as lower-class Communists entered the white-collar professional and administrative elite as a result of affirmative action, and the barriers to white-collar entry into the party were removed at the end of the decade. Still, the conceptual dichotomy remained, and with it the sense that the intelligentsia

(implicitly including its Communist members) collectively shared a value system or "public opinion" (*obshchestvennoe mnenie*) which, if not necessarily opposed to that of the party, was at least distinguishable from it.[13]

Anatoly Lunacharsky, a former émigré intellectual, was the party's point man in dealing with the intelligentsia in the 1920s. But as a political figure, like other formerly prominent intellectuals in the party, he was only of the second rank, as Stalin was at pains to impress on a visiting foreign journalist in 1925. [14] In his zeal to build bridges between the party and the cultural world, Lunacharsky found himself acting as an all-purpose patron for the intelligentsia, a similar role to that played by the pro-Bolshevik writer Maxim Gorky in the first years after the revolution, and then again (after his return from a decade of residence in Europe) in the 1930s. At this point, there was no concept in the Bolshevik Party of patronage as a phenomenon appropriate to a revolutionary world; the practice simply emerged spontaneously, as luminaries of the artistic, scholarly and scientific world (familiar with the ways of patronage from prerevolutionary experience) sought patrons and protectors among Bolshevik leaders. Since the Bolshevik leaders they tended to know personally were intellectuals themselves, most of the early Bolshevik patrons came from the intellectual, former émigré group in the party leadership, not the less cultured and cosmopolitan *komitetchiki*. Trotsky's clients included the writers Isaak Babel, Eduard Bagritsky, and Boris Pilniak and the avant-garde theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold. Lev Kamenev, a serious literary intellectual, was active as a patron of artists and intellectuals, as was his wife Olga Kameneva (Trotsky's sister), who was the founding director of VOKS, the society for cultural relations with the outside world. Other Politburo members active as patrons in the first decade after the revolution included Alexei Rykov, head of the government after Lenin, and Nikolai Bukharin, patron among others of the poet Osip Mandelstam.[15] As these names suggest, leaders who found themselves in opposition to Stalin in the course of the 1920s predominated among the early Bolshevik patrons of the arts.[16]

Stalin held aloof from all this: the "high society" of Moscow under the New Economic Policy was not his milieu, and he tended to distrust the party's self-styled intellectuals. This did not mean that Stalin was not or did not consider himself an educated and cultured person. But he was socially ill at ease with the intelligentsia, both inside the party and out, and in the 1920s, no doubt feeling that the more glamorous party intellectuals would put him in the shade with the old intelligentsia, he avoided direct contacts and, if asked his opinion on a cultural matter, tended to temporize.[17]

Stalin's strategy in the 1920s was to cultivate the young Communist challengers in the cultural world—leaders of the militant Russian Association of Proletarian Writers (RAPP), the graduate students and young scholars at the Institute of Red Professors (IKP), and the Communist Academy,[18] whose self-appointed job was to end the hegemony of "the bourgeois intelligentsia" in culture. But this strategy proved disappointing, both for the

party in general and for Stalin. RAPP, led by the ambitious and well-connected Leopold Averbakh (nephew of early Bolshevik leader Yakov Sverdlov, brother in law of Genrikh Yagoda, the chief of the secret police), was not only highly confrontational and intolerant in its dealings with other literary factions but also failed to show appropriate respect for the party's Central Committee. Despite Stalin's assiduous cultivation of the RAPPists from the mid-1920s, Averbakh never seems to have developed a personal loyalty to Stalin. It was even worse with the IKP students, in training to become the *smena*, or next generation of Communist leaders, because their allegiance went to a competitor, the "Rightist" Bukharin. By 1932, Stalin had given up on the idea of a Communist *smena* trained in the humanities and social sciences, settled for engineers in their place, and abolished all the proletarian artistic organizations, including RAPP.[19]

In later life, Stalin did not forget these defeats and humiliations; the would-be Communist *smena* suffered badly in the Great Purges. But the whole process of his cultivation of RAPP and IKP and subsequent disappointment had brought him closer to the sphere of high culture. He was developing a sense that supervision in this sphere was part of his job as top man: in response to a bumptious RAPPist's questioning of his expertise to adjudicate literary questions, he responded firmly: "This is necessary. This is useful. This is, in the final analysis, my duty."[20] That new sense of duty was manifest in Stalin's remarkably hands-on involvement in the foundation of the Soviet Writers' Union in the early 1930s.[21] Culture was one of three areas that Stalin had under his special supervision (*kuratorstvo*) as a Central Committee secretary in 1934 (the others were security matters and the Politburo).[22]

PATRONAGE NETWORKS IN THE 1930S

A change in the regime's approach to the intelligentsia, particularly the "creative" one, was succinctly summarized by an émigré Menshevik paper in 1934: "they [the political leaders] are courting and coaxing and bribing it." [23] This courting may have been prompted in part by recognition that the intelligentsia was now, as a result of Soviet affirmative-action policies, no longer purely "bourgeois" and non-Communist, having come to include the formerly conceptually distinct "proletarian" and Communist intelligentsia. During this same period, the party leaders were also getting to know various prominent figures of the creative intelligentsia on a personal basis; in other words, they were taking over the patronage functions earlier monopolized by intellectuals from the Left and Right Oppositions. In the 1920s, the only member of the Stalin group conspicuous as a patron was Klim Voroshilov, whose first clients were members of the Association of Revolutionary Painters (AKhRR), who had the bright idea of soliciting commissions for portraits of military leaders. By the mid-1930s, however,

it would be hard to find a Politburo member—Stalin excepted, but we will deal with him later—who was not established as a patron to whom particular writers, artists, theater people, musicians, and scholars would turn to appeal for a better apartment or a dacha or to ask for help in some professional squabble. Mikhail Kalinin,[24] Andrei Andreev,[25] Andrei Zhdanov,[26] the intellectual Valerian Kuibyshev (with a second marriage to a wife who liked to socialize with artists and writers),[27] and of course Voroshilov were all now active as patrons. Even Lazar Kaganovich, the least arty and most hard-working of the team, would go to Meyerhold's productions with the tickets Meyerhold had sent him and had his special intelligentsia clients.[28] Anastas Mikoian was the go-to man for Armenians,[29] Sergo Ordzhonikidze for Georgians.[30] Viacheslav Molotov, chairman of Sovnarkom (i.e., head of the government throughout the 1930s), was overwhelmed by requests from writers, artists, scientists and scholars.[31]

Outside the Politburo, military and secret-police leaders were particularly active as patrons. Of these, Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky—an amateur violinist, violin maker, and violin collector—is perhaps the most famous because of his association with Shostakovich.[32] But OGPU/NKVD chief Genrikh Yagoda deserves at least equal recognition. Personally close to RAPPists Averbakh and Vladimir Kirshon, he was, like them, a member of the important Nizhny Novgorod Bolshevik clan, which included the writer Maxim Gorky, newly returned to the Soviet Union in the early 1930s and fêted and cosseted by Stalin. Yagoda was a regular visitor at Gorky's house and dacha, partly at Stalin's behest but also because he had fallen in love with Gorky's daughter-in-law, Timosha. Nikolai Ezhov, the man who was to succeed Yagoda at the head of the NKVD, was also active as a patron, particularly through his journalist wife, Evgenia Ezhova (Khaitina, Gladun), a former lover of the writer Isaac Babel. Habitués of Ezhova's salon included the writers Babel, Pilniak, and Mikhail Sholokhov (another of her lovers)[33]; Nadezhda Mandelstam relates how in 1930 (when Nikolai was still working in the Central Committee secretariat) Evgenia tried to add Nadezhda's husband, the poet Osip Mandelstam, to her list of clients.[34]

Intermarriages of Communist leaders with members of creative intelligentsia were comparatively rare (none occurred at Politburo level) and liable to provoke disapproval. Marshal Budenny, of Civil War cavalry fame, and Anatoly Lunacharsky, head of the Commissariat of Enlightenment in the 1920s, were two second-tier figures who had taken actresses as their second wives. Corps Commander Vitalii Primakov, who married the poet Mayakovsky's former lover Lilia Brik, was another Old Bolshevik linked by marriage with the intelligentsia.[35] Affairs with ballerinas, actresses, and opera singers were more common (Stalin's old Caucasus comrade Avel Enukidze was notorious in this respect) but also somewhat disapproved of.

In the mid 1930s, we hear of salons where party, military, and police leaders mingled with leading writers, artists, and theater people. The

salon of Zinaida Raikh, wife of the theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold, attracted an extensive array of party leaders and members of the secret police.[36] The Grigorii Prokofievs (he deputy head of the NKVD, she a journalist) were regular hosts to such luminaries as the famous journalist and publishing bigwig Mikhail Koltsov (who was Sofia Prokofieva's boss), Children's Theater director Natalia Sats and her husband Israil Veitser, People's Commissar for Trade, along with assorted writers, actors, and NKVD colleagues of Prokofiev.[37] The Budennys—Marshal Semen Mikhailovich and his second wife Olga Stepanovna Mikhailova, singer at Bolshoi theater—had a salon, too, mixing military leaders linked by shared Civil War experience with Mikhailova's opera colleagues.[38] Olga Bubnova, wife of Andrei Bubnov (Lunacharsky's successor at the Commissariat of Enlightenment), ran a salon with Galina Egorova, film-actress wife of Marshal Aleksandr Ilich Egorov; it met on Wednesdays and Fridays and attracted a variety of famous people from the political and cultural worlds. [39]

STALIN'S MYSTIFICATIONS

Stalin himself had some social contact with the Egorovs—by some accounts, it was with Galina Egorova that he was flirting at the fatal Kremlin dinner party that preceded the suicide of his wife, Nadya Allilueva, in November 1932.[40] But he was not likely to be found at Galina's salon. Stalin wanted to make an impression on the world of culture, but he was not about to become a patron like anyone else. He had other strategies. One of them was his instrumental use of the writer Maxim Gorky, newly returned from Capri, who in his extensive activity as a literary patron may be seen in some respects as Stalin's surrogate or subcontractor. The other was his development of a striking new technique of unexpected personal interventions, usually by telephone, generating astonishment, awe, and gossip. The Bulgakov (1930) and Pasternak (1934) telephone calls are the famous ones, immediately entering the folklore of the Moscow intelligentsia. That was exactly their purpose.

The playwright Mikhail Bulgakov had sustained a barrage of hostile criticism from the proletarian militants of the literary world, along with unwelcome attention from the GPU,[41] for his Civil War play *Dni Turbinykh*, held to be overly sympathetic to the Whites; but Stalin had indicated a certain sympathy for his work (a fish in the more or less fishless pond of Soviet theater was how he put it in 1929).[42] Bulgakov had written a desperate appeal to Stalin, and the Politburo discussed it. [43] Months later (April 18,1930), out of the blue, Stalin called Bulgakov at home. The conversation, as later related by Bulgakov's wife, went as follows: "[Stalin]: We received your letter. Read it with the comrades. You will be receiving a favorable answer . . . and perhaps, in truth, we might let you go abroad? What's the matter—are you really fed up with us?"[44]

"All Moscow" was buzzing with the news of this intervention and what it conveyed about the attitudes of the mystery man in the Kremlin. And the GPU was reporting back accordingly, in one of the first known examples of a genre of *svodki* on the mood of the intelligentsia obtained by snooping, which were circulated, like celebrity gossip columns, to the Kremlin leaders. The Bulgakov telephone call had been a tremendous PR coup, according to the informants' observations, spreading quickly via the grapevine and having "an enormous impact" on intellectuals' views of Stalin. "It's as if a dam had broken, and everyone around saw the true face of comrade Stalin." Rascals had been "making a career out of persecution of Bulgakov, and now Stalin has given them a slap in the face," the intellectuals were saying, speaking of Stalin "warmly and with love."[45]

Spin and image making were what this was all about, the OGPU monitoring of reactions to Stalin's interventions being an intrinsic part of the process. The Bulgakov telephone call was followed by another well-publicized government response to an appeal for a pension sent to Stalin by the son of the nineteenth-century writer Saltykov-Shchedrin in 1932. According to the OGPU, the news went round Leningrad like wildfire, becoming "the sensation of the day." It was understood as Stalin's symbolic recognition of "the old intelligentsia's great significance in the country's cultural life"—something, the grapevine said, he had to battle for against other less sympathetic members of the leadership. "It really makes you see Stalin in a new way," said literary critic Medvedev: he is "a great liberal and patron (*bol'shoi liberal i metsenat*) in the best sense of the word."[46]

The great liberal struck again in 1934. The occasion was the poet Mandelstam's first arrest, but the telephone call went to another poet, Boris Pasternak. Different versions of this incident circulate, but Stalin's intent was evidently both to say that Mandelstam would be all right and to seek confirmation from Pasternak that Mandelstam was, indeed, a major poet (*master*). Pasternak, a narcissist of small differences, preoccupied as usual with himself, failed to give a clear response on the latter question, for which Stalin chastised him as a bad comrade—poets should stick together—and hung up.[47] After Stalin hung up on him, Pasternak tried to call him back but couldn't get beyond a secretary, who reassured him that "he could talk about [the conversation] as much as he liked."[48] Of course he could: the whole point was that such stories should be circulated. This piece of mystification went down well too. As Nadezhda Mandelstam noted wryly, "my contemporaries took Stalin's sermon on friendship between poets completely at its face value and were ecstatic about a ruler who had shown such warmth of spirit."[49]

There were, of course, a few dissenting voices, those of the writer Ivanov-Razumnik and the painter Kuzma Petrov-Vodkin being rather prescient. They said (according to the OGPU report) that all these "fairytale transformations in the fates of individual people at a single word from

the leader" were signs of a new "oriental despotism," a conscious effort to convey and make awesome "the terrible importance and power every word of Stalin has."[50]

PATRONAGE CHECKED—BUT NOT FOR LONG

The Great Purges put a crimp in the patronage style of Soviet elites. "All our most influential protectors were arrested and, in most cases, shot," writes Elagin about the Vakhtangov Theater.[51] Many of the clients who had formed particularly close relationships with the party, military, and secret police elite (Koltsov, Meyerhold, Babel, Pilniak) fell victim, pulled in via the detailed accounts of social networks extracted by NKVD interrogations as the basis for conspiracy accusations.[52] The salon-running wives were arrested too, generally along with their husbands,[53] but not invariably so (Marshal Budenny went free, although Olga Mikhailova, his wife, was arrested as an enemy of the people and spent twenty years in the camps).[54]

Avel Enukidze, one of the party leadership's most notorious and promiscuous (in every sense) patrons, had fallen into disgrace in 1935, one of the charges against him being indiscriminate patronage of cultural figures from the old privileged classes.[55] But there were more potential patrons in the sea than ever came out of it. Regardless of Stalin's disapproval, his old friend Klim Voroshilov continued to "play the patron (*metsenat*) and protector of artists" and "act like a lord (*barstvovat'*)" in their company.[56] Banning political patronage in the cultural world had about as much likelihood of succeeding as banning "family circles" (*semeistva*) in the political one. In other words, close to zero.

POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS

The late Stalin period in culture is remembered primarily for the disciplining of the arts of the *zhdanovshchina*. But there were other features of interest. As Vera Tolz has written, for the cultural figures who became top administrators in the (creative) Unions, the period between 1946 and the early 1950s was not "the darkest period of state interference" in their activities. Instead, it was the period when they themselves acquired very broad powers to control cultural production as well as the distribution of benefits and privileges among members of their professions. These cultural figures consolidated their positions as members of the highest state elite.[57]

With these newly powerful figures—brokers, in effect, in the intelligentsia's dealings with power—Stalin established a new and much closer relationship than any he had had before. He was a member of the Stalin Prize Committee, along with other Politburo members and the leaders of

the "creative unions" (Communist professionals like the writers Aleksandr Fadeev and Konstantin Simonov and the composer Tikhon Khrennikov, head of the Union of Soviet Composers), and took an active part in discussing the nominations that came from the unions. We have reports on these from Simonov—who kept detailed notes, written straight after the meetings—and Khrennikov. Both were impressed by Stalin's wide and careful reading, his interest in *professional* opinion (to which he usually deferred, even in the case of his personal favorite, the Polish realist writer Wanda Wasilewska, whose merits he could never get Fadeev and the others to recognize), and his willingness to argue points and even to be contradicted. Khrennikov felt that not only were "questions of science and culture . . . judged without preconceptions (*nepredziato*), openly and in a principled manner" at the Stalin Prize meetings but that it was "Stalin's participation [that] guaranteed the principled quality and independence."[58]

Still, it was not quite so straightforward. Stalin had not forgotten his old "signaling" tricks. He knew that the grapevine would carry a virtually complete account of every word he said to everyone in the intelligentsia loop by the next morning. So, when he felt like it, he would use this mechanism to put out disinformation. One such occurrence was when, in the early 1950s, he dropped a remark indicating anger and surprise at the antisemitism that was currently infecting the press and state and party agencies. Simonov, probably the most reliable witness, thinks this happened in 1951, and that what set Stalin off was a nomination of a work by a writer whose Russian name was followed in parenthesis by his Jewish one.[59] That way of drawing attention to somebody's Jewishness had recently become fashionable in antisemitic literary circles, but Stalin now attacked it vigorously.

> Why Maltsev and then in parenthesis Rovinsky? What's going on? How long is this going to continue. . . . Why are they writing the double name? If someone chose a literary pseudonym, that's his right, we won't say on any other grounds than simple decency. . . . Evidently someone likes to underline that the person with a double surname is a Jew. Why emphasize that? Why do it? Why sow antisemitism?[60]

Khrennikov's memory is a bit different (or perhaps it was a different event): he puts Stalin's anti-antisemitic outburst in November/December 1952, gives no context, and makes it simpler: "We've got antisemites in the Central Committee. That's outrageous (*bezobrazie*)!" But both he and Simonov understood it as a signal "to us, representatives of the intelligentsia, who were at the meeting," so that they "would tell everyone that Stalin had nothing to do with the antisemitic abominations" (*gadosti*).[61] At some later point, they realized that they had been gulled—that, as Simonov put it, Stalin was "just putting on a show for us, *intelligenty*, of whose conversations, doubts and uneasiness [about the current wave of antisemitism] he was evidently quite well informed from his sources."[62]

ALL INTELLIGENTSIA NOW?

That us/them dichotomy between *intelligentsia* and *vlast'* is well embedded in Simonov's and Khrennikov's accounts of the Stalin Prize meetings. True, the intelligentsia's brokers present were virtually all party members by this time, and it was becoming more and more common for young intellectuals—and sometimes older ones too—to join the party. But that did not stop *intelligentsiia* being their primary self-identification, at least in the context of conversations with Stalin. (One sees this clearly in Simonov's report of a meeting at which a draft of a document denouncing cosmopolitanism was read aloud by Fadeev, on Stalin's instructions, while Stalin himself watched to see what effect it produced "on us intelligentsia people—Communists too, but still intelligentsia"[63]). Stalin and his political associates undoubtedly thought in terms of the same dichotomy, as do scholars. When we are dealing with the late Stalin period, however, it may be time to muddy the water a bit.

If the "intelligentsia" was becoming ever more Communist without losing a sense of distinctiveness or the capacity to generate an "opinion" distinct from that of the party and the broader population, the party elite was in the process of learning to behave like the intelligentsia (or at least the way they thought intelligentsia people would behave). The regime's relentless promotion of "cultured behavior" (*kul'turnost'*) since the mid-1930s had been aimed at the political elite as well as the populace.[64] Party leaders had become better dressed, substituting suits of the kind that would once have been called bourgeois for their old leather jackets and proletarian caps, and they were expected to take their wives to the opera, ballet, and theater and to have an intelligent appreciation of what they saw and heard. Indifference to Pushkin and the classics of Russian literature was now a cause of shame, and Politburo members were expected to keep up with contemporary Soviet literature, like Stalin if not as thoroughly. Evening cinema viewings at the Kremlin became part of the Politburo member's working day. Just as the new brokers on the intelligentsia side were now Communists (which had not been the case in Gorky's time), so the younger cohort of the political elite—men like Andrei Zhdanov, Georgii Malenkov, Lavrentii Beria, Aleksandr Shcherbakov, and Nikolai Voznesensky, who joined the Politburo in the late 1930s or 1940s—were now, if not *intelligenty* precisely in the sense that the intelligentsia would recognize,[65] at least persons with higher education[66] and a sense of themselves as men of culture.

The memoirs of Sergo Beria (son of Lavrentii) and Andrei Malenkov (son of Georgii) are remarkable for their insistence on the intelligentsia character of their families. Of course this is partly to whitewash their fathers by backgrounding the political, but still it is hard to imagine that it was made up out of whole cloth. "Thinking, talented, energetic men" were the type that Beria and his cultured wife Nina[67] liked to have around, according to his son: academician Igor Kurchatov, leader of the atomic physics project,

for example; aviation constructor Andrei Tupolev; the historian and academician Isaak Mints. There were many architects among the family's friends (harking back to Beria's own first choice of profession)—Georgian writers, artists, and philosophers.[68]

Malenkov *fils* is even more insistent on the intelligentsia character of the Malenkov household. Malenkov was a 1920s graduate of the prestigious Bauman Institute, and his wife, Valeria Golubtsova, also had an engineering degree. "Our family circle was a world in which father and mother remained highly intellectual (*vysokointelligentnymi*) people" and for this reason found the older members of the leadership, with their swearing and lack of polished manners, crass. "Not once did any of the oligarchs of the first Stalinist rank come to us as guests, nor any of their households." Indeed, the parents had such refined taste that it was hard even to imagine "the boring Molotov" or the boor Kaganovich "swearing like a coachman" at the family table, not to mention the unspeakable (lower-class) Khrushchevs. Their friends were intellectuals, people like the medical researchers academician Vinogradov[69] and Professor Preobrazhenskii.[70]

It goes without saying that such *intelligentnye* parents should have *intelligentnye* children—and indeed both the Beria and Malenkov sons had impressive scientific careers, Sergo Beria with a doctorate in physical and mathematical sciences, Andrei Malenkov as a distinguished biologist. But they were not the only ones. By the 1940s, most of the children of the Stalinist Politburo had reached young adulthood—and the majority of them ended up as professionals and college graduates who, as far as we can judge, self-identified as intelligentsia. Out of a group of thirty-six Politburo sons and daughters on whom information is available, [71] twenty-seven (75 percent) had higher education, including nine who went into scientific research and obtained higher degrees. [72] Another eight opted for the core intelligentsia disciplines of the humanities and social sciences, Stalin's daughter Svetlana and her second husband Yuri Zhdanov among them.[73] Four Politburo offspring went into architecture[74] and the same number into engineering. [75] Two physicians[76] and a lawyer[77] completed the group. Parental educational status made no difference: the four Khrushchev children and Kaganovich's Maia headed into intelligentsia professions with no less determination than Zhdanov's Yuri and Malenkov's Andrei.

Military careers were the only real alternative to the civilian professions for the children of Stalinist leaders, and eight of the twenty-one of the sons did in fact become military professionals, [78] often after serving in the army or air force in World War II. Indeed, if we were able to ascertain self-ascription, it is quite likely that all the five Mikoian sons, including the two who stayed in the military after the war, considered themselves members of the intelligentsia (although the same, to his father's annoyance, could not be said of another of the air force contingent, the ne'er-do-well Vasily Stalin). None of the children, with the exception of Yuri Zhdanov, who at

Stalin's insistence worked in the Central Committee secretariat for a few years, went into politics or government.

The old man himself, Stalin, is not generally thought of as having joined the intelligentsia in his old age. Indeed, he would not make the grade according to many of the criteria for intelligentsia membership I suggested at the beginning of this essay—notably recognition as such by other intelligentsia members, perception of outsiders, dress and demeanor. Yet his late-life preoccupation with intellectual projects like the book on socialist economics and the linguistic debates, not to mention his tireless professional-standard editing, make one wonder if, moving away from the military wartime persona of Generalissimus in his last years, he had not come to see himself above all as an *intelligent*. My final question, however, will be a more general one. *Kto-kogo?* asked Lenin, meaning will the proletariat conquer the bourgeoisie or vice versa? So what is the *kto-kogo?* outcome as far as Soviet power and the erstwhile "bourgeois" intelligentsia are concerned? It will not come as a surprise to say that the intelligentsia gradually became sovietized over the years, although an underground stream of non- or antisovietness remained, emerging into the light again in the late 1960s. But it turns out that the same thing happened in reverse: the top Communist elite, leading the national march toward culture in the 1930s and 1940s, evidently transmitted to their children, consciously or unconsciously, the conviction that the *intelligentsia* was the cultural and social elite they should strive to enter—and keep as far as possible away from the dirty business of politics.

NOTES

1. On Iosif Dzhugashvili's prowess in early life as an anthologized Georgian poet, see Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Young Stalin* (Toronto: McArthur, 2007), 48–51, and Evgenij Dobrenko, "Stalins Schreibweise. Von der romantischen Dichtung der Zukunft zur sozialistisch-realistischen Prosa der Vergagenheit," in Albrecht Koschorka and Konstantin Kaminskii, eds., *Despoten Dichten: Sprachkunst und Gewalt* (Konstanz: Konstanz University Press, 2011), 97–176.
2. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2001), 1.
3. Eric Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany*, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Birgit Schwarz, *Geniewahn: Hitler und die Kunst* (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009).
4. Michaud, *The Cult of Art*, 29, quoting Hans Friedrich Blunck, president of the Reich Chamber of Literature.
5. Major Stalin biographies include Dmitrii Volkogonov, *Triumf i tragediia. I.V.Stalin, politicheskii portret* , bk. 1 (parts 1 and 2) and 2 (parts 1 and 2) (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Agentstva pechati Novosti, 1989); Robert C. Tucker, *Stalin as Revolutionary, 1879–1929* (New York: Norton, 1973); id., *Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928–1941* (New York: Norton, 1990); and Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: the Court of the Red Tsar* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2003).

6. See Evgenii S.Gromov, *Stalin: vlast' i iskusstva* (Moscow: Respublika, 1998); B. Ilizarov, *Tainaia zhizn' Stalina. Po materialam ego biblioteki i arkhiva* (Moscow: Veche, 2003); R. A. Medvedev, *Chto chital Stalin? Pisatel' i kniga v totalitarnom obshchestve* (Moscow: Prava cheloveka, 2004).
7. See, for example, his unexpected instruction in 1935 that the writer Leonid Sobolev, whom he optimistically regarded as a "major talent," should not be forced to write "about kolkhozes and Magnitogorsk. . . . Let him write *what* he wants and *when* he wants. In short, let him run wild . . . [sic] And protect him." *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia. Dokumenty TsK RKP(b)-VKP, VChK-OGPU-NKVD o kul'turnoi politike, 1917–1953*, comp. Andrei Artizov and Oleg Naumov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyk fond "Demokratiia," 1999), 279.
8. *Tvorcheskaia intelligentsiia*, as opposed to *tekhnicheskaia*.
9. Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front. Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 1–15.
10. For elaboration of these points, see Fitzpatrick, *Cultural Front*, esp. "The Soft Line on Culture and Its Enemies," 91–114.
11. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear off the Masks. Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 42, 82, and passim. A more detailed discussion of these issues is in id., *Education and Social Mobility in the Soviet Union 1921–1934* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
12. See Stalin's comments on the draft of the new constitution in I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia*, vol. 1 (XIV), ed. Robert H. McNeal (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1967, 169.
13. See "Introduction: Power and Culture," in Fitzpatrick, *Cultural Front*, 1–15.
14. See "Letter to comrade Md-rt," February 28, 1925, in I. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* VII (Moscow, 1947), 42–43.
15. On Bolshevik patronage of the arts, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Intelligentsia and Power. Client-Patron Relations in Stalin's Russia," in Manfred Hildermeier, ed, *Stalinismus vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg. Neue Wege der Forschung/ Stalinism before the Second World War. New Avenues of Research* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1998), 35–53.
16. For example, in the 1920s, virtually all the patrons of the theater director Vsevolod Meyerhold, a virtuoso in the field of patronage-seeking, ended up in either the Left or the Right Opposition. It was not until the 1930s that he established extensive patronage connections with high-ranking Stalinists. Iurii Elagin, *Temnyi genii. Vsevolod Meierkhol'd* (New York: Izd-vo im. Chekhova, 1955), 241.
17. See, for example, his response to Lunacharsky, February 25, 1925, who had consulted him on an issue involving the Bolshoi Theater: "In matters of art, as you know, I am not strong, and I wouldn't take it on myself to say something decisive in this area." Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI), f. 558, op. 11, d. 760, l. 148.
18. According to his office log (published from the archives in *Na prieme u Stalina. Tetradi (zhurnaly) zapisei lits, priniatykh I.V.Stalinym (1924–1953 gg.),* ed. A. A. Chernobaev [Moscow: Novyi Khronograf, 2008]) for 1926–1931, Stalin received very few representatives of the intelligentsia or cultural world in his office. The exceptions were the RAPP group, whom he saw in various combinations half a dozen times, and the various IKP groups, whom he met on several occasions starting in 1926.
19. See Sheila Fitzpatrick, "Cultural Revolution as Class War," in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., *Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928–1931* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), esp. 35–36.

20. Letter of I. V. Stalin to Bill'-Belotserkovskii, February 28, 1929, in *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, 111.
21. See *M.Gor'kii. Neizdannaia perepiska s Bogdanovym, Leninym, Stalinym, Zinov'evym, Kamenevym, Korolenko* (Moscow: Nasledie, 1998), 275–309. Stalin was the first named member of the Politburo commission set up to draft the resolution on March 8, 1932 (along with Molotov, Kaganovich, Postyshev, and Stetsky. *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia*, 168.
22. See Resolution of Politburo on distribution of responsibilities among Central Committee secretaries, June 4, 1934, in *Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 1930-e gody. Sbornik dokumentov*, comp. O.V. Khlevniuk et al (Moscow: AIRO –XX, 1995), 141–142.
23. *Sotsialisticheskii vestnik*, 1934, no. 19, 14.
24. E.g. P.D.Rozhkov, 13 February 1938, in *"Schast'e literatury." Gosudarstvo i pisateli, 1925–1938. Dokumenty*, comp. D. L. Babichenko (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), 273–275; RGASPI, f. 85, op. 28, d. 77 (economist Ermanskii).
25. See letter from Communist women writers V. A. Gerasimova and A. A. Karavaeva , March 2, 1938, in *"Literaturnyi front": Istoriia politicheskoi tsenzury. Sbornik dokumentov,* comp.,D. L. Babichenko (Moscow: Entsiklopediia rossiiskikh dereven', 1994), 27.
26. E.g., the appeal to Zhdanov from Leningrad theater people in Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv istoriko-politicheskoi dokumentatsii Sankt-Peterburga (TsGAIPD), f. 24, op. 2v, d. 2679, ll. 28–30.
27. Ivan Gronsky, *Iz proshlogo . . . : Vospominaniia* (Moscow: Izvestiia, 1991), 259–260.
28. See Viktor Fradkin, *Delo Kol'tsova* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2002), 245, on his "great closeness" with the writer-apparatchik V. P. Stavskii, who boasted of the connection. On his "very good relations" with Meyerhold, see Feliks Chuev, *Tak govoril Kaganovich: Ispoved' stalinskogo apostola* (Moscow" Otechestvo, 1992), 105–106.
29. See, for example, Elena Bonner, *Mothers and Daughters*, trans. Antonina W. Bouis (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 123–124. But not only Armenians: see Boris Pilniak's letter to Mikoian of May 25, 1936 in "*Literaturnyi front,*" 15–16.
30. As Georgian clients' letters in his personal archive (RGASPI, f. 85) attest.
31. For examples, see Fitzpatrick, "Intelligentsia and Power," in *Stalinismus vor dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, ed. Hildermeier, 41–42.
32. *Testimony. The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich*, ed. Solomon Volkov, ed., trans. Antonina W. Bouis (New York: Harper, 1980), 98–99; Elagin, *Ukroshchenie iskusstv*, 303–04. For other musical clients of Tukhachevsky, see Simo Mikkonen, *Music and Power in the Soviet 1930s: A History of Composers' Bureaucracy* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), 340, 342; Amy Nelson, *Music for the Revolution. Music and Power in Early Soviet Russia* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 243; Caroline Brooke, "Soviet Musicians and the Great Terror," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54:3 (2002), 402–404.
33. Vitalii Shentalinskii, *Raby svobody: V literaturnykh arkhivakh KGB: Babel', Bulgakov, Florenskii, Pil'niak, Mandel'shtam, Kliuev, Platonov, Gor'kii* (Moscow: Parus, 1995), and see below.
34. Nadezhda Mandel'shtam, *Vospominaniia* (New York: Izdat. im. Chekhova., 1970), 119–120.
35. It was apparently Primakov who was indirectly responsible for Stalin's famously unexpected 1935 commendation of Mayakovsky (who died by his own hand in 1930), since he had personally delivered Lilia Brik's letter

pleading Mayakovsky's case to Stalin's secretary. See biographies of Primakov and Lilia Brik in Nikolai Zenkovich, *Samye sekretnye rodstvenniki. Entsiklopediia biografii* (Moscow: OLMA-Press, 2005) , 308–312.

36. Elagin, *Temnyi genii*, 291.
37. Fradkin, *Dela Kol'tsova*, 82 (Koltsov's confession).
38. Larisa Vasil'eva, *Kremlevskie zheny* (Moscow: Vagrius, Novosti, 1992), 243, 267.
39. Vasil'eva, *Kremlevskie zheny*, 266.
40. This was Molotov's recollection (Feliks Chuev, *140 besed s Molotvym: Iz dnevnika F. Chueva* [Moscow: Terra, 1991], 307–308), but Vlasik, Stalin's chief bodyguard, identified the woman Stalin had been flirting with as Guseva, the wife of another military commander (Montefiore, *Stalin. At the Court of the Red Tsar*, 18).
41. *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, 746 n. 30.
42. See letter to Bill-Belotserkovsky, February 1, 1929, in *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, 101. Similarly sentiments expressed—to a doubtful audience—in speech to Ukrainian writers, February 12, 1929, *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, 105–106.
43. A Politburo commission headed by Central Committee secretary A.P.Smirnov reported on August 3, 1929 (*Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia,* 115, note 748).
44. Text from *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, note p. 748, citing *Voprosy literatury* 1966, no. 9, 139.
45. OGPU report quoted in Shentalinskii, *Raby svobody*, 124.
46. *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia,* 170–171.
47. For the version reported by Nadezhda Mandelstam, based on Pasternak's report to her at the time, see Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope against Hope. A Memoir*, trans Max Hayward (New York: the Modern Library, 1999), 147. For a version less flattering to Pasternak, see the OGPU source quoted by Shentalinskii, *Raby svobody*, 239.
48. Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope against Hope*, 147.
49. Nadezhda Mandelstam, *Hope against Hope*, 148.
50. As reported to Stalin by the OGPU in March 1932, in *Vlast' i khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia*, 135.
51. Iurii Elagin, *Ukroshchenie iskusstv* (New York: Izd-vo im. Chekhova, 1952), 217. He names in particular Enukidze, Sulimov, Agranov, and Rudzutak.
52. Although it should be noted that the list of plotters, according to confessions since discovered in the archives, includes many well-known high-society cultural figures like Aleksei Tolstoi and Ilya Ehrenburg, who were *not* arrested.
53. For example, the Bubnovs, Egorovs, (Grigorii) Prokofievs, Ezhovs, Meyerholds.
54. Vasileva, *Kremlevskie zheny*, 245.
55. See, for example, criticism of his help to a (former?) wife of the disgraced playwright Nikolai Erdman at the Central Committee plenum that condemned him: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 2, d. 542, ll. 79–86.
56. Chuev, *140 besed*, 314–315.
57. Vera Tolz, "'Cultural Bosses' as Patrons and Clients: the Functioning of the Soviet Creative Unions in the Postwar Period," *Contemporary European History* 11:1 (2002), 99.
58. Tikhon Khrennikov, *Tak eto bylo* (Moscow: Muzyka, 1994), 177.
59. Orest Maltsev (Rovinsky), nominated for *Iugoslavskaia tragediia*.
60. Konstantin Simonov, *Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniia: Razmyshleniia o I.V.Staline* (Moscow: APN, 1988), 188. Simonov then had to spoil the

point by pointing out that actually Maltsev was the man's real name; he had used instead the Jewish name Rovinsky in his last book for reasons unknown (*Glazami*, 189).

61. Khrennikov, *Tak eto bylo*, 179.
62. Simonov, *Glazami*, 203.
63. Simonov, *Glazami*, 114. The Russian phrase is "*na nas, intelligentov, kommunistov, no pri etom intelligentov.*"
64. On *kul'turnost'*, see Catriona Kelly and David Shepherd, eds., *Constructing Russian Culture in the Age of Revolution 1881–1940* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,1998), 291–313; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Everyday Stalinism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
65. There is a nice moment in one of the Stalin Prize meetings when Stalin nominated Lev Mekhlis (Stalin's assistant in the 1920s who rose to Orgburo though not Politburo status) for membership of a cultural commission, teasing the *intelligenty* present because he knew they wouldn't like it. Zhdanov, less given to teasing, weighed in ponderously with a reference to Mekhlis's studies at the Institute of Red Professors in the 1920s—"he's an old literary man, after all (*On vse zhe kak-nikak staryi literator*)" in justification. *Glazami*, 108–109. Note also that Dmitrii Shepilov, at the next level down in the political hierarchy, but closely involved in the disciplining of the intelligentsia in the late 1940s, known as the *zhdanovshchina*, seems not only to have seen himself as a member of the intelligentsia but also to have been acknowledged as such, since Shostakovich and others kept in touch with him after his political disgrace, Shostakovich inviting him to concerts of his new works. Dmitrii Shepilov, *Primknuvshii* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001).
66. Beria had to drop out of architecture school after the revolution because his successful political career left him no time, but he continued to regret and complain about it throughout the 1920s. The only real exception was Khrushchev—and his *nekul'turnost'* was something the others noted critically.
67. Nina Teimurazovna Gegechkori (1905–1991) was a scientist who worked at the Timiriazev Agricultural Academy in Moscow after the family's move from Georgia in the late 1930s.
68. Sergo Beriia, *Moi otets—Lavrentii Beriia* (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1994), 36.
69. This sentence carries a double message, since both the "medical researchers" named—Vladimir Nikitich Vinogradov (1882–1964), elected to the Academy of Medical Sciences in 1944, and Boris Sergeevich Preobrazhenskii (1892–1970), elected to the Academy of Medical Sciences in 1950—were Kremlin doctors arrested in connection with the Doctors' Plot (in November 1952 and January 1953 respectively) and released by Lavrentii Beria in April 1953.
70. A. G. Malenkov, *O moem ottse Georgii Malenkove* (Moscow: NTTs "Tekhnoekos," 1992), 24–5.
71. The thirty-six sons and daughters on whom educational/occupational data are available are (higher education in bold) **Vladimir Andreev** (b. 1919), **Natalia Andreeva** (b. 1921), **Sergo Beria** (b. 1924), **Maia Kaganovich** (b. 1917), Yuri Kaganovich (adopted son, b. ?), **Valeri Kalinin** (b. 1904), **Aleksandr Kalinin** (b. 1908), **Lidia Kalinina** (b. 1912), **Anna Kalinina** (b. 1916), **Yulia Khrushcheva** (b. 1916), Leonid Khrushchev (b. 1917, d. 1943), **Rada Khrushcheva** (b. 1929), **Sergei Khrushchev** (b. 1935), **Elena Khrushcheva** (b. 1938), **Vladimir Kuibyshev** (b. 1917), **Galina Kuibysheva** (b. 1919), **Valentina Malenkova** (b. 1925), **Andrei Malenkov** (b. 1937), **Georgii (Georgievich) Malenkov** (b. 1938), **Stepan Mikoian** (b. 1922), **Vladimir Mikoian** (b. 1924, d. 1942), **Aleksei Mikoian** (b. 1925), **Ivan Mikoian** (b. 1927),

Sergo Mikoian (b. 1929), **Svetlana Molotova** (b. 1929), **Eteri Ordzhonikidze** (b. 1923), **Konstantin Shcherbakov** (b. 1938), **Ivan Shcherbakov** (b. 1944), Yakov Dzhugashvili (Stalin) (b. 1907, d. 1943), Vasili Stalin (b. 1921), **Svetlana Stalina (Allilueva)** (b. 1926), Artem Fedorovich Sergeev (b. 1921), Petr Voroshilov (b. 1914), **Tatiana Frunze** (b. 1920), Timur Frunze (b. 1923, d. 1942), **Yuri Zhdanov** (b. 1919). The group includes adopted children brought up in Poliburo households, like the two Frunze orphans, Timur and Tatiana (Voroshilov's household) and the orphaned son of Old Bolshevik Artem, Artem Fedorovich Sergeev (Stalin's household). My calculations are based on biographical data from a number of sources, notably Zenkovich, *Samye sekretnye rodstvenniki* and Russian *Vikipediia*.

72. Vladimir Andreev, Sergo Beria, Andrei Malenkov, Georgi Malenkov, Stepan Mikoian (who was also a professional military man), Tatiana Frunze, Sergei Khrushchev, Yulia Khrushcheva, and Ivan Shcherbakov.
73. The others were Svetlana Molotova and Eteri Ordzhonikidze, who trained (like Bukharin's Svetlana) as historians; Rada Khrushcheva, trained as a journalist at MGU; Sergo Mikoian, who studied international relations at IMEMO (an elite school attracting several of the Politburo children); and, judging by their later professions, Konstantin Shcherbakov and Natalia Andreeva.
74. Vladimir Kuibyshev, Galina Kuibysheva, Maia Kaganovich, Valentina Malenkova.
75. Sergei Khrushchev (doctor of technical sciences), Valeri Kalinin, Aleksandr Kalinin, Ivan Mikoian.
76. Lidia Kalinina, Anna Kalinina.
77. Elena Khrushcheva.
78. Vasili Stalin, Stepan Mikoian, Aleksei Mikoian, Yuri Kaganovich, Vladimir Andreev, Petr Voroshilov, Artem Sergeev, and Alexandr Shcherbakov. In addition, professionals: Vladimir Mikoian, Leonid Khrushchev, Timur Frunze, and Yakov Stalin entered the military and died on active service during the war, before settling into adult life.

5 The Great Manipulator
Francisco Franco

Paul Preston

An intriguing insight into the enigma that was Francisco Franco can be found in the contradictions between the myths that the Caudillo himself and his propagandists created throughout his adult life and the realities underlying those myths. Franco consistently rewrote his own life story and naturally improved on it, either directly in his speeches and articles or indirectly via interviews with journalists or in conversations with his official biographers and hagiographers. Sometimes he did so by means of the uniforms that he wore. All this, as with all dictators and most politicians, was a symptom of both ambition and insecurity. From the time that he was in a position to influence the perception that others had of him, Franco created an exaggerated image of his achievements, which grew ever more disproportionate once he had a propaganda apparatus at his disposal. His delight in being compared to the mythical warrior heroes and the real empire builders in Spanish history—above all El Cid, Carlos V, or Felipe II—derived only in part from reading his own sycophantic press or hearing the speeches of his most servile supporters.

For instance, Franco thoroughly approved of the bizarre speeches and other activities of his intimate friend and first wartime propaganda chief General José Millán Astray, the self-styled "bridegroom of death."[1] Without the consent of the Caudillo himself, Millán Astray could hardly have published statements like "Franco is God's emissary sent to liberate Spain and to lead her to greatness," or that he "is the greatest strategist of the century," or to repeat endlessly that he "never makes mistakes."[2] Franco expressed his delight, for instance, in regard to Millán Astray's part in an incident that provoked considerable international ridicule. On October 12, 1936, in a ceremony in the University of Salamanca, the distinguished philosopher Miguel de Unamuno had denounced the gratuitous brutality of the Francoist repression and the military rebels' hatred of Catalonia and the Basque Country, declaring that to win (*vencer*) was not to convince (*convencer*). An apoplectic Millán Astray had screamed "Death to Intelligence" and "Catalonia and the Basque Country, the Basque Country and Catalonia, are two cancers in the body of the nation! Fascism, Spain's remedy, comes to exterminate them, slicing healthy, living flesh like a scalpel."

Franco believed that Millán Astray had behaved as a patriot.[3] The very fact that Franco could have chosen such a man to present his image to the world and subsequently showered him with preferment speaks volumes.

Franco did not always use paid propagandists or ambitious amateurs. Throughout his life, he frequently retouched his own life story. At times, he actually did the rewriting himself, but more often he did so through "revelations" granted to his biographers. For many aspects of his life, the only possible basis for what was written was the testimony of the only witness—Franco himself. In the cases, for example, of his close friends, Joaquín Arrarás and José Millán Astray, there is little doubt that the "information" was passed directly. When he was posted to Oviedo in 1917, Franco lived in the Hotel París, where he became friends with the then university student Arrarás and served in the Foreign Legion with Millán Astray. Representative of these autobiographical revelations made to Arrarás, Franco's first biographer, are the following exploits from the Moroccan wars. The first recounts an advance in mid-May 1912 made by a force of the mercenaries known as the *Regulares Indígenas* (Native Regulars), among them a section commanded by Franco. Supposedly, from a nearby hill, Colonel Dámaso Berenguer, the overall commander, watched the advance through binoculars and exclaimed, "How well that section is moving!" and one of his adjutants replied "Yes, it's Franquito's section." The idea that the colonel of the regiment might be known by the name "Frank," a lowly second lieutenant who had arrived in the territory barely three months earlier, is in itself implausible. In any case, Arrarás's story is undermined on two counts because, at the time, Franco was not posted to the Regulares but to a regiment of Spanish conscripts (the Regimiento de África No.68), which was under the command not of Berenguer but of Colonel José Villalba Riquelme. Franco was not posted to the Regulares until April 15, 1913, when he came under the command of the now Brigadier General Berenguer.

Arrarás then recounted more supposed heroism by Franco in October 1914 in a place called Izarduy. His service records place him in the combat arising from the protection of defense works being constructed, although there is nothing to suggest the prominence recounted by Arrarás, who wrote, "In the opinion of Dámaso Berenguer, the military temperament of Franco [in command of his section of Regulares], was revealed when he captured, with a skill that confirmed his vocation as a warrior and with a spirit that reflected his bravery, some heights that the enemy had defended fiercely."[4] Another anecdote that Arrarás can have heard directly only from Franco himself is not located in either time or place: "One day, standing on a parapet, he picked up a thermos flask of coffee. A bullet aimed with diabolical precision ripped the top from between his fingers. Unperturbed, the captain finished his coffee and looking in the direction of the enemy, shouted: 'See if you can aim better!'"[5]

In the case of Luis de Galinsoga,perhaps the most extreme sycophant, the revelations came via Franco's cousin and secretary, "Pacón" (Francisco

Franco Salgado-Araujo). Pacón recalled years later: "As if it were a zarzuela (operetta), Luis wrote the music and I wrote the words, which constituted the real life of the Caudillo, which I know so well having always been at his side."[6] Given the iron control imposed on the media and the publishing world, such wildly exaggerated panegyrics could not have been produced without Franco's consent. All this makes all the more remarkable the fact that when those closest to him, such as his brother-in-law Ramón Serrano Suñer or Pacón, wrote their memoirs, the portrait presented was less heroic and more grotesque, mean, and mediocre.

The best example of the restructuring of his own life carried out by Franco himself can be found in his filmscript *Raza: Anecdotario para el guion de una película* (*Race: Material for a Film-Script*). Dictated during the last months of 1940 and the first of 1941, *Raza* was an unmistakably autobiografical effort to reconstruct his genealogy and his childhood. In the script and in the film itself, the central character's father, a naval officer who died heroically in Cuba in the Spanish-American war, is an idealized figure who is the very opposite of Franco's own gambling, womanizing father. In sentimentally indulging his fantasies, Franco makes good the frustrations of his own life.[7] *Raza* was the most extreme and capricious manifestation of Franco's untiring efforts to create a perfect past. The choice of pseudonym under which it was published, Jaime de Andrade, the name of an ancient and noble family to which he was distantly related through both his parents, revealed both Franco's social aspirations and his tendency toward self-worship.

The title reflected Franco's infatuation with Nazism. In *Raza*, Franco romantically retints his social origins and his childhood through José Churruca, the hero. In fact, at the peak of his power, Franco wrote a book in which he fabricated a past worthy of the providential Caudillo. His triumphs had not been able to wipe away the humiliations that he attributed to his father. The internal logic of the book derives from the idea that the protagonist (José Churruca/Franco) and his family represent everything of value in the Spanish race; thus they, like Franco, are capable of liberating Spain from the foreign poisons of liberalism, Freemasonry, socialism, and communism. There are parallels between Franco's fabrication of his own life and his dictatorial remodelling of the life of Spain between 1936 and 1975. In the book, he created the ideal family and father that he had never had. While in power he governed Spain believing himself to be a stern father of a tightly knit family. Shortly after he had finished the book, the resources of the state were put at the disposal of the film director José Luis Sainz de Heredia so that he could transfer it to the big screen. At the first showing, Franco, never slow to cry, wept profusely like a child. Over the next thirty-three years, he would watch the film almost weekly. In 1950, it was relaunched with the title changed to *The Spirit of a Race* and the soundtrack redubbed in order to remove the fascist connotations of the original. It is not known which of the two versions he preferred.[8]

Another of Franco's books, *Diario de una Bandera* (*A Battallion Diary*), the war diary he published in 1922, also provides invaluable clues to his psychological makeup. In the diary, he recounts a clearly invented anecdote:

> One day a Legionary of mature years and a look of weariness crosses the street. He carries his head high like all Legionaires but his step is tired, the silver of years whitens his brow and his unkempt beard. As he passes an Army officer and raises his arm to salute him, the officer stops, they look at each other and then fall weeping into each other's arms. The officer was his son![9]

It was the first draft of what he would finish in *Raza*. When his own father, Nicolás Franco Salgado-Araujo, died on February 24, 1942, Franco seized the corpse and implicitly reinvented the second half of Don Nicolas's life—the part subsequent to his abandonment of his family—by having him buried with full military honors, which was utterly inappropriate given the last bohemian years of his life.

In the case of *Raza*, there is little doubt that the text passed through various hands. Franco dictated a first draft to Manuel Lozano Sevilla. Thereafter, he received help, at least regarding style, from two loyal journalists, Manuel Aznar amd Manuel Halcón. Then, the script was retouched by the man who would direct the film, José Luis Saenz de Heredia, and by Antonio Román.[10] In the case of *Diario de una bandera*, there were rumors at the time that it had not been written by Franco but by a journalistic ghostwriter. Stanley Payne suggested that this was "a Catalan journalist Juan Ferragut." In fact, there was no such person. "Juan Ferragut" was a character invented by the Andalusian journalist and novelist, Julián Fernández Piñero. His stories about this fictional member of the Spanish Foreign Legion, later collected in his book *Memorias del legionario Juan Ferragut*, also had a diary format and similarly exaggerated patriotic tone. That could have been the basis of the rumors or indeed implied that Fernández Piñero was the ghostwriter.[11]

It is impossible to determine this question with certainty. What is clearly the case is that, in *Raza*, in *Diario de un bandera*, in other texts published under his name, and in his thousands of pages of speeches as well as in the surviving fragments of his unfinished memoirs and countless press interviews, Franco constantly adorned the role that he had played and the things that he claimed to have said in specific incidents in such a way as to appear in the best light possible and thereby provide the raw material necessary to guarantee that any biography would be a hagiography. The persistence of many favorable myths is testimony to his success in manipulating his image.

Franco's ability to create legends was first revealed in the early years of his service in Africa. On July 24, 1916, he applied for the award of Spain's highest military decoration, the Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando, for

his part in a battle that had taken place barely a month earlier on June 29 at El Biutz, where he had been seriously wounded. The regulations of the Gran Cruz required that, for his application to be successful, he would have had to have keep on fighting after his unit had lost half of its men and, despite being wounded, to have remained in command until the objectives of the operation had been achieved. This was impossible because Franco was among the first to be wounded and was immediately carried from the battlefield. When the case was examined, the doctor who attended him testified that Franco was the first arrival at the first-aid post, and another witness declared that the casualties suffered by the company occurred after he was removed. Another witness swore that "he knew that Franco was present in the battle and was wounded but that he was unaware that he had done anything worthy of his being considered for the award of the medal." Four other officers stated that "Captain Franco did no more than help the advance of the cavalry, without his role being in any way out of the ordinary." Given the contradictions between his own version of the incident and that of the other witnesses, his application was rejected and he was compensated with a lesser decoration, the Cruz de primera clase de María Cristina. He then made a formal complaint to King Alfonso XIII and successfully requested that the medal be substituted by a promotion. On February 28, 1917, he was promoted to the rank of major for battlefield merit.[12] Nevertheless, his resentment that he had not been given the Gran Cruz Laureada festered for years until, as dictator, he was able to award it to himself.[13]

The public dimension of Franco's process of improving on reality began as soon as his adventures in Africa began to draw the attention of the press. The young major quickly discovered a talent for manipulation, which he used with newspapermen. He managed to turn himself into a national figure by dint of his role as operational chief of the legion after the defeat at Annual in July 1921. The press of his native Galicia praised "the sang froid, the fearlessness and the contempt for life" of the "beloved Paco Franco" after an incident in which Franco relieved a besieged blockhouse accompanied by only twelve volunteers. The press was delighted to publish an interview, in which he revealed that he and his men had returned carrying "as trophies the bloody heads of twelve *harqueños* (tribesmen)." Franco was already working on his public image and thereby revealed the scale of his ambition. In the interviews that he gave, the speeches at banquets given in his honor, and in articles that he published, he began to project the image of the selfless, reluctant hero.[14]

In mid-October 1921, one month after taking over as acting commander of the Spanish Foreign Legion from the seriously wounded Millán Astray, Franco received a congratulatory telegram from the mayor of Ferrol, his hometown. In the heat of battle, he found time to make a self-deprecatory reply: "The legion is honoured by your greeting. I merely fulfil my duties as a soldier."[15] It was representative of his efforts to project publicly the image of a brave but self-effacing officer interested only in his duty. On

leaving an audience with the king in early 1922, he told reporters that the king had embraced him and congratulated him on his success commanding the legion during Millán Astray's absence: "What has been said about me is a bit exaggerated. I merely fulfil my duty. The rank-and-file soldiers are truly valiant. You could go anywhere with them."[16] In fact, Franco never showed much concern for the soldiers under his command either in the African wars or in the Civil War. However, the self-perception projected in his diary and interviews was probably sincere. It is impossible to say whether *Diario de una bandera* was the product of a collaboration with Julián Fernández Piñero. Nonetheless, his frequent statements to the press and the very publication of the diary in late 1922, with complimentary copies freely distributed, demonstrate his acute awareness of the value of a public image in the endless quest for promotion.[17]

While Franco actively ensured that details of his exploits appeared in the press, he was gradually converted into a national hero, "the ace of the legion." A good example, and one that confirms suspicions about his collaboration with Fernández Piñero, is the highly flattering and revealing profile presented in an interview granted ostensibly to the fictional "Juan Ferragut," who takes care to state that it is the first time that they have met. The interview constitutes a self-portrait of Franco shortly before his marriage to the aspiring Carmen Polo, with the apparently reckless heroism about to give way to an altogether more calculated ambition. In the profile, the voice of the man of action can still be heard, but it is a voice that will soon disappear from Franco's repertoire. Moreover, the clichéd patriotism and romantic heroism of many of his remarks indicate that the persona of intrepid hero of the Rif was not entirely natural or spontaneous. There is an element of affectation in Franco's replies that indicates a conscious effort to construct the image of the selfless patriot—an effort seconded by Fernández Piñero, who writes that, when praised, "Franco blushes like a girl who has been flattered." He brushes aside the praise, as befits a hero, "but I've done nothing really! The dangers are less than people think. It's all a question of endurance." Asked if he had ever felt fear, he smiled as if puzzled, and shyly replied "I don't know. No one knows what courage and fear are. In a soldier, all this is summed up in something else: the concept of duty, of patriotism."[18]

In June 1923, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and given formal command of the Legion. *La Voz de Asturias* dedicated its entire front page to a review of his achievements. In the accompanying interview, Franco showed himself to be the public's ideal young hero, dashing, gallant and, above all, modest. He dismissed talk of special bravery and showed himself perplexed by all the fuss that was being made. Somewhat theatrically, he interrupted the journalist's attempted eulogy saying "I just did what all the legionnaires did, we fought with a desire to win and we did win." Asked about his plans, he gave a self-regarding hint about the sacrifice involved in having to leave his bride-to-be to go back to Morocco. "Plans? What

happens will decide that. I repeat that I am a simple soldier who obeys orders. I will go to Morocco. . . . When the *Patria* calls, we must reply, Present!"[19] This self-abnegation was questioned by the monarchist intellectual Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, who had befriended Franco in Oviedo and years later would be one of his ministers: "He spent his entire life obsessed with his career. He gave Alfonso XIII no peace, constantly going on about his prowess, his merits, his record in Africa, his recommendation."[20]

Franco's promotion to brigadier-general on February 3, 1926, at the age of thirty-three and two months, was the basis of the myth that he was the youngest general in Europe since Napoleon. In fact, there had been younger generals both in the Spanish Army as well as in those of other nations during the Great War.[21] Once promoted and on the mainland, he ceased to be the focus of journalistic attention. Nevertheless, his appointment as director of the Academia General Militar in Zaragoza in 1928 turned him into something of national figure. In late May 1928, the magazine *Estampa*—a predecessor of *¡Hola!*—interviewed both Carmen Polo and her husband. Asked if he was satisfied to be what he was, Franco replied sententiously "I am satisfied to have served my fatherland to the full." Asked about his greatest ambition, he replied "that Spain should become as great as she once was." Asked if he was political, he replied "I am a soldier" and declared that his most fervent desire was "to pass unnoticed. I am very grateful for certain expressions of popularity but you can imagine how annoying it is to feel that you're often being looked at and talked about."[22] This supposed modesty was at odds with his ambition.

With the arrival of the democratic Second Republic on April 14, 1931, Franco's use of the press became more defensive. On April 18, the monarchist daily *ABC* claimed that the new Republican-Socialist government planned to appoint him high commissioner in Morocco, a post that he certainly coveted. Three days later, he replied with a letter that had been drafted for him by his brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer. In order to distance himself from the new regime and scotch suspicions that had been implicated in the coming of the Republic, he denied categorically that any such offer had been made to him. He wrote

> I could not accept any such post unless I was ordered to do so. To accept such a post might be interpreted in some circles as suggesting that there had been some prior understanding on my part with the regime which has just been installed or else apathy or indifference in the fulfilment of my duties.[23]

He thus distanced himself from other officers who had participated in the struggle to bring down the monarchy, such as General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, who made capitain-general of the First Military Region, Madrid, and General Eduardo López Ochoa, who was made captain general of the Fourth Region, Barcelona.

Between 1931 and 1936, Franco dedicated less time to the elaboration of his image because he was too occupied with surviving the hostile situation of 1931, or from 1932 to 1935, fulfilling demanding roles such as military commander of the Balearic Islands or chief of the general staff, or in 1936 conspiring against the Republic. However, the extent to which he went in order to do so subsequently is noteworthy. This may be illustrated by his repeated rewriting of his role in the rerun elections in Cuenca in early May 1936. There had been falsification of votes in Cuenca in the February general elections. In the rerun, the list of right-wing candidates included the Falangist leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera and General Franco. The former was included in the hope of securing him parliamentary immunity and release from prison, where he had been since March 17.

Franco's inclusion was the result of his own initiative. On April 20, Franco had written to the secretary of the authoritatian Catholic party (the Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Right-Wing Groups, or CEDA) expressing his desire to be a parliamentary deputy, preferably in the forthcoming elections for Cuenca. Ramón Serrano Suñer persuaded the CEDA leader José María Gil Robles to agree. However, when the list was published, Gil Robles was visited by Miguel Primo de Rivera who informed him that his brother considered Franco's inclusion to be a "crass error." José Antonio believed that the general would be a disaster in the Cortes. He threatened to withdraw if Franco's name was not removed. Several right-wing figures, including Serrano Suñer, managed to convince the Falangist leader to drop his opposition to Franco. Serrano finally managed to persuade his brother-in-law that the cut-and-thrust of parliamentary debate might see him humiliated publicly. Franco withdrew, aware of Jose Antonio's hostility. Subsequent events would show that he neither forgot nor forgave.[24]

Many on the left, especially the moderate socialist leader Indalecio Prieto, feared that Franco wanted a parliamentary seat as a safe base from which to conspire against the Republic.[25] Certainly during the Civil War, Franco's propaganda apparatus claimed that this was the case. However, there are legitimate reasons to suspect that his motives for wanting to leave his post in the Canary Islands were more selfish. Gil Robles believed that the plan to enter parliament reflected doubts about the success of a military coup and, even before he had decided to join the conspiracy, the desire for a safe haven in civilian life where he could wait on events. A prominent conspirator, General Joaquín Fanjul expressed a similar opinion to a friend.[26]

Whatever the case, the five subsequent versions of the Cuenca episode, either produced by Franco directly or through his friend and biographer Joaquín Arrarás, show that he felt it somehow damaged his image. The first, in his first official biography, published by Arrarás in 1937, saw Franco deny ever requesting a parliamentary seat and claim that the right-wing parties had offered him a place in the list for Cuenca because he was a persecuted man and they wanted to free him "to organize the defense

of Spain." He "rejected the offer publicly" because "he did not believe in the honesty of the electoral process or expect anything from the Republican parliament."[27] This entirely mendacious version of his involvement in the Cuenca by-election implies that, had the electoral system been clean, Franco would have been a candidate. Accordingly, in the second version, of 1940, Arrarás eliminated this inadvertent proclamation of faith in democracy and merely stated that Franco had withdrawn his candidacy because it lent itself to "distorted interpretations."[28] Ten years after the event, Franco himself presented a third version, declaring in a speech to the Falangist Youth of Cuenca that he desired to be a parliamentary deputy to combat "the danger faced by the *Patria*."[29]

In the early 1960s, in the draft of his never completed autobiography, Franco produced his fourth version. Determined to eliminate any hint that he might have been seeking an escape route, he wrote in the third person that "General Franco sought a legal method of leaving the Canary Islands which would allow him to have more direct contact with other garrisons and to bolster those where it looked as if the Movimiento might fail." This version is perhaps the most scandalously mendacious reworking of the story. In it, Franco falsely atributes to himself all credit for securing José Antonio Primo de Rivera a place in the right-wing candidacy. With equal inexactitude, he claims that General Fanjul withdrew as a candidate to make way for him (Franco), something he had actually done for José Antonio. Franco invented the reasons for the withdrawal of his own candidacy with an airy claim that, on the morning on which the candidates were to be announced, he had received a telegram from "those affected" saying that it was impossible for his name to appear since it was too sensitive.[30]

It is perfectly understandable why Franco would omit any mention of the incident with the leader of the Falange. Since 1937, his propaganda apparatus had worked frenetically to convert Franco into the heir of José Antonio in the eyes of Falangists. Moreover, by claiming that his intention was to be able to supervise the preparations for the coup, he was subconsciously revealing his desire to diminish the posthumous glory of Emilio Mola, the real director of the conspiracy.

In the fifth and most plausible attempt to rework the Cuenca episode, Arrarás wrote that Franco withdrew "because he preferred to concentrate on his military duties and thereby better serve the national interest." Any hint of friction between Franco and José Antonio Primo de Rivera remained taboo.[31] Farcically, neither could have stood, because only the original candidates were legally permitted to stand in the Cuenca by-election.

This microremodeling of one incident was a minor aspect of Franco's obsession with image. During the Civil War, his instinct for spin was exercised on a much greater scale. Indubitably his rise to power in the rebel zone was based on indisputable qualities and military successes but above all on his astute and implacable hunger for power. In this regard, his manipulation of the world's press would play a key part. Given his reputation as one

of the best-prepared and most competent officers in the army, his decision to join the uprising in Morocco lifted the spirits of the rebels. Equally, his contagious "blind faith" in victory in the face of difficulties helped the rebels to overcome the setbacks of the early days. Franco revealed his personal ambition when, after the death of General Sanjurjo, the original leader, he took it for granted that he should succeed him and informed the Germans and Italians that this would be the case.[32]

Franco's first great contribution to the rebel cause was his solution to the problem of transporting the African army to the Spanish peninsula when a mutiny in the fleet had left the Straits of Gibraltar in Republican hands. Franco adopted the idea of breaking the blockade with an airlift. Despite the doubts expressed by his staff, he also decided to send a convoy by sea. It was one of the rare occasions when Franco, the cautious and hesitant planner, took a daring risk. Within days of reaching Morocco, Franco had set up both a press and a diplomatic office. The international and the Spanish rebel press received communiqués that referred to him as "supreme commander of the Nationalist Forces."[33] On July 25, Franco informed the Italians that five of Spain's military regions, together with the Balearic and Canary Islands and Spanish Morocco, were "in his power."[34] This exaggeration was an essential factor in securing Axis assistance.

Franco was also aware of the influence that the press could have on the morale of his Republican enemies. This was made clear in an interview given to the American journalist Jay Allen in Tetuán, on July 27, in which he was presented as "head of the Spanish rebels." When Allen asked him how long the killing would continue now that the coup had failed, Franco replied "there can be no compromise, no truce. I shall go on preparing my advance to Madrid. I shall advance. I shall take the capital. I shall save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost." Denying that there was a stalemate, Franco declared "I have had setbacks, the defection of the Fleet was a blow, but I shall continue to advance. Shortly, very shortly, my troops will have pacified the country and all of this will soon seem like a nightmare." Allen responded "that means that you will have to shoot half Spain?" At which a smiling Franco said "I repeat, at whatever cost." However, it appears that shortly afterward, Franco had second thoughts about the possible consequences of a public association with the cruelty and brutality of his African columns. After the interview appeared, one of Franco's staff told the American consul in Tangier that if he were ever captured, Jay Allen would be shot. Back in Gibraltar, the British authorities informed Jay that they could not guarantee his safety and recommended that he leave. There was a price put on his head by the rebels. In late October 1936, when, after wandering behind rebel lines, Dennis Weaver was arrested along with Hank Gorrell and James Minifie, news was sent to Franco's headquarters that a *News Chronicle* correspondent had been captured. Franco ordered that he immediately be brought to Salamanca. When the generalísimo saw him, he is reported to have said: "No, that's not the one. The one I want is taller."[35]

For Franco, the future power struggle was as important as possible victory. He, like Mola, realized that an effective war effort required a single overall military command and some kind of centralized diplomatic and political apparatus. Franco had already created a dedicated team. He would further tip the power balance in his favor when he sent his African columns to Toledo to liberate the besieged Alcázar despite the the fact that he thereby gave Madrid time to organize its defense. Franco gave a greater priority to the enhancement of his international image by means of a great propagandistic coup than to the swift defeat of the Republic. If he had captured Madrid immediately, it would have been too soon in terms of the irrevocable consolidation of his political position. The sequence of events confirms this interpretation. On September 21, at his request, a meeting of rebel generals near Salamanca had been held to resolve the question of the single military command. They chose Franco, convinced that they were making a provisional appointment, without political powers, and merely until victory was secured. He forced their hands with the liberation of the Alcázar on September 27 which was restaged two days later for the world's press and newsreels—all correspondents having been excluded on the day of the bloody assault on Toledo. At a second meeting of generals on September 28 it was agreed that Franco would be designated single commander with the title of generalísimo of the armed forces and head of government, "as long as the war lasts." Allegedly this last phrase was read by Franco and crossed out. Made head of the government of the Spanish state, Franco simply referred to himself as, and arrogated to himself the full powers of, head of state.[36]

In the event, the reality of Franco's position owed as much to the power of the press as to the agreement among the generals. The media were used to inflate the figure of the caudillo. His first chief of press and propaganda was General Millán Astray, who ran the press office as if it were a barracks, making the reporters line up when he blew a whistle and subjecting them to wild harangues. The press, the radio, and wall posters were used to establish similarities between Franco and El Cid. Collaborators like Dionisio Ridruejo, Ernesto Gimenez Caballero, and Fermín Yzurdiaga created links between the war against the left and the regional nationalities and the reconquest of Spain from the Moors. Their scripts projected the image of Franco, the undefeated caudillo, sent by God to combat the forces of evil. The press office similarly denied the August 1936 massacre of Badajoz and claimed that the bombing of Guernica in April 1937 was the work of Basque dynamiters.

It would, however, be absurd to suggest that Franco was nothing but an image without substance. By securing Axis aid, he practically guaranteed victory, but his unflappable determination also played its part. He had a remarkable capacity to keep up the morale of his followers. His confidence in himself was facilitated by his lack of imagination regarding possible defeat and his acceptance of his own propaganda. The pseudomedieval

choreography of many public ceremonies in which he participated, of which the most spectacular was the victory parade of May 19, 1939, delighted him. The frequent representation of Franco as a warrior king (rey-caudillo) thrilled him as well as being a crucial element of what passed for ideology in his regime. In paintings, posters, and public events, an image was projected of an all-powerful and all-seeing Franco, a holy crusader carrying out God's mission.

Perhaps the most striking symbol of this was the mural *El enviado de Dios* (*The Man Sent by God*) by the Bolivian artist Arturo Reque Meruvia, painted in the 1950s for the Civil War Hall of the Military Archive in Madrid. Much earlier, the reiterated declarations along the same lines by important figures of the Catholic hierarchy must also have influenced Franco. On October 1, 1938, the archbishop of Burgos said to Franco: "Just when madness seemed determined to take Spain to perdition, you arose by providential design to assure the salvation of souls." On August 26, 1943, the abbot of Samos called him "Defender of the Faith." On August 8, 1946, the mitred abbot of Santo Domingo de Silos declared that "Franco is the providential figure who has not only saved Spain, but who is also the moral guarantor of Europe."[37] Praise on this scale was not confined to the church. In a speech at the monastery of Guadalupe to the National Congress Women's Section of the Falange, of which she had been the leader since April 18, 1944, Pilar Primo de Rivera described Franco as "Our Lord on earth."[38]

In personal terms, perhaps the event that meant most to Franco was the ceremony on May 19, 1939, at which he was awarded the longed-for Cruz Laureada de San Fernando. Bypassing the order's regulations, he granted it to himself, although to do so he had to abandon the headship of state for several hours so that the decree could be signed by General Francisco Gómez-Jordana, the vice-president of the government. The ceremony was the culmination of the five-hour victory parade, which had been choreographed in order to identify Franco with Hitler and Mussolini, to associate him with the great medieval warrior figures of Spanish history, and to humiliate the defeated Republican population. Overhead, a large formation of biplanes spelled out the letters "VIVA FRANCO." Another aeroplane wrote his name in the sky with smoke. The Cruz Laureada de San Fernando was pinned on Franco by General Varela—a man who had won the medal legitimately on two occasions.[39]

Even the calendar was changed in order to exalt Franco. The year 1939, known during the war as the "third triumphal year," was elevated to "year of victory"—clearly, his victory. National feast days, other than religious ones, were celebrations of his victory: April 1—"Day of Victory;" April 17—"Day of the Unification" (to commemorate the obligatory unification of all political parties into his single party, the *Movimiento*); October 1—"Day of the Caudillo." In the corresponding celebrations, Franco, always wearing a spectacular uniform, was the principal protagonist, or, in the rare cases when he was absent, the central symbol. Pictures of his public

appearances were always first in the state-controlled cinema newsreels of the *Noticiario Español* and its later manifestation, the NO-DO (*Noticiarios y Documentales*—News and Documentaries).[40]

In other ways, Franco also rectified the personal dissatisfactions of his past, such as not gaining entry into the naval college. On October 1, 1943, Day of the Caudillo, Franco appeared at a reception for the diplomatic corps wearing the uniform of admiral of the fleet. On October 8, 1947, he received a group of American senators and congressmen dressed as an admiral. On October 12, 1948, the "Day of the Race" was celebrated with a commemoration of the foundation of the Armada of Castilla. Franco took the salute of twenty-eight warships in the estuary of the Odiel River at Huelva. At the monastery of La Rábida, where Christopher Columbus had kept vigil on the night before setting out on his historic voyage, Franco was invested with the title and paraphernalia of lord high admiral of Castile. His delight could be discerned both in his jauntily enthusiastic speech about Spanish naval tradition and in his beaming face. One year later, on October 22, 1949, Franco made a state visit to Portugal, and the choreography of his arrival was designed to show off his status as an admiral. He traveled by road to Vigo, where he boarded the battlecruiser *Miguel de Cervantes*, which put to sea at the head of a flotilla of eleven warships. At the mouth of the Tagus, it was met by four Portuguese destroyers and escorted to Lisbon.[41]

His power as head of state permitted such indulgences. Franco ended the Civil War with greater powers—at least in theory—than Felipe II. Whereas, during the war he had been presented as a medieval crusader engaged in the reconquest of Spain as the first step to the building of a great world empire, now he began to consider himself a great empire builder like Carlos V or Felipe II. Unfortunately the only way to achieve this was by sneaking crumbs from Hitler's table. In the event, it was fortunate for Franco that the Führer was not able to grant him the French North African Empire, nor provide sufficient resources to rebuild the Spanish armed forces and reconstruct the Spanish economy. Despite Franco's earlier offers to join the Axis, the end of the war in Europe was greeted by the regime's media with wild exaggerations of the achievements of the "Caudillo of Peace" and the supposed wisdom and strength which had enabled him to give Spain the gift of tranquillity while the rest of the world suffered the horrors of war. According to the Falangist daily *Arriba*, the end of the war was "Franco's Victory." The entire front-page of *ABC* was occupied by his photograph and the caption "he seems to have been chosen by the benevolence of God. When all was confusión, he saw clearly and defended the neutrality of Spain."[42]

In fact, Franco had avoided the consequences of his flirtation with Hitler by dint of the economic and military weakness that had diminished his attractiveness as an ally. Nevertheless, he never had the slightest qualms about peddling outrageous lies about his behavior during the World War.

In June 1945, for example, in an interview for the United Press, he said: "when Germany seemed to be winning the war, some members of the Falange tried to identify Spain with Germany and Italy, but I immediately dismissed all persons so inclined. I never had the slightest intention of taking Spain into the war."[43] For the rest of his life, he maintained the fiction of his commitment to Spanish neutrality, telling his doctor Ramón Soriano: "I never considered entering the war." He told his friend Max Borrell that, at the October 1940 meeting at Hendaye, he had enjoyed making Hitler nervous. He said this despite the existence of photos and newsreels that show that the one suffering nerves in the presence of the great man was Franco, not to mention the abundant documentation of the offers made by Franco to go to war at Hitler's side.[44]

For Franco, the defeat of the Third Reich brought to an end what, until that moment, had been an almost uninterrupted chain of triumphs for Franco. But he was always the supreme pragmatist. He was committed to the eternal survival of his regime but he had no long-term ideological vision that might limit his flexibility in the way that Hitler or Mussolini did. He felt no obligation to die in the ruins of the bunker. Franco decided to brazen out the hostility of the Allies, and he did so with a level of cunning and intuition that makes it difficult to understate his extraordinary political intelligence.

In doing so, he lost no opportunity to remind the Spanish people of what their service had cost him, although his sacrifices were hardly on the scale that he claimed. In March 1946, Franco presided over the opening of the new exhibition halls of the Army Museum. The entire ceremony was a glorification of the rebel cause in the Civil War, a reminder to his supporters that the best defense against a possible return of a vengeful left was to unite around him. Speaking of international hostility, he declared that

> it should surprise us least of all, since we never heard of anything but sacrifices and discomfort, of austerity and long vigils, of service and sentry duty. But in such service, you can occasionally rest. I cannot; I am the sentry who is never relieved, the one who receives the unwelcome telegrams and dictates the solutions; the one who is watchful while others sleep.

He reiterated the personal costs of his selfless dedication. Forgetting his hunting and fishing trips, his golf, and his long holidays, he told his audience of army officers that, unlike him, they could forget their cares and preoccupations. "I, as Chief of State, see my private life and my hobbies severely limited; my entire life is work and meditation." The combination of self-glorification and self-pity was typical.[45] The image of the tireless and vigilant caudillo, "the chief of state, victorious caudillo of our war and our peace, reconstruction and labour, devotes himself to the task of ruling over and governing our people" was constantly projected through the newsreels of NO-DO.[46]

During the period from 1945 to 1950, Franco convinced himself that he and Spain were under deadly siege. With opposition reemerging and hoping for backing from the Allies, many of the Caudillo's followers wavered during what has been called "the black night of Francoism."[47] Franco decided that his best tactic with regard to the Great Powers was to rewrite the story of his role in the Second World War and, with regard to the Spanish population, rewrite what was happening outside the country. After nearly ten years of daily adulation, he was incapable of perceiving a difference between his personal political needs and those of Spain. He dismissed foreign criticism of himself as the fruit of a masonic conspiracy against Spain. Throughout the Cold War, he used the press shamelessly as an instrument to guarantee his own survival. It was repeated almost daily that Franco—the man who had diligently courted Hitler—had personally saved Spain from the World War. The international ostracism provoked by his Axis links was presented as a perverse international siege motivated by the envy of the democracies for what he had done for Spain.

Although a guerrilla war was being fought against his regime and despite the fact that starvation afflicted large swathes of the population and diseases not seen for centuries had reappeared, he could congratulate himself for "the order, the peace and the joy which makes Spain one of the few peoples still able to smile in this tormented Europe."[48] He was incapable of accepting that popular distress could have any objective cause, believing it rather to be generated by foreign communist agitators and sinister Freemasons. This distance from reality gave Franco a confídence in himself entirely devoid of self-criticism. The conviction that he was always right permitted him the flexibility to adapt ceaselessy to changes in national and international circumstances.

His success in terms of survival culminated in the signature of the Concordat with the Vatican and the Pact with the United States in 1953. At the peak of his power, Franco began to forge a new image, a new mask—that of benevolent father of his people, an image that, with the passing of the years, would be transformed into that of the kindly grandfather of his people. Nevertheless, by the middle of the 1950s, Franco had not only been unable to fulfil his imperial dreams but—thanks to a misplaced economic policy of autarchy and despite the claims of regime propaganda—was presiding over a process of national impoverishment. In 1957, it was clear that Spain was on the edge of bankruptcy. Franco was sixty-five, the age at which many think of retirement. The scale and complexity of Spain's economic problems obliged him to recognize that more expert minds than his were required. Only when faced with the prospect of the return to Spain's roads of the *gasógenos*—cars powered by a cumbersome wood-burning device—did Franco reluctantly hand over the daily governance of the country to a group of technocrats. In practical terms, he was retiring as executive head of government in order to concentrate on being a rather more ceremonial head of state. From the end of the 1950s, he abandoned many of the cares

of government and left day-to-day administration in the hands of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco and his team of technocrats. He kept on numerous routine obligations, which he fulfilled in regal style: formal audiences, the inauguration of great public works, the chairmanship of cabinet meetings (at which little of moment was decided), and attendance at religious services. While others undertook the complex daily business of government, Franco dedicated the rest of his life to hunting, fishing, watching films, television, football, doing the pools, and—in terms of work—elaborating his great last political project: the preparation of postfrancoismo, a Francoist monarchy in which he would choose his royal successor.

In 1964, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the end of the Civil War was commemorated so as to resanctify Franco as the "Caudillo of Peace," although his emphasis was on "twenty-five years of victory."[49] Through exhibitions, endless newspaper articles and radio and television programs, the history of his dictatorship was rewritten in order to highlight his triumphs. The artifact that best summed up both the celebrations and the propaganda of the previous twenty-five years was the film *Franco, ese hombre*, written by José María Sánchez Silva and directed by José Luis Saenz de Heredia, the director of *Raza*. It was a skilful piece of work, a reverential corporate video for the caudillo, "Franco, that man who forged twenty-five years of peace with his spirit of steel on the anvil of his life." The picture it presented was of a hero who saved a country in chaos from the hordes of communism, then saved it again from the hordes of Nazism and later became the benevolent father of his people. Among its most outrageous inventions was the small lie that "Hitler's face was transformed" when he met Franco at Hendaye and the rather larger one that "the result of this meeting of David and Goliath" was that "the intelligence of one man held back what could not be stopped by all the armies of Europe, including the French."[50] The film ended with an interview with Franco, who took part enthusiastically. He agreed to wear makeup but "only for the good of the film."[51]

Until the very end of his life, Franco remained intensely conscious of the importance of his image. He gave the impression of believing his own propaganda, which raises interesting questions about the relationship between his cunning and his total lack of self-knowledge. In this context his frequent denials that he was a dictator must be judged. In March 1947, he told Edward Knoblaugh of the International News Service that there was no dictatorship in Spain: "I am not free, as it is believed abroad, to do what I want." In June 1958, he assured a French journalist that "to describe me as a dictator is simply childish."[52] On August 8, 1939, the Law of the Headship of State had given him the power to promulgate laws and decrees without consulting his government. He believed that the one-party state, the censorship, the prison camps, and the apparatus of terror were somehow balanced by letting his ministers talk interminably in cabinet meetings, this being merely a reflection of poor chairmanship. The decisions that he considered really important were often taken outside the cabinet. Since he

was told on a daily basis by the press and radio of the Movimiento that he was the saviour of Spain universally beloved by all but the sinister agents of occult powers, it is hardly surprising that Franco did not consider himself to be a dictator.

His own propaganda so inflated Franco's self-satisfaction as to permit him to distance himself from the consequences of his actions. This can be seen in the way in which he dealt with the internal power struggle in the 1940s between the Falange and the army. When senior officers came to complain about upstart Falangists to him, he—who was national chief of the Falange—would agree, saying that it was so difficult to control "these Falangists." When senior Falangists, such as his brother-in-law Ramon Serrano Suñer, complained that the generals were reactionary, he—who was generalísimo of the Armed Forces—would reply that it was so difficult to control these generals. There is a well-known story that when General Agustín Muñoz Grandes asked about the fate of a mutual friend, General Campins, who had been a colleague in the Academia Militar de Zaragoza, Franco replied: "the Nationalists shot him."

The combination of self-deception and manipulation continued even unto Franco's deathbed. When he realized that he was dying, Franco wrote his political testament, to be broadcast to the Spanish people after his death. This was duly done by his last prime minister, the tearful Carlos Arias Navarro, at 10 a.m. on November 20, 1975. As with all his autobiographical works, it took a benevolent view of its author:

> Spaniards, on rendering my life to the Most High and awaiting his final judgment, I beg God to welcome me kindly to his presence because I always wanted to live and die as a Catholic. In the name of Christ, I am proud that my constant wish has been to be a faithful son of the Church in whose bosom I will die. I beg forgiveness of everyone, just as with all my heart I forgive those who declared themselves my enemies even though I never thought of them as such. I believe that I had no enemies other than the enemies of Spain.

Having wiped the slate clean of all of his victims, he warned "Do not forget that the enemies of Spain and of Christian civilization are on the alert."[53] He was right. Those enemies would soon be dismantling his regime, holding free elections, and establishing democracy in Spain.

NOTES

1. For an account of Millán Astray's antics as a propagandist for Franco, see Paul Preston, *¡Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War* (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 24–39.
2. General José Millán Astray, *Franco, el Caudillo* (Salamanca: M. Quero y Simón Editor, 1939), 42–43.

3. Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1976), 431.
4. Joaquín Arrarás, *Franco* 7th ed. (Valladolid: Librería Santarén, 1939), 25, 28; Esteban Carvallo de Cora, ed.,*Hoja de servicios del Caudillo de España, Excmo. Sr.Don Francisco Franco Bahamonde y su genealogía* (Madrid: Editora National, 1967), 31–34; Carlos Blanco Escolá, *La incompetencia militar de Franco* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2000), 86–88.
5. Arrarás, *Franco*, 29.
6. Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, *Mi vida junto a Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1977), 345.
7. Jaime de Andrade, *Raza. Anecdotario para el guion de una película* (Madrid: Ediciones Numancia, 1942).
8. José María Gárate Córdoba, "'Raza,' un guion de cine," *Revista de Historia Militar*, no. 40 (1976), 59–73; Román Gubern, *"Raza" (un ensueño del General Franco)* (Madrid: Ediciones 99, 1977), 10–11, 124–125; Rogelio Baón, *La cara humana de un Caudillo* (Madrid: Editorial San Martín, 1975), 89.
9. Comandante Franco, *Diario de una bandera* (Madrid: Editorial Pueyo, 1922), 21.
10. Gárate Córdoba, "'Raza,'" 61.
11. Stanley G. Payne, *The Franco Regime 1936–1975* (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1987), 72. Julián Fernández Piñero, *Memorias del legionario Juan Ferragut (novela)* (Madrid: Editorial Mundo Latino, n.d. [1922]).
12. Carvallo de Cora, *Hoja de servicios del Caudillo*, 37–38, 93–97; Arrarás, *Franco*, 31–32; Blanco Escolá, *La incompetencia militar*, 95–103.
13. Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, *Testimonio y recuerdos* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1978), 324.
14. *El Correo Gallego*, April 20, 1922.
15. *El Correo Gallego*, October 19, 1921.
16. *El Carbayón*, February 23, 1922.
17. *El Carbayón*, February 23, 1922.
18. *Nuevo Mundo*, January 26, 1923.
19. *La Voz de Asturias*, June 10, 1923.
20. Julián Lago, *Las contramemorias de Franco* (Barcelona: Ediciones Zeta, 1976), 145.
21. Alberto Reig Tapia, *Franco: El César superlativo* (Madrid: Tecnos, 2005), 371–372; Alberto Reig Tapia, "Historia y memoria del franquismo," in José Luis de la Granja, Alberto Reig Tapia, and Ricardo Miralles, eds., *Tuñón de Lara y la historiografía española* ed. (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1999), 196.
22. *Estampa*, May 29, 1928.
23. *ABC*, April 18, 21, 1931.
24. José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona: Ariel, 1968), 563–567; Maximiano García Venero, *El general Fanjul: Madrid en el alzamiento national* (Madrid: Ediciones Cid, 1967), 226–228; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la Historia como fue. Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), 56–58.
25. Indalecio Prieto, *Discursos fundamentales* (Madrid: Ediciones Turner, 1975), 255–273; Indalecio Prieto, *Cartas a un escultor* (Buenos Aires: Losada, 1961), 92–110.
26. Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, 563–564; Basilio Alvarez, *España en crisol* (Buenos Aires, Editorial Claridad, 1937), 69.
27. Arrarás, *Franco*, 231.
28. Joaquín Arrarás, *Historia de la Cruzada española* 8 vols, 36 tomos (Madrid: Ediciones Españolas, 1939–1943) II, 488.

29. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *Textos de doctrina política: palabras y escritos de 1945 a 1950* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 109.
30. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *«Apuntes» personales sobre la República y la guerra civil* (Madrid: Fundacion Francisco Franco, 1987), 34–35.
31. Joaquín Arrarás, *Historia de la segunda República española,* 4 vols. (Madrid, 1956–1968) IV, 165–166.
32. Ismael Saz Campos, *Mussolini contra la II República: hostilidad, conspiraciones, intervencion (1931–1936)*, (Valencia: Edicions Alfons el Magnànim, 1986), 191–193; Franco, *Apuntes*, 39; Ángel Viñas, *Franco, Hitler y el estallido de la guerra civil. Antecedentes y consecuencias* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2001), 343–353.
33. *Dez anos de política externa (1936–1947) a naçaõ portuguesa e a segunda guerra mundial* III (Lisbon, 1964) 156; *The Times*, August 11, 17, 1936.
34. De Rossi to Ciano, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 8ª serie, vol.IV (10 maggio—31 agosto 1936)* (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato/ Libreria dello Stato, 1993), 690–691.
35. Allen, undated memo to Carlos Baker, Jay Allen Papers (private collection of Jay Allen's family).
36. Luciano González Egido, *Agonizar en Salamanca: Unamuno julio-diciembre 1936* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1986), 109; Guillermo Cabanellas, *La guerra de los mil días. Nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República española*, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo, 1973), I: 654–655; Ramón Garriga, *La España de Franco: las relaciones con Hitler*, 2nd ed. (Puebla, México: Cajica, 1970), 73; and letter to the author, April 30, 1991; Maximiano García Venero, *Falange en la guerra de España: la Unificación y Hedilla* (Paris: Ruedo Ibérico, 1967), 167; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la Historia como fue. Memorias* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), 163–164.
37. Carlos Fernández Santander, *Antología de 40 años (1936–1975)* (Sada-A Coruña: Ediciós do Castro, 1983), 65, 136, 175.
38. Pilar Primo de Rivera, *Discursos, Circulares, Escritos* (Madrid: Seccion Femenina de FET y de las JONS, s.f.), 62.
39. Daniel Sueiro and Bernardo Díaz Nosty, *Historia del franquismo*, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1985), I: 22–24; Franco Bahamonde, *Hoja de servicios*, 123–124.
40. Rafael R.Tranche, "La imagen de Franco 'Caudillo' en la primera propaganda cinematográfica del Régimen," in Vicente Sánchez Biosca, coordinador, *Materiales para una iconografía de Francisco Franco* 2 vols. (Madrid: *Archivos de la Filmoteca*, nos. 42–43, Octubre 2002–Febrero 2003), 77–95.
41. Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain* (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 175; Luis Suárez Fernández, *Francisco Franco y su tiempo*, 8 vols. (Madrid: Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco, 1984), IV: 188–189; Paul Preston, *Franco. A Biography* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 582–583, 591.
42. *Arriba*, May 8; *ABC*, May 8, 1945.
43. *The Times*, June 18, 1945.
44. Ramón Soriano, *La mano izquierda de Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1981), 159; Borrell interview, María Mérida, *Testigos de Franco. Retablo íntimo de una dictadura* (Barcelona: Plaza y Janés, 1977), 225.
45. *Arriba*, March 8, 1946; *ABC*, March 8, 1946.
46. Tranche, "La imagen de Franco," 92–93.
47. Max Gallo, *Spain under Franco: A History* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1973), 153–159.

48. *La Vanguardia Española*, July 18, 1945; *The Times*, July 18, 1945; Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *Textos de doctrina política: palabras y escritos de 1945 a 1950* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1951), 15–25.
49. *ABC*, April 1, 1964.
50. José María Sánchez Silva and José Luis Saenz de Heredia, *Franco . . . ese hombre* (Madrid: Difusion Librera, 1965), 14, 139.
51. Gárate Córdoba, "'Raza,'" 60; José María Sánchez Silva and José Luis Saenz de Heredia, *Franco . . . ese hombre* (Madrid: Difusion Librera, 1975).
52. Franco, *Textos 1945–1950*, 229; Francisco Franco, *Discursos y mensajes del Jefe del Estado 1955–1959* (Madrid: Publicaciones Españolas, 1960), 496–497.
53. Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *Pensamiento político de Franco*, edited by Agustín del Río Cisneros, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1975), I: xix.

6 Blueblood and Blacksmith

A Comparative View of Churchill's and Mussolini's Speeches

Giuseppe Finaldi

MUSSOLINI'S AND CHURCHILL'S SECOND WORLD WAR OF WORDS

During the Second World War Mussolini and Churchill became direct adversaries. Hitler, however, was always the British statesman's defining rival (a compliment not reciprocated by the Führer, for whom the equivalent role fell to Stalin), with the Italian dictator usually making an appearance as sidekick. Throughout the conflict, Churchill remained the archenemy for Il Duce. Still, there were times when the British prime minister aimed his thunder directly at Mussolini and, using the platform of speeches to their respective peoples, the two leaders fought it out in words that reciprocated the ordnance trained on each other's armed forces. The most obvious example of this verbal jousting across enemy lines occurred in December 1940, when Churchill made his "One Man Only" speech, which Mussolini countered a few weeks later, and in late 1942, when the Italian dictator directly responded to a broadcast made by Churchill some days before.

As has often been pointed out, Churchill's wartime speeches (and his later history writing) anthropomorphized the European nations into the simple characters of an adventure novel or drama: Germany was the villain and corruptor, the occupied European nations (say France or Poland) its innocent victims, and Britain the stock hero fighting not only in its own defense but also for the redemption of the subjugated victims.[1] In a speech to the boys of his old school, Harrow, delivered when the war was over in October 1945, Churchill told such a story in as stark and simple a form as possible: "it was on our country that the brunt of the burden fell for more than a year, of saving civilization and the world."[2] In such a storyboard Italy could most plausibly be cast as the main villain's buffoon, the "light relief" of a Mafioso[3] (as trotted out rather predictably by Charlie Chaplin in the *Great Dictator*), after tackling the "stony path" of the genuine struggle with Hitler. In the British children's comic *The Beano*, between 1940 and 1943, Il Duce was inspiringly dubbed "Musso the Wop, he's a big-a-da-flop," although there is no record of Churchill having been influenced by this publication or Mussolini responding to it.[4] Nevertheless, in a speech

broadcast to the nation in April 1941, Churchill invoked such a screenplay or cartoon character:

> I turn aside from the stony path we have to tread, to indulge for the moment in a little light relief. I dare say you have read in the newspapers that by a special proclamation the Italian dictator has congratulated the Italian army in Albania on the glorious laurels they have gained by their victory over the Greeks. Here, surely is the world's record in the domain of the ridiculous and the contemptible. This whipped jackal Mussolini, who to save his own skin has made of Italy a vassal State of Hitler's empire, goes frisking up at the side of the German tiger with yelps not only of appetite—that could be understood—but even of triumph. [We will] find a new object in life in making sure that when we come to the final reckoning this absurd imposter shall be abandoned to public justice and universal scorn.[5]

At times however, in an attempt to pry open a rent between Italian people and their dictator, Churchill chose to tread more carefully and avoided casting Mussolini as nothing more than "Hitler's jackal." In his late 1940 "Address to the Italian People," this approach involved selecting a narrative that needed to be more sensitive in its judgment of the dictator; up to that moment it appeared that Italians had followed him willingly and their foolishness in having done so could not be overly highlighted. Moreover, Churchill had himself in the past been fulsome in his praise of Il Duce, most prominently during a visit to Rome in 1927, when he had commended Mussolini for having in Fascism discovered the "necessary antidote for the Russian virus."[6] As late as 1937, no doubt with an eye to isolating the German menace, he had written of the "amazing qualities of courage, comprehension, self-control and perseverance which [Mussolini] exemplifies."[7] It was a few weeks after the Italian invasion of Greece, in December 1940, that Churchill reined in his venom and with tempered words asserted that it was only the long years in power and the corrupting influence of "the ferocious, pagan barbarians" north of the Alps that had induced Mussolini to his present folly, even though there was "no denying" that he had once been a "great man."[8]

"One man, and one man alone ordered Italian soldiers to ravage their neighbor's vineyard," the British prime minister stated with a typical flourish, which conjured up images of classical and biblical antiquity appropriate to the Mediterranean theater.[9] Mussolini had broken the covenant he had established with the Italian people; the latter were complimented by Churchill with lofty historic titles such as being "the trustees and inheritors of ancient Rome," or the guardians at the "sacred center of Christendom."[10] Furthermore, identifying more palatable poles to which Italians might redirect their loyalty, Churchill stated that it was against the wishes of the Italian monarch and the Pope that,

> One man, and one man alone has resolved to plunge Italy after all these years of strain and effort into the whirlpool of war. And what is the position of Italy today? Where is it that the Duce has led his trusting people after eighteen years of dictatorial power? What hard choice is open to him now? It is to stand up to the battery of the whole British Empire on sea, in the air and in Africa, and the vigorous counter-attack of the Greek nation; or, on the other hand, to call in Attila over the Brenner Pass with his hordes of ravenous soldiery and his gangs of Gestapo policemen to occupy, hold down and protect the Italian people, for whom he and his Nazi followers cherish the most bitter and outspoken contempt that is on record between races.[11]

But by November 1942 any notion of Mussolini as "great man" had turned to sand on Churchill's lips: in a "World Broadcast from London," Il Duce had transmogrified from that to jackal and now to a "hyena," which had "broken all bounds of decency and even common sense." The "fair land of Italy" was now gripped in agony, and "measureless calamities" awaited the "hard-working, gifted, and once happy Italian people." The British prime minister, however, reiterated that "one man, and one man alone, had brought [these calamities] to this pass."[12]

How then did the "one man" himself respond to these appeals so artfully constructed to provide for the Italian people (and its monarchy) an alternative to obeying their leader and persisting with the German alliance? Without publicly acknowledging Churchill's December 1940 address, Mussolini nevertheless counterattacked in a widely reported speech delivered to Rome Fascist Party members in February 1941. His style was very different from that employed in Churchill's "Address to the Italian People," most significantly in his making no attempt to split the British public from its "masonic," "capitalistic," "liberal," "democratic," and "plutocratic" leaders.[13] The "English" were the enemy *tout court* and, in order to assure Italian victory, needed to be regarded with "cold and conscious hatred, a hatred that should be implacable, rooted in every heart and spread into every home."[14] After reminding his audience that in fact Italy had been at war with what Britain represented since Fascism had come to power in 1922, Mussolini pointed out that talking about a separate peace was "demented" and that it was

> supremely ridiculous to speculate on a possible moral retreat of the Italian people. Churchill has not the slightest idea as to the spiritual force of the Italian people and what Fascism is capable of . . . [T]hat Churchill should have bombed Genoa in order to weaken its resolve was a puerile illusion . . . [s]ignifying only that he did not understand the temperament, the character of the Ligurians in general and the Genoese in particular. It means being unaware of the civic virtue, the proud patriotism of a people who, in the arc of its coast, has given Columbus, Garibaldi and Mazzini to the fatherland.[15]

As to Churchill's argument that the alliance with Hitler had been nothing more than the decision of "one man," Mussolini assured his public that, "whoever might be tempted to think differently, forgets that the alliance between Italy and Germany is not only one between two armies or diplomacies, but of two peoples and two revolutions destined to leave their mark in history."[16]

To Churchill's 1942 "hyena" jibe, Mussolini chose to highlight his earthy origins compared to those of the man born in Blenheim palace:

> It is said that this gentleman is descended from a family of dukes and there is plenty of blue blood in him. In my veins instead flows the healthy and pure blood of a blacksmith. In this moment I feel infinitely more a lord than this man out of whose mouth, fetid with alcohol and tobacco, comes such miserable baseness.[17]

As for "hyenas in human dress," Mussolini continued, "the last three hundred years of British history had unleashed hyenas intent on drinking the blood of entire generations in all the corners of the earth."[18] "If you tear off the suit in which the English take their five-o-clock tea," Il Duce quipped, "you will find the old, primitive barbarian with his skin painted in many colors that was conquered by the organized legions of Caesar and Claudius."[19] Such clichés seem not to have perturbed Churchill; but with less self-assurance Mussolini did feel compelled in the same speech to dispel the idea "diffused throughout the world" of an Italy "which should dispend its energies exclusively on brushes, chisels and musical instruments."[20] He even "categorically refuse[d] to believe that the Italian people is of an inferior temper to the English or the Russian," although he had prefaced this sentence with the challenge "until proven otherwise."[21] The key, however, in Mussolini 's reaction to the challenge posed by Churchill 's attempt to speak directly to Italians without the intercession of Il Duce was quickly made in the 1941 speech and was a promise of his own to them that,

> when the war is over, in the world social revolution that will follow, with a more just distribution of the earth's wealth, the sacrifices made and discipline shown by the Italian working class will not be forgotten. The Fascist revolution will take another decisive step in the equalization of the social order.[22]

MUSSOLINI AND CHURCHILL, COMPARISON AND HISTORY

This public and very politically significant exchange between Churchill and Mussolini in many ways encapsulates the difference in the style and common narratives employed by these two contemporaries in their public speaking over their long careers. Churchill, born in 1874, was nine years

older than Mussolini and made his first political speech in 1897. He entered Parliament at the very young age of twenty-six and was to remain at the heart of British politics for the next sixty years. Mussolini was almost as precocious, becoming head of Italy's Socialist daily *Avanti!* at the age of twenty-nine. He had already published various books, made perhaps thousands of speeches, and penned hundreds of articles. While not rich, Churchill was to the manor born, whereas Mussolini was indeed the son of a blacksmith, even if by the standards of nineteenth-century Italy he could not be classified as poor. Unlike Churchill, Mussolini never wrote history books, but he wrote more newspaper articles than his wartime rival. By the end their lives both men had left behind an enormous corpus of writings and speeches, which have provided the basis for massive biographies detailing almost their every significant utterance and deed.[23]

For obvious reasons perhaps, direct comparisons between the two men have never been made. Mussolini slayed democracy, established a cruel dictatorship, and ended up ransoming his regime and thereby his country to a cloying friendship with the Third Reich that, according to F. W. Deakin—incidentally one of Churchill's most distinguished research assistants—was a "brutal" one.[24] Churchill was the good guy who saved the world from the horrors of precisely the kind of thing Mussolini espoused. Apart from the moral judgment of history, which is more likely to thrust together the bad guys in an attempt to fathom from what common well of evil they may have drawn, the most evident distinction between Mussolini and Churchill was that the Italian, like Hitler or indeed Stalin, was an intruder in the political systems as established throughout Europe in the nineteenth century; that is he did not recognize (first as a radical Socialist and then as Fascist) the legitimacy of established political institutions, and that he was prepared to advocate change via unconstitutional means. Churchill, by contrast, was a conservative (even when he was in the Liberal Party) for whom the preservation of the "long continuity of our institutions," as he put it in his most famous speech, provided the very foundation for his whole political outlook. He worked the system from within, and even during his "wilderness" years remained a prominent member of Parliament.[25]

Comparison is one of the fundamental, indeed essential tools in the trade of making sense of history. But what determines whether a comparison is valid? When Alan Bullock wrote his double-barreled biography of Hitler and Stalin, it was plausible to argue that these two tyrants had lived "parallel lives"—and more recently Richard Overy has repeated the match.[26] The dictators of Russia and Germany can be placed in a "totalitarian" basket, or they may be conjoined simply because they so ruthlessly implemented two of the twentieth century's worst dystopias, totalitarian or otherwise. Stalin will not appear as a protagonist in books on fascism in the way that Mussolini and Hitler must. "Political religion," like totalitarianism, might like to have all three dictators rub shoulders. But more improbable comparisons can be enlightening. In one of Thomas

Szasz's many histories of psychiatry, what he calls the "science of lies" is matched blow for blow by chapters detailing the rise and fall of an older instrument of social control, the Catholic Inquisition.[27] Shmuel Eisenstadt compared empires disparate in time and place because they were empires,[28] and Brian Bosworth has drawn an intriguing parallel between Alexander the Great and Hernán Cortés.[29]

A direct comparison between Mussolini and Churchill is rarely made, although there is one school of thought that regards them as the best of enemies.[30] Richard Bosworth quite rightly but conventionally girded himself for his biography of Mussolini by reading up on Franco and Hitler, not Churchill.[31] There are no easily available boxes in which one can plausibly place Churchill, as has been said, a scion of one of Britain's great aristocratic families, the son of an almost prime minister, and Mussolini, a self-made man who rose from the obscurity of the provincial lower classes to the giddy height of great dictator. Churchill, despite his career having got under way when Victoria presided over far-flung palm and pine, would be buried when that empire had become one with Nineveh and Tyre; Mussolini's life had ended two decades earlier with a rip of machine-gun fire in a devastated continent. His life had coincided almost to the day with Europe's greatest crisis.

Yet apart from the fact that Mussolini and Churchill became direct rivals and hurled bitter words at each other across the battle lines of the Second World War, there is scope to put the two men side by side, most obviously because their careers condensed two of the greatest political threads of post-1789 Europe and that, at least at times, their messages resonated with vast numbers of contemporaries. Whereas both men quite appropriately believed in historical progress, Mussolini spoke with the voice of the Europe, which embraced change, dynamism, and utopias in which the past could be cast aside in a leap forward into the unknown; Churchill instead saw the past as an ancient but hale plant to be carefully nurtured, preserved even, pruned, and built upon rather than uprooted.

Neither Churchill nor Mussolini was a great or original thinker; their careers were founded literally on their success (again not at all times but undoubtedly at particularly vital junctures) at speechmaking, or more precisely on torrential outpourings of words. They were above all else communicators. Their charisma was much more important than their tenacity in sitting on committees and pulling strings in the shadows (like Stalin) or winning the personal and unswerving loyalty of a group of capable and believing henchmen (like Hitler), or even in a determined pursuit of a deeply held ideology. It is not surprising that both Churchill and Mussolini were fickle in their political loyalties. They headed parties not primarily because they were in control of the machinery of those parties but because they could communicate over and beyond them to the people who those parties were meant to represent. Churchill was never loyal to a party, notoriously crossing the floor not once but twice in his parliamentary career, and the

soon-to-be Duce "converted" from Socialist internationalism to authoritarian nationalism during the First World War. Arguably even as Duce, Mussolini never had a coherent set of values upon which he decided policy, unless opportunism can be regarded as a principle.[32] Over their careers they changed their views on any number of issues. Churchill advocated democracy, but only for Europeans.[33] As is well known, his reputation as a staunch defender of liberty was garnered while repressing (or calling to subdue) any sign of it in Britain's nonwhite empire.[34] His attitude to Fascism, as has been shown, was not always as consistently hostile as is often presumed. Mussolini's antisemitism came late in his regime, was never deeply held, but was legislated into Italian law.[35] The list of blatantly contradictory statements in Mussolini's oeuvre, as anyone who has glanced at as few as a couple of the forty-four volumes of his complete works will know, is embarrassingly long.

Some elasticity in their political outlook over their long careers and a distinct lack of party loyalty united both Mussolini and Churchill, but these qualities were merely symptoms of their enormous or perhaps inflated sense of self-importance and unmitigated ambition. In a discussion seeking to understand what exactly Churchill believed, Paul Addison wrote that the British statesman "was never free for long from compulsions to glory. He was either driven by the conviction that he was a genius and a man of destiny, or harrowed by fears that he was not."[36] Robert Rhodes James points out that in 1880 Charles Dilke noted in his diary that "Rosebery is about the most ambitious man I have ever met," having later to reassess such a judgment, however, because he had, "since known Winston Churchill."[37]

"Though he was constantly prey to self-doubt, the image he conveyed was that of a man possessed by a ferocious optimism, an absolute conviction that history was on his side—and the image was what mattered."[38] These lines, written by historian Donald Sassoon, refer to Mussolini, although they could just as easily have been meant for Churchill. Even the latter's certainty that Britain was a unique force for good in the world cannot be easily disentangled from his insatiable desire to be at the helm of that mission; as for Mussolini, love of country was a vehicle for personal advancement. Indeed, both men's views of history were unsophisticated and in the simplistic pageant depicted again and again in their writings and speeches they cast themselves in starring roles. They both wrote autobiographies at immodestly young ages; Mussolini tried his hand when he was under thirty,[39] as did Churchill, and both (perhaps more justifiably) did not lose the habit as the years went by and their careers took off. The British statesman never published his memoirs as is expected of British prime ministers, preferring instead to pen histories of the world into which they could be inserted.[40] As was put so finely by Isaiah Berlin, Churchill imagined the actors on the world stage as "something between Victorian illustrations in a book of history and the great procession painted by Benozzo Gozzoli in the Riccardi Palace."[41] He could join the pageant by taking up similar

poses. Mussolini too saw history in terms of great men on horseback, of which he was the contemporary exemplar. He noted in an article in 1933 that it was surely no coincidence that a spate of books on Julius Caesar had been published since he had become Duce.[42] In Emil Ludwig's 1932 interview, the conversation "on the school of history" revolved around Machiavelli (whose works were apparently read aloud to the family by Mussolini's father), Napoleon, and Caesar, with Il Duce noting that it was with the last, as philosopher and man of action, that he felt the greatest affinity.[43]

Whereas Mussolini and Churchill had some similar character traits and parallels may be drawn between their insatiable ambition, their unshakeable drive for self-aggrandizement, and their unsophisticated view of the past, they were very different actors who made very different political claims. Yet what made them such domineering personalities of the first half of Europe's twentieth century was their skill as communicators, albeit in the different contexts of Britain and Italy. It was their ability to project their personalities through speech that made of Churchill and Mussolini such charismatic figures of the first half of the twentieth century. But what did they communicate?

WE SHALL FIGHT ON THE BEACHES

According to Denis Mack Smith, the Italian dictator's speeches are in themselves "not interesting," and it is true that it has been a much more rewarding experience reading through Churchill's rather than the Italian's.[44] Yet Mussolini's words cause one to wince, cringe, or smile, most obviously because of the enormous disparity between what is claimed in them and what then occurred. A good example is the speech on the war situation given to Fascist party bosses (then broadcast to the nation) on November 18, 1940. Regarding the setbacks suffered recently by the Italian army in its attempt to subdue mighty Greece, Mussolini solemnly promised, in a phrase that later became an Italian colloquialism, to "snap Greece's kidneys should it take two or twelve months."[45] Defeats during the Second World War (and Italy endured many) were invariably associated by Mussolini with Rome's battle lost to Hannibal at Cannae, it naturally followed that the equivalent of the decisive victory at Zama would be over the horizon.[46] The speech on Italy's entry into war in June 1940 was Mussolini at his best. Declaimed from the famous balcony of the Palazzo Venezia in Rome, its final words stated:

> Proletarian and Fascist Italy is for the third time on its feet, proud and united as never before. A single, categorical and demanding word soars and lights up hearts from the Alps to the Indian Ocean. Victory! [*vincere*] And victory will be ours in order to finally give to Italy, to Europe and to the world a lasting and just peace.[47]

Once again Mussolini was engaging directly with Churchill. His words in this speech appear to be directly mirroring Churchill's to Parliament on the British statesman's assumption of the premiership in May 1940:

> You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word: It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival. Let that be realized; no survival for the British Empire, no survival for the urge and impulse of the ages, that mankind will move forward towards its goal.[48]

Rhodes James states that Churchill's "blood, toil, tears and sweat" speech, from which the above quotation is taken, is "one of the most crucial in modern history."[49] Such elevated historical standing is never claimed for Mussolini's speech declaring Italy to be at war, no matter the enthusiasm of the sycophants below Palazzo Venezia. Mussolini did not win; his promises proved to be ludicrously empty, but what of the reasons given for entering the war? Mussolini stated:

> This gigantic struggle is nothing but a phase in the logical development of our revolution; it is the struggle of the poor and numerous peoples against those who starve the rest by viciously monopolizing all the world's wealth and gold; it is the struggle of the young and fertile peoples against those that have become sterile and head towards their sunset; it is the struggle between two centuries and two ideas.[50]

Churchill's task was simpler and more appealing. The implausibility of convincing anybody in Italy that Britain was one of the most "monstrous tyrannies" in history may have taken some of the edge off Mussolini's ability to depict the war against Britain as a matter of life and death. For Churchill, Italian Fascism did not fit this bill either, but Nazi Germany clearly did.

> You ask, what is our policy? I can say: It is to wage war, by sea, land and air, with all our might and with all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark lamentable catalogue of human crime.[51]

Churchill's World War II speeches constructed a simple narrative of historical continuity in Britain's centuries-old mission to do good. His essential message was that his country needed no changing, but that it should continue along the path (incidentally decreed by God) upon which it had treaded since time immemorial, placing it at the forefront of that "urge and impulse of the ages" that was to bring "mankind to its goal." What exactly these "goals" and "impulses" were remained unclear, but they were

nevertheless powerful ideals when juxtaposed to the tyranny that would lead the world to "sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age."[52] Churchill's message was that the British should essentially be themselves and bond with the spirit of the nation's illustrious ancestors, thereby rendering the present generation worthy descendants of those who had lived in what he called the "brave old days of the past." "Therefore, we must regard the next week or so," he stated in a broadcast of September 1940,

> as a very important period in our history. It ranks with the days when the Spanish Armada was approaching the Channel, and Drake was finishing his game of bowls; or when Nelson stood between us and Napoleon's Grand Army at Boulogne. We have read all about this in the history books; but what is happening now is on a far greater scale and of far more consequence to the life and future of the world and its civilization than these brave old days of the past. Every man and woman will therefore prepare himself to his duty, whatever it may be, with special pride and care.[53]

No such narrative was easily available to Mussolini. He had brought Italy into the conflict and determined that it should be a "Fascist" one—that is, that the supposed transformation of Italy and Italians, which had taken place since 1922, had been the fruit of his "revolution" and that the war would in consequence be fought on the terms established by his "twentieth-century ideology."[54] Churchill's most famous speeches were delivered when Britain risked invasion and Mussolini's Italy faced a similar scenario in June 1943. With the Allies about to land in Sicily, Il Duce was presented with the opportunity to replicate the orations of his British counterpart, rallying the population to stern resistance according to his view of Fascism's place in Italian history. The young Mussolini had of course been one of the major voices (or so ran the legend) in steeling, through his newspaper articles, the will of the Italian people to resist after the Italian defeat of Caporetto in October 1917. But then there had been no alternative Italy to that established by unification, to which the Italian population (as was to happen after 1943 and in uncanny accordance with what Churchill had predicted in 1940) could revert by default. Mussolini's greatest failing compared with his liberal predecessors in the Great War was that those Italies Churchill had identified as rivaling the dictator for the loyalty of the Italian people (the church and the monarchy) had never cast their lot entirely with the regime. Churchill had neglected to point the Italian people to the Socialists in 1940 for obvious reasons, but through the alliance with the Soviet Union even that Italy was brought within the pale of the alternatives to Fascism. During the war, defeat after defeat meant that Mussolini could no longer claim to speak for all Italians.

It is no surprise that his last address before falling from power, delivered on June 24, 1943, was directed at the Fascist Party rather than the Italian

people, although it was broadcast to the nation some days later. Whereas Churchill had succeeded (as Hitler was to, but in relation to Stalin's Russia)[55] in plausibly arguing that "without victory there is no survival," Mussolini did not even pretend that such an apocalyptic future would be the inevitable consequence of defeat. If we lose, he warned, "Italy will have a dishonorable peace which will thrust her to fourth or fifth place in terms of her great power status."[56] Intriguing as it is to speculate what position Mussolini expected his listeners to believe their country had previously occupied, the prospect of being "fourth or fifth" would hardly have alarmed war-weary Italians. But most notorious in this speech, a sure confirmation that Il Duce had lost his touch, was the phrase in which Mussolini made an appeal that should enemy invaders land they would be halted on the *bagnasciuga*.[57] According to Sergio Romano the employment of this last word sent Italians scurrying for their *Treccani* dictionaries only to realize that what Il Duce had intended to say was "*battigia*" (i.e., the point on the beach where the water touches the sand).[58] *Bagnasciuga* is a nautical term denoting the zone between the maximum and minimum floating capacity of a ship.[59] In reality what Mussolini was failing to emulate was Churchill's "we shall fight on the beaches"[60] speech, which the British prime minister had delivered to the House of Commons three years earlier, when it appeared that Hitler's divisions were about to be ferried across the English Channel. Sicilians greeted the Allies as liberators a few days after the *Bagnasciuga* speech, precipitating Mussolini's fall; this was as appropriate a response to the dictator's sloppy words as had been Britain's resolve in response to Churchill's stirring ones.

FINEST HOURS

But it is a mistake to try to shed light on any power Mussolini's speech making may have had by focusing on the Second World War. It was Italy's appalling performance on the battlefield during that conflict which revealed the shallowness of Il Duce's Fascist "revolution" and therefore the hollowness of his words. Was he not believed more sincerely before that catastrophe? Mussolini's "finest hour" can be located back in 1935–1936, during the conquest of Ethiopia, which coincided with Churchill's years in the "wilderness." From the back benches of the House of Commons the latter thundered against Hitler; but despite supporting sanctions directed at Italy by the League of Nations during the Abyssinian crisis, Churchill was less astringent with the Italian as opposed to the German dictator.

Commenting on Italy's participation in the 1937 Nyon conference and the so-called clearing of "pirates" from the Mediterranean, Churchill stated that "the mere mention of [Mussolini's] name quelled the wicked depredations of these marauders."[61] He was even more effuse in his praise of the Italian dictator in October 1935, in commenting on the League of Nations'

sanctions in a speech to the House of Commons. He complemented Mussolini for his restraint and for his skill in finding the right words to overcome his country's difficult situation.

> Signor Mussolini—I think it is a sign of his commanding mind; to my mind it is one of the strongest things he has done—has submitted to these invidious sanctions and still preserved his contact with the League of Nations. Instead of saying "Italy will meet them with war," he says "Italy will meet them with discipline, with frugality and with sacrifice." That is a great saying in the setting, in the difficulties, in which he stands.[62]

Mussolini in fact skillfully navigated Italy through the Abyssinian crisis with a series of speeches that may have provided something of a model for Churchill when it came to Britain "standing alone" in 1940. The fact that the League of Nations condemned Italian action (but without posing any serious military threat) allowed the dictator to appear as a courageous leader defending his people's interests despite unjust threats, prepared, though with dignified reluctance, to even use force against Europe's "have" powers should such a course of action be required to preserve Italian honor. "It is not merely an army that aims to its objectives," he proclaimed, in the mobilization speech of October 1935 from which Churchill took his cue in the quotation above,

> it is an entire people of forty-four million souls against whom a dark injustice is being attempted: that of taking away from us a small place in the sun. . . . To economic sanctions we will oppose our discipline, our frugality and our spirit of sacrifice. Military sanctions will be answered by military measures, acts of war will be met by acts of war. . . . Never as in this historic moment has the Italian people revealed the quality of its spirit and the power of its character. It is against this people to whom humanity owes many of its greatest achievements, it is against this people made up of poets, artists, heroes, saints, navigators and migrants, it is against such a people that there is talk of sanctions. Proletarian and Fascist Italy, Italy of Vittorio Veneto [n.b., the battle which led to Italian victory in World War I] and of the Revolution! Arise! Let the cry of your decision fill the skies and be of inspiration to the soldiers that await in Africa, let it be of cheer to our friends, and a warning to our enemies throughout the world: a cry of justice, a cry of victory![63]

The determination to persevere despite the opprobrium of the League of Nations was rewarded by victory in Ethiopia seven months after the "mobilization" speech. In stark contrast to the grating vacuity of Mussolini's speeches in World War II, success gave Il Duce's victory proclamation, again delivered from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia and amplified

throughout the country by radio, in newsreels and in print, the sense that a major and historic turning for the Italian people and the Fascist regime had been reached.

> All knots have been severed by our resplendent sword and this African victory remains intact and pure in the history of our fatherland just as our fallen and our surviving legionaries dreamed and wished. Italy has its empire. It is a Fascist empire because it carries with it the signs of the indestructible will and power of the Roman lictor, because this is the goal to which over fourteen years the exuberant and disciplined energy of this young and vigorous generation of Italians has been directed. . . . The people of Italy with its blood has created the Empire; it will be nourished with its labor and defended against anyone with its arms. With these supreme assurances lift on high, legionaries, your standards, your steel and your hearts and salute, after fifteen centuries, the reappearance of the Empire on the fatal hills of Rome.[64]

Like Churchill's "Finest Hour" speech,[65] Mussolini's "Proclamation of Empire" address was a typical if potted Periclean oration.[66] Praise for the dead becomes an exhortation to the living. The present generation is commended for being worthy of the forefathers; indeed, future generations will forever be grateful to those to whom the speech is directed. In his most celebrated speech, Churchill (although in a moment of peril rather than after victory had been attained)—with the famous "let us so bear ourselves, that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last for a thousand years, men will still say, This was their finest hour"—had also commandeered the actions of the present generation via this time-honored rhetorical flourish.[67] Mussolini's speech announcing that Ethiopia had been conquered on May 5, 1936, in the same vein, plotted the here and now as hugely significant in the long history of the nation:

> Over its thirty century old history Italy has lived many memorable moments, but that of today is without doubt one of the most solemn. I announce to the Italian people and to the world that the war is over. I announce to the Italian people and to the world that peace has been re-established.[68]

The difference was, of course, that in Mussolini's case Fascism was singled out as the new ingredient (along, naturally, with Il Duce's leadership), which had brought about the spiritual reconnection with the hallowed Roman forefather. For Churchill, not speaking as a revolutionary but in the tradition of the "long continuity" of British institutional history, no "new" ingredient was necessary except that the British should be or return to being themselves. In the Italian case it was precisely to the "new ingredient," Fascism, that Italians could ascribe both the success of 1935–1936

and the defeats of the Second World War, thus hoisting Mussolini's rhetoric with the same petard he had employed to such good effect during the conquest of Ethiopia.

Mussolini's speech launching the African war had employed the grandiloquence of the "have not" power, or as it was often formulated in Italian rhetoric since the coining of the term by Nationalist Enrico Corradini at the beginning of the twentieth century, the "proletarian nation" taking what should rightfully have been its own.[69] According to this view, the "have" powers, chief of which was of course Great Britain, were bloated with possessions and monopolized the lion's share of the world's territory and resources to the detriment of the "youthful" and aspiring nations, which had only in the second half of the nineteenth century come together as political entities. The First World War had intensified this imbalance, with Germany having lost the meager colonies it had had before 1914 and Italy being given, according to those who agreed with Gabriele D'Annunzio's notion of Italy's war having resulted in a "mutilated victory," almost nothing for its massive and decisive sacrifice in 1915–1918. Churchill was perfectly well aware of this dangerous discrepancy in the distribution of wealth among the powers. Indeed, one can argue that much of his career and millions of the words he spoke and wrote were given over to formulating a coherent and morally acceptable justification for such a state of affairs; his "broad sunlit uplands" were peopled by happy imperial subjects and their just and paternalistic British overlords. In a speech delivered at the Conservative Party conference of March 1945, with victory in Europe only a few weeks away, he summed up this vision, quoting Benjamin Disraeli, as *Imperium et Libertas*. *Libertas*, in Churchill's glorious prose, had been preserved by Britain standing alone against the Nazi menace. He stated:

> It will always be the glory of our island race that in the teeth of what seemed to outsiders overwhelming odds they never swerved from the path of duty, they never lost faith in their mission to fight against tyranny to the death. Thus we held aloft the light of freedom when all around the night was black as jet.[70]

Imperium was tackled next:

> But there was another glory in which we may rejoice. In those terrible days the whole of our Empire and Commonwealth of Nations—apart from one melancholy exception, round the corner [n.b., who else but Ireland]—stood together with us of their own free will. . . . This astounding union of communities and races spread round the globe, springing not from legal or physical obligations but from the mysterious, unfathomable uplifting of the soul, raises our world-wide association to heights never attained nor even dreamed of by any empire of

> the past. . . . Without freedom there is no foundation for our Empire; without Empire there is no safeguard for our freedom.[71]

As has been said, the justice in Britain's possessing the imperial lion's share was to be found in Churchill's deep conviction (as had been proven by the fight against Nazism) that his country's rule was progressive, benevolent, and above all consented to by the Empire's millions of subjects. The recourse to a "mysterious, unfathomable uplifting of the soul," a spiritual and mystical force binding together this diverse imperial family (with the sulky and deluded exception of Ireland), was Churchill's rhetorical sleight that bridged what appeared to be the unbridgeable principles of *Imperium et Libertas*. Yet in the 1930s Churchill pointed out that the jealousies of the other European powers ought to be recognized and not simply discounted in uptight demonstrations of British pacifism and self-righteousness. In a speech reflecting on the "the causes of war" broadcast in November 1934, he noted the depth of revulsion at the thought of war permeating British culture and warned of the dangers of forgetting that the status quo so favorable to Britain after 1918 was not in itself neutral; that it, without proper military precautions on Britain's part, was likely to provoke the unbridled desire of others. In this speech Churchill asked himself whether debate and reasoned argument about the "insensate folly of human strife" would be a sufficient deterrent to the other powers. "I doubt it," he admonished,

> I gravely doubt it. . . . They might say "you are rich, we are poor. You seem well fed, we are hungry. You have been victorious, we have been defeated. You have valuable colonies, we have none. You have a Navy, where is ours? You have had the past, let us have the future." Above all, I fear, they would say "You are weak and we are strong."[72]

Churchill was referring to Germany in this speech but was aware that this description of the logic at work among the "have nots" would in many ways have been applicable to Italy. Central to Mussolini's rhetoric in this same period was precisely the idea that through Fascism Italy had broken with the liberal world order, the leadership of which had indeed belonged to Britain. "The war which we have begun in Africa," Mussolini proclaimed to the peasants of the Fascist new town Pontina in December 1935,

> is a war of civilization and liberation. It is a war of the people. The Italian people feels this war as its own. It is the war of the poor, the disinherited, the proletarians. In fact against us is aligned the front of conservatism, egoism and hypocrisy.[73]

In a 1934 speech, Mussolini had defined "democracy, socialism, liberalism and freemasonry" as the "exhausted ideals of the previous century,"

the residue still clinging to "those who wished to halt the course of history, to freeze its movement and to swim upstream." These, Mussolini assured his listeners, "had been overwhelmed."[74] The idea of Fascism as the defining ideology of the twentieth century, with its revolutionary credentials and having proven its immense superiority over liberalism through the successful conquest of Ethiopia and the supposed transformation of the Italian people, became, as we have seen, a central theme of Mussolini's speeches once he had cast his and Hitler's regime as a double "revolution" after 1936. In a speech delivered in Milan in November of that year from a podium outside the city's immense cathedral, Mussolini launched the "Axis" and reiterated that Fascism had finished with democracy of the old sort: "There is a country," he proclaimed,

> where true democracy has been realized, and that country is Italy. Because, oh true and authentic reactionaries of all countries, we are not the embalmers of the past but are the vanguard of the future. We do not bring capitalist civilization to its extreme consequence . . . we create a new synthesis.[75]

Churchill spoke for the status quo yet was, in his speeches, able to conjure up images as dynamic and as stirring as any that were envisaged in the utopias being dreamed up across the English Channel. It was during the Spanish Civil War that Churchill developed and refined his stance against what he refused to believe were the only alternatives available. Communism and Fascism, he stated to the worthies of Leeds in a speech in January 1937, were like the Arctic and the Antarctic, opposites, but both wastelands of ice and snow.

> I have made a resolve. I am getting on in life and I have made a resolve that I will never go to the Arctic or the Antarctic regions in geography or in politics. Give me the temperate zone. Give me London, Paris, or New York. Let us keep our faith and let us go somewhere and stay where your breath is not frozen on your lips by the secret police. Let us not wander away from the broad fields of freedom into those gaunt, grim, dismal and gloomy regions.[76]

CONCLUSION

Mussolini's style, so effective in 1935–1936 when Italy stood alone and successfully took its "small place in the sun," according to the metaphor of the "proletarian nation" and a Fascism that had purportedly invigorated the Italian people, had exhausted its impetus by the time of the Second World War. Only victory would have lent some credibility to Mussolini's words. They were hollow-sounding by the time Britain and then lowly

Greece destroyed the myth of Mussolini's Roman empire peopled by fanatical legionaries devoted body and soul to their novel Caesar. Mussolini's rhetoric depended on metaphors of transformation and "palingenesis and popular ultra-nationalism"[77] even, but it was always going to be easier, as Richard Bosworth has so convincingly argued, to mouth words, make speeches, and pose aggressively on a balcony than to build planes and tanks and deeply change Italians.[78] There was some attempt to turn Churchill into "Dr. Churkill" (as was entertainingly done in one Italian newsreel cartoon of 1942[79]), but Italians in their tens of thousands tuned in to *Radio Londra*, where a benevolent Britain presided.[80]

Mussolini and Churchill were two of the twentieth century's greatest political communicators. It is often claimed that Churchill's words were as vital to Britain's Second World War as the soldiers, the air force and the navy. A.J.P. Taylor, a historian who was mischievous and impish with the "great" in other "great men," uncharacteristically became reverential when it came to Churchill, labeling him the "saviour of his country."[81] Whatever one may think of his political views on any number of issues, few people, even today, can remain wholly unmoved by Churchill's words, so skillfully marshaled as to ambush some unconscious emotional reservoir within. Both Mussolini and Hitler provided in their own declaimed words the chamber from which Churchill's grand speeches drew their resonance. In the English-speaking world the incomprehensible ranting, half guttural and half hiss, of the Führer's diatribes and the manic staring eyes and exaggerated gesticulation of Il Duce were the perfect foil for the calm, majestic tones and heroic words of the British statesman. The leaders of the belligerents spoke to each other as much as to their own people and launched concepts, metaphors, and visions of the past and future like so many divisions on the battlefield. Each sought to touch the "emotional reservoir" that would secure the loyalty of the people and at the same time intimidate the enemy.

In this battle Churchill emerged victorious. Yet even for the British statesman much of what he had declaimed in 1940 no longer resonated by 1945. He was unceremoniously dumped from office in the elections of July that year, demonstrating that, to at least a part of the British people, the epic and biblical language appropriate to war, with Nazism defeated, was discordant and incongruous in the task that was now engaged to build a more caring and class-free Britain. Like Churchill's after 1945, Mussolini's speeches no longer resonated in World War II as they had once done, although his words and gestures remained those he had employed in his "finest hour," back in the mid-1930s. Deeds indeed speak louder than words, and it was on the anvil of deeds that the blacksmith's son was silenced; as for the blue-blooded aristocrat, his quieting was gradual and dignified. But by the time his voice fell silent in 1965, it was the words of the Beatles and the Rolling Stones that were listened to with the same enthusiasm in Italy as in Churchill's native land.

NOTES

1. Jonathan Charteris-Black, *Politicians and Rhetoric: The Persuasive Power of Metaphor* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004), 41–45.
2. Robert Rhodes James, ed., *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches 1897–1963* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974), vol., VII, 7241. (Henceforward "Churchill, *Complete Speeches*.")
3. Cf. Richard J. Bosworth, *Mussolini* (London: Arnold, 2002), 1–2.
4. See http://www.beano.com/retro-beano/musso-the-wop.
5. Churchill, *Complete Speeches*, vol., VI, 6381.
6. Ibid., vol., IV, 4126.
7. Ibid., 3530.
8. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol., VI, 6323.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 6324.
11. Ibid., 6325.
12. Ibid., 6712–6713.
13. Duilio Susmel and Edoardo Susmel, eds., *Benito Mussolini: Opera Omnia* (Florence: La Fenice, 1951–1958), vol., XXX, 51. (Henceforward "Mussolini, *Opera Omnia*.")
14. Ibid., 54.
15. Ibid., 56.
16. Ibid., 55.
17. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia,* vol., XXXI, 128.
18. Ibid., 130.
19. Ibid., 126.
20. Ibid., 130.
21. Ibid., 126.
22. Ibid., vol., XXX, 57.
23. Martin Gilbert's (and Randolph Churchill's) eight-volume biography of Churchill (London: Heinemann, 1966–1988) is a few thousand pages longer than Renzo De Felice's seven-volume one of Mussolini (Turin: Einaudi, 1965–1996), but considering that the Italian dictator lived three decades less than the British statesman, the number of pages dedicated in these books to each day of their respective lives is comparable. De Felice's biography is more analytical and confusing; Gilbert's is straightforward but reads something like a secretary's diary of the great man's engagements.
24. F. W. Deakin, *The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966).
25. Robert Rhodes James, *Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900–1939* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970).
26. Alan Bullock, *Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives* (London: HarperCollins, 1991); Richard J. Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).
27. Thomas Szasz, *The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970).
28. Shmuel Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires* (New York: Free Press, 1963).
29. Brian Bosworth, "A Tale of Two Empires: Hernán Cortés and Alexander the Great," in Elizabeth Beynham and Brian Bosworth, eds., *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), 23–49.

30. Hans Woller, "Churchill und Mussolini: Offene Konfrontation und geheime Kooperation?" *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 49, no. 4 (2001), 563–594.
31. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, 5–7.
32. A classic example in this vein is Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981) or anything written about the Italian dictator by A.J.P. Taylor.
33. Roland Quinault, "Churchill and Democracy," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, vol. 11 (2001), 201–220.
34. Richard Toye, *Churchill's Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made* (New York: Henry Holt, 2010).
35. Meir Michaelis, *Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish Question in Italy, 1922–1945* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1978).
36. Paul Addison, "The Political Beliefs of Winston Churchill," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Fifth Series, vol. 30 (1980), 23–47, 35.
37. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. I, 9.
38. Donald Sassoon, *Mussolini and the Rise of Fascism* (London: Harper, 2007), 143.
39. See Luisa Passerini, *Mussolini immaginario* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1991), 16.
40. David Reynolds, "Churchill's Writing of History: Appeasement, Autobiography and 'The Gathering Storm,'" *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, vol. 11, (2001), 221–247.
41. Isaiah Berlin, "Mr. Churchill," *The Atlantic Magazine* September 1949. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1949/09/mr-churchill/303546/
42. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia* vol. XXIV, 22.
43. Emil Ludwig, *Talks with Mussolini* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1933), 51–62.
44. Mack Smith, *Mussolini*, 126.
45. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia,* vol. XXX, 36.
46. Ibid., vol. XXX, 55.
47. Ibid., vol. XXIX, 405.
48. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VI, 6220.
49. Ibid., 6219.
50. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia,* vol. XXIX , 404.
51. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VI, 6220.
52. Ibid., 6238.
53. Ibid., 6276.
54. See especially the work of MacGregor Knox, e.g., *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); *Hitler's Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); *Origins and Dynamics of the Fascist and National Socialist Dictatorships* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); or James Burgwyn, *Mussolini: Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940–1943* (New York: Enigma, 2012).
55. See on this Ian Kershaw, *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944–1945* (New York: Penguin, 2011).
56. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia,* vol. XXXI, 195.
57. Ibid., 196.
58. Sergio Romano, "Mussolini nell'estate del '43. Il discorso del bagnasciuga," *Corriere della Sera* December 27, 2007, 43.
59. In the years that followed Mussolini's gaffe, Italians on beaches were telling their children to play on the *bagnasciuga* without going into the water

(especially after lunch), testifying to the fact that not only did Italians listen to Il Duce's speeches but also that he must have indeed always been right.

60. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VI, 6231.
61. Ibid., 5909.
62. Ibid., 5683.
63. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia*, vol. XXVII, 158–160.
64. Ibid., 268–269.
65. See the enlightening Stephen Bungay, "His Speeches, How Churchill Did It," available at: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-about-winston-churchill/his-speeches-how-churchill-did-it
66. As in Book II of Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian War.*
67. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VI, 6238.
68. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia*, vol. XXVII, 265.
69. Gulatiero Castellini, ed., *Il Nazionalismo italiano, Atti del congresso di Firenze* (Florence: La Rinascita del Libro, 1911), 33–34.
70. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VII, 7129.
71. Ibid., 7129–7130.
72. Ibid., vol. V, 5433.
73. Mussolini, *Opera Omnia*, Vol. XXVII, 203.
74. Ibid., vol. XXVI, 185–186.
75. Ibid., vol. XVIII, 70.
76. Churchill, *Complete Speeches,* vol. VI, 5823.
77. Roger Griffin, *International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus* (London: Edward Arnold, 1998).
78. Among much other work by Richard Bosworth, see his "War, Totalitarianism and 'Deep Belief' in Fascist Italy, 1935–43," *European History Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (2004), 475–505.
79. In this cartoon a bestial and cigar-smoking fiend drinks a potion of "democracy" and "fraternity" to transform himself into an English gentleman who proceeds to pump gold from an exhausted world until the stern hand of the Swastika and the Fascist lictor put a stop to his game. Luigi Pensuti (dir.) *Il dottor Churkill* (Rome: INCOM, 1942). Six-minute video is available at http://www.archivioluce.com/archivio/
80. Matthew Hibberd, *The Media in Italy* (Maidenhead, UK: Open University Press, 2008), 65.
81. A.J.P. Taylor, *English History* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965), 4.

7 "A Place in the Sun"

The Conquest of Ethiopia in 1935–1936 as Seen in Contemporary Diaries

Christopher Duggan

As has often been suggested, the invasion of Ethiopia marked the high tide of popular support for the Fascist regime in Italy. The declaration of war by Mussolini from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia on October 2, 1935—with its hyperbolic talk of "forty-four million souls" moving in unison to rectify "the blackest injustice" of having been "deprived of a little place in the sun"—may have been greeted with some initial trepidation; but as news came through of the first victories (including the capture of Adua—site of the country's humiliating defeat in 1896), a wave of enthusiasm swept the country. The condemnation of the attack by fifty-two member states of the League of Nations in the second week of October, and the subsequent application of sanctions, served merely to stiffen Italian resolve. Erstwhile liberal critics of the regime such as Vittorio Emanuele Orlando, Luigi Albertini and even Benedetto Croce pledged their support for the war. So, too, did the leading socialist Arturo Labriola, who now apologized for his opposition to Fascism and returned to Italy from exile. Among those who volunteered to fight in Africa was the sixty-one-year-old physicist and Nobel laureate Guglielmo Marconi.[1]

In the face of such patriotic fervor, those who had any reservations about the war were extremely unlikely to risk speaking out in public. Occasionally they did. As Richard Bosworth has noted, dissident voices can be traced in the police files of those sent to *confino*. In the village of Vezzano sul Crostolo in the province of Reggio Emilia, for instance, a watermelon seller was heard telling his customers that Mussolini's real aim in invading Ethiopia was "just to have the Italians die in war and of hunger, since now they will say we must tighten our belts." He added: "The Abyssinians are in the right because we are the ones who are breaking into their homes." In Forlì, a town which, like Vezzano sul Crostolo, had a strong socialist background, a railway worker was arrested for declaring over coffee in a local bar that Italy was wrong to incur the wrath of Britain by invading Ethiopia: "That nation should always be feared because it succeeded in subjugating Napoleon Bonaparte, [Kaiser] William II and others." It was also richer and had far more resources at its disposal than Italy.[2]

Reservations about the war were more easily voiced in private. Among the dozen or so unpublished diaries written at the time of the conquest of Ethiopia preserved in the National Diary Archive (*Archivio Diaristico Nazionale*) in Pieve Santo Stefano, one (although it is probably noteworthy that it is only one) displays hostility to the invasion. It is written by Vasco Poggesi, a young man of limited education (two years of secondary schooling) from a humble Tuscan family, whose passion for learning and self-improvement was later to propel him into the Communist Party and a career in local politics and trade unionism. In March 1935, at the age of 22, Vasco was sent for military service to the Italian colony of Somalia. From the start his humanitarian inclinations (evident in his love of nineteenth-century writers such as Tolstoy and Hugo) led him to question what he was doing in Africa. He was disinclined, for instance, to attend mass at Easter with his fellow soldiers on the ground that it seemed wrong that the church should be supporting war:

> Are we, who have come to kill or to get ourselves killed, not entirely at odds with the divine commandments? And we've not even been driven to do this, have we, by a need to safeguard our lives and our interests, but to continue to keep in subjection peoples so different from us, in language and civilization?

And as the prospect of war in neighboring Ethiopia increased in the summer of 1935, his disquiet intensified at the thought of being sent "to slaughter poor devils whose only fault is that they are still not civilized."[3]

Vasco knew he was out of step with most of his compatriots: when war against Ethiopia was declared at the beginning of October, he did not share the "enthusiasm" of his fellow soldiers. But he did not, as he was keen to affirm in his diary, regard himself as any the less patriotic for this. He was proud of his country and its glorious cultural tradition—just as he also admired the achievements of Britain, France, Germany, and other nations. What saddened him was that Italy was now set on dominating others with "the force of its arms" instead of looking to assert itself as in the past with "the force of its spirit." He could not accept the claims made by the regime (and the church), which were being echoed by those around him, that Italy was invading Ethiopia in order to civilize a semibarbarian country:

> Is our aim really to bring light where there has been darkness, or is it rather to conquer a rich and fertile land? . . . No, I cannot find a justification for our action against Abyssinia. First and foremost because I hate war and violence. Secondly, because on this occasion too an attempt is being made to conceal behind a mask of humanity and civilization what is really a violent act of aggression against an enemy that can only resist with his courage and his fury. So I criticize what my nation is doing. Am I a discordant note in what is—or what is said

> to be—a full and harmonious symphony of approval? Yes. I am not a sheep, and my mind is not so closed as not to see good and evil. And what we are doing is evil.[4]

Vasco also found himself unable to accept the other justification that people were putting to him for the invasion, namely that Italy did not have the space and resources for its population:

> In that case, why have we been undertaking—and are still undertaking—a very vigorous demographic campaign aimed at increasing the population? Clearly, to make ourselves numerous and thus be able, according to the theory of "number as force," one day to impose our will on some other country that is weaker and not prey to the same desire for greatness.[5]

Poggesi's passionate rejection of the regime's rhetoric and propaganda is not evident in the remainder of the diaries in Pieve Santo Stefano. The only other discordant notes are to be found in the diary of an eight-year-old schoolgirl from the Veneto, Albertina Roveda, who was surrounded at home and school by phrases and ideas that left her bemused. When one morning at breakfast early in 1935 her older brother announced that he was thinking of going to serve in the army in Africa, on the grounds that "to leave is to live, to stay is to die," she confessed: "I did not understand." Later in the year, after war had been declared, she reported: "My schoolmistress has said the Duce wants to give Italians a place in the sun. It seems to me that in my town we have got enough sun." And when she tried to find Ethiopia on a map and was told by her teacher that it was "beyond 'our sea' [*mare nostrum*]," she wrote: "I really don't understand why it is ours. The ancient Romans could say that because they had a big empire."[6]

The indications from the other diaries in Pieve Santo Stefano, and indeed from additional unpublished (and published) sources, are that the justifications provided by the regime for the invasion of Ethiopia resonated strongly with ordinary Italians and did not trigger criticism. Part of the reason for this appears to lie in the way that Fascism had managed to combine the suppression of dissent with the exaltation of "faith" as a political virtue. Time and again it is possible to note in diaries written during the 1920s and 1930s, and indeed, in the innumerable letters preserved in the archive of the Personal Secretariat of Il Duce (*Segreteria Particolare del Duce*) in Rome, how expressions of support for the regime—and above all for Il Duce—were underpinned by the idea that unquestioning belief was a paramount quality. To take a small (but politically momentous) example: When the Grand Council came to discuss the introduction of racial laws in the late summer of 1938, a number of senior Fascists wondered whether Giuseppe Bottai, the cultured minister of national education, would be able to stomach such inhumane measures. He did, and he went on to become one of their most

zealous enforcers. In his diary Bottai justified his acceptance of the laws by underlining how in fascism obedience toward authority was a supreme duty: "The orders of the Leader must be accepted or not accepted"; and nonacceptance was conceivable only on "irresistible moral grounds."[7]

The many thousands of letters to Mussolini that poured into the Segreteria Particolare from ordinary members of the public in late September and early October 1935 pledging their support for the invasion of Ethiopia, and endorsing the regime's justifications for the war, show how much uncritical obedience and enthusiasm were interwoven under Fascism. Almost all the writers passionately applauded Italy's pursuit of a "place in the sun" and its "civilizing mission" against barbarism and condemned the selfishness of Britain in trying to stop the war:

> England, which is a nation so rich in lands and money and lacks for nothing, is attempting to snatch a piece of meat from our plate, which would serve to feed millions of hungry people. . . .
>
> God created the universe and human beings and so we as a civilizing people feel it our duty to exploit those lands. . . .
>
> Would that God could paralyze the foul and stinking thoughts and actions of the English government and all those vile people who, like vultures, simply hope to humiliate us (because they envy us and wish you were not so just, so right, so human in your dealings with your people . . . and with the poor mistreated Abyssinian slaves).
>
> . . . .
>
> The Italy of the Augustuses and the Caesars was master of the known world. This is why England is so ungenerous to us. It is afraid of its decadence, which is already evident. . . .
>
> The Risorgimento . . . the Revolution of 1922, which has ended with the spiritual Unity of the nation—our age-old civilization—give us the right to impose our resolved will for expansion. . . .
>
> Adua is ours! Your brave and intrepid followers have conquered it with Napoleonic lightning! How can my Italic blood not tremble with joy at this exhilarating news? . . . Will I be able to contain the fever that scorches, burns, and engulfs me? . . . [8]

Intermingled with these declarations of support for the war, which in keeping with the regime's celebration of faith allowed no doubt or criticism to be expressed, were calls for the most brutal methods to be used, including bombing with poison gas. Such extreme demands can again be seen as a logical extension of Fascism's emphasis on conviction ("In East Africa send as many gas bombs as are needed to saturate the plains of Somalia and the forests of the Tigray in a week—with aeroplanes, so as to destroy *everything*, with diabolical ferocity. Because fascism *must* triumph."[9]) But they also intersected with other features of the regime's cultural universe—such as the idea that violence was a supreme manifestation of idealism (a

central element in the myth of *squadrismo*, or gang violence), and the view that fascism was a "modern" ideology that had superseded the outdated and weak humanitarian values of liberalism. As a group of Bologna university students, eager to volunteer, wrote to Mussolini at the start of the war (and their advice presciently mirrored the tactics that were to be deployed in Ethiopia):

> WE WANT AN OFFENSIVE AERIAL WAR, IN WHICH CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARE USED ON A GRAND SCALE, AS MODERN WARFARE DEMANDS. . . . Flight must be prevented with liquid incendiaries, with sheets of lethal gases, with tear gas, and with every other means that science provides. . . . DUCE: we are not impetuous or bloodthirsty; we are Italians and we wish to keep our sacrifice to the minimum, particularly when it is a question of fighting animals like the Abyssinians. What is the point of Treaties? They are only of value to weak nations. . . . Who can check if Italy does or does not use gas? . . . All that is needed for victory in Ethiopia is our glorious air force, provided it uses chemical weapons and incendiary bombs. . . . The Infantry and other arms must simply occupy positions with the MINIMUM FIGHTING. . . . The aerial attacks with lethal gas should be carried out far away from our troops so as not to hinder their advance.[10]

The sentiments expressed in the letters sent to the Segreteria Particolare were bound to be particularly effusive: writing to Il Duce was strongly encouraged by the regime as a mark of loyalty; during the 1930s, an average of 1,500 letters were sent each day to the Fascist leader by men, women, and children from all backgrounds and walks of life—often to ask for material help of some kind but frequently simply to affirm devotion and support.[11] But the evidence from diaries suggests that enthusiasm for the war and uncritical acceptance of the justifications given for it by the regime were powerful features of private as well as public experience. The need for a "place in the sun" in which to settle the country's surplus population, the prospect of valuable mineral resources including gold, the satisfaction of bringing modern "civilization" (not least Christian civilization, as dozens of archbishops and bishops gave vocal backing to Italy's "mission" in Ethiopia)[12] to a "barbarian" slave-owning country, the iniquity of the opposition of Britain and the League of Nations seen as driven by a selfish desire to preserve the dominance of the democracies and stop a "proletarian" nation from acquiring its rightful share of the world's wealth—such ideas were internalized by ordinary Italians and used to justify their belief in the necessity and the morality of the war.

For those diarists who went to serve as soldiers in Ethiopia, the tone of their account was often set by the rapturous scenes that accompanied them on their departure from Italy. Gino Bernardini was a young woodcutter from the province of Grosseto. He was called up in the spring of 1935,

and on July 9 he and his regiment left the Piedmontese town of Casale Monferrato for Naples, from where they would sail to Africa. He found the emotion of the occasion—the sense of in particular being the focus of passionate attention—exhilarating. And despite the difficulties he had with writing, he set out to record the events of the day in detail:

> Towards four in the afternoon we came out of the barracks, each of us waving a tricolor flag. At our head was a band to accompany us to the station. . . . The town's most important officials also came with us, as did Colonel Carnellutti. . . . We marched in line through the main streets of the town, singing a very nostalgic song, with a gipsy violin tune, which we had composed for our departure. . . . The streets were crowded with people, two deep on both sides, and there was hardly space for us to pass. The public cheered, spontaneously from their hearts, waving hats and white handkerchiefs and gesturing good-bye with their hands. Every now and then you could see mothers with grey hats, unable to hide their emotions, crying uncontrollably, perhaps thinking of the day when they had seen their sons leaving along the same street. . . . Before getting on the train we were offered bunches of flowers and baskets full of cakes and fruit for the journey. We boarded the carriages, which were empty and reserved just for us, amid embraces, weeping and warm handshakes. . . . It was a moving moment. The departure for the war in Africa united us all in brotherly love. . . . I can't describe my state of mind at that moment. I found myself with my arms full of flowers carried away by the crowd without realizing it. It was then that a blond-haired girl came up to me with a bunch of flowers and put them in my hands along with the others, and without hesitating, as if she knew me, leaned up to me and kissed me on the face, saying: "Take this kiss to my brother. He's called Fabbroni Ugo and is in the Peloritana division based in Mogadishu." I was left motionless and unable to say a word. I felt my face was on fire, especially where she had kissed me. I stretched out my hands to keep hold of her, but the crowd surged and I lost her.[13]

Gino's subsequent diary entries are shorter, and once he got to Massaua on the Red Sea coast he became increasingly reluctant to record his impressions. He found the heat, the dirt, and the "coal-black" faces of the local population difficult to bear. He felt he was in "a living hell." But the patriotic rhetoric surrounding the war helped to sustain his morale and provided him with the conceptual and moral tools with which to help make some sense of his experiences. The march into the interior of Eritrea proved very difficult: "Yet we did not complain. Love of our dear fatherland gave us the strength to go on." He was inspired by seeing the graves of men who had been killed at Adua in 1896: "We were there to avenge them." And when in October Italian troops began pouring into Eritrea following the formal

declaration of hostilities, he referred to them as "smiling in the face of death for the greatness of our dear fatherland." He apparently saw action himself, but he left no record in his diary of the fighting and whether his patriotic feelings survived the encounter with the realities of the battlefield.[14]

The excitement that Gino so vividly recorded in his diary as he set off for Africa carried over for many writers into their descriptions of the journey south. The troops on the ships were full of fervor, according to Gino Magrini, a young militia member from Tuscany, and sang "songs of the Fascist revolution."[15] The passage through the Suez Canal was frequently a high point, with "enthusiastic, unforgettable, delirious demonstrations made by Italians all along the shores of the canal"—as one naval captain wrote in October 1935—"with vehicles following the course of the vessel and banners celebrating Il Duce. On board, the soldiers replied with a delirium of applause and enthusiasm. It was a heartening spectacle such as I had never seen and it moved me to tears."[16] The patriotic thrill of traveling to Ethiopia was compounded for Manlio La Sorsa, a twenty-six-year-old university graduate from Puglia, by the romantic images he harbored of Africa and the prospect of exotic experiences:

> I think that Africa would never have seemed to me more beautiful and emotionally rich without the backdrop of war. And this is why I am going, drawn above all by the thought of being able to live a rather adventurous life. I have never had any inclination for hunting, but that does not mean that I have not always enjoyed immensely the natural spectacle of thick forests inhabited by so many ferocious animals, vast deserts, rivers full of crocodiles, villages devastated by locusts, caravans wiped out beside a dry and dusty oasis etc. . . . No film has made more impression on me than, for example, [the American documentary] *Africa Speaks*, and such like.[17]

Manlio arrived in Massaua on February 21, 1936, when the campaigning was in full swing. He was stirred by the stories that he heard of the heroism of the Italian troops, who were "renewing the deeds of our unbeaten *arditi* [shock troops of the First World War] and the ancient glorious Roman legions." And when news came through at the end of the month of the "resounding" Italian success at the battle of Tembien, he committed to his diary his sense both of pride and regret: "As I write this entry, my heart exalts with genuine, burning patriotism; it trembles with joy and satisfaction at the great victory, and with sadness at not being among the first fighters or among the first glorious dead!"[18] The fierce resistance that was being put up by the enemy angered him, as it was leading to Italians being "barbarously slaughtered"; but it also saddened and to a degree puzzled him in that it resulted in Ethiopians dying for no good cause, "on account of their not having understood that [the Italians] wanted only to bring the torch of civilization to those lands where no spark of civilization had ever shone."[19]

The theme of Italy's civilizing mission in Ethiopia as a justification for the invasion runs through many diaries and letters. The prominent fascist intellectual Giuseppe Bottai, who in 1936 was briefly to be governor of Addis Ababa before returning to Italy to become minister of national education, wrote to his wife from Eritrea at the end of October 1935 about how iniquitous the response of the international community had been to Italy's military action:

> Believe me, all that is being perpetrated against us, in the world, is a gross crime. We should not deserve to be treated in this way. You only need to see these lands, the poor people over the border [in Ethiopia], to be convinced of the historic necessity of our undertaking. The humblest of our infantry soldiers is aware of this. And it is this that is moving: to see ordinary people, cleansed of all impurity, fighting with an instinctive knowledge of the historic objectives, which do not even touch their own interests indirectly.[20]

However, Bottai's sense of Italy's necessary civilizing mission in Ethiopia was interlaced with a morally more problematic tendency to celebrate the war from aesthetic and emotional standpoints (in line with Futurism and the myth of *squadrismo*). He described to his wife the excitement he felt just after he arrived in Eritrea at being taken by Galeazzo Ciano in a plane and dropping sixteen bombs on an enemy village. "You cannot imagine how I feel 'in my element' here."[21] And a few months later he wrote to her about the battle of Tembien, saying:

> It has been "beautiful." In contrast to the massive and brutal battles of the Carso [in the First World War] . . . this one, which has been mobile, agile, sensitive and protean, has consistently engaged mind, stomach and spirit. For five days we have lived the war as a work of art, in its intuitions, its creations and its fervid poeticism.[22]

The sense of Italy's civilizing mission in Ethiopia mingled in the minds of many writers with a desire to avenge the humiliation of Adua in 1896 and what was felt to have been the great injustice perpetrated at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when Germany's colonies had been carved up exclusively between Britain and France. Religious strains—encouraged by the near strident backing given to the campaign by many senior Catholic clergy—also feature regularly in diaries. One such is that of Espedito Russo, a twenty-five-year-old quartermaster of humble extraction and limited education from the province of Avellino. Espedito was called up in August 1935 and expressed his joy at being able to "avenge the fallen of 1896." On October 3, the day after the formal declaration of hostilities, he wrote:

> We will be proud to follow, step by step, our Duce. Italy will secure in this battle the most beautiful victory. Oh! God grant that in the soul

> of us legionaries should ever be vivid the memory of those that died as heroes, shedding their blood in sacrifice for the Fatherland. The war that has brought us into African lands was foretold by many; it is now up to us, the sons of great Italy—beautiful, strong, prolific and fascist—to gain victory. It is up to us to avenge the error of Versailles. . . . Today the youth of Italy springs up as one man, ready to take arms and carry into the barbarian land the sign of Rome, symbol of greatness, civilization and strength.[23]

Espedito longed to see the triumph of "the ancient civilization of Rome" and of "proletarian and fascist Italy" over "the hordes of barbarian Abyssinians." He was convinced that the hand of Mussolini, "the man who controls the destiny of one of the most powerful nations in the world," would "come down inexorably on the heads of those who have sought to obstruct us along the path of our clear journey and who have attempted and still attempt to rob us of a place in the sun."[24] He was scathing about the opposition of "that most civilized country, England," which had put itself forward as "the supreme defender of a bunch of filthy, ragged, cowardly slave drivers."[25] But despite his fervid belief in the justice of Italy's cause in Africa and his hope that his beloved wife, Elisa (for whom he was writing the diary), would be proud of the way in which he carried out his "sacred duty" in Ethiopia, he did not, as he wished, see action. Despite requests, he remained stationed in Eritrea, where he succumbed to a debilitating tropical infection that resulted in his being sent back to Italy in the autumn of 1936.

Another diarist whose enthusiasm for the campaign was underpinned by a strong sense of both the holiness and the justice of Italy's mission in Africa was Mario Saletti. He came from a lower-middle-class family in the Tuscan town of Montepulciano and was twenty-two when he volunteered to go out to Ethiopia as a telegraph operator. "To be among the first civilians to have come to bring the breath of civilization to this ignorant land is for me a source of pride," he wrote at the end of December 1935.[26] His diary, which is full of invocations to God to assist him in his "calvary," exuded faith in Italy's impending victory and a conviction that the opposition of Britain and the League of Nations was futile:

> Oh blind Halcyon [i.e., Albion], know that you will hurl your spears in vain, as they are destined to shatter on the barrier formed by myriad heroes, who, all inspired by the example of a great man, brave danger with the ardor of a passionate youth who is about to hurl himself into the arms of his beloved![27]

On Easter Sunday 1936 he attended mass and reflected on why he felt "almost happy" in Africa despite the constraints of military life and being separated from his family. He concluded that it was because he knew that he was serving "the cause of the fatherland and fascism:" "Thank you, Oh Lord, for making me able to understand what is beautiful."[28]

Certainty about the justice of Italy's cause left most diarists relatively untroubled by the more brutal aspects of the campaign. For Bottai, the backwardness of the indigenous people meant he could feel little sadness at the wholesale destruction of villages: in Ethiopia, he claimed, there was no "civilization, idea, tradition"; there was just "barbarism, communist and atomized."[29] He did not criticize the use of poison gas: he noted without comment in his diary early in February 1936 that Italian troops were being warned not to touch bomb fragments on the ground in case they were contaminated with mustard gas.[30] He was certainly very troubled by reports of what he called "episodes of bestial behavior"—the cold-blooded massacres of civilian "partisans" or the way in which Achille Starace, the party secretary, had been seen lining up a group of prisoners and using them for target practice, shooting them first in the testicles and then in the heart.[31] But the main conclusion that he drew from such brutality was that it provided evidence of the shortcomings of the Italian middle classes and of the need for the regime to press ahead with forging a stronger and more disciplined ruling class.[32]

For Manlio La Sorsa, the deployment of mustard gas was part of the march of modern civilization—awesome, but morally acceptable given the longer-term benefits for Ethiopia. After all, as he said in a speech to mark his commanding officer's birthday, the Italian forces were fighting in Africa, "with most Fascist faith," not just to make "our dear fatherland greater, stronger and more respected," but also to transport "civilization" to "this dark and shadowy land."[33] On March 8, 1936, two weeks after arriving in Massaua, he visited the Italian military base at Mai Edaga. Of the two airports there, it was the one for bombers that most impressed him:

> This latter is on the most vast and extensive scale and is built according to the most modern technical criteria, with numerous enormous and powerful hangars and huts for the staff, intelligently adapted to the terrain and climate. . . . The airport is truly imposing and colossal, with capacity for over 160 aeroplanes, most of which I saw lined up outside the hangars fitted out already with bombs—very heavy and of great caliber—containing mustard gas and ready to set off and launch their lethal load on the enemy hordes. . . . To go and see these horrifying and yet marvelous great frames is moving.[34]

In Manlio's diary the dichotomy between civilization and barbarism acted as the main filter through which to order his moral responses to what was occurring in Ethiopia. He reported how the Libyan troops fighting on the Italian side had been using "barbaric, ferocious, and inhuman" methods against the Ethiopians. But such behavior was justified, he maintained, because it was "the only effective way of dealing with barbaric and inhuman people." And given the greater humanity of Europeans, he added, the Italians would not have been able to deploy the necessary degree of cruelty: "We Europeans, who are easily moved and easily forgive, would never have

been capable of carrying out the vandalic acts that, with this perfidious and ignorant people, would have been indispensable for bringing them to heel and stopping any thought of further resistance."[35] But such humanity, as he must have been aware when he surveyed a battlefield strewn with the bodies of thousands of Ethiopians and experienced very little sense of grief, was easily blunted when the dead were regarded as "barbarians."[36]

Where Manlio found his emotions toward the Ethiopians more equivocal was in relation to women. An important dimension of the popularization and "marketing" of the invasion, certainly with Italian men, was the suggestion that there would be opportunities for sexual adventure. The hugely successful song *Faccetta nera*, with its jaunty chorus about a "beautiful Abyssinian girl" who would be given "other laws and another king" when "we are together with you," could be regarded as emblematic of this aspect of the campaign. Manlio, like other male diarists in Ethiopia, described in detail the availability of prostitutes and the invitations he received for sex ("*nik nik*").[37] The tension between his impulse to accept these overtures and his feeling that the women belonged to a different level of civilization and might appropriately be shunned crystallized around issues of cleanliness. In July 1936 he recorded his response to being taken into the hut of a prostitute, who did all she could to seduce him. But he was overcome by "disgust" at her dirtiness and her "unbearable sickening smell"; thus he had to make his excuses and leave.[38] He eventually had a satisfying sexual encounter with an Ethiopian—but, as he stressed in his description of the episode (in a scene that might have come from a novel by D'Annunzio), she was from an aristocratic family and clean.[39]

In keeping with many published memoirs about the Ethiopian campaign,[40] Manlio's diary—which he says was intended solely as a private record of his time in Africa[41]—is suffused with a consistently romantic tone. The horrors of war provided little more than an incidental backdrop to what he appeared determined to experience above all as a poetic adventure. On July 28, 1936, amid entries briefly documenting the continued Ethiopian resistance and Italian reprisals, he described the exceptional beauty of the starry nights and noted

> how much gentleness, how much love, and how much goodness there is in hearts under this sky illuminated by the white disc of the moon, which instills into the soul of those who dream of their fatherland, their mother and their wife who is waiting for them a sense of beatitude and of deep and calm happiness.[42]

A few months later, on his birthday, he reflected on his passing youth and on how much he wanted to live his life "intensely, thoughtlessly, almost with desperation": "To drink to the last drop from the chalice of happiness so that I can say: 'I am growing old, it is true, but I have lived my youth to the full, and I regret nothing.'"[43]

Alongside the romanticism was an intense pride: pride at what Fascism had managed to achieve and pride at the civilization that was now being brought to Ethiopia by Italy. The whole campaign, Manlio wrote in August 1936, had been brilliantly conceived and executed:

> The preparation was intense and formidable, with extreme open-mindedness, so as not to repeat the errors made by past governments in the not very successful colonial wars. Under the driving impulse of the Duce, the Italian people has accepted this expedition with enthusiasm and Roman spirit, trusting in its own Leader and conscious of its own needs and destiny. . . . From the military point of view the planning was studied down to the smallest details: the most up to date military means have been adapted to the requirements of the war terrain. . . . [44]

Now that the "exterminating and liberating war" was ending, "the wings of eternal Rome, with its work, its songs and its riches" would extend over the land. Already new roads had been built and "little churches, votive chapels and sanctuaries" were springing up: "We civilizers of this great new empire will carry the luminous torch of our civilization to shine in the shadows that have kept this people, abandoned to misery, poverty and squalor, in the most wretched barbarism."[45]

Manlio returned to Italy early in 1937, his enthusiasm for the campaign in Ethiopia undimmed. The extent to which he had internalized much of the regime's rhetoric about the justness of Italy's cause in Africa is testimony to the immense power and resonance of the ideas that were used to frame the invasion: revenge for Adua and for Italy's treatment in Paris in 1919; the expectation of great mineral wealth and land for settlement; the sense that Italy was now "strong, feared and respected" in the world; and that the old imperial powers, Britain in particular, were jealous and fearful of the progress made by Italy under fascism; the claim, heavily endorsed by the church, that Italy was engaged in a civilizing mission against barbarism and bringing a benighted land the benefits of a superior culture. There were voices of dissent—occasionally in public, and sometimes in private—as the diary of Vasco Poggesi shows; and some of those who were stationed in Ethiopia after the formal ending of hostilities in May 1936 and witnessed the chaos, the corruption, the continued resistance and the brutality in the colony did sometimes question in their diaries whether Italy's "mission" had been quite as laudable as the regime maintained.[46] But they appear to have been a small minority.

One of those whose faith in Fascism was challenged—though only mildly—by his time in Africa was Ciro Poggiali. Ciro went out to Ethiopia as a correspondent for the *Corriere della Sera* in the summer of 1936. He was very restricted in what he could report back to his newspaper and instead used a private diary to record some of the more unsavory aspects of Italian administration of the colony. He was eyewitness in February 1937 to the random killing in Addis Ababa of between 3,000 and 6,000 Ethiopians

in forty-eight hours in retaliation for a bomb attack by two Eritrean rebels in which a number of Italians died. By the time he returned to Italy in October 1937 he had a rather jaundiced view of what was going on ("I leave Ethiopia with a far from brilliant impression of the situation: the resistance is spreading and growing stronger.")[47] And when he arrived in the port of Messina and saw the desperation and poverty of the local people, he began to wonder whether Italy's hugely expensive search for a "place in the sun" had been such a good idea after all:

> The sight on the quay is both picturesque and pitiful. Every time a steamship arrives from Africa the people of Messina come out and play music on cylinder pianos, hand-organs, guitars and mandolins for the returning passengers. There are hawkers, priests, friars and nuns—who knows if genuine or not—with things for sale, travelling jugglers, even a little cart with a small stove for frying fish on the spot, sellers of flasks of wine, fruit and hardboard suitcases. But above all there is a crowd of people in rags begging. To fetch a packet of cigarettes, children will throw themselves into the sea. These are the signs of the profound poverty of the city and of Sicily in general. The captain of the ship is furious: he had requested in vain to dock in the commercial harbor so as to avoid the wretched spectacle. I remember that perfidious article that *The Times* published on its front page when Italy decided to invade Ethiopia. "Italy," it said, more or less, "is about to spend several billion lire. Even assuming it does manage to conquer the territory of Abyssinia, this will not mean that it has secured completely the riches of Abyssinia—which are only latent riches and also 5,000 kilometers from the peninsula. How much better if those billions could instead have been devoted to the totalitarian regeneration of Sicily, which is a potential earthly paradise waiting to become a real paradise and richly productive, if only every strip of its coastal, interior or mountain land could be given the water it lacks. With the billions. . . . Italy would have on its doorstep that agricultural and non-agricultural wealth that it is going in search of so far away with its risky enterprise." However much inspired by traditional English egoism, perhaps the article was not entirely wrong.[48]

But rational doubts of this kind unfortunately struggled, it seems, to surface in the minds of most Italians, who found themselves immersed in a regime that celebrated blind obedience, faith, and enthusiasm and offered no obvious intellectual or moral grounds for construing dissent.

NOTES

1. Cf. E. Gentile, *Fascismo di pietra* (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2007), 132–133 (speech of Guglielmo Marconi to the Senate, May 16, 1936).
2. R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship 1915–1945* (London: Allen Lane 2005), 385.

3. Archivio Diaristico Nazionale (ADN), DG/96, Vasco Poggesi, "Africa orientale italiana," April 25, 1935, August 7, 1935.
4. Ibid., December 6, 1935.
5. Ibid., December 10, 1935.
6. ADN, DP/Adn2, Albertina Roveda, "Diario di Albertina," January 3, 1935, December 27, 1935, October 15, 1936.
7. G. Bottai, in G.B. Guerri, ed., *Diario 1935–1944* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2001), 133 (September 8, 1938). Cf. G. Ciano, in R. De Felice, ed., *Diario 1937–1943* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1980), 193 (October 6, 1938).
8. Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), Segreteria Particolare del Duce (SPD), Carteggio Ordinario (CO), "Sentimenti per Il Duce," b. 2806, letters of September 23, 1935, September 29, 1935 (Naples), October 2, 1935 (Pavia), October 7, 1935 (Rionero), October 12, 1935 (Rome) .
9. Ibid., "un fascista," late September 1935.
10. Ibid., "Goliardi Bolognesi," early October 1935.
11. T. Mazzatosta and C. Volpi, *L'italietta fascista (lettere al potere 1936–1943)* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1980), 15–21.
12. G. Salvemini, "Pio XI e la guerra etiopica," in *Opere di Gaetano Salvemini. 3: Scritti di politica estera*, vol. 3 (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1967), 754. He records public endorsements of the war by seven cardinals, twenty-nine archbishops, and seventy-five bishops.
13. ADN, DG/99, Gino Bernardini, "Una parte della mia vita in Africa," July 9, 1935.
14. Ibid., July 21, 1935, August 11, 1935, September 15, 1935, October 2, 1935.
15. ADN, DG/97, Gino Magrini, "Diario giornaliero della mia vita," August–September 1935.
16. ADN, DV/92, Armando Pieroni, "Diario del mio comando," October 22, 1935. Cf. ADN, DG/98, Armando Antonellini, "Ricordi di guerra," February 28–29, 1936.
17. ADN, DG/95, Manlio La Sorsa, "Il mio viaggio in Africa," January 30, 1936.
18. Ibid., February 27–29, 1936.
19. Ibid., March 20, 1936.
20. Fondazione Mondadori (Milan), Archivio Bottai, b. 62, f. 273a, letter of October 28, 1935.
21. Ibid., letter of October 19, 1935.
22. Ibid., letter of February 24, 1936.
23. ADN, DG/99, Espedito Russo, "Diario 1935–36," October 3, 1935.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., winter 1935.
26. ADN, DG/98, Mario Saletti, "Sono in ufficio soletto," December 27, 1935.
27. Ibid., January 13, 1936.
28. Ibid., April 12, 1936.
29. G. Bottai, *Quaderno affricano* (Florence: Sansoni, 1940), 40–41.
30. Bottai, *Diario 1935–1944*, 86 (February 3, 1936).
31. Ibid., 102 (May 16, 1936).
32. Ibid.; cf. Fondazione Mondadori (Milan), Archivio Bottai, b. 62, f. 273a, Bottai to wife, December 25, 1935, April 26, 1936.
33. ADN, DG/95, Manlio La Sorsa, "Il mio viaggio in Africa," April 5, 1936.
34. Ibid., March 8, 1936.
35. Ibid., May 21, 1936.
36. Ibid., April 5, 1936.

37. See, for instance, ADN, DG/88, Giuseppe Ghione, "Appunti della mia vita in Africa," October 30, 1935, November 6, 1935, etc.; ADN, DG/99, Gino Bernardini, "Una parte della mia vita in Africa," July 21, 1935; ADN, DG/99, Luigi Pilosio, "Diario o brevi note," August 24, 1939.
38. ADN, DG/95, Manlio La Sorsa, "Il mio viaggio in Africa," July 3, 1936.
39. Ibid., October 27, 1936.
40. See, for example, S. Benelli, *Io in Affrica. Con una conclusione politica*, (Milan: Mondadori, 1936); V. Mussolini, *Voli sulle ambe* (Florence: Sansoni, 1936); I. Montanelli, *XX Battaglione eritreo* (Milan: Panorama, 1936).
41. ADN, DG/95, Manlio La Sorsa, "Il mio viaggio in Africa," August 3, 1936.
42. Ibid., July 28, 1936.
43. Ibid., December 4, 1936.
44. Ibid., August 30, 1936.
45. Ibid., August 8, 1936, August 30, 1936.
46. Cf. ADN, DG/99, Luigi Pilosio, "Diario o brevi note," November 19, 1938, August 24, 1939.
47. C. Poggiali, *Diario AOI. 15 giugno 1936–4 ottobre 1937* (Milan: Longanesi, 1971), 277.
48. Ibid., pp. 283–284.

8 "Wrapped in Passionless Impartiality?" Italian Psychiatry during the Fascist Regime

Daniela Baratieri

In recent years interest in the history of Italian psychiatry, its institutions, and its gendered subjects has increased considerably, as witnessed by the growing number of associated publications.[1] Despite increasing sophistication within this corpus, studies that stretch beyond the local or that span disciplinary boundaries are relatively scarce.[2] Moreover, scholarly attention has tended to focus on the birth of psychiatry and related sciences in the eighteenth century, the establishment of the Italian asylum system in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or the closure of Italian mental hospitals from 1978. To date no single volume has examined the practice of psychiatry in relation to Italian Fascism. This lacuna is particularly surprising considering the wealth of studies and the vitality of debate on Nazism and the medical profession[3] and the direct interactions between the two political regimes.

The lack of studies on "mental hygiene" under the Fascist regime is even more striking considering the vast literature on the Fascist period and within it the primacy of debate about the role of consensus and coercion under the dictatorship.[4] The temptation to transform the country of Mussolini into that of the Resistance, hiding or downplaying Italian atrocities and crimes against humanity by comparing them to the excesses of Nazi Germany, was ever present and until the 1970s bridged the left-right historiographical divide. As Richard Bosworth has put it: "It is the ghost of Adolf Hitler who ensures that we think of all dictators and all societies that have the misfortune to be ruled by them as the replica of his murderous and inexorable regime." Adding "but letting Hitler be our history teacher and implicit model is not a good idea."[5] On the relationship between psychiatry and Fascism, this tendency still produces atrophy in tackling evidence. An example highlighting such simplistic dichotomies may be found as late as the 2011 issue of the journal *History and Psychiatry*; therein, a brief assessment of psychiatry during Italian Fascism asserts that,

> In the face of the horror generated . . . by the Nazis, it would be logical to hypothesize that something similar happened in Italy during the 20 years of Fascist totalitarian regime and that psychiatric care

> experienced the repercussions of the widespread repressive political climate of the time. In fact, none of this happened.[6]

This view, in this case held by contemporary practicing psychiatrists doubling up as historians, sees Italian psychiatry as having generally been untouched or untroubled by the totalitarian regime constructed around it. Moreover, the discipline and praxis of Italian psychiatry, it is argued, contributed little or nothing to the development and sustenance of Fascism itself.

Yet a scenario holding to the existence of a scientific community "wrapped in passionless impartiality" had been challenged as early as 1915, when, as war enveloped the continent, Sigmund Freud noted how intensely the European states demanded the allegiance of their scientists.[7] In the post-1918 totalitarian states, scientific "impartiality" was called into question with ever greater vigor as the pressure for all of society to partake in these new regimes' political and social agendas radically increased. This chapter argues that the psychiatric establishment in Italy was not as impervious to the challenge of Fascism as has often been suggested. While not engaged in the same exterminationist policies as its German counterpart, Italian psychiatry was nevertheless integrated into the Fascist system of repression and was fundamental in delineating acceptable boundaries to Fascist notions of citizenship. Mental asylums took the place of political exile (*confino*) in cases where an acknowledgment of the political nature of an act was not in the interest of the authorities. In particular, the dissent of women was frequently both contained and neutralized by institutionalizing them as mentally ill.

MADNESS IN FASCIST ITALY

As was the case in the rest of Europe, in Italy the mental hospital was a legacy of the eighteenth century. Over the following hundred years a series of asylums had been established throughout the peninsula, often run by religious orders or provincial authorities, and the situation did not change substantially with unification in 1860–1870. In 1904 most of these institutions passed into the hands of the state, although their day-to-day administration was left to the provinces. By the First World War, Italy's 152 mental hospitals housed around 54,000 patients, not a high number by European standards. Nevertheless, around the turn of the twentieth century, these institutions generally absorbed more than 10 percent of the entire provincial administrative budget. While there were complaints about escalating costs, the financial commitment to housing and separating the insane from the rest of society did not flag but increased.[8] During Fascism the asylum system continued to grow. New mental hospitals were established—including Varese, Quarto in Genoa, and Grugliasco in Turin—but a marked expansion was more visible in the south, which had previously lagged behind the

north; there, ten new mental hospitals were opened.[9] By the late 1920s the number of patients in asylums in Italy had risen much faster than the overall population. In 1941 there were almost 100,000 patients in Italy's mental hospitals and institutions.[10] Throughout the peninsula it had become the norm that in most Italian provincial capitals, on the outskirts of town, a vast complex had come into being with the capacity to house thousands of inmates. To take one example, Pergine, just outside Trento in the far northeast of the peninsula, initially built when the Trentino province lay in the Austrian Empire, was the biggest building in the entire region, dwarfing cathedrals and even the old prince-bishop's castle in the center of the city. By the 1920s it housed around 2,000 patients and was by far the largest employer in the district.[11]

In this regard Italy was no different from other European countries where major and even relatively minor urban centers all considered the accouterment of a vast and often sumptuous asylum to be an essential part of the very fabric of a modern and civilized society. To Europe's people these buildings, looming just outside their city gates, were an ever-present reminder that madness lurked on the edge of normal life, defining in many ways what "normal" was. If good behavior and obeying the law could generally mean the avoidance of prison, no such assurance existed as far as the asylum was concerned. Madness or "mental illness," as it had come to be called, was not beyond anybody's ken.

Between 1922 and 1945 the number of criminal mental hospitals in Italy also increased, "to satisfy major and unexpected events," according to Fascist bigwig Dino Grandi.[12] The new penal code of 1931 tightened state control over mental institutions, establishing, for instance, a minimum sentence of imprisonment for the criminally insane and stressing the punitive character of the criminal asylum.[13] Most importantly it confirmed and strengthened the 1904 law regarding subjects to be interned. This stated that the latter were "people affected, for any reason, by mental alienation, when they are dangerous to themselves or others or give public scandal and can only conveniently be cured in a mental institution."[14] This law presented the asylum as a measure of social defense rather than an institution intent on healing. Patients in mental hospitals had to be registered in criminal records, thus effectively equating mental illness, or even signs of it, with crime.[15] The 1931 code, with its regulations on "public decency and security," expanded the jurisdiction of the psychiatric profession considerably. During the dictatorship, the state intervened heavily in health care,[16] and although mental institutions have been presumed to be the least touched by innovation, in 1924 the first mental aid dispensary was opened in Milan. Taking the idea of "prophylaxis" advocated by the eugenics movement seriously, by 1937 mental care clinics had spread across twenty-six provinces, with "visiting nurses" entering houses to assess the state of sanity of the population.[17] During this period, psychiatrists could turn to politicians to advocate reforms, such as those prescribing compulsory health checks

on prostitutes and penalties for syphilitic contagion or those in line with eugenic perspectives, which sought to restrict marriage between sick people or those with a hereditary "predisposition" to illness.[18]

In this same period the Gentile reform in education established psychology as a humanities discipline and psychiatry as a science.[19] Italian success in the field of endocrinology together with Ugo Cerletti and Lucio Bini's 1937 launch of electricity in convulsive therapy[20]—as a cheap substitute for the extremely popular (among psychiatrists) insulin and pentylenetetrazol treatment—gave further support to the somatic approach to psychiatric illness at a time when disciplines such as positivistic anthropology and criminology, hygiene and eugenics were translating themselves into "Laws for the protection of the Italian race" (1938), and the Fascist regime was drawing ever closer to Nazi Germany. However, whereas the Germans had already in 1933 passed the "Law for the Prevention of Hereditarily Diseased Progeny,"[21] Italy would never endorse sterilization policies against the "degenerate." This may be partly explained by the powerful position of the Catholic Church in relation to the Fascist regime and the pope's explicit condemnation of these practices in the 1930 Encyclical *Casti Connubii*.[22] The scenario portrayed by the anthropologist Paolo Mantegazza in his science fiction utopia *The Year Three Thousand*—with children likely to suffer from illnesses in later life being reduced to a "pinch of ash" in specially constructed ovens—never took place in Italy as it did (much sooner than in the year 3000) in Germany with the Aktion T-4 program.[23]

However, since the late nineteenth century, the issue of eugenics had been acrimoniously debated in Italy[24]; most prominent psychiatrists expressed their deep reservation regarding its implications. In 1915 the psychiatrist Enrico Morselli declared that "Confronted with families with hereditary defects . . . we feel without any sure criterion."[25] In 1923, after having pointed out how he was disturbed and disoriented in his "human feelings" in the face of the idea of the massacre of the mentally deficient envisaged by eugenic principles, he was relieved to point out that such a scenario was "fortunately completely impossible and impractical."[26] Ugo Cerletti in 1924 was horrified by the idea: "discarded horses and cattle are killed. Scrawny puppies are thrown into the canal. . . . But humans?"[27] Again, as late as 1938, Arturo Donaggio, in the acts of the conference of the Italian League for Mental Hygiene, warned: "At the present state of our knowledge, the uncertain bases do not allow for an authoritative decision regarding a disablement of the human personality, through such action as sterilization."[28]

Nevertheless, eugenics sometimes entered through the back door. For example, in 1940 the Italian authorities used the option agreed with Germany to send German-speaking Italians (from the South Tyrol) to the Reich, where they were to be naturalized as German citizens. Opting to be German was meant to be a free choice; but in the case of mental hospital patients, it was the hospital authorities who made the decision. In May 1940, a total of 299 German-speaking patients left Pergine for the

mental hospital of Zwiefalten. Sixty-one of these patients died in German "euthanasia" centers, and 48 percent of the total German naturalized patients died, probably as part of the "wild euthanasia" program that continued despite the fact that Aktion T4 had been officially halted.[29] A few months later an article published in the Bolzano *Volksbote* aired doubts on the German euthanasia program against the insane.[30] It is unclear if the Italian authorities were aware that sending mental patients to the Reich would most likely spell their death, but it is highly probable considering that Italian and German psychiatrists continued to meet and collaborate during the war.

The extremely high level of mortality in Italian mental hospitals during the Second World War might also suggest that undercurrents of eugenicist thinking were at play despite the absence of any official policies in this direction. In particular, after 1941, the level of mortality in Italian mental hospitals was double that of the general population. It rose from six per hundred for the period 1931–1940, to fourteen for the period 1942–1945.[31] Malnutrition killed many thousands. Such a jump in mortality rates points to the fact that, with regard to resources, the mentally ill were shunted to the bottom of the Italian pecking order, very close to becoming what in Germany was labeled as "life unworthy of living." As two psychiatrists put it immediately after the war: "We see only one reason [for this massive loss of life]: improvidence, the indifference and the lack of responsibility on the part of the state, and provincial and local authorities."[32] Equating "lack of responsibility" with eugenicist agendas may be stretching a point, but it is worth noting that the number of patients in Italian mental hospitals fell by 50 percent between 1940 and 1945.[33]

MADNESS AS REPRESSION

The growth of the asylum, laws, and scientific debates, however, may not tell the whole story in terms of the degree to which psychiatry in general and the mental hospitals in particular acted as conduits for Fascist policies or as an arm of the repressive state. Paul Corner has pointed out that we should be acutely aware of the fact that in Italian Fascism "the rules were in many ways unwritten . . . and could only be guessed at—something that gave the authorities a great deal of discretionary power."[34] In the later phase of Fascism it became standard practice that, on Mussolini's public visits to any location up and down the peninsula, mental asylums were asked to host the "unbalanced" with "manias" characterized by "political delusions." At the mental hospital of Genova Quarto, a planned visit to the city by Mussolini involved drawing up a list of sixty-two people who, between April and May 1938, were ordered by the prefecture "to be taken out of circulation for a few days because [they were] likely to stage impromptu political demonstrations." Where it was impossible to justify

picking people up on grounds of mental instability, it was determined "that other policing measures should be used."[35]

There are many examples of mental hospitals being used as temporary prisons when the regime wanted to present itself as acclaimed unanimously by local people. In February 1930, for example, from the commune of Lana near Bolzano, a request was made to detain a certain Marta Reinstadler. Her confinement at Pergine mental hospital lasted just twenty days, which was long enough to establish that she was suffering from no mental disorder but also served to prevent her from importuning the wedding ceremony of the heir to the Italian throne.[36] In the month preceding the visit of Il Duce to Cuneo in May 1939, Agnese P. was temporarily interned in the local hospital because she was considered to be a high-risk candidate to disrupt various public ceremonies. She was diagnosed as "affected by nervous overexcitement and maniacal tendencies prone to explode in violent acts against third parties and to use foul language."[37]

Professionals expressed some disdain at seeing the hospitals having to fulfill such policing obligations. The asylum director who had been given the task of detaining Agnese P., in view of Mussolini's visit, did so, but subtly expressed his reservation in a note in response to the police commissioner's requests:

> The subject to which you refer is still here as an inpatient and we kept her precisely due to the reasons you gave us, although there are no mental health grounds to confine her in a mental hospital. I would like to add that up until now we have scrupulously attended to your safety measures signaling to you every discharge from this mental hospital.[38]

Such a cleanup of the streets in the days before Mussolini gave his speeches to unanimously adulating and "oceanic" crowds may go some way to explaining the spectacle created by Fascism and uncritically summarized by Emilio Gentile as the "unique, vast scenario where millions of people were celebrating, in a simultaneous chorus, timed by a continuous rhythm, the feasts of the nation."[39]

The police and the hospitals worked in tandem in the case of Rosa Pappalardo, a Sicilian housewife who, in April 1940, was stopped by the police in via Quattro Fontane (Rome) because she was determined to approach Il Duce in order to ask him for a job. It was later ascertained that Pappalardo was breaching an expulsion order and she was sent to prison; on the way she swallowed some copper sulfate and thus temporarily diverted the police van to Santo Spirito hospital. From prison she was sent back to the mental hospital of Francofonte (Siracuse). A couple of her letters addressed to Mussolini arrived at the Rome Segreteria Particolare. In broken Italian, she asked to be received by Il Duce. The police labeled her a "fanatic."[40]

The wealthy fifty-two-year-old Enna Cicita, married with five children, in 1941 traveled twice from Cagliari to Rome in an effort to spur Il Duce

"to start negotiations with the enemy to make peace." A year later she sent a letter to Hitler, which was picked up by Italian censors, and on the basis of her record was officially reprimanded (*diffidata*) and told not to write to high personalities again. The prefect of Cagliari described her as "a graphomaniac (compulsive scribbler) affected by religious mania . . . who although clearly deranged, does not present any overt danger at present."[41] In 1938 the widow Agnese Castaldi was prevented from continuing to write postcards to high personalities from Villafaletto (Turin) by being committed to a mental hospital. Agnese was not the only one to end up in an asylum for "subversive graphomania," as we will see.[42]

The language of mental illness was employed easily, almost immediately, with regard to insubordinate women. Were women particularly vulnerable to being confined to asylums rather than being dealt with by the normal repressive apparatus of the Fascist state? Women were underrepresented among those exiled to remote locations (*confino*), comprising less than 10 percent of the total.[43] Among those tried by special tribunals (courts for political subversion) between 1926 and 1943, the share was even smaller. Of 5,619 people brought to trial, only 170 were women; until March 1927, no woman was tried at all. The 109 women found guilty were mostly accused of "organizing or adhering to the Communist Party" or having founded anti-Fascist organizations or distributed propaganda. In the 1940s, some were found guilty of partisan activity. These women's names tend to be tied to clear party groups or regional party leaders. Of the forty-one women who were passed back to ordinary tribunals one knows little, since information on them was sent to local courts.[44] Certainly the normal tribunals themselves also processed and sent women to prison and mental hospitals.

Why were the numbers of dissident women during the Fascist regime so small? Even taking into consideration that women were not as active as men in the public sphere, the numbers still appear to be too small, particularly if one considers the very paltry reasons for which many men were sent to *confino*. Together with intellectuals and political activists, as Bosworth has shown, ordinary people who made a few remarks on politics, politicians, and the like were all too likely to end up as *confinati*. An example might be Galliano Conte, the municipal dog-catcher of Treviso, who, at the time of the Führer's visit in May 1938, told a woman that he was looking forward to using his unwanted canines on Hitler and Mussolini.[45] Few women arrived in front of the special tribunal; those who did were sentenced for having made similar pronouncements. Exceptions were the sisters Elda and Lidia Koch, who had been heard saying that after the war "revolution will break out and Mussolini will be killed." The sisters were condemned, but in June 1940 their arrest caused disturbances in the Borgata Quadraro in Rome.[46]

Must we assume that the regime was more lenient with women or that women never spoke ill of Mussolini or the regime? Were there other means to discipline women's tongues? It must be granted that women may have

expressed politics in an "unmanly fashion" through words and systems of thought often categorized as religious or superstitious, but did women's subversive politics go scot-free? Were they silenced by hospitals rather than by the *confino*? Were mental hospitals much more important in the Fascist methods of discipline and punishment than has hitherto been claimed?

TWO ILLUSTRIOUS PATIENTS

This last question is important in considering the case of Violet Albina Gibson and her undeniably political act: on April 7, 1926, she attempted to assassinate Mussolini, but her bullet merely grazed the dictator's nose. A second bullet, which would undoubtedly have killed Il Duce, jammed in the gun barrel. On the days after the failed assassination, the front pages of newspapers across the peninsula described Violet as "an Irish hag,"[47] "a foreigner! Crazy or sane as she may be,"[48] "a wretched" "colorless figure of a woman,"[49] "an old madwoman."[50] Historians have discussed the series of attempts on Mussolini life—from the end of 1925 with Tito Zaniboni's failure to that of Gino Luccetti in September 1926 and the following month's miss by fifteen-year-old Anteo Zamboni—as having pushed or provided Mussolini with an excuse to intensify repression against all political opposition. In most histories Gibson is granted a few lines and the portrayal of her as an "old madwoman" is consistently reproduced. "Violet Gibson has been declared insane by psychiatrists and historians, in agreement in defining the case as pathologic not political," as Richard Collins notes in his 1988 biography.[51]

Violet Gibson came from a prominent, well-respected Anglo-Irish family. Daughter of the Protestant and conservative Edward Gibson, first Baron and Lord of Ashbourne, Lord Chancellor of Ireland in 1885, and of of Frances Colles, an aficionado of the Christian Science sect, Violet, unlike her brothers, never went to university. Nevertheless, she was highly educated for a woman of that period. She was also financially independent, thanks to a small fund from by her father. She had plenty of time to travel abroad and to involve herself in intellectual and social pursuits. In 1914, for example, Violet participated in a peace conference, the Women's International Congress at The Hague, and then spent some time in Paris campaigning against the war for various pacifist organizations. She had also been involved in theosophy and anthroposophy. Later she turned to Catholicism and within it modernism. Modernism, with its emphasis on the immanent nature of religion, skepticism toward church dogma, and active involvement in helping the poor led to the excommunication of many of its leaders and a ban from Pius X expressed both in his encyclical *Pascendi Dominici Gregis* (1907) and an oath to be made by priests. It was after her modernist retreat, organized by the Jesuit John O'Fallon Pope in 1916, that Violet kept a notebook in which she expressed her unrest and ethical queries in a succession of religious

quotations worth remembering and maxims to be reflected upon. Throughout her life Violet was interested in the political developments taking place in Ireland and Italy, to the point that one of her sisters later noted as a proof of Violet's "madness" that, after ten years in a mental asylum, she was upset about what was happening in Ireland and that, although incarcerated, she knew more about politics in Ireland than did the sister herself.[52] After the Italian general elections of 1924, Violet returned to Rome. There she spent time in charitable work in Trastevere and frequented the anti-Fascist priest Ernesto Buonaiuti, an important member of the modernist movement, who was excommunicated several times. There are a few indications that in this period she sought an audience with the pope. On March 16, 1926, she was seen in the courtroom of Chieti at the trial of Amerigo Dumini and accomplices for the murder of the socialist politician Giacomo Matteotti, and on March 28 she was present at Villa Glori hippodrome where Mussolini gave a speech celebrating Fascism. A few days later in Rome she endeavored to assassinate Mussolini.

Relations between Italy and Britain were put under strain by her act. Immediately, telegrams from the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, King George, Austen Chamberlain, the English ambassador in Rome Sir Ronald Graham, and from members of the Gibson family arrived to congratulate Mussolini on his escape. Violet's sister employed one of Italy's most celebrated lawyers, Enrico Ferri, to defend her. The police left no stone unturned in a bid to determine whether, despite her religious motivation, she acted with accomplices or alone. Was she feigning madness? In the meantime Violet was shifted to and fro between Le Mantellate prison, Sant'Onofrio, and Santa Maria della Pietà lunatic asylums, subjected to police interrogations and an extensive somatic and psychiatric examination, which included a gynecological test to determine whether she was a virgin. The decisions regarding Violet's sanity came from the top; for diplomatic reasons it was deemed to be more convenient that Violet should be returned to England on grounds of mental infirmity rather than punished for her crime in Italy. As might have been expected, the trial was extremely brief. The judges found, contradictorily, that her assassination attempt "was a case of chronic paranoia and therefore Gibson was not responsible for her actions . . . although conscious of them."[53] A week later Gibson and her sister were accompanied by the police to the border on their way to London. On the journey back to Britain, Violet declared that she felt she was the Italians' "beloved Violetta" and suggested that she might return to Italy (to kill Mussolini).[54] On her arrival in London, to her surprise, she was conducted by her sister to Harley Street and subjected to two brief psychiatric examinations, which resulted in two letters of commitment. Violet was immediately taken to the posh private lunatic asylum of St. Andrews in Northampton, where she died twenty-nine years later, regardless of all the requests for freedom that she wrote after 1935 to high personalities in England or her appeals to be transferred to a Catholic institution.

Despite her history of political involvement, mental instability was seen as a possible cause of her act from the moment of her capture. It is quite evident that women were perceived to be naturally prone to insanity. This may be because of the filtering down of medical theories and practices characterizing women as "more vulnerable than men because the instability of their reproductive systems interfered with their sexual, emotional, and rational control."[55] Or the physiological explanation may have borrowed from the "common sense" view that women, by their very nature, were mentally less stable than men. Interestingly, the most important point that convinced Italian psychiatrists of Violet's insanity was the fact that she did not express remorse or guilt for what she had done—which would have been taken as deeply subversive in the case of a man. The final verdict of insanity in this case had a clear political agenda and allowed Violet to be physically set apart and silenced. This label, however, denied Violet political agency to the point that in the 1950s, in her clinical papers, a doctor declared that Gibson was still afflicted by paranoia because she believed that she had once shot Mussolini.[56]

Whereas women were more likely to be declared insane because they engaged in overt political gestures, men at times suffered a similar fate. In 1924 Argo Secondari, leader of the *Arditi del Popolo*, a left-wing paramilitary group set up to pay back Fascist violence in its own coin, was imprisoned in the mental hospital of Rieti, where he was to end his days almost twenty years later.[57] In September 1924, Giovanni Corvi, a worker, killed the Fascist deputy Armando Casalini on a Rome bus, asserting that he was avenging the assassination of Giacomo Matteotti. Such a plausible political act was, however, considered to be the result of insanity. Corvi was locked up in Rome's asylum, from which he was then moved to another hospital at Aversa. Here he remained until 1937, when he was sent to *confino* on the Tremiti. In 1943, at Mussolini's first fall, he was liberated but was later captured by the Germans and disappeared forever in the maze of Nazi lagers.[58] Nor was the practice of declaring political assassins insane restricted to Italy. As far back as 1723 in Britain, Ned Arnold who had tried to kill Lord Onslow, a prominent politician, was tried and found to be insane. So too were Margaret Nicholson, who attempted to kill George III, and Mathew Hadfield, who shot at the same king in 1800. Insanity was also put down as the cause of Daniel McNaughton's celebrated assassination of William Drummond, British Prime Minister Robert Peel's private secretary, in 1843.[59] Madness has often come to the rescue of lese-majesté, even when there might have been grounds for imposing the death penalty. Only a mad person would lift his or her hand against established power. The death penalty grants legitimacy to an act that removal to an asylum would nullify.

The bases on which Ida Irene Dalser was declared insane in June 19, 1926, were her persistent "delusions" of having borne Mussolini a son and of being his lawful wife.[60] The first delusion could have been effortlessly

shown to have been nothing of the sort if only the psychiatrists' competence and ethical stands had allowed them to check beyond their institution. The fact was that in the legal offices of Guido Gatti, by signing a statutory certification dated January 11, 1916, Mussolini had acknowledged the paternity of two-month-old Albino Benito. The second "delusion" would not be so easily dispelled because, apart from Mussolini's "promise to marry" (a legally binding declaration), many documents were destroyed by close collaborators of Il Duce. It is also clear that neither Ida Dalser nor her family were prepared to hand over probing documentation to the authorities, who were working quite hard to erase all traces of Mussolini's spare wife and legitimate son. Benito Albino Mussolini, then renamed Bernardi, at the end of June 1934 is posted by the Navy on his first *Stultifera Navis*[61] (Ship of Fools) the cruiser *Regio Esploratore* on its way to China, his journey ended in October 1935 in Mombello's lunatic asylum in Limbiate, near Milan, where seven years later he was buried under a nameless tomb, numbered 931.[62] Elsewhere I have demonstrated that at different points in time Ida Dalser was not just a rejected ex-lover in the life of a powerful man but a political threat to a not-so-powerful man, more specifically a threat to the public image that Mussolini was creating between 1914 and 1919, in the course of his transition from a Socialist radical to a superpatriot and between 1925 and 1932 with the establishment of the Fascist regime between the Matteotti crisis in the second half of 1924 and the Lateran Treaty of February 1929.[63]

Unlike Violet Gibson, Ida and her son were not dedicated to a political ideal or a religious utopia but simply in search of personal justice. In their different ways, they troubled high politics and in both cases the mental hospital messily consigned them to oblivion and prevented them from being able to pose any sort of challenge.

ASYLUM INMATES

It was not just problems of high politics that found solutions in this kind of total institution. Asylums proved to be a useful tool in muffling the noise of minor dissent in the localities, often without trial: victims, again often women, were brought into the hospitals without the complication of a trial or police involvement beyond the carabinieri bringing the person to the hospital door (on the orders of the *podestà*, an appointed mayor, or the local chief of police). The usual order to the hospital directors was that there was an "urgent need" of commitment to a hospital, bypassing therefore the standard certification requirement of a doctor in the community.

Domenico D. and Vincenzo L. were confined to a mental hospital in 1938 for, respectively, "offences to His Excellency the Head of the Government" and "seditious shouting."[64] Writing letters to high personalities could be a very risky practice. Alice Maria Jachmann, an Italian born in

Berlin and resident in Sorrento, was presented to the police on the orders of the prefect of Naples. He explained that following her censored letter dated March 4, 1942, to Hitler, in which she "mentions, among other things . . . crimes that have purportedly been perpetrated by German troops at Sorrento and demand justice," she was subjected to a psychiatric visit in which she was recognized as being plagued by "dangerous mental alienation, and for this reason her admission to the province's psychiatric hospital has been determined."[65] Another letter to Hitler was written by the "deranged," "inspired by God," Pia Pedroni from Modena, "mother of an illegitimate son" who had already spent eight months in Reggio Emilia's lunatic asylum for paranoid psychosis and because she had "molested respectable people attributing [to] them the paternity of her offspring and making all manner of people the targets of her graphomania." She had been placed under the tutelage of her father and brother in February 22, 1942. However, her letter to Hitler proved to the local authorities that "she had not desisted from her graphomania." Pedroni's relatives were issued with an official warning (*diffida*) by the Modena prefecture that would she again put pen to paper, she would be institutionalized.[66] A 1943 letter to Hitler also led to the forced psychiatric examination of the destitute Bolognese Lidia Rovesi, who had asked the Führer for financial assistance. Police reports state that "the local commune had been alerted to admit her to an apposite medical institution." A local doctor had in fact judged her as "hysterical, but not dangerous to herself or others to the degree expected to recommend for her an urgent confinement in a lunatic asylum."[67] In September 1942, the Roman Maria Luisa Mariani also wrote to Hitler and was labeled as "deranged" to be placed "under surveillance and cured at home."[68] The wealthy Emilian Luisa Ferrari of Sabbione, known as Mother Giovanna Francesca of Spirito Santo, founder of the sect "Spose del Verbo," although considered of "hysteric temperament with ascetical background," was nevertheless judged "of good civic and religious principles." This case did not require prompt intervention, since the Curia had informed parish priests to "tolerate and watch [her] contemporarily . . . shunning cooperation or dissent to avoid misunderstandings with the local population."[69] In 1942 Cristina B. was interned because of "a row in a public space with a black shirt about the insufficient bread ration and the political methods of Mussolini."[70] Giuseppina Casaro entered the asylum S. Clemente in Venice in April 1932 and would remain there till 1934 with a diagnosis of "schizophrenia" and a referral from a doctor who noted that she "spends long hours meditating, drawing words with her hands, writing letters to prelates and ministers, invoking the salvation of the world, [and] asserting she has a calling to do this." Her clinical papers at admission included more "supporting evidence" for her confinement: "She has written three letters to [Mussolini] to help him to redeem the world, with her help. She also wanted to go to Rome to presents herself directly to him."[71] The wealthy Anita De Mattia was declared paranoid in 1933 because her bothersome jealousy toward her husband

was compounded by her practice of writing letters and supplications to the police headquarters, the queen of England, or to Il Duce invoking help against her terrible enemies.[72] She would be confined in San Clemente hospital for six months. Brescian Marta Serini, after her separation from her husband, spent her life under surveillance, officially warned, confined for two years in Nuoro, then moved between Venice prison, San Clemente asylum (1934), and the Perugia penal colony. She had been condemned several times for insults and offences aimed at the police. On the top corner of her medical records one reads: "no sign of insanity," and in her diagnosis: "on the disposition of the Interior Minister."[73] Elisabetta C., a homeless woman of the Val Maira near Cuneo, was imprisoned at Racconigi asylum in 1938. On her clinical record one reads: "Attention! Before discharge," suggesting that the police should be given prior warning if she was let out of the hospital. She is described by the local police as "antifascist and unbalanced"; however, on her medical notes, a doctor wrote that "although her character is a bit difficult and she is prone to react and bully, in general she cannot with certainty be regarded as abnormal." Elisabetta would remain in mental hospital for nine long years.[74] Attached to Jemina Vinay's San Clemente clinical record is a newspaper cutting recounting why she ended up before a tribunal on April 27, 1926, and eventually at the Venetian mental hospital. In November of the previous year, on the train going to Mestre, she wanted the window open and started arguing more and more animatedly with those who wanted it closed; the train guard was called and he took the side of the closed-window party, handing Jemina over to the authorities in Mestre station. "From her incoherent replies" the soldiers who picked her up "thought they were in front of poor lunatic, especially because in their presence, the woman started to offend H. E. Mussolini." The psychiatric report confirmed her to be "mentally insane and dangerous to herself and others," and she was consigned to San Clemente.[75] No doubt if Jemina had been prepared to bear a stuffy train journey that November, she would not have spent the next seven years in a mental institution. Rinaldo S., a waiter from Cuneo, was confined to Racconigi mental hospital in 1939 for sedition. The police ordered that the director of the asylum should on no account "discharge Rinaldo S. from the hospital without the authorization of this office." The director could find no signs of madness despite the opinion of the police. He wrote that "having completed a period of observation [the patient's] subversive ideas cannot be attributed to an abnormal state of mind; he is a subject who is mentally sane. . . . I ask permission therefore to discharge him from this institute."[76] Stefania Seppi was moved from Bolzano's prison to its mental hospital July 1928, where she would stay until May 1933. From her clinical papers one learns that "agents of public security state that Mrs. Stefania, with a criminal record as long as her arm, 34 offences . . . on May 6 was arrested for having uttered in a public space of Bolzano insulting words towards the Head of State and towards Italians in general." She resisted arrest to the point that she had to be brought to

hospital. Furthermore, it was stated that Stefania, in a psychotic state, pronounced the words: "Mussolini is a swine and all Italians are swine." Such remarks called for an immediate psychiatric examination.[77]

CONCLUSION

This chapter has made a case for considering mental institutions as an integral part of the Fascist regime's repressive apparatus, being used to deal with dissenting voices, in particular women's. In many ways the lunatic asylum corresponded to the political *confino*. During Fascism doctors were called in to examine and to do their part in scientifically finding ways to discipline according to the agendas of the regime. The ease with which particular women's political statements and actions were interpreted first and foremost as madness is striking. In mental illness, as has been shown throughout this chapter, political agency could be neutralized, be it expressed in the assassination attempt of Violet Gibson, the grating "paranoia" of Mussolini's first wife, or the uncomfortable presence of people saying things that could not be harmonized with the image that Fascism liked to portray of itself as "celebrating, in a simultaneous chorus." That women's voices should in particular have been silenced through psychiatric diagnoses is explained perfectly by a member of the Fascist security police who in one report to Rome went to some length to declare that Fascists should never credit "insignificant women's" [*donnicciole*] utterances with the prestige of being autonomous political acts. They should be quieted in case they should bring men into disrepute or temptation. In the case of Laura Mauro and her daughter, who had been publicly "offending our Sacred and Magnificent Duce," the policeman pressed that

> they should be energetically punished so nobody can say: If they don't do anything to those women, they will do nothing to us. . . . furthermore should their words reach some subversive man's vile soul . . . it would bring a smile to his lips and . . . unfortunately a sarcastic laugh.[78]

In his 2002 thought-provoking article on the question of totalitarianism and dictatorship in Fascist Italy, Paul Corner suggested that the time had come to shift debate away from simplistic dichotomies of an Italy that had either "consented" to the regime or had been bludgeoned into accepting it: instead, he offers the concept of "restricted choice." What counts, he argues, is not the number of people who need to be in concentration camps before it becomes absurd to use the term "consensus" but how limiting life needed to be in order to avoid ending up in those concentration camps. "There was simply no feasible alternative" in Fascist Italy, he writes, "to toeing the line if you wished to continue to lead a normal life."[79] Such a view presumes that "normal" life was possible during the regime as long as one never "chose" to

step outside the permissible; according to Corner, this still qualifies Fascist Italy as totalitarian because "for the vast majority of people, there were no choices to be made; [and] this is what constitutes the real totalitarian nature of fascism (and not the greater or lesser level of open and direct repression)."[80] Corner can of course be accused of presenting a definition of totalitarianism that is so flexible that democracy might even fit inside it, as not all behavior, even in democracy, is permissible, thus restricting the individual's unlimited choice. The *degree* of choice available is naturally the crux of the matter and therefore also what exactly constitutes "normal life."

Such a sophisticated argument is useful to Corner, intent as he is on not letting right-wing politicians and historians in Italy laugh away claims that Fascism was a repressive regime, comparable to Nazism. But is the concept of an a priori "restricted choice" open to the Italian people really necessary to bring dictatorship back in? The focus of this chapter has in some ways been an attempt to return the debate to the question of repression in the way that Corner was saying should be avoided. Italy did have a "concentration camp system" ready made when it came to power. Studies of the mental hospital, with its function of disciplining and defining "normality," have shown that they were used for political ends in Britain, in the Soviet Union especially once the gulag could no longer be relied upon,[81] and in Nazi Germany.[82] In Fascist Italy, unlike Hitler's Germany, the mental hospital assumed a special importance. It would be true to say that what Ernst Fraenkel called the "normative" state continued to predominate over the "prerogative," hence the difficulty of placing Fascism alongside the totalitarianism of Nazi Germany.[83] In an Italy where the "normative" state could not be sidestepped as easily, the mental hospital may have played a vital part in ensuring the smooth functioning of the regime. As the canonical writers of the antipsychiatry movement—from Michel Foucault[84] to Roger Laing,[85] and Erving Goffmann[86] to Thomas Szasz[87]—have tried to show, psychiatry has provided a fundamental service to the establishment of the modern state by its ability to repress and imprison and also in the way the definition of what constitutes "normal life" is transmitted to society. As such, the role of psychiatry in lending itself to Fascism must be reassessed. It is hoped at the very least that the notion of psychiatry as "wrapped in passionless impartiality," simply carrying out its professional and scientific duties for the sake of its mentally ill patients while the rest of Italy was enveloped by Fascism, will be laid to rest.

NOTES

1. Matteo Floriani, *Bibliografia di storia della psichiatria italiana 1991–2010* (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010). It lists around two thousand articles, book chapters, and monographs published in the last twenty years.
2. Donatella Lippi, *San Salvi: Storia di un manicomio* (Florence: Olschki, 1996); Luigi Lugaresi, *LóOspedale Psichiatrico di Rovigo (1930– 1997)*

(Rovigo: Minelliana, 1999); Massimo Moraglio, *Costruire il manicomio: storia dell'Ospedale psichiatrico di Grugliasco* (Milan: UNICOPLI, 2002).

3. Michael Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900–1945* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Robert Jay Lifton, *The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Richard F. Wetzell, *Inventing the Criminal: A History of German Criminology, 1880–1945* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 2000); Dirk A. Moses, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Sheila Faith Weiss, *The Nazi Symbiosis: Human Genetics and Politics in the Third Reich* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).
4. For an introduction, see Richard J. B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism* (London: Arnold, 1998).
5. Richard J. B. Bosworth. *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Dictatorship* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 1.
6. Andrea Piazzi, Luana Testa, Giovanni Del Missier, Mariopaolo Dario, and Ester Stocco, "The History of Italian Psychiatry during Fascism," *History of Psychiatry* 22 no. 3 (2011), 251–267, here 252.
7. Sigmund Freud, "Thoughts for the Times on War and Death," in *Collected Papers*, vol. 4. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1924–1950), 289.
8. Romano Canosa, *Storia del manicomio in Italia dall'unità ad oggi* (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1979), 91–92.
9. Paolo Francesco Peloso, *La guerra dentro* (Verona: Ombre Corte, 2008), 34.
10. Canosa, *Storia del manicomio*, 155.
11. Gian Piero Sciocchetti, "Edificazione di un manicomio," in Casimira Grandi and Rodolfo Taiani, eds., *Alla ricerca delle menti perdute* (Trento: Onlus, 2002), 21.
12. Dino Grandi, *Bonifica umana. Decennale delle leggi penali e della riforma penitenziale,* vol.1 (Rome: Ministero di grazia e giustizia, 1941), 225.
13. Romano Canosa, *Storia del manicomio*, 159–161.
14. Ibid., 221–223.
15. Valeria Babini and Massimo Tornabene describe this as a Fascist decision, but G. De Plato and Michele Miravalle backdated it to 1904. Michele Miravalle, *La riforma della sanità penitenziaria: il caso Ospedali Psichiatrici*, 113. Available at: http://www.stopopg.it/node/206; G. De Plato *La legislazione psichiatrica in Italia*, 2. Available at: htpp://www.sburover.it; Massimo Tornabene, *La Guerra dei matti* (Boves: Araba Fenice, 2007), 20; Valeria Babini *Liberi tutti* (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 94.
16. Stefano Ravvicini, "Dalla legge sanitaria 1888 al Testo Unico delle leggi sanitarie 1934," *Difesa sociale* 13 (October 1934), 547–556.
17. For European comparisons, see special issues of the *International Journal of Mental Health*, 35, nos. 3 and 4 (2006); 36, no.1 (2007).
18. Andrea Piazzi et al., "Italian Psychiatry during Fascism," 255.
19. Babini, *Liberi tutti*, 59–71.
20. Ugo Cerletti, "Electroshock therapy," in Arthur M. Sackler et al. eds., *The Great Physiodynamic Therapies in Psychiatry* (London: Hoeber-Harper, 1956), 91–120.
21. Micheal Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance*, 42.
22. Franco Gaeta and Nicola Tranfaglia, *La Storia d'Italia,* vol. 19 (Novara: De Agostini, 2005).
23. Paolo Mantegazza, *L'anno tremila: un sogno* (Milano: Treves 1897).

24. Claudia Mantovani, *Rigenerare la società. L'eugenetica in Italia dale origini ottocentesche agli anni Trenta* (Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 2004); Claudio Pogliano, *L'ossessione della razza. Antropologia e genetica nel XX secolo* (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2005); Francesco Cassata *Molti, sani e forti: L'eugenetica in Italia* (Turin: Bollati borighieri, 2006); Mattias Tydéu, "The First Wave Eugenic Revolution in Southern Europe," in *Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 382–385.
25. Enrico Morselli, "L'eugenetica e le previsioni sull'eredità neuro-psicologica," *Quaderni di psicologia*, II series, 2 (1915), 321–331.
26. Enrico Morselli, *L'uccisione pietosa* (Torino: Bocca, 1923), 272.
27. Roberta Passione, *Ugo Cerletti. Il romanzo dell'elettroshock* (Reggio Emilia: Aliberti Studi, 2007), 92–94.
28. Atti della Lega italiana di igiene e profilassi mentale, 1938, 105.
29. Hartmann Hinterhuber, *Uccisi e dimenticati* (Trento: Museo storico in Trento, 2003), 65.
30. Paolo Francesco Peloso "Psychiatry and Psychiatric Patients in Italy during World War II," *International Journal of Mental Health* 35, 4 (Winter, 2007), 66–80, here 68.
31. Peloso, "Psychiatry and Psychiatric Patients," 76.
32. G. Padovani and L. Bonfiglioli, "Le vicende storiche e statistiche dell'assistenza psichiatrica in Italia durante la seconda Guerra mondiale," *Rivista sperimentale di Freniatria* 18, 52 (1948), 375–396, here 395.
33. Canosa, *Storia del manicomio*, 155.
34. Paul Corner, "Italian Fascism: whatever happened to dictatorship?" *Journal of Modern Italy* 74 (2002), 344.
35. Peloso, *La guerra dentro*, 46.
36. Ospedale Psichiatrico della Provincia di Trento in Pergine, donne, n.4277/3500.
37. To these two women could be added to "the three socialists and the two anarchists who were sent for a brief prison holiday to prison camps at Fossano or to Saluzzo." Giorgio Bocca, *Il filo nero* (Milan: Mondadori, 1995), 47.
38. Tornabene, *La guerra dei matti*, 79–80.
39. Emilio Gentile, *Il culto del littorio. La sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista* (Roma-Bari: Laterza, 1993), VII.
40. Segreteria Particolare Duce, carteggi ordinari, busta 28, fascicolo 209.878.
41. Ministro Interni, divisione generale pubblica sicurezza, A5G II WW, 58.
42. Ministro Interni, divisione generale pubblica sicurezza, 1920–43, ACS, busta 57, fascicolo Torino.
43. Adriano Dal Pont and Susanna Carlini, *L'Italia al confine,* vol. 4 (Milan: ANPPIA, 1983); id., *L'Italia dissidente e antifascista* (Milan: ANPPIA, 1980); Adriano Dal Pont, *I lager di Mussolini* (Milan: 1975). Manlio Brigaglia, Francesco Manconi, Antonello Mattone and Melis Guido, *L'antifascismo in sardegna* (Cagliari: Edizioni Della Torre, 1986).
44. Berardo Taddei, *Donne processate dal Tribunale speciale 1927–43* (Verona: Grazia, 1969); Adriano Dal Pont, Alfonso Leonetti, Pasquale Maiello and Lino Zocchi, *Aula IV* (Rome: La Pietra, 1961); AA.VV. *Antologia dell'antifascismo e della Resistenza* (Milan: La Pietra, 1974).
45. Richard J. B. Bosworth, "Totalitarianism and 'Deep Belief' in Fascist Italy, 1935–43," *European History Quaterly* 34, no. 475 (2004).
46. "Donne davanti al Tribunale Speciale." Available at: http://www.anpi.it/donne-davanti-al-tribunale-speciale/4/
47. *La scure*, Piacenza (April 8, 1926).

48. *Sentinella delle Alpi* Cuneo (April 8, 1926). Nearly all newspapers emphasized this.
49. *L'Eco della Sicilia e della Calabria* (April 7, 1926).
50. Cuttings from newspapers collected in Segreteria Particolare del Duce, carteggi riservati 1922–1943, busta 64, 377/R.
51. Richard Oliver Collin, *La donna che sparò a Mussolini* (Milan: Rusconi, 1988), 5.
52. Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Woman Who Shot Mussolini* (London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 274.
53. The psychiatric report is in the archive of the Santa Maria della Pietà mental hospital in Rome.
54. Stonor Saunders, *The Woman Who Shot Mussolini*, 254–256.
55. Elaine Showalter, *The Female Malady* (New York: Pantheon, 1987), 76.
56. Stonor Saunders, *The Woman Who Shot Mussolini*, 282.
57. Michael Leeden, *D'Annunzio: The First Duce* (Rutgers: Transaction, 2002), 46.
58. Archivio Antifascista, "Giovanni Corvi: Un irregolare dell'antifascismo," *'l Gazetin* (December, 2010).
59. David Healy, *Mania: A Short History of Bipolar Disorder* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 45–49; "L'altro diritto. Centro di documentazione su carcere, devianza e marginalità." Available at: http://www.altrodiritto.unifi.it/ricerche/sanita/simonett/cap1.htm
60. Riccardo Paicher, "All'ombra fosca delle dittature," *Azione* (October 1945); Marco Zeni *La moglie di Mussolini* (Trento: Edizioni EFFE e ERRE, 2005); Alfredo Pieroni, *Il figlio segreto del* Duce (Milan: Garzanti, 2006); Umberto Dinelli, *La Mussolina: I fuochi di donna, le ceneri di un regime* (Verona: Cierre, 2010).
61. Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilisation: a History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 3–37.
62. Nera Fallaci, "Così il duce si sbarazzò di Albino, figlio scomodo," *Oggi* (November 12, 1983).
63. Daniela Baratieri, "Sanity from a Lunatic Asylum: Ida Dalser a Threat to Mussolini's Image," in Christopher Duggan, Stephen Gundle, and Giuliana Pieri, eds., *Mussolini and the Italians from 1914 to the Present* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2013).
64. Tornabene, *La guerra dei matti*, 81.
65. Ministero Interno, divisione generale di pubblica sicurezza, AA.GG.RR. busta 57, fascicolo 23, 4, no.3, parte III.
66. Ministero Interno, divisione generale di pubblica sicurezza, A5G Seconda Guerra Mondiale, busta 59, fascicolo 23.
67. Ibid.
68. Ministero Interno, divisione generale di pubblica sicurezza, A5G Seconda Guerra Mondiale, busta 58.
69. Ministero Interno, divisione generale di pubblica sicurezza, A5G Seconda Guerra Mondiale, busta 59, fascicolo 23.
70. Tornabene, *La guerra dei matti*, 109.
71. Manicomio Femminile di S. Clemente a Venezia, anno 1932, no. 69.
72. Manicomio Femminile di S. Clemente a Venezia, anno 1931, no. 188.
73. Manicomio Femmile di S. Clemente a Venezia, busta B593, anno 1934, no. 151.
74. Tornabene, *La guerra dei matti*, 82–83.
75. Manicomio Femminile di S. Clemente a Venezia, anno 1927, no. 88.
76. Tornabene, *La guerra dei matti*, 81.
77. Ospedale Psichiatrico della Provincia di Trento in Pergine, donne, no. 3987.

78. Tribunale Speciale per Difesa Stato, busta 433.
79. Corner, "Whatever Happened to Dictatorship?" 349.
80. Ibid., 351.
81. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, *Russia's Political Hospitals* (London: Gollancz, 1977), 48–65.
82. Burleigh, *Death and Deliverance*, 113.
83. Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipperman, *The Racial State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10.
84. Michel Foucault, *History of Madness* (London: Routledge, 2006).
85. Ronald Laing, *The Divided Self: an Existential Study in Sanity and Madness* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1959).
86. Erving Goffman, *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1961).
87. Thomas Szasz, *The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct* (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

9 Coercion, Consent, and Accommodation in the Third Reich

Dick Geary

INTRODUCTION: A POPULAR CONSENSUS

In recent years the analysis of the relationship between the Nazi regime and the German people between 1933 and 1945 has undergone a sea change. Increasingly, Nazi rulers and their policies have been judged to have been popular, whereas the role of terror in the maintenance of the system has been downplayed and in some cases even denied. Robert Gellately has argued that the Third Reich rested on a general consensus among Germans;[1] Götz Aly has claimed that the Third Reich was not a dictatorship maintained by force;[2] and Eric Johnson's *The Nazi Terror* similarly sees the majority of the German population reaching an accommodation with its rulers,[3] although I will argue later that accommodation and consensus are not the same things. Johnson, together with Karl-Heinz Reuband, has also analyzed the results of an opinion poll conducted among elderly Germans in the 1990s, from which they claim such a degree of popular support for National Socialism and for Hitler that terror was rarely needed to guarantee loyalty.[4] Elsewhere I have surveyed at length a substantial body of literature seeking to demonstrate that this loyalty also embraced the German working class.[5] This last point has been further elaborated by a large body of recent writing, which sees the key to an understanding of the Third Reich in the concept of the "People's Community," treated no longer as a tool of Nazi propaganda but a reality of social inclusion for all classes of Germans and a mechanism for the exclusion of social outsiders, ethnic minorities, and occupied populations, upon which all kinds of horror could be inflicted.[6] As Peter Fritzsche writes, "most people identified with the Third Reich, and most believed that the Nazis had healed the wounds of German history."[7] This chapter will first analyze the basis for these claims and then go on to question them in a critical fashion.

There is certainly no shortage of evidence for the popularity of Hitler and many Nazi policies. Ian Kershaw's seminal *Hitler Myth* demonstrated the massive personal popularity of the Führer, at least until 1942, based upon the removal of unemployment, foreign policy successes before 1939, and rapid military victories until 1941, as well as massive and very

sophisticated propaganda. Kershaw's companion volume titled *Popular Opinion* shows how attacks on the left-wing political parties and various kinds of social delinquents were welcomed by many.[8] Robert Gellately points to the yes votes (over 90 percent) for the Nazis and their policies in plebiscites and elections, deemed by the leading German historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler to have been relatively free of manipulation; to the massive increase in membership of the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) after the seizure of power; to the indifference demonstrated to the plight of foreign workers by their German counterparts; and to the fact that Germans fought on bitterly to the very end of the war in the most dreadful circumstances.[9] Gellately, like Johnson, also makes much of the fact that the infamous *Gestapo* (the secret state police) were nothing like as numerous or as threatening as used to be imagined and that much of the information obtained by it and other agencies came from denunciations of their colleagues and neighbors by ordinary Germans.[10] In a survey of opinion conducted in 1951, the peacetime years of Nazi rule were remembered as "quiet" and "good times;"[11] Johnson also reports that most Germans never worried about being arrested.[12] The same points emerge from the Johnson-Reuband opinion poll mentioned earlier.[13] For Gellately, what violence the state did inflict on Germans was directed overwhelmingly against "social outsiders."[14] Among the German working class, Inge Marszolek and René Ott have demonstrated enthusiastic support for the regime on the part of the labor force of the aircraft and automobile plants in Bremen; Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul have shown that discontent on the part of workers in the Saarland never stretched beyond "loyal antipathy"; and Ulrich Herbert has analyzed the indifference and sometimes brutality meted out to foreign workers by their German counterparts. Alf Lüdtke claims that workers remained no more distant from the regime than other Germans, and other writers make similar claims.[15]

How did this remarkable consensus come about in a nation previously tortured by the most intense social and religious rivalries? Unquestionably part of the answer is that the Nazis could build on a substantial consensus (outside of left of German politics, that is) that wanted to restore national greatness abroad and order at home, put an end to Weimar politics, and destroy the threat of Marxism (be it Social Democratic or Communist). Moreover, according to some, the Third Reich presided over a huge improvement in the economic lot of millions of Germans, most obviously by removing unemployment and increasing pay packets. By 1939 real hourly wages were up 7 percent and weekly wages up 23 percent on the values of 1932. According to Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann, the country witnessed a new consumerism, with the advent of mass tourism in the *Kraft durch Freude* (KdF—Strength through Joy) leisure organization, the production of the People's Radio (*Volksempfänger*), the launch of the People's Car (*Volkswagen*), and various holiday offerings, including Baltic cruises. The regime also developed a vocabulary of homage to ordinary

workers, praising their contribution to national greatness. In this scenario, this new world undermined class separation and seduced labor into the *Volksgemeinschaft*.[16] Moreover, the development of new industries in new locations, together with Allied bombing, sometimes destroyed the older communal centers of socialist and communist strength, while the mobility prospects of skilled younger German workers were increased by the massive import of some 8 million foreign workers, creating a new racial hierarchy of labor with Germans in the supervisory positions.[17] It has also been claimed that the employment opportunities and mobility of women were enhanced under the regime.[18] Others, more skeptical about whether such a transformation of economic and social realities took place, nonetheless identify the ideological triumph of the People's Community as the result of a belief that things were getting better, that now hard work would be rewarded, and that the lazy and "work-shy" would be excluded. Such beliefs and the restoration of national pride then bound even the factory workers to the regime.[19] A third and probably the most common variant of the triumph of the *Volksgemeinschaft* had the issue of racial inclusion and exclusion at its center. The majority of the German people accepted the persecution of racial minorities and some helped the Nazi persecution of the Jews by providing information and denunciations. Local authorities and communities often gave their support to such persecution and indeed engaged in a brutal escalation of the violence. As Michael Wildt reports, it became "open season" against anyone expressing open sympathy for the Jews.[20] Aly also claims that both the war and antisemitic policies generated support, not least because they brought substantial material benefits to the German population. He argues that the massive plunder of the occupied territories meant that the war was fought at the cost of the subjugated populations and brought financial rewards to ordinary Germans, as did the expropriation of Jews in the "Aryanization" of the economy. The subtitle of *Hitler's Beneficiaries—How the Nazis Bought the German People*—makes this thesis abundantly clear and leads its author to claim that the regime "maintained its popularity during the war."[21]

The remainder of this chapter takes issue with the consensus arguments outlined above by raising five points: First, the rapid emergence of unions, the SPD and the KPD on the left and of divided Catholic and Protestant bourgeois political cultures, which in many ways reproduced Weimar configurations, in some parts of Germany in the period from 1946 to 1949, together with elections of that year in the occupied western territories (the last Weimar election according to Jürgen Falter), belies claims of an irreversible transformation of German social structures and values and points to the significance of context in understanding what happened to the German people and why they behaved in the way they did between 1933 and 1945. That context included the fact that the nation was at war for half the regime's existence and the reality of terror. Second, the consensus view plays down the simple fact that the Third Reich was a massively repressive

state and that its repression was directed at a substantial number of Germans who were neither "social outsiders" nor members of ethnic minorities, although it was manifestly directed at these groups too. Third, the supposed material benefits that allegedly bought loyalty were far less substantial than Aly and others imagine. Moreover, it is misleading to generalize about the views of entire generations, regions, and social classes let alone to generalize about the views of a whole nation, especially about one whose history was until 1933 dominated by generational, class, regional, and religious conflicts. In this respect, Nazi Germany was not so different from Fascist Italy.[22] There is, indeed, considerable empirical evidence, especially from Gestapo and social-democratic sources, of variations in attitude: variations over time, with increasing dissatisfaction from 1942; variations between social groups and between individuals; and variations in attitudes toward specific policies. Finally, the use of the term "consensus" is of dubious value in the case of a repressive one-party state in which civil rights did not exist and non-Nazi organizations had been abolished. I would argue that it is precisely this context that explains both the withdrawal into privacy on the part of some Germans and the accommodations that many others made with Nazi institutions. Such accommodations (denunciations, joining Nazi organizations) might be made because of ideological fervor or identification with the regime; but equally they might be made by individuals to feed their families, keep their jobs, or get promotions. Such strategies of daily existence have been well known in many repressed conditions, including that of slavery.

1945: AFTER THE END

The significance of context in understanding public behavior is made clear by certain developments after 1945. I am not trying to claim that these are typical of Germany as a whole, but then one of my central points is that we need to avoid the kind of crass generalization about popular attitudes that has characterized many of the arguments about consensus. What is remarkable is the rapidity with which repressed and apparently destroyed trade union, social-democratic, and even communist organizations reappeared at the end of the war. Moreover, early 1947 saw strike waves in the Ruhr. These were obviously reactions to hunger and massive food shortages, but they were also much more than this. Like the strikers in 1920 in the wake of the Kapp Putsch, those of 1947 also demanded the socialization of the mines, the appointment of trade union representatives to public bodies, and the dismissal of reactionaries from public service. Of the fifty-two recorded strikes in North-Rhine Westphalia in 1947, only three were exclusively about wages whereas thirty-one sought to increase the powers of factory councils, clearly indicating that older ambitions had not been extinguished. Perhaps even more remarkable was the reemergence of the

German Communist Party (KPD) after the arrest of almost half its membership and the murder of thousands more between 1933 and 1945. In the regional elections in North-Rhine Westphalia in 1947, the KPD won 14 percent of the popular vote as a whole and over 20 percent in Duisberg, Oberhausen, Gelsenkirchen, Gladbeck, Recklinghausen, Bochum, Castrop-Rauxel, Dortmund, Herne, and Wattenscheid, while its share of the vote was at least 28 percent in Remscheid, Solingen, Bottrop and Wanne-Eickel. These values compare well with those of the early 1930s and show that it was the Cold War, and not National Socialism, that killed Communism in West Germany.[23] However, I do recognize an important qualification to this point: the rapid decline in the Communist tradition after 1948 may also have been a consequence of generational change. Kershaw's perception that Nazi propaganda was most successful where it did not have to compete with strong traditional loyalties would suggest that the Third Reich remained relatively unpopular with former members of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and KPD but enjoyed much better fortunes among the young or with workers who had never been part of the socialist tradition. As far as the former were concerned, Mark Roseman writes, "never had a generation been subjected to such a homogeneous and distinct socialization as the Hitler Youth generation. This socialization would make the transmission of older traditions and values very difficult in post-war years."[24]

TERROR AND REPRESSION

In the second edition of my *Hitler and Nazism* I stated that the Nazi seizure of power in the middle months of 1933 was far from peaceful, pointing out that in addition to constitutional changes at the political center and the creation of a one-party state, KPD and SPD members in the localities were seized, beaten up, and sometimes incarcerated in "wild" concentration camps, such as the Vulkan docks in the North German port of Stettin and the Columbia cinema in Berlin, where many were tortured and some were murdered. I also stressed the destruction of virtually all non-Nazi organizations, including professional bodies and sports clubs, or their "coordination" into specifically Nazi-controlled associations. This Nazification of the public sphere, combined with the removal of civil liberties, constituted the erection of a repressive dictatorship.[25] All of these points were extremely well known before I repeated them in 2000 and they remain true today. However, the recent claims of a Third Reich "consensus" made by Gellately, Aly, and others have required their restatement and more sophisticated elaboration by leading historians such as Richard Evans and Geoff Eley. The former has demonstrated with numerous examples, first, that Nazi violence on a massive scale was directed in the early years of the Third Reich not only against "social outsiders" but also and primarily against numerous members of the Communist Party, which had over 300,000 members

and had won over 100 seats in the Reichstag in November 1932. Over the course of the regime's existence, 150,000 party members were incarcerated ("only" 150,000 claims Gellately!) and 42,000 murdered. Many members of the SPD suffered a similar fate, as Evans again demonstrates with numerous examples. Given that the two socialist parties combined won more votes than the NSDAP in the November 1932 Reichstag elections and thus represented a substantial part of the German political nation, it is scarcely sane to argue that the prime target of the regime, at least at this point in time, was "social outsiders." Evans further testifies to examples of interference and violence against representatives of the Catholic Center Party; and demonstrates, *pace* Wehler, significant Nazi intrusions in and interference with electoral processes in the Third Reich.[26] Such examples of violence were further seen in the executions of leaders of the Sturmabteilung (SA) [Storm Detachment, or Brownshirts] and others in the Night of the Long Knives in 1934 and in the attacks on Jews in 1938 in *Reichskristallnacht*, events that had a profound effect on the German people, as Geoff Eley has argued.[27] Ironically, Gellately displays awareness of the centrality of the threat of violence, writing that "few dared even to criticize" the destruction of November 1938's "Crystal Night."[28] He also recognizes that by July 1933 the leaders of virtually all political parties "right down to the local level" were in "protective custody" and further that the system of "police justice" removed the sense of "legal security."[29]

In 2000 I was only one of many historians who saw Nazi interference with the law and the destruction of civil liberties as absolutely central to the operation of Nazi rule and the emasculation of independent behavior.[30] Now Evans has made a major contribution to our understanding of the even greater significance of these factors. He writes, "the principal instrument of terror in Nazi Germany was not the concentration camps but the law."[31] Of course the camps were initially important, detaining around 100,000 inmates, primarily political opponents, during 1933. Moreover, their existence was publicized by the regime to heighten the deterrent effect. However, most of the camps had been emptied by the end of the year and their subsequent development, especially from 1936, concentrated on "social outsiders" (the "work-shy," juvenile delinquents, Freemasons, and members of religious sects), and then, during the war, foreign workers.[32] The reason for the relative shutdown, however, was, as Evans points out, that the leading role in repression switched to the regular courts and the prisons. He goes on to list the vast expansion of treason laws and the death penalty. In consequence the prison population of Nazi Germany increased from 69,000 to 122,000 between 1932 and 1937.[33] Prisons thus became a major resource of the Nazi system of political repression, as Nikolas Wachsmann has shown.[34]

Of course, levels of terror imposed on the populations of occupied territories and especially against the Jews during the Second World War reached a scale and intensity unknown in Germany proper. However, there was a

massive escalation of domestic terror and violence in the latter stages of the war, as Kershaw notes.[35] Eley also describes how in the first six months of 1943 there were 982 convictions for treason, of which 948 ended in executions; 8,850 Germans were charged with "left wing activity," 8,727 with "resistance," and 11,075 with "opposition." A further 10,773 prisoners were charged with fraternizing with foreign workers and prisoners of war.[36] These figures tell a story that has little to do with approval or consensus.

It is true that the feared Gestapo was much smaller in number than used to be imagined and that many of its employees were engaged in office work rather than in scouring the streets for opponents of the regime. Hence, Gellately and others have argued, their repressive role has been exaggerated. Moreover, one result of this situation was that much of the information gathered by the Gestapo came from denunciations from the general public.[37] How one assesses the acts of denunciation is far from clear and is discussed later in this chapter. What has become clear, however, is that first of all the Gestapo had a massive network of informers beyond those it specifically employed in a full-time capacity and that it was far from the only agency to spy on and repress the German people between 1933 and 1945. Claire Hall has identified the existence of a network of paid Gestapo informers. These even included some Jewish informers in Berlin, and they were extremely effective in combating underground Communist resistance. In fact, in February 1937 no less a person than Reinhard Heydrich declared the work of such paid informers to be "indispensable," and as the war progressed their number seems to have increased. As Hall points out, paid informers were also used by the German Labour Front (DAF),[38] while, as Evans notes, "block wardens" reported on attitudes in the block of apartments for which they were responsible.[39]

The multiplicity of agencies of repression and of the forms of pressure that could be brought to bear on Germans should never be forgotten and is central to the critique of "consensus" arguments, for they stretched beyond the courts, prisons, camps, and executioners. In the context of massive unemployment in the early years of the Nazi regime, which in the winter of 1935/1936 still stood at 2 million, the threat of dismissal worked powerfully. Exclusion from sports clubs and leisure associations, now coordinated under Nazi governance, could be used to punish any sign of dissidence on the part of the sportsmen and women or their families, much as was the case in East Germany after 1949. And the punishment of family members did not stop there. One particular form of family, as distinct from individual, sanction—*Sippenhaft*—was exercised primary by the military and against the families of military men, although other local party agencies sometimes used it too. It punished not only the guilty individual but held his or her family liable for any misdemeanor; types of punishment included threats to employment or promotion or sometimes, in the case of the army, removal of relatives to punishment centers. According to Robert Loeffel, there are many examples of "the arrests of wives, siblings, and children and

even the murder of targeted relatives" in 1933/1934 in the cases of prominent Communists, Social Democrats, and trade union leaders. The use of the punishment of family members became common on the part of the military, especially in the case of army deserters, toward the end of the Second World War; most infamously, it was used in the punishment of participants in the July Bomb Plot of 1944. Loeffel also makes the important point that the significance of *Sippenhaft* lay not so much in the frequency of its use as in the threat of its use and the fear that it inspired, for it is the threat of violence, the fear inspired by examples of repression, that explains much about popular behavior in the Third Reich.[40] Such fear has been seen by Armin Nolzen as crucial to the history of the regime.[41] We have therefore already seen that a range of agencies—the police, the Gestapo, the army, the Labor Front—were involved in the maintenance of the Third Reich and were capable of exercising sanctions against the German people, as were the SA, the *Schutzstaffel* or SS (Hitler's private Defense Corps), and the NSDAP itself.

THE MATERIAL WORLD

In some cases the popularity of the Nazi regime is held to have been a consequence of improvements in living standards, characterized by the definitive removal of unemployment and subsequent full employment in the armaments boom of 1936, improvements in real earnings, increases in the mobility prospects of younger male and female German workers, and a new consumerist culture.[42] I have argued elsewhere that this picture is decidedly misleading.[43] Wage levels were higher than in 1932, but 1932 was a year of very low wages and short working hours. Real wage levels in the Third Reich reached those of 1929 only in 1941, and these, in turn, were little higher than those of 1913, leading to complaints even on the part of workers who had previously been unemployed. Moreover, shortages of some foodstuffs were not uncommon, especially in the winter of 1935/1936, and there was deterioration in the quality of both food and consumer goods, about which workers also complained. The Nazi regime also established an increasing number of controls over labor, including the criminalization of labor indiscipline in 1939, which even saw one worker hung for persistent absenteeism. By 1944 no fewer than 2,000 workers a month were being arrested for breaches of labor discipline.[44] Under these circumstances it is difficult to see the Third Reich as possessing a modern consumerist economy, for the products of German economic growth in these years were redistributed to profits, which rose significantly faster than wages, and to the German state rather than to private consumers. Thus the major declines in world food prices in the 1930s were never passed on to German consumers, unlike their British and American counterparts. Working-class consumption in Germany in 1937 remained lower than in 1927; no German worker ever got a *Volkswagen*;

and the benefits brought by the KdF are easily exaggerated. Most *Strength through Joy* holidays were short trips rather than the more vaunted Baltic cruises. Perhaps most important of all, only 15 percent of the beneficiaries of KdF schemes were blue-collar workers, who constituted around 1 percent of the German manual labor force.[45]

No less problematic is Aly's claim that Nazi plunder meant that Germans were spared the hardships of war, were thus "bought off" and remained loyal to the regime to the end. Kershaw's exhaustive study of the final year of the war (*The End*) shows clearly that by 1944 neither Hitler nor the regime was popular and that the NSDAP was truly hated by this time.[46] Given the fear of Russian advance, the upheavals of evacuation, the realities of bombing, and having to work ever longer hours in ever more impossible conditions, it is scarcely surprising that few Germans experienced the benefits of war in quite the way that Aly imagines. Reasons for fighting on to the bitter end lay elsewhere and are discussed later.

POPULAR OPINION

Some of the evidence for the popularity of the regime identified by historians such as Gellateley and Aly comes from a few isolated post facto opinion polls, from a mistaken underestimation of the multiple forms of control and repression, and from counterfactual assumptions—first that the absence of large-scale resistance somehow demonstrates satisfaction and second that denunciations or the act of joining the Nazi Party and its many ancillary organizations necessarily betokens support and consensus. Moreover, resorts to generalizations about the German people can be confounded by systematic use of two contemporary sources, namely the reports of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in Exile (SOPADE Reports) and even more of the Gestapo itself, which give us a much more nuanced picture. I should make it clear that I am not trying to claim that the regime was generally disliked (at least not before 1943) and I am aware that some Nazi policies were overwhelmingly popular, such as the removal of unemployment, the great foreign policy successes of 1936, which were achieved *without* resort to war, and subsequently the very rapid and relatively uncostly military victories of 1939 and 1940. However, I wish to argue that, from such undoubted popularity, generalizations cannot be made about attitudes toward other issues and at other points in time. Rather, the views of the regime held by Germans varied from time to time, place to place, group to group, and policy to policy. Furthermore there is considerable evidence to support such a position.

In this attempt to reach popular opinion, we will first follow Evans's trenchant examination of the Johnson/Reuband opinion poll conducted in the 1990s. As we have seen, Johnson and Reuband stressed the affirmative image of the regime expressed by their interviewees and that few feared arrest. Evans

points out first of all the age composition of the sample of Germans polled, most of whom were aged between five and twenty-three years in 1933 and between seventeen and thirty-five years in 1945. Moreover it is likely, given the demography of longevity, that more would have been born toward the end of the period than at its beginning. These demographics are significant given the fact that, as we have already seen, Nazi propaganda was most successful with the young, as Johnson and Reuband acknowledge. In fact, they themselves produce additional evidence of this thesis in the case of their Berlin respondents, with only 35 percent of those born between 1911 and 1916 admitting to have been "positive or mainly positive" about the regime, with comparable figures of 39 percent in Dresden and 21 percent in Cologne.[47] What these data show, to my mind, is not only generational but also regional differences, which may also have been reinforced by confessional differences in the case of Catholic Cologne. Evans takes his dissection of the Johnson/Reuband evidence further by pointing out that the attitudes of most people when confronted by a range of questions were mixed and not infrequently changed over time.[48] This more nuanced picture is congruent of what we know from SOPADE and Gestapo reports, which are remarkably similar on occasion; these have been utilized by historians such as Ian Kershaw and Jeremy Noakes; in these material differences in attitude between individuals, groups, regions, and traditions remain marked throughout. Noakes, for example, comments on the "variety and complexity of working-class attitudes to the regime." Thus in one and the same SOPADE Report from Berlin in April 1936 we have evidence of working-class solidarity in a large armaments factory *and* an absence of solidarity in a new metal plant in the Tegel district of the same city.[49] This bears out my own work on working-class identities in the Third Reich, which stresses the existence of different and often conflicting traditions within German labor before as well as after 1933. There were conflicts, for example, between a largely Marxist left in old labor strongholds like Berlin and Leipzig, and nonsocialist labor (Catholic and Nationalist in some cases and unorganized in others), with younger workers and those in new industries or new areas of industry—such as aircraft and automobile manufacture in Bremen or the Goering works in Salzgitter—who were most enthusiastic about their Nazi rulers after 1933.[50] Differences between Germans are also central to Jill Stephenson's study of rural Württemberg during Nazi rule, demonstrating the conflicts and mistrust between urban evacuees and the local farming community, while fraternization between Germans and foreign workers, especially in farming communities and against specific Nazi legislation, was far from uncommon.[51]

This picture of difference is reinforced by Kershaw's work on popular opinion in the Third Reich, which demonstrates both the chronological variations in levels of support for the regime and a range of issues that were at best divisive and at worst unpopular. Clearly divisive and provoking the ire of German Catholics were the attempts of some Nazis in the localities to attack church traditions and, for example, remove crucifixes from schools. This attack on religion produced such an outcry and threats of

civil disobedience in parts of Bavaria that central government told the local Nazis not to proceed.[52] Other material demonstrates that the regime was far from popular in Berlin in January 1936, in the context of food shortages and high prices. The local Gestapo reported "in a shockingly high percentage of the population a negative attitude to the state and the [Nazi] movement predominates." A few weeks later it was also noted that the "Heil Hitler" greeting had virtually disappeared.[53] Other points to emerge from Kershaw's path-breaking work on popular opinion are that few Germans wanted war in 1939 and that the euphoria of early and easy victories soon gave way to a desire for the war to end quickly. In the later stages of war the NSDAP was widely hated, and it was not support for Hitler or the Nazis that inspired Germans to fight to the bitter end.[54] Moreover, although it is certainly true that the massive, relentless antisemitic propaganda and persecution found considerable support among the German population, that support was far from universal, as mixed reactions to *Reichskristallnacht* demonstrated and as the deportation of Jews met with some criticism from "confessional [i.e., clerical] circles."[55]

To be fair, some of the authors criticized earlier are aware of the complexities of opinion. Gellately, for examples, recognizes that fear was a factor after "Crystal Night" and that most denunciations took place for "selfish" or "personal" reasons rather than ideological identity with the regime.[56] This point and its significance will be explored further below. Gellately also recognizes that the initial invasion of Poland was far from popular, and that grumbling about the economy persisted in 1937.[57] Johnson's *Nazi Terror* is even more nuanced. He recognizes that working-class youth gangs (the *Edelweisspiraten*) refused to conform, as did middle-class Swing Youth, with its predilection for jazz, which the regime denounced as abhorrent. The book even tells us that "Nazi Society still bristled with discontent, resentment and opposition" and that "numerous men and women from all social backgrounds told anti-Nazi jokes, spread malicious rumors, obstinately held on their religious identity, and gave succor [*sic*] to victims and opponents of the regime." Yet the author goes on to claim that "the overwhelming majority complied willingly with Nazi ideology and policy."[58] How can he know how large the share of willing collaborators was in a repressive, one-party state in which dissidence threatened life chances and in which the issue of national loyalty was made hugely complex by the fact that for half the Nazi regime's existence the German nation was at war? Is compliance always a sign of "consent?"

THE CONTEXT: SURVIVAL STRATEGIES AND ACCOMMODATION

First of all and very obviously, the fact of war meant that many Germans who did not share Nazi ideas and values nonetheless were confronted with a massive dilemma, for any opposition to the Reich's government could be construed not simply as disloyalty, dissent, or opposition but

as treason. Moreover, there is clear evidence that by 1944 Hitler and his party had lost the trust of most Germans. The reason they fought on to the most destructive end was not because they identified with the regime but to protect their lives, their families, and their homes at a time when all believed—with good reason—that a Russian victory and occupation would be brutal in the extreme. Moreover, given the atrocities perpetrated by Germans on other populations, there was no expectation of mercy. In a sense, all those (and they numbered tens of thousands, if not many more) who had a role in state and party between 1933 and 1945 realized that they had burnt their bridges.[59]

The second context of popular behavior in the Third Reich was set not so much by the numerous agencies and mechanisms of control described earlier but by the Nazification of civil society; the elimination of non-Nazi economic, social, and leisure organizations; and the destruction of civil liberties—that is, the removal of agencies that could provide a focus for collective actions and of the protection of the law. In pluralist democratic states, what guarantees freedom and the ability to act against the state or powerful agencies has been either legal protection or the protection that comes from collective organizations, from numbers. Having been deprived of both in the Third Reich, people found that their life chances and survival strategies were greatly altered. In reaction, citizens could retreat into a private existence, as did many, or embrace what opportunities there were for advancement. In this context it seems to me that the second choice can scarcely be construed as consent to the system but is much better understood as "accommodation" or a "survival strategy." To get on in life, to maximize earnings, to protect family, it might make sense to join the Nazi Party, and the rush to join the Nazi Party after January 1933 is better understood as an act of political "opportunism" than as an affirmation of political identity. The acts of denunciation served much the same purpose, for we know from detailed studies that only 25 percent of denunciations were ideologically inspired and that most sought to solve personal grievances—with neighbors, competitors, debtors and creditors, with miscreant husbands and unfaithful wives.[60] To be sure, such behavior had as its objective consequence the same result as ideological support in so far as it provided the authorities with information and helped to control the population. In this sense Nazi society coordinated itself; but I doubt it can be described as a genuine "consensus" around the regime's objectives.

Unlikely as it may seem, I am driven to this conclusion by the work I have been doing in the last ten years on slave revolt and protest in Brazil. There were innumerable slave revolts, especially after 1800; but as many, if not more, revolts failed to materialize because they were betrayed by slaves who brought news of conspiracies to their masters. Moreover, many Brazilian slaves sought in a variety of ways to satisfy their masters in order to gain skills and various life advantages, with the long-term aim of liberating themselves from their servile position. Such behavior was clearly

opportunistic; but no one would argue that it constituted consent either to their own enslavement or to the system of slavery.[61] To my mind similar arguments could be made about the attempts of individuals to improve their life chances in the Third Reich; a position not unlike that adumbrated here has recently been stated by Mary Fulbrook in her *Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorship*, in which she argues that simple dichotomies—"resistance or conformity" and "coercion or consent"—can mislead and that realities are infinitely more complex. For her, we might instead ask "how people adapted and learned to play new roles" and "how they developed the new ways of acting and speaking" required of them by "new circumstances."[62]

NOTES

1. Robert Gellately, *Backing Hitler: Consent and Coercion in Nazi Germany* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).
2. Götz Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries* (New York: Verso, 2007).
3. Eric Johnson, *The Nazi Terror* (London: John Murray, 2000).
4. Eric A. Johnson and Karl-Heinz Reuband, *What We Knew: Terror, Mass Murder and Everyday Life in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, MA: John Murray, 2005).
5. For a critical examination of this literature with specific references, see Ian Kershaw, "'Volksgemeinschaft.' Potenzial und Grenzen eines neuen Forschungskonzepts," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 59, no. 1 (2011), 1–17.
6. Dick Geary, "Working-Class Identities in the Third Reich," in Neil Gregor, ed., *Nazism, War and Genocide* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter Press, 20005), 42–55.
7. Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), vii.
8. Ian Kershaw, *The Hitler Myth* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1987); and Kershaw, *Political Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1983).
9. Gellately, *Backing*, 15–17, 136–141; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte:* IV. *Vom Beginn des ersten Weltkrieges bis zur Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2003), 614, 652.
10. The relative smallness of the Gestapo and limits on its power, together with studies of denunciation, can also be found in Reinhard Mann, *Protest und Kontrolle im Dritten Reich* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1987); and Klaus-Micael Mallmann and Gerhard Paul, "Omniscient, Omnipotent, Omnipresent? Gestapo, Society and Resistance," in David F. Crew, ed., *Nazism and German Society* (London: Routledge, 1994), 166–196.
11. Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler's Foreign Workers* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 33–39.
12. Johnson, *Terror*, 253.
13. Johnson and Reuband, *What We Knew*, 329–333.
14. Robert Gellately, "Social Outsiders and the Consolidation of Hitler's Dictatorship, 1933–1939," in Gregor, ed., *Nazism*, 56–74.
15. For references see Geary, "Working-Class Identities," 42–46.
16. Ibid., 42–55.
17. Ibid., 44–47.

18. Ibid., 50–51.
19. For references see Kershaw, "*Volksgemeinschaft*," 4–5.
20. For references see ibid., 7–9.
21. Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, passim.
22. R. J. B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy: Life under the Fascist Dictatorship, 1915–1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2006).
23. Geary, "Working-Class Identities," 54–55.
24. Mark Roseman, "National Socialism and Modernisation," in Richard Bessel, ed., *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 224.
25. Dick Geary, *Hitler and Nazism*, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2000), 39–40.
26. Richard Evans, "Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany," in *Proceedings of the British Academy* 151 (2007): 57–74.
27. Geoff Eley, "Hitler's Silent Majority? Conformity and Resistance under the Third Reich (Part Two)," *Michigan Quarterly Review* XLII, no. 3 (2003): 558–561.
28. Gellately, *Backing*, 127.
29. Gellately, *Backing*, 58, 82.
30. Geary, *Hitler*, 42–43.
31. Evans, "Coercion," 66–68.
32. Ibid., 66.
33. Ibid., 66–68.
34. Nikolas Wachsmann, *Hitler's Prisons. Legal Terror in Nazi Germany* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004).
35. Ian Kershaw, *The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany* (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 390.
36. Eley, "Silent Majority," 559.
37. See note 10 above.
38. Claire Hall, "An Army of Spies? The Gestapo Spy Network," *Journal of Contemporary History* 44, no. 2 (2009): 247–265.
39. Evans, "Coercion," 69–70.
40. Robert Loeffel, *Family Punishment in Nazi Germany: Sippenhaft, Terror, and Myth* (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2012); id., "The Sinews of the Modern Terror State: an Analysis of the Role and Importance of Family Punishment in Nazi Germany, *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 58, no. 3 (2012): 380–393; I am greatly indebted to the author for sharing a prepublication copy of this paper.
41. Armin Nolzen, "Nazi Terror Forum," Neil Gregor, ed. *German History* 29, no. 1 (2011), 92.
42. Kershaw, "Volksgemeinschaft," 3–4; Geary, "Working-Class Identities," 43–51.
43. See also Adam Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction. The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy* (New York: Viking, 2006); and id., "The Economic History of the Nazi regime," in Jane Caplan, ed., *Nazi Germany* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168–195.
44. Geary, "Working-Class Identities," 47–49.
45. Ibid.
46. Kershaw, *The End*, 389.
47. Evans, "Coercion," 72–73.
48. Ibid., 73–74.
49. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham, *Nazism 1919–45*, vol. 2: *State, Economy and Society 1933–1939* (Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, 2000), 178–179.

50. Jill Stephenson, *Hitler's Home Front. Württemberg under the Nazis* (London: Continuum, 2006), 306–308.
51. Kershaw, *Popular Opinion*, 185–223. Also Jeremy Noakes, "The Oldenburg Crucifix Struggle of November 1936," in Peter D. Stachura, ed., *The Shaping of the Nazi State* (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 210–233.
52. Ibid.
53. Kershaw, "Volksgemeinschaft," 11.
54. Kershaw, *The End*, 389.
55. To become involved in a discussion about German attitudes to the Jews would take us into realms and a literature so vast as place this issue beyond the remit of this chapter. By far the best survey of reasonably current debates can be found in Ian Kershaw, *Hitler, the Germans and the Final Solution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 119–256.
56. Gellately, *Backing*, 136–138.
57. Ibid., 71, 127
58. Johnson, *Nazi Terror*, 254.
59. Kershaw, *The End*, 389–391.
60. See note 10 above.
61. Dick Geary, "Accommodation and Resistance: Slaves in Brazil, 1780–1850," *Historia Antigua* 25 (2007): 577–594; id., "Anpassung und Widerstand: die Überlebensstrategien brasilianischer Sklaven," in Elisabeth Hermann-Otto, ed., *Sklaverei und Zwangsarbeit zwischen Akzeptanz und Widerstand*, (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Holms Verlag, 2011), 387–402.
62. Mary Fulbrook, Dissonant Lives: Generations and Violence through the German Dictatorships (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 98.

10 Peasants into Nationals

Violence, War, and the Making of Turks and Greeks, 1912–1922

Nicholas Doumanis

The ethnically defined nation was a category of fundamental significance for modern European states with totalitarian aspirations. In Mussolini's Italy as much as in Hitler's Germany, the ideal fascist man was first and foremost meant to be a pure national. In the Soviet Union, the nation was used as a means to rationalize the defunct multiethnic border regions. Thus, "Uzbeks" and "Azerbaijanis" were made of people who often had no sense of being Uzbeks or Azerbaijanis.[1] In the age of Hitler and Stalin, the objective of creating ethnically defined states was achieved largely through mass expulsions and mass killings, although such methods had already been pioneered in the late Ottoman Empire. As Donald Bloxham has pointed out, the "great unweaving" of European peoples that ended a few years after the Second World War began at least as early as the Eastern Crisis of 1875–1878, when Muslims in the Balkans and the Caucasus were forced to seek refuge within the contracting borders of the Ottoman Empire. Muslims suffered a number of ethnic cleansings and coined a term to describe the process: the *sökümü*.[2] The Christian successor states in the Balkans, which proceeded to obliterate all signs of the Ottoman legacy (mosques, Sufi shrines, graveyards), regarded such expulsions as nation-building exercises. The Ottomans retaliated in kind after the First Balkan War as the Young Turk regime sought to rid the empire of its remaining Christians.[3] Within a decade, a Turkish nation-state had emerged as a thoroughly homogenized ethnic space. Greeks and Armenians were expunged from Anatolia, and all ethnic Muslim groups were expected to subscribe fully to a Turkish ethnic profile. The Republic of Turkey essentially constituted an explicit rejection of Ottoman pluralism.

A question that historians have rarely asked about political violence of this kind is: To what extent were "peasants" really transformed into "nationals?"[4] Did Muslims as a consequence *become* Turks and Anatolian Christians *become* Greek or Armenian nationals? Did the political violence experienced in Ottoman lands between the Balkan Wars and the cessation of hostilities in Anatolia in late 1922, which was exceptional in terms of its scale and duration, secure the cultural hegemony of the nation in Turkey? What kind of nationalists did Christian and Muslim refugees become?

How thorough was the break with the multiethnic past? In other words, how complete was the transition from protonational to national?

Historians have followed closely the ascendancy of ethnic nationalism as a political project and have monitored the strategies used to recast society in culturally specific terms. But the question of popular reception—and how experiences of political violence shaped political cultures and identities at the receiving end—has attracted little attention. The presumption that appears to prevail is that Europeans had come to realize their national identities as Czechs, Germans, Italians, or Turks after having experienced total war and that they simply adopted identities as prescribed by each nation-state and its activists. However, as Pieter Judson has shown in his study of Habsburg borderlands, the transition from protonational to national was not a seamless one. Although "people had come to see themselves on one national side or another by the end of the war," the terms and extent of that identification often depended on locally contingent factors, and they "did not make the commitment with the kind of absolute finality that nationalist historians would like to imagine."[5] Total war did indeed transform nationalism into a mass phenomenon, but experiences of war and political violence varied enormously. Levels of commitment to national ideals and symbols therefore must have varied as well.

The aim here is to appraise the transformative effects of political violence, given that the use of coercive means to realize utopian dreams of national exclusivity must surely have rendered ambivalent outcomes. If, as Mark Mazower put it, "national purification lay at the heart of inter-war European politics," then how much was actual "purification" really experienced at the grass-roots level and to what degree should we countenance prenational continuities and antinational outcomes?[6] What follows, therefore, is an exercise in assessing the efficacy of the "totalizing" agendas of early-twentieth-century nationalism.

CONTEXT: ROMANS AND TURKS C. 1900–1912

The "nationalization of Europe's masses" was never as destined or ineluctable as implied by the commonplace trope "awakening." Most people, in fact, did not take to the national symbols readily.[7] Before the First World War, for example, nationalist activists operating in the Tyrol and Silesia often complained how difficult it was to convince villagers of their "true" identities as Germans, Czechs, Italians, or Slovenes.[8] The objective of these agents in the Habsburg borderlands, as elsewhere in the multiethnic empires, was to have peoples focus on their differences, and to make these differences the basis of a new political identity. However, the average Habsburg, Tsarist, or Ottoman subject already had meaningful identities that reflected status, class, language, localism, and kinship; these bespoke particular loyalties and prejudices and most commonly reflected confessional affiliations.

In Italy, religion served as an effective bulwark against the state's attempts to produce Italians. At best, ethnicity was one among many categories of practice. Furthermore, as historians of Europe's great dynastic empires have come to realize, it is of limited value as a category of analysis.[9]

The "Greeks" of the Ottoman Empire provide a case in point. In Turkish they were known as "Rum" (*Romeii* or *Romioi* in Greek), being the descendants of the conquered Romans or Byzantines, but more so by virtue of being "Greek Orthodox." In fact, throughout Ottoman history, Rum/Romios was in the first instance a religious ascription, which meant that it also applied to those who spoke Serb, Bulgarian, and Vlach as well as to Orthodox Christians who spoke Albanian, Turkish, and Arabic. The empire's "Greek" elites, including Constantinople's Phanariote class, which in the eighteenth century managed imperial finances and diplomatic affairs, were often from a variety of linguistic backgrounds.[10] By the second half of the nineteenth century, Rum identity no longer applied to Ottoman Bulgarians and Serbs but it continued to designate most other Greek Orthodox Ottomans who belonged to the *millet-i Rum* (Greek Orthodox millet), one of a series of religiously defined structures through which the Ottoman state administered its minorities.[11]

On the eve of the First Balkan War, there were as many as 2 million Rum/Romioi in an empire of roughly 20 million.[12] Just over half lived in Constantinople and Anatolia, particularly the western regions, which had experienced phenomenal urban and economic expansion in the preceding decades. Here, Rum numbers had grown significantly over the course of the nineteenth century. In Smyrna, the empire's export hub, the Romioi formed the largest single community and were prominent in most professions, services, and trades. They also constituted a strong presence in the burgeoning towns of the Aegean and Marmara littoral, the inland riverine areas, and along the recently built railway lines. Many had migrated from the Kingdom of Greece, the empire's Balkan provinces, and the Aegean Islands, with a significant proportion settling in vast areas being reclaimed for agriculture. In order to take advantage of growing foreign demand for Anatolia's raw materials, particularly grapes and silk, migrants and refugees settled in villages that were already occupied by local Muslims.[13]

According to most observers, the "Greeks" prospered most from the buoyant commercial conditions of the late nineteenth century: it was often claimed by western observers at the time that "Greek" confidence bordered on arrogance and that the "sharp-witted" Greek seemed set to wrest control of the empire from the "indolent" Turk.[14] Donald Quataert, the doyen of late Ottoman economic history, showed that the evidence did not support such commonplace western views; yet such was the economic influence of the Greeks of Smyrna that, as Philip Mansel notes, "they often behaved as if they ran Smyrna." Mansel further notes that during the annual Easter procession in Smyrna, streets were draped with Greek flags, as Romioi

"cheered for the Greek king as well as (and no doubt more than) the Ottoman sultan."[15] A more tangible measure of confidence was provided by the growth of Greek voluntary organizations, schools, philanthropic institutions, and churches, through which community leaders sought to promote Greek language, literature, and drama. It was not unusual before the Balkan Wars for Romioi to use Greek flags and Greek national dress.

Modern observers have usually mistaken this behavior as evidence of Rum disloyalty—that the flag-waving "Greeks" of Smyrna and Constantinople were yearning for national liberation. There is little evidence, however, of Rum interest in *secessionist* nationalism. The Greek kingdom certainly made no secret of the fact that its key foreign policy aim, known popularly as "The Great Idea" (*I Megali Idea*), was to "reclaim" Constantinople and Asia Minor and to rescue those Greeks still laboring under Turkish oppression. The Romioi were all too aware, however, that this was beyond the capacities of the fledgling kingdom and that Greek irredentist ventures in fact posed a grave threat to the community's welfare. The Romioi of Anatolia, who suffered reprisals with each such venture, did little to encourage secessionist politics.[16] Rather, as historians Charis Exertzoglou and Vangelis Kechriotis have demonstrated, Rum nationalism was focused on promoting the interests of the community *within* the empire and as such mirrored the kinds of nationalisms that fin de siècle Habsburg political leaders were prepared to accommodate within an overarching imperial structure.[17]

It is also worth noting that interest in Greek nationalism was restricted essentially to the wealthy and upwardly mobile. In the cities and towns of Anatolia, Rum elites saw Greek learning and language as status markers and regarded the creation and operation of Greek schools for both sexes as an important social responsibility. The second half of the nineteenth century witnessed an extraordinary efflorescence of Greek educational and cultural activities across Anatolia, where even such small Turkish-speaking Rum communities as found near Ankara and Safranbolu were financing Greek theater productions and musical bands.[18] It is not clear, however, that ordinary peasants were as interested in "Hellenism" as their social betters. Recent research has shown that in some communities near Kayseri there was some concern regarding the usefulness of Greek language teaching, especially "pure Greek" (*katharevousa*), which even Greek nationals could barely understand. Teachers complained that it was difficult to generate student interest.[19]

Many poor Romioi would later concede that they did not share the enthusiasm of their social betters for "things Greek" and that they knew very little about Greece. One Soultana Bouridou recalled that she became acquainted with "Greece" only when the Greek army occupied her homeland in 1919: "We did not know anything about 'Greeks.' Our men would bring these soldiers into our homes so we could feed them, and to wash their clothing. That is how we learned about the Greeks."[20]

INTERCOMMUNALITY

For most members of the *millet-i Rum*, Hellenism was a remote issue that had little if any bearing on their everyday existence. Rather, living as they did within a multiethnic domain, ordinary Ottomans were more concerned with crossing boundaries than with defining them. Whereas historians have until recently written of the subjects of multiethnic societies as if they were pure ethnic actors, there is growing recognition nowadays that such societies could function only through routine intercommunal engagement and accommodation. In such cosmopolitan centers as Smyrna, Beirut, and Salonica—where daily business was conducted in several vernaculars and in several scripts, and where citizens were deeply familiar with the holidays, feasts, and fasting periods of each faith—life was defined by intercommunal engagement. Although hardly a paradigm of communal harmony, the Ottoman entrepôt was a place where interaction and mutual influence was ingrained into the habitus of civic life.[21] Among the villages, where the great majority Ottoman subjects were to be found, coexistence and engagement was also the typical mode. In most parts of Ottoman Anatolia or the Balkans, village communities often featured at least two confessional groups or distinct Muslim and Christian villages were located in close proximity. In either case, communities saw fit to cooperate over a whole range of matters, from grazing rights to water access. Significantly, Muslim and Christian groups also formed composite "moral" communities, to the extent that each group extolled its respective moral norms within the context of community and that each group saw fit to extend these values to the other. In other words, Muslims and Christians found it both practical and appealing to treat each other as their own and to talk and behave as if they were one community. Long after the Christians were expelled from Anatolia, the Romioi often reflected proudly on the solidity of communal order in Anatolia and expressed their great admiration for their "own Turks" (*I diki mas i Tourki*).[22]

Intercommunality was expressed in a number of ways. At the everyday level, it involved the observance of certain boundaries, particularly sexual boundaries, in order to offset the possibility of communal tensions. It also featured the transgression of other boundaries. Individual friendships between Muslims and Christians usually involved house visits and invitations to weddings, baptisms, and circumcision celebrations. It was not unusual for friends to pay their respects by visiting each other's churches and mosques, thereby violating their own formal religious norms. It was also very common for confessional groups to attend their respective festivals and to merge certain celebrations. Western visitors were often struck by what seemed to be forms of religious syncretism, particularly in regard to the veneration of saints. Hidirellez, the most celebrated saint among Muslims throughout the empire, and St. George, the favorite of Greek Orthodox Christians, were effectively merged into a single saint whom the communities celebrated jointly.[23]

As Judson has shown in regard to mixed regions of the Habsburg Empire, nationalism within the Ottoman domain faced formidable obstacles. The nation demanded of ordinary Muslims and Christians that they reject such interactions and the deeply cherished moral norms that were embedded in practices of coexistence. Nationalism's agents expected the "slumbering" protonationals to "awaken" and forget everything that informed their sense of worth. Far from demonstrating rank ignorance, therefore, the unresponsiveness of the illiterate peasantry of Europe and the Ottoman world was perfectly rational. The values of nationalism evidently grated with those of community. Nationalism was a new creed that was utterly alien to social experience and indeed threatened social stability.

Nationalists, in turn, did understand that the mixed worlds of dynastic empires were not easily unmixed, the more so because these worlds were forged over time and thus organic. To make ethnic spaces, nationalism had to unravel these entities by having communities focus on their differences or, if that failed, to apply sustained political violence. In Ottoman Anatolia, the unraveling began in earnest in October 1912.

INTERCOMMUNALITY SUSPENDED, 1912–1914

The First Balkan War (October 1912–May 1913) was an Ottoman catastrophe. The combined military forces of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro rapidly overran the provinces of Yanya (Ioannina), Monastir, Scutari, Salonica, and Edirne, and the Greek navy seized what remained of the Ottoman Aegean archipelago. The Ottoman government had little choice but to accept Great Power arbitration and quite typically was dealt a brutal peace. The Treaty of London of May 30 produced an independent Albania and saw the rest of Ottoman Europe or "Rumelia," save for the immediate region west of the capital (Eastern Thrace), ceded to the Balkan powers. The loss of these European territories meant much more than the loss of Bosnia to Habsburg Austria in 1908 or Egypt to Britain back in 1881. "For centuries," notes Şükrü Hanioğlu, "the empire had rested on two pillars, Rumelia and Anatolia, between which nested the imperial capital."[24] The central Balkan region had always been considered an Ottoman heartland, albeit one shared with a slight Christian majority. These territories were claimed very early in the empire's history, before Mehmet II seized Constantinople (1453). However, they also happened to be populated predominantly by Orthodox Christians and as such were coveted by neighboring Christian states, each of which also claimed large parts of it as their historic right. It was no coincidence that the fathers of Turkish nationalism came from this contested region, as did much of the Young Turk leadership and Kemal Mustafa Atatürk.

The First Balkan War effectively destroyed all hope that the empire might be salvaged as a multiethnic order. The Young Turk regime, which was

returned to power after a brief sojourn, remerged as a champion of Turkish nationalism and was determined to transform Anatolia into a Turkish homeland. Not insignificant was the fact that the empire had been humiliated by former subject peoples who once belonged to the Orthodox *millet*s. For Ottoman Muslims, the First Balkan War had a strong element of betrayal about it, as attention was suddenly focused on the fidelity of Orthodox subjects still living within Ottoman territory. At the time, rumors abounded that the Ottoman war effort had been undermined by the seditious behavior of Ottoman Christian troops and that Rum money helped to bankroll the Greek army.[25] Far more important in terms of influencing popular Muslim opinion toward their Orthodox Christian neighbors, however, was the fact that the war unleashed a major refugee flow from the conquered territories. At least as many as 339,074 Muslims had been displaced as a consequence of the First Balkan War, and those who escaped to reach Anatolia brought stories of atrocities committed by Orthodox Christians.[26]

As a consequence, Anatolia's Romioi became the focus of resentment. Refugees from Rumelia and the popular press were calling for their expulsion. During the course of 1913 and particularly the months leading to the outbreak of the First World War, the Young Turk regime pursued a number of strategies to induce the flight of Romioi along the western coastal regimes. Muslim refugees were willing foot soldiers in state-approved boycotts of Rum businesses and producers, but a more direct approach came with the organization of the "Special Organization" (*Teskilat-i Mahsusa*), which consisted of armed bands that would essentially ethnically cleanse the coastal regions. The mere rumor of an impending attack by the *Teskilat-i Mahsusa* was enough to persuade many coastal communities to flee to the safety of neighboring islands. Those remaining were subjected to brutal attacks, particularly during the summer of 1914, when the empire and Greece stood on the brink of war over the Aegean islands seized by Greece during the Balkan War. Tens of thousands of Romioi fled across to the Greek- and Italian-controlled islands, while many villagers took refuge in cities like Bursa and Smyrna to escape attacks by the paramilitaries.

Needless to say, the persecutions also saw to an overall suspension in normal intercommunal activity.[27] Such important annual events as feasting on St George's Day/Hidirellez were not observed. Muslims ceased seeking "blessings" from priests, and Christians stopped visiting miracle-working Muslim shrines. Shocked by the treatment meted out to fellow Muslims from the Balkans, ordinary Anatolian Muslims now began to question whether their Rum neighbors had any right to continue living within a Muslim domain. Many complied willingly with state boycotts, although many also had to be monitored by government operatives, who punished those who failed to observe the boycotts. The Romioi ascribed much of the blame for the breakdown in intercommunal relations on Muslim refugees from Crete and the Balkans, whom they denounced as "bad Turks" and

who were the most virulent supporters of all anti-Rum measures. They were deemed to have "ruined" (*halasane*) their "own" Turks with their nationalist politics and anti-Christian hostility.[28]

WAR AND THE ANATOLIAN HOME FRONT, 1914–1922

Notwithstanding the stresses imposed in civil society by the fallout of the Balkan War, ordinary Muslims and Christians might have expected a return to some semblance of normalcy once the political tensions abated and that forms of coexistence among the multiethnic neighborhoods and villages could be resumed. Other parts of the empire had recovered from violent intercommunal ruptures in the past, as happened in Lebanon after the horrific bloodshed of 1860. In Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, anti-Christian riots flared in a number of cities during the middle decades of the nineteenth century, but each time the communities gradually returned to the older modes of engagement.[29] In an ethnography of a mixed confessional village in Lebanon that was conducted some time after the 1985 civil war, where Christians had since returned to claim their properties, anthropologist Anja Peleikis notes how the values and mutual obligations that once underscored intercommunal relations were still in place. The failure of Christians to attend the funeral of Muslim neighbors, for example, was the cause of disquiet among local Muslims. Despite unforgivable sectarian violence committed by certain members of the village, there was agreement among many members of each community that some form of amnesty on past misdeeds was needed in order to "restore the happier days."[30]

In Anatolia, however, there was no respite in the persecutions to allow a thawing in relations. By the end of October 1914 the empire was again at war, only this time the Young Turk ruling (CUP) executive, led by Enver Pasha, exploited the international wartime conditions to take punitive actions against the Armenian, Assyrian Christian, and Rum populations, because each was seen as posing a security threat. The fact that most Romioi lived in areas of strategic sensitivity served as a pretext for mass population transfers to the interior of Anatolia, although it was undoubtedly the case that the transfers were also used for culling Christian numbers. Whereas adult men were recruited into labor battalions—in which they were worked to exhaustion and suffered horrific mortality rates—women, children, and the elderly were marched for months across difficult terrain, often in extreme weather conditions and usually with little food or water.[31] The CUP authorities were particularly thorough in evacuating Romioi from the Russian front in the region of Trabzon, where most village communities were uprooted and marched through the Pontic Alps; many perished en route from disease, hunger, and exhaustion. The descendants of these Pontic communities have long since argued the case for a "Pontian" genocide.[32]

Not all Romioi were deported to the interior, however. Residents of Constantinople, Smyrna, and the larger towns were left undisturbed because of their economic significance in the war effort; in Smyrna even foreign nationals of the Entente Powers, whose soldiers were besieging Gallipoli in 1915, were encouraged to stay in the spirit of "business as usual."[33] Many Christian villages situated away from the strategically sensitive coastal areas were also permitted to stay put, although these communities became the principal victims of a general breakdown in law and order. Muslim bandit groups, known as "chette" (*çete*) bands, which were essentially composed of army deserters, roamed the countryside, robbing and extorting indiscriminately. Their chief targets were Christians, since these "infidels" were now deemed to be "enemy" peoples. "The Black Book" (*I Mavri Biblos*), a document commissioned during the war by the Patriarchate of Constantinople on living conditions of the *millet-i Rum*, showed that Christian communities lived through these war years in a constant state of terror. Published in 1919, "The Black Book" contained a litany of eyewitness accounts of mass killings, gang rapes, and looting, including stories of chette bands herding locals into churches and setting them alight or of raping the women after having slain all the males.[34] Needless to say, the Romioi also recognized the violence as being political in nature. Although the chettes were outlaws exploiting wartime conditions for material gain and sexual gratification, the absence of even a gesture of state protection confirmed that the violence was part of a general political project of Anatolia's "Turkification."

When the Ottoman government accepted an armistice in October 1918, civilians within the empire, as elsewhere in Europe, yearned for a return to some semblance of normalcy. The Romioi who had survived the forced marches and life in exile were permitted to return to their homes. Enver, Talaat Pasha and Cemal Pasha, the CUP leaders, were discredited by the defeat, thus allowing the sultanate some scope to reestablish its authority and perhaps the restoration of the traditional social order. Indeed, for a short time Christians were qualified for government assistance to rebuild their homes; most of those returning from exile in Anatolia or from Greece found that their homes had either been looted or torched or found displaced Muslims living inside. The resettlement of returning Christians was a matter dealt with by Allied authorities, who appraised conditions in every locality in order to determine the distribution of reconstruction funding.[35] In many cases the Romioi found that their Muslim neighbors had taken care of properties and salvaged belongings. Polybios Narliotis recalled that when he and his father returned in 1918 to the village of Kütsüküyü on the northern Aegean coastline, his friend Remzi Effendi had saved his father's sewing machines. Thus Narliotis senior was able to restart his business and make a living. "We will never forget the innocence and moral rectitude of the Turk," Narliotis proclaimed rather hyperbolically, by which he effectively meant that the people of Kütsüküyü had not forgotten the

values of friendship. In many cases Romioi claimed their own "Turks"—who were deemed to be very different to the bad "Turks" from the Balkans and Crete—and remained friends "through to the end" (*mehri to telos*).[36]

Throughout Anatolia, however, a great sense of unease prevailed in the immediate postwar years as the empire's future hung in the balance. The fact that its fate was being determined at the Paris Peace Conference, where there was no Ottoman representation, was cause for concern among Muslims. A punitive peace was expected, their worst fears being that Anatolia, the homeland of the Turks, might be divided up between the victorious powers. Most Muslims dreaded another phase of the *sökümü*, for once the Armenians and the Greeks were awarded vast parts of Anatolia, Muslims expected that they would be removed from these territories as well. In the meantime, Ottoman Rum and Armenians hoped that they might be placed under either Greek or Armenian rule, given their wartime experiences. Rum refugees in Greece were reluctant to return to their homes: most never did. In the distant Black Sea or Pontus region, some Rum community leaders lobbied futilely for Greek annexation, which the Greek government discouraged, whereas in regions along the Aegean littoral, the clamoring of communal elites for Greek annexation greatly antagonized local Muslims. From Gallipoli down to towns like Kaş at the southern extreme of the Aegean, Greek officials and Red Cross operatives were treated to flag-waving receptions, which local Muslims interpreted as proof of Rum treachery.[37]

Wartime experiences of persecution also explain the behavior of some Smyrniot Rum toward Muslims on May 15, 1919, when a large Greek military force was permitted by the Allies to occupy the city and its hinterland. The troops were given an ebullient reception by the large Rum community and the occasion was sullied by communal violence. A U.S. military attaché, one among numerous independent witnesses to the brutal treatment of Ottoman government officials and personnel, noted that "a regular man hunt had been organized in the side streets" as local Rum thugs used the presence of nervous Greek soldiers to settle old scores.

> Led on by all the roughs of the town, the Greek soldiers, firing recklessly to right and left at every head that protruded from window and balcony, forced open houses and stores, dragged out the wretched Turks who sought shelter therein, and, after robbing them of all they possessed, marched them to the transports, leaving the premises open to the prey of their co-religionaries, who had assisted them in this gallant task.[38]

Ottoman Muslims regarded such behavior as a foretaste of what the Greeks had in store for the rest of Anatolia. Indeed, the landing in Smyrna was pivotal in mobilizing a war-weary Muslim populace: Atatürk would later quip that it was the Greeks who awakened a population that might otherwise have gone on sleeping.[39] The Treaty of Sevrès, which was signed

on August 20, 1919, confirmed what Muslims had long been suspecting, as the Ottomans were left with just one third of Anatolia. There were to be French, British, and Italian "concessions," an international demilitarized zone that was to include Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and territories ceded to Greece and Armenia. Sevrès destroyed the credibility of the Ottoman government and boosted the stocks of the Turkish nationalists based in eastern Anatolia; it also led to resistance against the treaty's implementation. Whereas Turkish Nationalist forces initially focused their energies on securing eastern Anatolia from the Armenians, the Greek occupation, which extended to the entire northwestern region of Anatolia from mid-1920, was resisted by local militias, which were often working under the direction of the nationalists. Atrocities within the Greek occupation zone continued to be reported, among others by Arnold J. Toynbee, who, like many westerners, seemed surprised that Greeks could be as "uncivilized" as the Turks. Stories of mass killings and ethnic cleansing operations near Yalova and the ancient city of Nicaea (Iznik) convinced Toynbee that the Greeks were just as unfit as the Turks to govern mixed populations.[40]

An important study by Ryan Gingeras has demonstrated, however, that the struggles that raged behind enemy lines could not be reduced to a contest between rival national or ethnic interests. Rather, Gingeras shows that the breakdown in authority unleashed a range of preexisting social and political tensions and that the result was political fragmentation. Not all "Turks" were drawn to the nationalists; indeed, many took up arms against them. "Class and regional associations," he argues, "were often greater factors in swaying allegiances of Muslim Circassian or Albanian immigrants than the forces of nationalism and Islam."[41] He also shows that most of the violence conducted behind enemy lines was carried out by paramilitary groups, many of which were mere bandit organizations that profited from the general breakdown in order. These included Rum bands, which were usually working with Greek authorities, and bandits operating from the neighboring Greek islands.

The eventual triumph of Kemal Atatürk's nationalists over all their foreign and internal enemies, however, ensured that the history of the Turkish War of Independence would be written in terms of a simple national struggle against foreign invaders. The dominant Turkish and Greek narratives on the war, in fact, found agreement on the basic point that the war was one between rival "peoples"—of Greeks versus Turks. The gruesome climax of the Greek-Turkish War contributed to this simplification process. The trail of destruction left behind by retreating Greek troops in August and September 1922 appeared to focus Muslim minds on the Greeks as the enemy and the Romioi as their collaborators. Greek soldiers spitefully torched villages and towns and left a long trail of dead civilians in their wake. The advancing Turks did much the same in retaliation and set the Greek quarters of Smyrna alight. Although nationalists on both sides continue to dispute who was responsible for the fire, the

dominant narrative in Turkey has since had it that the fires were a form of cleansing—that the burning of Smyrna symbolized a complete break with Ottoman multiethnicity.[42]

BECOMING GREEKS AND TURKS AFTER 1922

The Nationalist victory meant that at least one Central Power emerged victorious from the war period: Kemal's forces had seen off not only the Greeks and Armenians but also the Italians, French, and British. So emphatic was the triumph that the nationalists could insist on a compulsory population exchange and justify it on the grounds that it would secure lasting peace.[43]

The nationalists also insisted, probably correctly, that the expulsion of the Romioi reflected the will of all "Turks."[44] Public hostility toward the Rum population was certainly palpable at the end of the war because of the brutalities committed against Muslim civilians during the Greek occupation and particularly owing to the trail of destruction left by the retreating Greek army. In his study of Turkish popular memory of the population exchange, Bruce Clark notes that the Rum community was linked to crimes committed at the time against the Turkish people. Those interviewed noted that Rum males did enlist with the Greek army and that they did participate in the persecutions. Muslims therefore judged that the Greek invasion was a "revelation" that exposed the true worth of the Romioi, who "sold out" their neighbors for Greek nationalism. In having collaborated with the invaders, interviewees reasoned that the Romioi had "forfeited their collective right to live in Anatolia."[45] The Romioi, in a sense, betrayed the social compact encapsulated by intercommunal relations and the values ascribed to it. As a consequence, the Muslims had no choice but to become nationals themselves.

A similar indictment of civilians has underpinned high-level international discourses on the compulsory population exchange provided for by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees, like most diplomats at the time, was horrified by the compulsory provision that the Kemalists insisted upon and which was acceded to by the Greek government; but since Lausanne the dominant viewpoint has been that the exchange was responsible for securing lasting peace. Another description of the population exchange is that it was a "humanitarian" measure.[46] According to this standard view, the population exchange finally gave the region the basis for lasting security and peaceful coexistence within the region. Minorities also finally found protection by ceasing to be "minorities." The construction of ethnically pure homelands set the foundations for domestic stability, and the removal of "unredeemed" minorities beyond the nation's border also erased the main excuse for irredentism. The implication of this line is that multiethnicity and Ottoman civilians had been the *essential source* of instability

and that the violent destruction of the empire was an inevitable function of its cultural mix. According to this logic, the children, women, and elderly people who were attacked by the chettes, marched through icy mountain regions, and made to sleep in the snow as well as the Muslims caught in the path of the retreating Greek soldiery were the ultimate cause of this international problem.

The exchange was therefore predicated on a facile notion of collective responsibility. The Turkish historian Onur Yıldırım makes the important point that friction between Greeks and Turks was historically uncommon and that the great majority of ordinary Muslims and Christians neither generated nor participated in the violence that raged between 1912 and 1922.[47] As the previous section has shown, the persecutions suffered by civilians were overwhelmingly a function of state terrorism and perpetrated by soldiers and paramilitaries. In other words, there was no "people's war" driven by ancient hatreds or struggle of neighbor against neighbor. To be sure, Anatolians recognized that the political violence might eventually entrench hatreds between the two peoples. Sir Harry Lamb of the British High Commission noted in April 1921 the extent to which the unruly behavior of troops in the Greek occupied zone had torn the social fabric:

> There is no inconsiderable risk, as an old inhabitant expressed it to me, of the present hostilities, which began as a pure political maneuver, degenerating into religious war with consequences that cannot fail to be disastrous for the country and which is all the more regrettable when one considers on what terms the two elements managed to exist together up to the commencement of the present century.[48]

Diplomats and scholars have nevertheless been as susceptible as nationalists to reducing such complex formations as societies, peoples, and cultures into legible units, externally bounded and internally coherent, and to misread their mutual encounters and confrontations.[49] For all the concern for humanitarian outcomes, their disregard for the actual experiences of the objects of humanitarian measures betrayed an extreme level of condescension. Onur Yıldırım notes the extent to which the proponents of this line, including those who would later hold up the Greek-Turkish population exchange as a "model" peace strategy in ethnically complex zones (e.g., Israel-Palestine), overlook the abject destruction wrought upon the lives of the exchanged and the fact that the people being "saved" were rarely consulted. Moreover, the provisions for compensation as provided for by the Exchange Convention that operated in the region were hardly observed by political authorities on either side of the Aegean. Indeed, many Muslim and Christian communities did not wish to be exchanged, for many of them believed that they could have a future within their mixed communities if they were allowed to stay put.[50]

Even so, the Greek-Turkish War proved a triumph for nationalism, because the victims of state terrorism and paramilitary actions did indeed prove susceptible to rereading their own experiences in ways that conformed to the nationalist line. In Bruce Clark's study, the interviewees were refugees or the progeny of refugees from Crete now living in the Aegean coastal town of Ayvalık. His study confirms a popular view in Turkey that Muslim Cretans are exceptionally patriotic Turks and that, like most citizens of the republic, they revere the figure of Atatürk and his legacy. In Greece, the displaced Romioi by and large became fully fledged Greek nationals, and they harbored a much greater animosity for Atatürk and his republic than most Greeks. As with their counterparts on the other side of the Aegean, the refugees from Anatolia and their progeny quickly became devotees of the nation-state, its symbols, and its myths. To be sure, both refugee groups were placed under considerable pressure from the state and the host society to assimilate to the national culture; as children were regularly subjected to corporal punishment for speaking their mother tongues, much as their parents were openly berated for doing the same in public. Even so, the refugees quickly recognized that they could claim a stake in the nation as each regional group reconstituted itself within the national framework. They became Smyrniote "Greeks" and Pontic "Greeks" much as Muslim refugees became Cretan or Salonikan "Turks." They reread their histories as part of the national narrative and rebadged their cultural mores as national traditions.[51] Among the panoply of "regional" groups featured in the opening procession of the Athens Olympics in 2004 were the Pontian (Black Sea) Greeks, and like other regional groups they make claims to being better or more "Greek" than other Greeks.

In other words, Muslims and Christians were indeed *nationalized* by the experience of political violence and displacement and thereby became implicated in the nation-building process. For many of these victims, the war years also confirmed that they could no longer live in a mixed society and that they were better off surrounded by their own people.[52] The cumulative effect of the political violence that traumatized the whole of Anatolia was to ensure that cultural groups which had been conditioned to see difference as normal to now see difference as destructive.

THE LIMITS OF NATION BUILDING

However, the same Muslims who expressed disappointment in their former Christian neighbors for having traded community for nation were also effectively conceding that their own recourse to nationalism was a cause for regret. Turkish nationality was not a matter of choice but a transformation that was forced on them by Greek nationalism and the failure of neighborly solidarity. Although they had become proud Turks and would not brook criticism of

their nation, Bruce Clark's interviewees could not forget what was sacrificed in becoming nationals. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Aegean, a number of ethnographic studies on Anatolian refugees have noted a similar level of disquiet regarding the nation because of the circumstances in which it was forged. The mass atrocities and expulsions—provoked by the actions of the Greek state in Balkan Wars and later through its invasion of Anatolia—inevitably prompted reflections on nationalism from a critical standpoint.

Thus the same Rum refugees who believed that their patriotism was unimpeachable could at the same time denounce "the Greeks" (among others) for having ruined their Anatolian homeland. The refugees in Greece regularly complained that they "lived well with the Turks," that the average Turk subscribed to strong ethical values, and that "our" Turks were more trustworthy than Greeks. Indeed the predominant view among the 1.2 million Romioi who were resettled in Greece was that life was better in the "fatherland." One might argue that such nostalgia for Turks and the homeland was influenced by the hostility suffered by the refugees in Greece, but the literal message of their nostalgic utterances was that the refugees preferred Ottoman rule and the Turks to Greece and their autochthonous Greek neighbors. In praising the Ottoman Empire and ordinary Turks, the refugees consciously violated some of the most sacred tropes of Greek nationalism, taking the risk of appearing unpatriotic in the process. And yet such was the anger toward the elements that ruined their homeland (Greek and Turkish states, nationalists, the Great Powers) and such was their love of their Anatolian homelands that they were not prepared to sacrifice their memories for the nation.

Rather, their nationalism was based on a compromise. In fact, all victims of the Greek-Turkish population exchange became nationals on their own terms. The totalitarian demands made upon them by the nation—that they forget their multiethnic pasts or any positive memories of that social order—was resisted in the face of considerable moral pressure. Having been displaced by the nation, they could at least insist on the right to remember their own pasts. If, as Clark claims, the Muslims from Crete continued to harbor a love for their old Christian neighbors despite the fact that they are not supposed to love Greeks or Greece, it was because they wished to stay true to their memories and the values associated with them. Similarly, the Romioi who resettled in Greece continued to describe themselves as "refugees" (*prosfiges*) long after they moved out of the shelters and reconstituted their lives. When the anthropologist Renée Hirschon interviewed former Ottoman subjects in Piraeus in the 1970s, half a century after the flight from Anatolia, they were still identifying proudly as *prosfiges*.[53]

One finds that it is often at the quotidian level that the totalizing claims of the nation-state are challenged or, at the very least, problematized. In her seminal study of the Turin working class under Fascism, Luisa Passerini demonstrated the unique importance of ethnography for appraising Mussolini's totalitarian claims at the level where these claims were meant

to have their most far-reaching effect. Her study of social memory and the subjective responses of ordinary individuals revealed that these effects were complicated: that worker's experiences certainly could not be understood through a "resistance-collaboration" frame and that some aspects of Fascism did resonate with a community that was otherwise politically opposed to it.[54] Elsewhere in Europe, the nation has proven far more successful than the avowedly totalitarian creeds in transforming the self and creating primary political identities. Even so, its claims have always been challenged by competing primary values (family, regional, confessional, sexual) and, as this chapter has sought to show, by memories of the political violence that went into the making of these nations.

NOTES

1. Jörg Baberowski and Anselm Doering-Manteuffel, "The Quest for Order and the Pursuit of Terror: National Socialist Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union as Multi-Ethnic Empires," in Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 206.
2. Donald Bloxham, "The Great Unweaving: The Removal of Peoples in Europe, 1875–1949," in Richard Bessel and Claudia B. Haak, eds., *Removing Peoples: Forced Removal in the Modern World* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 178; Kemal Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3 (1972), 272.
3. Caglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire," in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen, eds., *After Empire: Multi-Ethnic States and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires* (Boulder CO: Westview, 1997), 41.
4. Cf. Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen; The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1979).
5. Pieter Judson, *Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 229.
6. Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Lane, 1998), 41.
7. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 195; cf. George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses* (Ithaca, NY: H. Fertig, 1975).
8. Judson, *Guardians of the Nation*.
9. On the distinction of categories of practice and analysis, see Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, "Identity," reprinted in Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005), 62–63.
10. Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2011).
11. Karen Barkey, *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 116.
12. Population figures given by experts are rough approximations and can vary dramatically, but see also Donald Quataert, "The Age of Reforms, 1812–1914," in Suraiya Faroqhi, Bruce McGowan, Donald Quataert, and Şevket

Pamuk, eds., *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire*, vol.2, *1600–1914* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 779.

13. For the most thorough account of the Greeks in late Ottoman Anatolia, see Sia Anagnostopoulou, *Mikra Asia, 19ai os- -1919: I Ellinorthodoxes koinotites apo to Millet ton Romion sto Elliniko Ethnos* (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1997).
14. William Ramsay Mitchell, *The Intermixture of Races in Asia Minor: Some of Its Causes and Effects* (London: British Academy, 1917), 32.
15. Philip Mansel, *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean* (London: John Murray, 2010), 171.
16. Before 1912, most Greek military ventures against the Ottoman state were disastrous and required intervention from the Great Powers to prevent punitive Ottoman retaliation. Each setback meant reprisals against the Romioi. In 1821, the uprising in the Peloponnese was meant to synchronize with a rebellion in the imperial capital. Although the Romioi in Constantinople had no intention of taking on the Ottoman Empire, they nevertheless paid dearly for the actions of the rebels in the remote and Greek-dominated Peloponnese.
17. Charis Exertzoglou, *Ethniki Taftotita stin Kostantinoupoli to 19 Aiona: O Ellinikos Filologikos Syllogos Kostantinonoupoleos*, *1861–1912* (Athens: Nefeli, 1996); Vangelis Kechriotis, "Greek-Orthodox, Ottoman Greeks or Just Greeks? Theories of Coexistence in the Aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution," *Etudes Balkaniques* 1 (2005): 51–72 .
18. Kiraiki Mamoni and Lida Istikopoulou, *Somateiaki Organosi tou Ellinismou sti Mikra Asia* (1861–1922) (Athens: Estia, 2006), 50–53.
19. Nicholas Doumanis, *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence in the Ottoman Empire and Its Destruction* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).
20. Soultana Bouridou (Bithynia, Karete), Oral History Archive, Centre for Asia Minor Studies (Athens).
21. See Marie-Carmen Smyrnelis, *Une Societe Hors de Soi: Identites et Relations Sociales a Smyrne Aux XVIII et XIX Siecles* (Paris: Peeters, 2005); and Mansel, *Levant*.
22. See Doumanis, *Before the Nation*.
23. see Doumanis *Before the Nation*, chapter 3; but also Maria Courcouli, "Saint George the Anatolian, Master of Frontiers," in Dionigi Albera and Maria Couroucli, eds., *Sharing Sacred Spaces: Christians, Muslims, and Jews at Shrines and Sanctuaries* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012).
24. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 173.
25. Fikret Adanir, "Non-Muslims and the Ottoman Army in the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912–1913," in Ronald G. Suny, Fatma Müge Göçek, and Norman Naimark, eds., *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 113–125.
26. Hilmar Kaiser, "Genocide at the Twilight of the Ottoman Empire," in Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses, eds., *The Oxford Handbook for Genocide* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 369.
27. Interview transcripts of Demosthenes Axiotis (Bithynia, Smavlo); Aggeliki Kapanou (Bithynia, Bursa); Charilaos Tsairis (Mysia, Narli); Oral History Archive, Centre for Asia Minor Studies (Athens).
28. Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, 136–142
29. On sectarian conflict see Bruce Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), chapter 5.

30. Anje Peleikis, "The Making and Unmaking of Memories: The Case of a Multi-Confessional Village in Lebanon," in Ussama Makdisi and Paul A. Silverstein, eds., *Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 145.
31. Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, 154.
32. Konstantinos Fotiadis, "The Pontian Genocide. From the Time of the Young Turks to the Advent of Mustafa Kemal," *AHIF Policy Journal* (Winter 2011–2012). Available at: http://ahifworld.org/pdf/vol3winter2011–12/06.pdf
33. Mansel, *Levant*, 198.
34. *I Mavri Biblos, I Martiries ton Thymaton, pou den dimosiefthikan pote* (Istanbul: Ecumenical Patriarchate, 1919).
35. Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, 158.
36. Interview transcripts of Polybios Narliotis (Mysia, Kütsüküyü); Stavros Muratidis, Stavros Houlidis and Sofia Paschalidou (Bithynia, Karavalet); Alexandros Iosifidis (Bithynia, Kirezli); Giorgos Moisidis (Bithynia, Espe), Oral History Archive, Centre for Asia Minor Studies (Athens).
37. Doumanis, *Before the Nation*, 159
38. Public Records Office, Foreign Office 406/41, M.A. van der Zee to United States Senior Naval Officer, Constantinople, May 20, 1919.
39. Andrew Mango, *Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey* (New York: Overlook, 1999), 217.
40. Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations* (London: Constable, 1922).
41. Ryan Gingeras, *Sorrowful Shores: Violence, Ethnicity, and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1912–1923* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 168.
42. Leyla Neyzi, "Remembering Smyrna/Izmir: Shared History, Shared Trauma," *History & Memory* 201, no. 2 (2008): 106–127.
43. Fikret Adanir and Hilmar Kaiser, "Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building: The Case of the Ottoman Empire," in Rene Leboutte, ed., *Migrations and Migrants in Historical Perspective: Permanences and Innovations* (Brussels: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 281–282.
44. Adanir and Kaiser, "Migration, Deportation, and Nation-Building," 284.
45. Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: How Mass Expulsion Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (London: Granta, 2006), 37.
46. Onur Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement: Reconsidering the Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations, 1922–1934* (London: Routledge, 2006), 10.
47. Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, 15.
48. Public Records Office, Foreign Office, 286/761 April15, 1921.
49. Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 7.
50. Yıldırım, *Diplomacy and Displacement*, 123.
51. Renée Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 1998).
52. Clark, *Twice a Stranger*, 37.
53. Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe*, 4.
54. Luisa Passerini, *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Experience of the Turin Working Class* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

11 Learning from the Enemy?
Entangling Histories of the German-Soviet War, 1941–1945[1]

Mark Edele

I

History as we know it is a child of nationalism. Conceived as part of the attempt to forge ethnically and culturally homogenous populations as the basis of the modern state, the profession has been carved up geographically, linguistically, and ethnically.[2] Time and again, however, historians have tried to extricate themselves from the grip of the nation-state, be it through "world," "universal," or "comparative" history or even the history of civilizations. The most recent attempt at deliverance from the despotism of the nation is variously called "transnational," "cross-national," "transfer," or "entangled" history. It tries to chart the ways in which objects, people, and ideas traveled between nations in order to explain common trajectories beyond now unfashionable functionalism and similarly old-fashioned modernization theory, to say nothing of structural comparison.[3]

War is ideally suited to explore "entanglement." In its very essence, wrote Carl von Clausewitz, war is an interaction with a tendency to escalation fueled by both sides. You overcome the enemy by using greater force; the enemy tries to do the same and, unless politics intervenes, extreme and unfettered violence must be the inevitable result.[4] The Soviet-German war—the most destructive war in human memory—provides a particularly fertile field in considering this reciprocal and entangled relationship of violence. Indeed, from its very start, both sides envisaged the conflict as one where their own brutality was just an effect of the encounter with the barbaric other. Historians following this approach quickly fell into what has been termed a "victimization trap."[5]

The methodological problems of such a history go further. The conundrum is not that the Soviet Union was no "nation-state" in the strict sense of the word but rather a multinational empire, although the complexity of the Soviet Union's national setup points to a central question: Who or what are the entities which are potentially "entangled"? One could, of course, focus on the dictators themselves, but to restrict analysis to the (not so) great men would be flattening out the possibilities of a transnational history of war.[6] Instead, we move outward toward the two regimes, only to

encounter the problem of establishing the unit of analysis again. As decades of research have shown, Hitler's state was far from monolithic but riddled with conflict and contradictions, overlapping jurisdictions, and difficulties of communication, all of which combined to encourage local initiative.[7] Whereas Stalin's own dictatorship was somewhat less chaotically constituted, here, too, we can see divergence between, say, the dictator's and the military's announcements on how to fight the war. Such dissonances can be followed all the way down to frontline troops doing one thing while their commanders order another. Policy was implemented through more or less unclear signals that had to be interpreted further down the hierarchy.[8]

As a result, in considering the interaction between "the Wehrmacht" and "the Red Army," who or what are we actually talking about? Do we mean the entanglement between the totality of the 10 million or so Germans who served in the Soviet Union at one point or other in this war with the 36 million men and women of the opposing war machine?[9] As neither fighting force was homogenous—either in terms of personnel, political outlook, mechanization, or professionalism[10]—and given that encounters were always structured by local circumstance, no single story line is likely to emerge even if we ignore the complications introduced by the many unaligned irregulars who tried to fight their own war relatively independent from the main contenders.[11] This complexity can throw us back, again, to the overall organizations, represented by their top-level decision makers, but it can also open the way for multiple histories of interaction: different levels, different people, and different organizations had different "encounters" and thus learned different lessons from different instantiations of "the enemy." Who or what interacted with "the other" in each particular case, therefore, is an empirical as well as a conceptual question of some importance.

Second, an analytical focus on interaction runs the risk of mistaking long-term developments for short-term processes. How can we disentangle preconceptions, plans, and expectations from actual experience with the enemy? Historians might decide to focus on either side of this equation, but, as Christian Hartmann has stressed for the respective ways of war, longer-term traditions structured what could be learned and how.[12] This dialectic between longer-term histories and short-term encounters holds for entities other than the regimes and their armies: individual people, too, had their own horizon of expectation, which determined how they reacted to the space of experience in which they found themselves.[13]

II

In this war, then, the first glance often leads astray. There are many instances where one side seemingly learned from the other; closer examination, however, finds that the observation and experience of enemy action often merely

actualized already extant ideas or practices. Operational warfare is a case in point. One might imagine that the Soviets learned blitzkrieg from the Germans by studying what the aggressor did, imitating and adapting it to Soviet circumstances. The Germans, after all, invaded with a sophisticated practice of combined arms movement, quickly breaking through the Soviet defenses; the Soviets eventually recovered from the rout of the war's first phase, restructured their army, and struck back with their own operations, which, although named differently ("deep battle"), were similar to the German equivalent.[14] If we begin the story in 1941, therefore, the entanglement seems obvious: the Soviets learned from their enemy. German military men certainly perceived the improvements in Red Army performance in these terms,[15] but we should not take the Wehrmacht officers' words as historical wisdom. Soviet commanders already knew, in principle and very early in the war, how to counter German maneuver warfare by movement of their own.[16] And they had not just learned on the fly, although observation of what the Germans did certainly helped. Theories of combined arms mobile warfare did not develop in the short period since 1941 but had been the bedrock of Soviet operational thought since the late 1920s. Their further development was interrupted in the mid-1930s because of the experience of the Spanish civil war and the bloodbath of the Great Purges. The German example since 1939 and the experience of actual fighting from 1941 did not inspire the idea but further removed the blockage to its implementation, which the Soviets had already begun to dislodge when the storm broke. The Red Army certainly learned a lot by doing, but it learned in the context of a genuine Soviet military tradition.[17]

Insofar as there was a transfer of ideas, much of it happened earlier, during the time of secret military cooperation in the 1920s and early 1930s. Particularly during the early phase of this strange history, the Soviets were more ready to emulate German organization and tactics than their counterparts, who were nonetheless impressed with the potential of the Soviet state to organize society for total war. "We, too, can learn from the Red Army," wrote Major-General Werner von Blomberg in 1928 about the attractions of dictatorship. Summarizing his impressions from a month in the Soviet Union, he particularly stressed close links between the army and the population, the easy access of the military to scarce resources, and the widespread paramilitary training of civilians.[18] This perception of the Soviet Union as a well-organized warfare state might well have helped, as Manfred Zeidler has argued, in the later Nazification of officers like von Blomberg. At the same time, however, the *Reichswehr* officers often thought that they were the origin of much that was good in Red Army performance on a technical and doctrinal level. However, the German example was not the only foreign model the Soviets adapted to their own circumstances. The development of "deep operations" owed as much, probably more, to British theorists (who were also read in Germany) than to the *Reichswehr* example.[19] "Entanglements," then, there certainly were, but they played themselves

out in much more complex ways than is sometimes assumed. Rather than a simple transmission of ideas from one organization to the other—be it the Soviets copying the Germans or the latter plagiarizing the innovations of Mikhail Tukhachevskii—the most convincing archival investigation has found parallel evolution within the context of an international transformation of military ideas.[20]

Scorched earth tactics is another example of how the first glance can be misleading in terms of the deeper logic of events. The sequence in 1941 and after might suggest that the Germans learned from the Bolsheviks. First came a Soviet retreat, which tried to leave nothing to the enemy—"we destroy everything left behind, even warehouses full of valuables, even the crops, while the populace simply looks on."[21] The goal was, in Stalin's words, to "create unbearable conditions for the enemy."[22] Then came the reversal of the process once the Red Army advanced and the Germans retreated: "On our way back," reported one participant, "we set fire to the villages we came through and blew up the ovens. Desolation (*Verödung*) had been ordered, so the pursuers would not find shelter. . . . Women cried, children were freezing and curses followed us. We soon no longer cared and when we finally got cigarettes, we lit them on the burning houses."[23] Soon, the Wehrmacht systematized and perfected this tactic, which it would use extensively in retreats to come.[24] Comparing German and Soviet behavior, one might conclude that the former had copied the latter: "The wind sowed by the Soviets in their scorched-earth policy of 1941," noted a landmark study, "was reaping a German whirlwind," in particular from 1943.[25] German intelligence officers provided detailed descriptions of these Soviet tactics, which functioned both as information about enemy behavior and as detailed how-to guides.[26] Nevertheless, this adaptation has to be set into a broader history as well. German military planners had long envisioned, to quote Michael Geyer, "a most brutal kind of warfare that knew no rules and employed . . . a mixture of terrorism and scorched-earth tactics combined with conventional operations."[27] These plans were based on actual experience: German troops had already employed similar tactics in 1917—on the Western Front![28]

A similar process can be observed on the Soviet side. When Stalin announced in November 1941 that he accepted war on German terms ("If the Germans want a war of extermination, they will get it")[29] and when he declared, in his famous order No. 227 of July 28, 1942, that the Red Army should copy the German institutions of penal battalions and blocking detachments, he seemed to have been radicalized by enemy example.[30] If we widen our horizon beyond this immediate encounter, however, we see why he could seize upon these examples so readily. Stalin's expectations about war, like those of most in his entourage and still many in the officer corps, were deeply influenced by the savage fighting of 1918–1921, the Russian Civil War. This had been a war without mercy, to use John Dower's words, and the unleashing of totalitarian war from 1941 onward was in

part a reenactment of that original conflict. Blocking detachments, penal battalions, and the use of unrestrained force were part of the repertoire of Soviet war making, not just reactions to German brutality. The latter activated this behavioral pattern rather than creating it.[31]

As in the case of operational art, then, the history of the tactics of totalitarian war must span beyond the confines of the war itself. Again, if there was an entanglement between the two sides, it was of much longer standing: the potential interaction was not between Nazis and Soviets but between their respective predecessors. During its 1915 retreat, the Tsarist army, remembering how Napoleon had been stopped in 1812 and perhaps also drawing on experience gained during the Caucasus campaigns of the nineteenth century, used scorched earth extensively in an attempt to slow down the advancing German Imperial Army.[32] Might this encounter, together with colonial experience, have constituted part of the origin of *Reichswehr* ideas about this technique?[33] Wehrmacht officers certainly remembered Russian behavior during the earlier war, particularly in trying to calm their own consciences about their treatment of the civilian population: On June 11, 1941, leading cadres of Panzer Group 3 were briefed on their expected conduct in the East. "The harshness of war," as the chief intelligence officer summarized the instructions, "requires harsh punishment (remember the [First] World War: The Russian in Gumbinnen: all villagers along the line Tilsit-Insterburg to be shot if the line is damaged)."[34] Past Russian reprisals hence became the model for the future German equivalent.

Again, however, the transfer was less clear cut than it appeared. What had happened in Gumbinnen had quickly become part of an expansive atrocity discourse during World War I—an imaginary and imagined war more frightening than wartime reality. The officer quoted above surely remembered this myth rather than the actual experience of earlier Russian outrages. Moreover, well before any enemy action could have radicalized it, the German army of 1914 committed war crimes against civilians in Belgium, France, and Russia. Motivated by what in a later conflict would be called "guerilla psychosis," German troops deported or executed civilians, used them as human shields, destroyed their homes, and even sacked their cities—all as "reprisals" against mostly imaginary irregular warfare.[35]

The rise of antisemitism in Soviet society during and after the war of 1941–1945 provides another case study of a potential history of wartime transfers. Nazi ideology seems to have seeped into Soviet society, making anti-Jewish violence and eventually anti-Jewish policies (disguised as a struggle with "rootless cosmopolitanism") a central feature of late Stalinism.[36] This interpretation, as popular as it was with German officers interested in the effectiveness of their propaganda across the line,[37] obscures the long history of violent antisemitism in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. We might remind ourselves that some of the most infamous pogroms of the nineteenth century happened here in the 1880s; that worker strikes at the turn of the century often slipped into anti-Jewish violence;

that, as Omer Bartov shows in his contribution to this volume, the Tsarist troops committed gruesome atrocities against Jews in Galicia in World War I; that grotesquely violent killings of Jews were run of the mill during the Civil War of 1918–1921; that, in the 1920s, the victorious Bolsheviks were seen by many ordinary Soviets as "Jewish" and thus alien when anti-religious campaigners were accosted with cries of "beat the *zhidy*"; that resistance to forced collectivization and dekulakization in the early 1930s was often couched in anti-Jewish slogans; that during the Great Terror people were executed for spreading the rumor that the *zhidy* were in power; or that in 1941 some could exclaim: "Good, the war's begun—they'll kill the Jews."[38] Doubtless such feelings were reactivated and refueled by wartime interaction with the Nazis; doubtless, too, the easier admission to the Communist Party at the frontline, which opened the gates to "ideologically unprepared" combat veterans, helped these sentiments further to penetrate from the outskirts of the political system to its center. Nevertheless, they were not completely new either inside or outside the political establishment, nor were they exclusively of German origin.[39]

Not everything happening in the context of war, then, had its origin in the war itself and can thus be explained or comprehended by the method of transnational history. In some cases, indeed, the hope of finding the origin of a violent phenomenon in its immediate environment is dangerously misleading, as the most infamous aspect of the war in the "East" shows. Crucial stages of the gestation of the systematic murder of Europe's Jews took place within the war of extermination against the Soviet Union. The war, however, did not "cause" the Holocaust: the general policy had already been set by the start of Operation Barbarossa, and *Einsatzgruppen*, supplemented by police units, began shooting Jews from the first days of the war. With some variation in the details between squads, these mass operations focused first on men of military age (17 to 45) and then widened to include men of reproductive age (16 to 65). In late July and August 1941, now reinforced by SS Brigades, the killers further radicalized the practice, shooting women and children as well. By September, the murder units reported that whole regions were *judenfrei*. This radicalization was driven by the dynamics at work within the Nazi political system. It was not a "reaction" to anything experienced in "the East," even if Soviet war crimes were instrumentalized to legitimize the slaughter.[40]

It is clear, then, that a history of the German-Soviet war cannot start in 1941, as if all the atrocity unfolded as a result of wartime brutalization. On the German side, the genealogy of this violence has to reach back to the *Kaiserreich*, where *völkisch* thought and the idea of Lebensraum emerged; to the 1870–1871 war, the origin of the German army's hysteria with partisans; to the German colonial experience, where elements of totalitarian warfare were first tried out; to World War I, when the collective psychosis about irregulars led to war crimes under the legalistic cover of "reprisals," when ethnic cleansing of the territories conquered in the East was seriously

considered, ethnic warfare and scorched earth tactics trialed again, and the terrible vision of the Bolshevik menace fused with the preexisting racist antisemitism; and to the *Reichswehr's* war games and war plans, which attempted to synthesize irregular and operational warfare.[41] Finally, this history must encompass Nazi planning for this war and for the larger project of "solving the Jewish question." The Soviet genealogy might reach back to 1812 and the Caucasus wars of the nineteenth century but more obviously to the beginning of the Russian age of violence in 1904–1906, which extended all the way down to 1921; state brutality was re–affirmed during forced collectivization (from 1929), and the mass operations of the Great Terror (1937–1938) provided the model for the Katyn massacres of 1940, as well as the more panicked mass shootings in 1941.[42]

III

Many on both sides, then, needed no mutual reinforcement in justifying the behavior that would characterize the conflict: *Einsatzgruppen* on the German side or state security troops among the Soviets, but also ideologically motivated individuals within each army were ready for this war—hence the immediate descent into barbarization in 1941. Others reenacted practices they remembered from the first age of violence of 1904–1921.[43] Nevertheless these were minorities within armies of millions. In order to widen the circle of participants in such totalitarian warfare, the encounter with what the enemy did and the explanations offered by their agitators (in the Soviet case) and officers (in the German case) were crucial for the process which made the Wehrmacht Hitler's and the Red Army Stalin's military.[44]

Consider the vexed question of the impact on the Wehrmacht of the encounter with the barbarity of Stalin's regime. The German version of events was that the Wehrmacht marched into Soviet-held territory, found mountains of corpses in prisons, mutilated bodies at the side of the road, and mass graves in the forest of Katyn; these relics demonstrated the monstrous inhumanity of the "Jewish Bolsheviks" and led to "reprisals," usually against the local Jewish population.[45] The corpses and the graves were real enough, but the link to "the Jews" was neither real nor obvious.[46] Nor was the unceremonious execution of "Jews," "commissars," and "other radical elements" an unplanned, emotional, or spontaneous reaction to the encounter with the real atrocities of the opposing side. Their murder was premeditated.[47]

However, once we stop talking about "the Germans" and think of a plurality of Germans instead, the encounter with the brutality of the Soviet retreat, and—equally importantly—the propaganda about these atrocities, become more central.[48] That the army and the Ministry of Propaganda "made immediate use of the executions of alleged political enemies of the Soviet Union" suggests that the authorities assumed that many in the Wehrmacht still needed convincing.[49] If so, they did not have to worry too

much: the Soviet propaganda of the deed was rather persuasive, and the news of it spread faster by word of mouth than through the more clumsy official media. The real encounter with Soviet brutality, while not *creating* the idea of the war of extermination or *causing* the Holocaust, ensured that many more participated in the widespread lawlessness or stood aside and watched than might have otherwise been the case. Indeed, German officers used every instance of Red Army barbarism to radicalize their own troops.[50] Their efforts were flanked by a propaganda apparatus, which had perfected the technique, already trialed in Poland in 1939,[51] to pick up on real crimes, interpret and exaggerate them to conform to Nazi visions of the enemy, and distribute this poisonous concoction to the troops.[52]

Likewise, the vast majority of Red Army soldiers were not initially ready for this war, despite the militarization and ideologization of much of Soviet life in the interwar years.[53] They, too, were subject to a complex dialectic of propaganda, reports from witnesses who had escaped the enemy, rumor further disseminating the horror of what was happening in occupied territory, to say nothing of personal experience. Propaganda messages were embedded in a wider field of both first- and secondhand knowledge.[54] Like their German counterparts, Soviet frontline agitators drew not only on atrocities reported in the media to radicalize their own troops but consciously and systematically employed examples "which the soldiers know from their own experience," as a 1941 guideline put it.[55]

It is on the level of the broad mass of German and Soviet soldiers, then, where the linear narratives of brutalization—whether told as histories of entanglements or not—make most sense. However, they are also incomplete, as they assume that barbarization was a cumulative process—once brutalized, always brutalized. Such a view of the escalation of violence makes the widespread return to a nonviolent civilian life after 1945 perplexing. True, there were examples of brutalized individuals, such as the German who, when asked for the time during a furlough from the front, ripped out his sidearm and stabbed the "provocateur" in the throat.[56] True, too, there were, in the Soviet case, instances of violent conduct, rape and murder, or riots of soldiers after the war was over, both in the occupied territories and at home. But, by and large, once demobilized, former soldiers did not persist in the barbarity many of them had practiced while still in formation, uniform, and on enemy territory. Indeed, much of the violence in postwar Soviet society was perpetrated by minors, who had been too young to fight.[57] Traumatized or not, most soldiers were able to turn their "brutalization" off once the conditions for its emergence were gone. Hence we need to consider context: encounters with enemy atrocity played a role in radicalizing individuals and groups at least for a time, which drew them into the inner circles of barbarity and made atrocity propaganda meaningful. These same people and groups, however, could also slip out of such patterns again, either because their rage subsided, or because circumstances changed. Brutalization was not necessarily linear but came in

waves of escalation, deescalation, and reescalation on both the micro and the macro levels.[58]

IV

Indeed, the effects of the interaction between the two sides sometimes resulted in the opposite of what one might expect a priori. A particularly complex case is that of partisan warfare.[59] The Germans claimed from the outset that they were confronting an inhuman enemy who was not playing by the rules and that, therefore, they had to take off the gloves themselves. This narrative might not sound unlikely, given the Soviet history of violence and Stalin's public demand that partisan warfare be unleashed at all costs. Both common sense and high theory (i.e., von Clausewitz) suggest that, once started, an escalating spiral of violence and counterviolence would brutalize both sides. The fact of the matter is, however, that the Germans conducted most brutal antipartisan operations from the very start, whether there were guerrillas or not. The Soviets provided nothing more than an alibi. As early as July 16, 1941, Hitler had seized upon the Soviet order to unleash partisan warfare as advantageous: "it gives us the possibility," he told his henchmen, "to exterminate what stands against us."[60] Ideological zeal combined with military considerations. As the chief of the Wehrmacht's High Command, Wilhelm Keitel, pointed out a week later, the Germans could never get enough boots on the ground to secure the conquered territories. The only way to govern, therefore, was meeting resistance "not by legal punishment of the guilty, but by striking such terror into the population that it loses all will to resist."[61] The victims of such "pacifications" were largely civilians, often Jews, who were "exterminated as partisans," as Himmler's notation of December 18, 1941 put it.[62]

Such "operations" helped engender an actual partisan threat: given the choice to not fight and die or fight and maybe survive, more were likely to choose the latter.[63] The growing partisan movement, however, had a curious effect: rather than further radicalizing German war making, it provided some officers with ammunition to argue for a more measured modus operandi. Subsequently the violence decreased, making way, in early 1942, for a more nuanced strategy, which not only tried to kill the guerillas and their supporters but also attempted to win the hearts and minds of the rest of the population. [64] This approach eventually influenced central policy. Even as, in the summer of 1942, the violence was ratcheted up again, some of the earlier concerns could still be heard. Hitler's Directive No. 46, entitled "Instructions for intensified action against banditry in the East" of August 18, 1942, combined "rapid, drastic, and active operations" to exterminate the irregulars with "propaganda, economic, and political measures" to ensure "the *co-operation of the local population*", now said to be "indispensable."[65] Only once it became clear that the Red Army would retake the

partisan territories—which made "hearts and minds" measures meaningless—did the occupiers return to blanket terror and scorched earth, creating "dead zones" in 1943.[66]

The adjustment of warfare against civilians was not the only deescalation of German policies prompted by experience with the counterproductive results of the original brutality.[67] In 1942, prisoner-of-war policies were recalibrated to allow exploitation the captives' labor first, rather than condemning them to death at the moment of capture. At the same time the growing number of officers who had argued against the Commissar Order (June 6, 1941) ever since the late summer of the first year of the war against the Soviet Union got their way too: On May 6, 1942, Hitler, who hitherto had strictly opposed any compromise in this area, suspended, "as a trial," the order to shoot captured political officers, and he never reinstated it. The argument was, again, that this policy was counterproductive: rather than disintegrating the Red Army, as intended, the execution of political workers, functionaries, and Jews seemed to strengthen the resolve of the adversary. Such reasoning could now be heard because the original strategy of Barbarossa as blitzkrieg had clearly failed and a long-term struggle was on the horizon, a war that required somewhat different tactics.[68]

These considerations, however, did not apply to the expanding Holocaust, a hard-line policy not open to renegotiation. By the spring of 1942, the killing of Jews had been divorced not only from "pacification" operations but also from the killing of Bolshevik functionaries and "commissars." Thus, at exactly the time the Wehrmacht recalibrated its policies toward civilians and prisoners of war alike, the murder of Jews in the occupied regions escalated: between May and the summer of 1942, the Nazis murdered all remaining Soviet Jews within their reach.[69]

V

Whereas German war crimes were ultimately caused by a mixture of ideological war aims and military utilitarianism, the Soviet leaders' relationship to war crimes was tactical through and through. Both civilian politicians and the Red Army command attempted to adjust their troops' level of atrocity in accordance with experience, which led to several moments of radicalization, deescalation, and reescalation. These shifts were never implemented perfectly, but they did have a strong signaling function channeling behavior on the ground without ever determining it. The standard accounts of Red Army barbarity are somewhat misleading here, as they focus on 1945 and on a process of linear, piecemeal brutalization in reaction to German atrocity exacerbated by a shrill hate propaganda.[70] The problem with this account lies in 1941, when war crimes occurred, which cannot be understood as a reaction to German conduct. The killing of prison inmates, which stood in the tradition of the mass operations of the Great Purges and

had the same goal (i.e., the elimination of potential enemy collaborators); the wild or cold-blooded shooting of captives, either before or after interrogation; the expressions of hatred against the enemy from the very outset—none of these can be made sense of with reference to what the Nazis did once they took over Soviet territory. Their genealogy is rooted in a longer time frame and must be found in Soviet, not German history; they were, in Amir Weiner's words, the result of "integral brutality unleashed."[71]

If expedient, however, the leash could be put back on, or at least the collar tightened, to signal a change of policy. It soon became clear that, rather than terrorizing the Wehrmacht into submission, the conformity of the Red Army's behavior with the picture painted by Nazi propaganda strengthened German resolve.[72] In reaction, the authorities tried, from the very start of the war, to rein in the wild shooting of prisoners, which was repeatedly and explicitly prohibited by senior commanders.[73] In late February 1942, Stalin himself backed this policy by declaring publicly that the "Red Army captures German soldiers and officers and saves their lives if they surrender."[74] While ambiguities remained and wild executions continued throughout the war, they became less frequent as a result of the changed signals from above.[75] From now on, hate propaganda attempted to channel the killing to the battlefield: captives could be hated but they should not be killed.[76] Reescalation was pursued again, however, once the Red Army reached the borders of the prewar Soviet Union and began to march onto foreign territory, to be ratcheted up even more once German soil was within reach. Revenge seemed the best way to motivate the war-weary troops to continue fighting, and it picked up on a strong groundswell of accumulated hatred and anger, now also directed against civilians.[77]

However, even this renewed escalation was not the end of the cycle. Soon, the encounter with German reactions to Soviet words and deeds prompted another change of course: German resistance stiffened and panicked groups of refugees clogged the roads. Hatred might fuel the fighting spirit of the soldier, but it also undermined discipline. As a high-level political officer complained to his peers on February 6: "First he rapes a German, and then he rapes also a Pole. A senior officer orders him to stop, and he shoots the officer. Can such a person fight selflessly? No!"[78] Military vehicles were overflowing with plunder, scorched houses could not shelter troops, and drunkenness further increased the chaos. Faced with such counterproductive results, military leaders began to act. Marshal Rokossowski, then commander of the Second Belorussian Front, ordered, on January 21, 1945, that hatred be focused on the battlefield. His prohibition of marauding and senseless destruction of civilian property—and the flanking threat of severe punishment for anything from burning down houses, to raping women, and on to executing prisoners of war—was widely resented. "First they tell us one thing," the soldiers griped, "and now another." Other commanders passed similar orders at the same time, and by February 9 even the army newspaper *Red Star* picked up the topic, followed by a series of articles

demanding discipline and proper behavior in order to not give the enemy propaganda material.[79] But, as in 1941–1942, the change of signals still had to be backed up by Stalin himself.

And the great leader dragged his feet. Not long before, indeed, he had displayed a rather blasé attitudes toward war crimes. When the Yugoslav communists complained behind closed doors about Red Army rapes in their country during the winter of 1944–1945, Stalin berated them for not understanding that "a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle." In early April 1945, he repeated similar remarks and reacted likewise when the behavior in Eastern Prussia was brought to his attention.[80] Despite such nonchalance, the concerns of commanders did begin to filter through to the supremo. The first sign of a shift in attitude preceded the April conversation with the Yugoslavs. On April 2, Stalin gave the order to inform both the civilian population and the frontline troops about to attack Vienna that "the Red Army fights against the German occupiers, not against the population of Austria." Even Nazi party members would be safe if they proved loyal to the new authorities. The troops were ordered to "conduct themselves correctly" and "not offend" the locals.[81] Better known is Georgii Aleksandrov's attack in *Pravda* on the monochromic hate propaganda of Ilya Ehrenburg of April 14, 1945. But while the chief of the Central Committee's Agitprop Department acted on Stalin's instructions, while he reclaimed a more nuanced picture of "the Germans" (among whom there were now "less idiots, ready to quietly lose their head for Hitler"), and while he restated Stalin's 1942 declaration that a war against the Germans would be "stupid and senseless," his main audience was not Soviet but German. Indeed, Aleksandrov flatly denied that the Germans continued fighting the Red Army because they were afraid of revenge, which was the main reason why the Soviets considered deescalation—to limit their own losses.[82]

Stalin finally acted on April 20, 1945. Addressing the troops engaged in the battle for Berlin, he now ordered unambiguously to "change the attitude toward Germans, be they prisoners of war or civilians." Soldiers now were to "relate better to Germans," and as in the case of Austria, even rank-and-file Nazis were to be left in peace. In line with earlier pronouncements, he explained the reason for this policy shift: what he called a "cruel attitude" (*zhestokoe otnoshenie*) toward the enemy only strengthened resistance, which was "not advantageous for us."[83] Whereas a complete establishment of discipline and order in occupied Germany was impossible, owing chiefly to administrative chaos,[84] the changed signals from above did not remain without consequences. By April 29 the boss of the Eighth Guard Army's Political Department noted that cases of rape and other "immoral occurrences" had now decreased to "two or three" in each settlement. Earlier he noted, with statistical accuracy, that their number was "far greater." If possible, offenders were now prosecuted.[85] The Third Shock Army, likewise, noted on May 2 that the education of the troops about Stalin's new

directive had changed their attitude to the Germans. The military prosecutor's work might have helped too, which serves as a reminder that we speak here of a change in degree only, as random violence continued long after the signals changed. But in this war, degrees mattered.[86]

VI

Not all encounters with the enemy, then, led to further escalation. Even more: on both sides of the front line, individuals found aspects of the "other" they could appreciate. What they learned in these close interactions could fuel both criticism of and support for their own side—sometimes in the same person. Consider the Soviet case first: Red Army soldiers were amazed at the comparatively high standard of living they encountered in 1945 in Germany and Austria, but the lessons they drew were contradictory. For some, Germany became an example of advanced civilization, expressed by good roads, "order," material well-being, clean houses, and generally a high level of "culture." Often, this position crystalized over time, but in some instances the immediate encounter was a mixture of anger and appreciation. "I am writing this letter from a German town," penned the scout Ivan Andrianovich S. to his sister in March 1945. "The town in itself is very pretty, but destroyed," he continued, observing that the returned population had begun to clean up the streets: "We can learn a lot, an awful lot from the Germans!" But immediately he channeled his enthusiasm in the right direction: "The most important thing they taught us, is how to fight. In return, we will now exorcise their interest in this science!" Others simply declared the entire material culture they encountered the result of pure robbery. The experience of life in Germany could thus be used to confront Soviet reality and falsify Soviet propaganda, but it could also, and often at the same time, further fuel the rage: "Why did these people who were living so well have to invade us?"[87]

On the German side, too, interactions with Soviet citizens and observations of the realities of German occupation could undermine or complicate the rough-hewn propaganda images.[88] They could even fuel resistance to the Nazi regime, as in the case of the already critical students of the Weisse Rose group.[89] In other cases, however, the results were more contradictory. Konrad Jarausch, a German nationalist but not a Nazi, quickly noted that official representations were false, as he had expected. "I had a lively discussion with a really bright high school student who studied for a number of years in Berlin," he wrote to his wife on August 16, 1941. "In reality," he concluded, "not all Russians are 'swine' or 'beasts.'" Of course, he added, "we knew that before, but it's good to have that impression confirmed by firsthand experience." His increasingly close contact with prisoners, however, also helped to legitimize the war of extermination. Commenting on the shooting of Jews, he wrote on November 14, 1941, that "the whole thing is already more murder than war." But he immediately silenced his

doubts with recourse to what he had learned from his acquaintances among the prisoners of war: "If we didn't constantly hear from the Russians about how they suffered under Bolshevism, then we could really despair of the meaning of the whole thing."[90] We do not know what he would have learned from and about the enemy in the long run: death soon ended the encounter, as it did for over 2.7 million German and 7.8 million Soviet soldiers.[91]

NOTES

1. Michael David-Fox inspired this essay through an invitation to a panel titled "Stalinism and Nazism as Entangled Histories" at the 2009 Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in Boston. The perceptive critiques of Sheila Fitzpatrick and Omer Bartov, the panel's commentators, helped in the further development of the paper, as did R.J.B. Bosworth's comments on an early version and Giuseppe Finaldi's on the penultimate product. Some of the argument was prefigured in "Totalitarian War and Atrocity Process: Reconsidering Violence at the German-Soviet Front, 1941–1945," debated at the Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association for European History, Sydney, July 2, 2007. In particular, Walter Manoschek's reactions were most helpful. Research for this essay was in part supported by a University of Western Australia Research Grant (2006) and a UWA Research Development Award (2010). Jürgen Förster taught me how to use the German military archive and where to eat.
2. Concisely, R.J.B. Bosworth, *Nationalism* (London: Pearson Longman, 2007), 29–34.
3. See Michael Werner and Bénedict Zimmermann, "Vergleich, Transfer, Verflechtung. Der Ansatz der Histoire croisée und die Herausforderung des Transnationalen," *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 26, no. 3 (2002), 607–636; id., "Penser l'histoire croisée: entre empirie et réflexivité," *Annales: Histoire, Science sociales* 58, no. 1 (2003), 7–36; Deborah Cohen and Maura O'Connor, *Comparison and History. Europe in Cross-National Perspective* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004). On Russia and the Soviet Union see Michael David-Fox, "Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and Soviet History," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (hereafter: JfGO) 54, no. 4 (2006), 535–555; id., "The Implications of Transnationalism," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* (henceforth: *Kritika*) 12, no. 4 (2011), 885–904. On the German-Soviet entanglement see, inter alia, Michael Geyer and Sheila Fitzpatrick, eds., *Beyond Totalitarianism. Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), and the special issue of *Kritika* 10, no. 3 (2009).
4. Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege. Ungekürzter Text* (Munich: Cormoran, 2000), esp. 27–47; 682–690 (book I, chap. 1; book 8, chap. 6).
5. Thomas Kühne, "Die Viktimisierungsfalle: Wehrmachtsverbrechen, Geschichtswissenschaft und symbolische Ordnung des Militärs," in Michael Th. Greven and Oliver von Wrochem, eds., *Der Krieg in der Nachkriegszeit: Der Zweite Weltkrieg in Politik und Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 183–196.
6. Note, however, Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 90–91; and Richard Overy, *The Dictators. Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Russia* (New York and London: Norton, 2006).

7. Cf. Robert Gerwarth's contribution to this volume.
8. Programmatic: James R. Harris, "Was Stalin a Weak Dictator?" *The Journal of Modern History* 75 (2003), 375–386.
9. Christian Hartmann, "Verbrecherischer Krieg–verbrecherische Wehrmacht? Überlegungen zur Struktur des deutschen Ostheeres," in Christian Hartmann et al., eds., *Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941–1944. Facetten einer Grenzüberschreitung* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 3–71, here 6; G. F. Krivosheev, *Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century* (London: Greenhill Books, 1997), 91 (34.5 million, which does not include partisans); *Russkii Arkhiv/Velikaia Otechestvennaia* [hereafter: RA/VO], vol. 20 (9), 7–8 (1.1 million partisans).
10. Mark Edele, "Militaries Compared: Wehrmacht and Red Army, 1941–45," in Thomas Zeiler, ed., *A Companion to the Second World War*, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2013), vol. I: 169–185.
11. Alfred J. Rieber, "Civil Wars in the Soviet Union," *Kritika* 4, no. 1 (2003), 129–162.
12. Christian Hartmann, *Unternehmen Barbarossa: Der deutsche Krieg im Osten 1941–1945* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2011), 33.
13. Reinhard Koselleck, *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1979), 349–375.
14. For a brief but effective comparison of the Soviet and German versions of the doctrine, see Geoffrey Roberts, *Stalin's General: The Life of Georgy Zhukov* (New York: Random House, 2012), 36–37.
15. For example: TB Ic, 296 I.D., April 1–December 31, 1942 [January 1, 1943], German Federal Military Archive, Freiburg i. Br. [hereafter: BA-MA] RH 26–296/95, folio 17; TB Ic, 296 I.D., January 1–June 30, 1943, BA-MA RH 26–296/101, folio 13; TB Ic, 296 I.D., July 1–December 31, 1943, BA-MA RH 26–296/106, folio 27.
16. See the perceptive analysis of German tactics titled "Peculiarities of Infantry Offensive in the German Army in Movement Warfare" captured by the Germans and distributed to their own troops on September 15, 1941. BA-MA RH 26–18/12, folios 28–29.
17. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *The Stalingrad Trilogy,* vols. 1 and 2 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009); id., *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 5–14; Evan Mawdsley, *Thunder in the East: The Nazi-Soviet War 1941–1945* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 221–223.
18. F. L. Carsten, "Reports by Two German Officers on the Red Army," *The Slavonic and East European Review* 41, no. 96 (1962), 217–244, here 241.
19. Manfred Zeidler, *Reichswehr und Rote Armee 1920–1933. Wege und Stationen einer ungewöhnlichen Zusammenarbeit,* 2nd ed. (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1994), 262–269.
20. Mary Habeck, *Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003). Compare to Albert and Joan Seaton, *The Soviet Army: 1918 to the Present* (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), on the one hand, and Lawrence X. Clifford, "Tukhachevsky and Blitzkrieg," PhD dissertation, Boston College 2004, on the other. The parallel Russian discussion focuses more on the training of cadres and development of infrastructure and technology than on the transfer of ideas. Compare Iu. L. D'iakov and T. S. Sushneva, *Fashistskii mech koval'sia v SSSR. Krasnaia Armiia i Reikhsver. Teinoe sotrudnichestvo. 1922–1933. Neizvestnye dokumenty* (Moscow: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1992) with the critique in Igor Pykhalov and Aleksandr Diukov,

Velikaia obolgannaia voina. Obe knigi odnim tomom (Moscow: Eksmo, 2009), 11–41.

21. Gennady Andreev-Khomiakov, *Bitter Waters: Life and Work in Stalin's Russia—A Memoir* (New York: Westview Press, 1997), 170.
22. Stalin's radio address from July 3, 1941, reprinted in Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine Sovetskogo soiuza* (Moscow: Izd-vo "Kraft," 2002), 11–16. The original order for scorched earth had been given some days earlier: SNK and CC directive, signed by Molotov and Stalin, June 29, 1941, reprinted in *1941 god. Dokumenty*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Demokratiia, 1998), 446–448, here 447. For a follow-up resolution on the organization of the struggle behind the enemy's lines (July 18, 1941), see V. N. Khaustov et al., eds., *Lubianka: Stalin in NKVD-NKGB-GUKR "Smersh." 1939-mart 1946* (Moscow: Demokratiia, 2006), 298. For a Stalin order to destroy all settlements "40–60 km" behind German lines, in order to deny the invaders shelter (17 November 1941), see RA/VO vol. 2(2), 120–121.
23. Willy Peter Reese, *Mir selber seltsam fremd: Die Unmenschlichkeit des Krieges. Russsland 1941–44* (Berlin: Ullstein, 2004), 81–82.
24. Armin Nolzen, "'Verbrannte Erde.' Die Rückzüge der Wehrmacht in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten 1941–1945," in Markus Pöhlmann und Dierk Walter, eds., *Besatzung. Funktion und Gestalt militärischer Fremdherrschaft von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert* Günther Kronenbitter, (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 161–175.
25. Alexander Dallin, Ralph Mavrogordato, and Wilhelm Moll, "Partisan Psychological Warfare and Popular Attitudes," in John A. Armstrong, ed., *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), 197–337; here 333. Less explicitly, Klaus Jochen Arnold, *Die Wehrmacht und die Besatzungspolitik in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion. Kriegführung und Radikalisierung im "Unternehmen Barbarossa"* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2005), 239–240.
26. 18. ID(mot), "Feindesnachrichtenblatt Nr. 8142," July 27, 1942, BA-MA RH 26–18/62.
27. Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914–1945," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 527–597, here 558.
28. Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, 786. See also ibid., 363, 365, 765–788; and id., *Unternehmen Barbarossa*, 78–81.
29. *Pravda*, 7 November 1941, 1–2, here 2.
30. Reprinted in: Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, 51–54.
31. Mark Edele and Michael Geyer, "States of Exception: The Nazi-Soviet War as a System of Violence, 1939–1945," in: *Beyond Totalitarianism,* 345–395, here 361–367 and 386–387; Vladimir Daines, *Shtrafbaty i zagradotriady Krasnoi Armii* (Moscow: Eksmo, 2008); Alex Statiev, "Penal Units in the Red Army," *Europe-Asia Studies* 62, no. 5 (2010), 721–747, esp. 726–727, 744; id., "Blocking Units in the Red Army," *The Journal of Military History*, 76, no. 2 (2012); John W. Dower, *War without Mercy. Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
32. Mark von Hagen, "The Great War and the Mobilization of Ethnicity in the Russian Empire," in Barnett Rubin and Jack Snyder, eds., *Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State-Building* (London: Routledge, 1998), 32–53, here 42–45, 51; Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, *War Land on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity and German Occupation in World War I* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 15, 17, 19, 20, 90, 96, 98;

Joshua Sanborn, "The Genesis of Russian Warlordism: Violence and Governance During the First World War and the Civil War," *Contemporary European History* 19, no. 3 (2010), 195–213, here 205; Moshe Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, 1825–1859," in Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov et al., eds., *The North Caucasus Barrier. The Russian Advance Towards the Muslim World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 45–61; Iakov Gordin, *Kavkaz: zemlia i krov': Rossiia v kavkazskoi voine XIX veka* (St. Petersburg: Zhurnal "Zvezda," 2000).

33. For archival evidence for the role of the colonial experience, see Michael Geyer, *Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit: Die Reichswehr in der Krise der Machtpolitik 1924–1936* (Wiesbaden, Germany: Steiner, 1980), 99–100. For a cautionary note about pressing the "colonial" genealogy too far, see Robert Gerwarth and Stephan Malinowski, "Der Holocaust as 'kolonialer Genozid'? Europäische Kolonialgewalt und nationalsozialistischer Vernichtungskrieg," *Geschiche und Gesellschaft* 33, no. 3 (2007), 439–466.
34. BA-MA RH 21–3/423, folio 32. On the importance of the experience of 1914–1918 for the German military's horizon of expectations, see also Jürgen Förster, "Zum Rußlandbild der Militärs 1941–1945," in Hans-Erich Volkmann, ed., *Das Rußlandbild im Dritten Reich* (Cologne, Weimar, and Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 1994), 140–163.
35. John Horne and Alan Kramer, *German Atrocities 1914: A History of Denial* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2001), chapters 1–4, on Russian conduct: 80–84; Laura Engelstein, "A Belgium of Our Own: The Sack of Russian Kalisz, August 1914," *Kritika* 10, no. 3 (Summer 2009), 441–473. On partisan psychosis (*Freischärlerpsychose, Heckenschützenpsychose*) in the Poland campaign in 1939, see Jochen Böhler, ed., *"Grösste Härte . . ." Verbrechen Der Wehrmacht in Polen September. Oktober 1939* (Osnabrück, Germany: fibre Verlag, 2005), 17–18, 94–115; Timm C. Richter, "Handlungsspielräume am Beispiel der 6. Armee," in Christian Hartmann, Johannes Hürter and Ulrike Jureit, eds., *Verbrechen der Wehrmacht: Bilanz einer Debatte* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 60–78, here 60.
36. G. V. Kostyrchenko, *V plenu u krasnogo faraona* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994); id. *Tainaia politika Stalina. Vlast' i antisemitism* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2003), 242; and Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2001), 219–222, 293–294.
37. For example, Panzer-Armeeoberkommando 3, "Zusammenfassender Bericht von Überläufer- und Gefangenenvernehmungen Nr. 10" (February 4, 1944) BA-MA 21–3/540, folio 93–100, here 97 (reverse).
38. For more details and sources, see Mark Edele, *Stalinist Society, 1928–1953* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 130–132. On violence against Jews in Moscow in 1941, also *Moskva voennaia 1941–1945. Memuray i arkhivnye dokumenty* (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995), 111–112; and the discussion of this incident by Rebecca Manley, *To the Tashkent Station: Evacuation and Survival in the Soviet Union at War* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 112. See also the discussion in Karel C. Berkhoff, *Motherland in Danger: Soviet Propaganda during World War II* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 164–165.
39. On admissions to the party, see T. H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R. 1917–1967* (Princeton, N J: Princeton University Press, 1968), 236–238, 250–257; and the newer archival data in Mark Edele, *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society, 1941–1991* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 135–136.

Antisemitism was not confined to new party members though: Berkhoff, *Motherland*, 218–219.

40. Jürgen Förster, "Wehrmacht, Krieg und Holocaust," in Rolf-Dieter Müller et al., eds., *Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 948–963; Peter Longerich, *Holocaust: The Nazi Persecution and Murder of the Jews* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapters 10–13. On instrumentalizing Soviet crimes: Bogdan Musial, *"Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschießen": Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941,* 2nd ed. (Berlin and Munich: Propyläen, 2001).
41. In addition to the already quoted, Fritz Fischer, *From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 1871–1945* (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986); Enzo Traverso, *The Origins of Nazi Violence* (New York: New Press, 2003); Ben Shepherd, *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), chapter 1; Reinhard Nachtigal, "Krasnyi Desant: Das Gefecht and der Mius-Bucht. Ein unbeachtetes Kapitel der deutschen Besetzung Südrußlands 1918," *JfGO* 53, No. 2 (2005), 221–246; Mark von Hagen, *War in a European Borderland. Occupations and Occupation Plans in Galicia and Ukraine, 1914–1918* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2007), chapter 5; Geyer, *Aufrüstung oder Sicherheit*, 81–82, 85–87, 97–100.
42. For the links back to 1904–1921: Peter Holquist, "Violent Russia, Deadly Marxism? Russia in the Epoch of Violence, 1905–21," *Kritika* 4, no. 3 (2003), 627–652; Piotr Wróbel, "The Seeds of Violence: The Brutalization of an East European Region, 1917–1921," *Journal of Modern European History* 1, no. 1 (2003), 125–149; Dietrich Beyrau, "Der Erste Weltkrieg als Bewährungsprobe. Bolschewistische Lernprozesse aus dem 'Imperialistischen' Krieg," *Journal of Modern European History* 1, no. 1 (2003), 96–124; Jörg Baberowski, "Kriege in staatsfernen Räumen: Rußland und die Sowjetunion 1905–1950," in Dietrich Beyrau et al., eds., *Formen des Krieges: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn, Germany: Schöningh, 2007), 291–309. On the "mass operations" in the 1930s, see David R. Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–1953* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2009), 358–361; and Paul Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police. Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–1941* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 227–287. On Katyn, see Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski (eds.), *Katyn. A Crime without Punishment* (New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2007); and Inessa Iazhborovskaia, Anatolii Iablokov, and Valentina Parasadanova, *Katynskii sindrom v sovetsko-pol'skikh i rossiisko-pol'skikh otnosheniiakh* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2009).
43. Edele and Geyer, "States of Exception," 365–366.
44. See Omer Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941–1945: German Troops and the Barbarization of Warfare* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); id., *Hitler's Army: Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991). For the Soviet process, see Catherine Merridale, *Ivan's War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939–1945* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).
45. Cf. Joachim Hoffmann, *Stalins Vernichtungskrieg 1941–1945,* 2nd rev. ed. (Munich: Verlag für Wehrwissenschaften, 1996).
46. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), chapter 1; Jürgen Förster, "Securing 'Living Space,'"

Germany and the Second World War, vol. IV/II (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2009), 1189–1244, here 1195–1196.

47. Jürgen Förster, "Operation Barbarossa as a War of Conquest and Annihilation," *Germany and the Second World War* vol. IV/I, 481–521.
48. Cf. Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, 223, 340, 514–515, 672.
49. Omer Bartov, "Germany's Unforgettable War: The Twisted Road from Berlin to Moscow and Back," *Diplomatic History*, 25.3 (2001), 405–423, 422.
50. Christoph Rass, "*Menschenmaterial": Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939–1945* (Paderborn, Munich, Vienna: Schöningh, 2003), 319, 334–336.
51. Peter Fritzsche, *Life and Death in the Third Reich* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 160, 192, 277.
52. Good examples of how facts were turned into fiction are the misinterpretations of the German War Crimes Unit of the evidence it had so meticulously collected: Wehrmacht-Untersuchungsstelle für Verletzungen des Völkerrechts, "Kriegsverbrechen der russischen Wehrmacht 1941" (November 1941) and vol. 2 (March 1942) BA-MA RW2/145; and RW 2/149.
53. Edele and Geyer, "States of Exception," 361–365. For two complementary approaches to the militarization of Soviet socialism, see Mark von Hagen, *Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1990); and David R. Stone, *Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926–1933* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000).
54. Berkhoff, *Motherland*, passim.
55. Aleksandr V. Perepelicyn and Natalja P. Timofeeva, "Das Deutschen-Bild in der sowjetischen Militärpropaganda während des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges," in Elke Scherstjanoi, ed., *Rotarmisten schreiben aus Deutschland: Briefe von der Front (1945) und historische Analysen* (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2004), 267–286, here 271–272.
56. Rass, "*Menschenmaterial,*" 161.
57. On violent crime committed by soldiers within the borders of the Soviet Union, see Stalin's special files: State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), f. R-9401, op. 2, d. 96, l. 316–324 (1945); d. 98, l. 11–12 (1945); d. 100, l. 2–9, 10–18, 19–27, 28–33 (four reports from 1945). On rioting soldiers on their way to demobilization see Edele, *Soviet Veterans*, 26–28. On the violence in Germany, see Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949* (Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1995), chapter 2. On criminal children and youth, see Juliane Fürst, "Between Salvation and Liquidation: Homeless and Vagrant Children and the Reconstruction of Soviet Society." *Slavonic and East European Review* 86, no. 2 (2008), 232–258; id., *Stalin's Last Generation: Soviet Post-War Youth and the Emergence of Mature Socialism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), chapter 5; and Olga Kucherenko, "Without a Family: Public Order, Social Welfare and Street Children in the Wartime Soviet Union," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 58, No. 3 (2012), 421–436. On postwar crime more generally, Elena Zubkova, *Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: Politika i povsednevnost' 1945–1953* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2000), 89–94.
58. E.g., Vladimir Tendriakov, "Liudi ili neliudi." *Druzhba narodov* no. 2 (1989), 114–144; Hannes Heer, *Vom Verschwinden der Täter. Der Vernichtungskrieg fand statt, aber keiner war dabei*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Aufbau, 2006), 118; Felix Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl. Wehrmacht und NS-Verbrechen an der Ostfront 1941/42* (Paderborn, Germany: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2009), 228–267; Hartmann, "Verbrecherischer Krieg," 23.

59. The following argument was foreshadowed by Alexander Dallin, *German Rule in Russia 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957), chapter 11.
60. Memorandum on Discussion by Hitler with Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel, and Göring (July 16, 1941), Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal, ed., *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1949), vol. 38, 86–94, here 88.
61. "Supplement to Directive No. 33" (July 23, 1941), in H. R. Trevor-Roper and Walter Hubatsch, eds., *Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1964), 89–90.
62. Bartov, *Hitler's Army*, 83–84; Hannes Heer, *Tote Zonen: Die deutsche Wehrmacht an der Ostfront* (Hamburg: Hamburger Editionen, 1999), 41–79. Himmler quotation from Christian Gerlach, "The Wannsee Conference, the Fate of German Jews, and Hitler's Decision in Principle to Exterminate All European Jews," in Omer Bartov, ed., *The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath* (London: Routledge, 2000), 106–161; here 120.
63. Armstrong, ed., *Soviet Partisans*, 3–70, 141–196; Kenneth Slepyan, *Stalin's Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), chapter 1; Bogdan Musial, *Sowjetische Partisanen 1941–1944: Mythos und Wirklichkeit* (Paderborn, Germany: Schönigh, 2009).
64. Shepherd, *War in the Wild East*, chapters 4 and 5; Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, 393–394.
65. *Hitler's War Directives 1939–1945*, 132–135. Italics in original.
66. Shepherd, *War in the Wild East*, chapter 6; on 1943, see also Nathalie Moine, "Experience de guerre, hierarchie des victimes et justice sociale a là sovietique," *Cahiers du Monde russe* 49, nos. 2–3 (2008), 383–418, here 393–396.
67. Cf. Förster, "Securing 'Living Space,'" 1243; and id., "Operation Barbarossa in Historical Perspective," in: *Germany and the Second World War,* vol. IV/II, 1245–1255, here 1254.
68. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, "Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener," in Hans Buchheim et al., eds., *Anatomie des SS-Staates*, 5th ed., vol. 2 (Munich: dtv, 1989), 137–232; Römer, *Der Kommissarbefehl*, 267–275, 526–550; Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, 67, 490–491, 511–512.
69. Longerich, *Holocaust*, 431. See also Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, 76; Adam Tooze, "The Economic History of the Nazi Regime," in Jane Caplan, ed., *Nazi Germany* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 168–195, here 192.
70. Merridale, *Ivan's War*; Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, chapter 2; Richard Stites, ed., *Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995); and E. S. Seniavskaia, *1941–1945: Frontovoe pokolenie. Istoriko-psikhologicheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow: RAN institut Rossiiskoi istorii, 1995).
71. Amir Weiner, "Something to Die for, a Lot to Kill For: The Soviet System and the Barbarisation of Warfare, 1939–1945," in George Kassimeris, ed., *The Barbarization of Warfare* (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 101–125; Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair*, chapter 1. On hatred of the enemy from the very outset, see John Barber, "Popular Reactions in Moscow to the German Invasion of June 22, 1941," *Soviet Union/Union Soviétique* 18, nos. 1–3 (1991), 5–18, here 6.
72. On this point see also Omer Bartov, "The Conduct of War: Soldiers and the Barbarization of Warfare," *The Journal of Modern History* vol. 64, Supplement: Resistance against the Third Reich (1992), S32–S45, here S38.

73. See the trophy documents collected by the German army: BA-MA RW2/154.
74. Stalin Order No. 55 of February 23, 1942, reprinted in Stalin, *O Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, 40–44, here 44.
75. Rass, "*Menschenmaterial*", 163, 165, 334, 335, fn. 19; Reese, *Mir selber seltsam fremd*, 83, 213; Römer, *Kommissarbefehl,* 249–250.
76. Carola Tischler, "Die Vereinfachungen des Genossen Erenburg. Eine Endkriegs- und eine Nachkriegskontroverse," in *Rotarmisten schreiben*, 326–339, here 329–331; Berkhoff, *Motherland*, 176–177, 181, 349 no. 29.
77. Manfred Zeidler, *Kriegsende im Osten. Die Rote Armee und die Besetzung Deutschlands östlich von Oder und Neisse 1944/45* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1996), 105–134; Anita Kondoyanidi, "The Liberating Experience: War Correspondents, Red Army Soldiers, and the Nazi Extermination Camps." *The Russian Review* 69, no. 3 (2010), 438–462; Berkhoff, *Motherland*, 180.
78. Seniavskaia, *1941–1945: Frontovoe pokolenie*, 200.
79. Alexander Werth, *Russia at War 1941–1945*, 2nd ed. (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2000), 966–968; Zeidler, *Kriegsende*, 155–162; Elena Seniavskaia, "Deutschland und die Deutschen in den Augen sowjetischer Soldaten und Offiziere des Großen Vaterländischen Krieges," *Rotarmisten schreiben*, 247–266, here 258–259.
80. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin* (New York: Harvest Books, 1990), 95, 110–111 (the April remarks must have been uttered after April 13).
81. Stavka directive No. 11055 of April 2, 1945, signed I. Stalin and A. Antonov, in: RA/VO vol. 5(4), 221–222.
82. G. Aleksandrov, "Tovarishch Erenburg uproshchaet," *Pravda*, April 14, 1945, p. 2; Berkhoff, *Motherland*, 193.
83. Stavka directive no. 11072 of April 20, 1945, signed I. Stalin and A. Antonov, in: RA/VO, vol. 5(4), 229.
84. Filip Slaveski, *The Soviet Occupation of Germany: Hunger, Mass Violence and the Struggle for Peace, 1945–1947* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
85. Report to Political Administration of First Belorussian Front, April 29, 1945, RA/VO vol. 15 (4–5), 228–231, here 229 (quotations), 230.
86. Reports of Member of Military Council of Third Shock Army and of Military Prosecutor of First Belorussian Front to Military Council of First Belorussian Front, both May 2, 1945 in RA/VO vol. 15 (4–5), 243–249, esp. 243, 245–246. For descriptions of the continuing violence, see, for example, Antony Beevor, *The Fall of Berlin 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2003); Giles Macdonogh, *After the Reich: The Brutal History of the Allied Occupation* (New York: Basic Books, 2007).
87. Scherstjanoi, ed., *Rotarmisten schreiben*, 84–85, 95 (first two quotations). See also Scherstjanoi's thought-provoking "'Wir sind in der Höhle der Bestie.' Die Briefkommunikation von Rotarmisten mit der Heimat über Erlebnisse in Deutschland," ibid., 194–128; but compare with Mark Edele, "More Than Just Stalinists: The Political Sentiments of Victors 1945–1953," in Juliane Fürst, ed., *Late Stalinist Russia. Society between Reconstruction and Reinvention* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 167–191; Oleg Budnitskii, "The Intelligentsia Meets the Enemy: Educated Soviet Officers in Defeated Germany, 1945," *Kritika* 10, no. 3 (2009), 629–682; and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, "Ideologie, Kontrolle, Repression. Als sowjetischer Besatzungssoldat im Westen," *Jahrbuch für historische Kommunismusforschung* (2010), 197–191. The final quotation is from Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, 78.

88. Hartmann, *Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg*, 502.
89. Christiane Moll, "Acts of Resistance: The White Rose in the Light of New Archival Evidence," in Michael Geyer and John W. Boyer, eds., *Resistance against the Third Reich 1933–1990* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 173–200; Hinrich Siefken, "'Die Weisse Rose' and Russia," *German Life and Letters* 47, no. 1 (1994), 14–43; Detlef Bald, "Kriegserfahrungen der Sanitätsfeldwebel im Sommer 1942. Impulse für den Widerstand der 'Weißen Rose,'" in Wolfram Wette, ed., *Zivilcourage. Empörte, Helfer und Retter aus Wehrmacht, Polizei und SS* (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004), 60–76; id., *Die "Weisse Rose". Von der Front in den Widerstand* (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 2004).
90. Konrad H. Jarausch, ed., *Reluctant Accomplice. A Wehrmacht Soldier's Letters from the Eastern Front* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 257, 325. Cf. also 327.
91. Michael Ellman and S. Maksudov, "Soviet Deaths in the Great Patriotic War: A Note." *Europe-Asia Studies* 46, no. 4 (1994), 671–80, here 675. German numbers are Eastern Front for 1941–1944 only; Rüdiger Overmans, *Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 277.

12 Genocide in a Multiethnic Town
Event, Origins, Aftermath

Omer Bartov

DESTRUCTION

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, brought a wave of unprecedented violence to Galicia—part of the eastern territory of Poland that had been annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939. The occupation of Galicia between 1941 and 1944 culminated in the mass murder of its Jewish population and the ethnic cleansing of its Polish inhabitants.

On July 5, 1941, the German army reached Buczacz, a small Galician town, which for over four centuries had been home to a mixed population of Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians. The following day the 101st Light Infantry Division reported "murders of inhabitants (Ukrainians) in the jails of Buczacz and [the nearby town of] Czortków" and noted that "a Ukrainian militia took over local police duties until the arrival of German troops." Wehrmacht units merely passed through Buczacz on the way to the east.[1] But the self-proclaimed Buczacz "sich," or Ukrainian militia, soon expanded to over a hundred men. Initially the unit was commanded by Tadei Kramarchuk and Andrii Dan'kovych, who were assisted by Myron Hanushevs'kyi, the local representative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). In late July command over the militia was transferred to former public prosecutor Volodymyr Kaznovs'kyi. The "sich" abused, looted, exploited, and murdered Jewish inhabitants of Buczacz. Acting alongside a few Gestapo officials, in mid-July it executed at least forty politically suspect Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians. And on August 25 the militia assisted a German police unit sent from the regional capital Tarnopol in a mass shooting of 400 to 650 Jewish craftsmen and professionals on the Fedor Hill, not far from the center of Buczacz.[2]

There were at the time approximately 8,000 Jews in Buczacz, making up slightly over half the total population. Because many Jews had been conscripted into the Red Army or had fled to the east and refugees were streaming in from the west, precise figures cannot be determined. In early August the Germans established a Jewish council (*Judenrat*) of twelve men and a Jewish police force (*Ordnungsdienst*, OD), which eventually expanded to about thirty policemen. The first head (*Obmann*) of the *Judenrat* was

Mendel Reich, the former chairman of the *kahal*, or Jewish community leadership. Rabbi Chaim Schapira acted as his deputy. Dr. Engelberg, the lawyer and chairman of the General Zionist Party's local branch, became his secretary, and the lawyer Dr. Szaja Hecht was the treasurer.

The *Judenrat* represented the elite of the local Jewish community. Other known members included the lawyers Dr. Emanuel Meerengel (who was also former deputy mayor and *kahal* chairman) and Samuel (Berko) Hersas; the chairman of the religious-Zionist Mizrahi Party's local branch, Munisz Frankiel; the merchant Ozjasz Freudenthal; and the physician Dr. Bernhard Seifer. Three *Judenrat* members were already murdered in the first mass shooting of August 1941: the quarry owner Dawid Kanner; the gymnasium teacher Kriegel, and the lawyer Dr. Y. Stern. Soon thereafter the Germans removed Reich as *Obmann* and appointed Dr. Silberschlag, who was in turn replaced by Dr. Engelberg. Described as an "upright man," Engelberg subsequently escaped with his wife and child, but he was denounced and shot along with his family. In early 1943, the factory owner Baruch Kramer was appointed *Obmann*; he was said to have been killed in the last liquidation in June 1943, although he may have in fact survived.[3]

Yitzhak Shikhor (Izaak Szwarc), who was twelve years old in 1941, wrote after the war that "the *Judenrat* should be credited for many accomplishments and good deeds during the first period of occupation." Thus it provided assistance to thousands of Hungarian Jewish expellees who streamed into the town, only to be driven out of Buczacz and murdered in Kamieniec Podolski by Police Battalion 320 on August 28–31, 1941. The *Judenrat* also set up a soup kitchen for the poor and arranged housing for Jews expelled to Buczacz later on from smaller towns in the vicinity.[4] Israel (Isidor) Gelbart also testified after the war that "compared to other Jewish councils, the Jewish council in Buczacz was considered to be very good, because within the constraints of its powers it took care of the public's welfare."[5] A private correspondence from 1946 credits the survival of up to a thousand Jews in Buczacz at the time of the town's first liberation to the community's leadership, concluding that "even if I had belonged to the Buczacz *kahal* [*Judenrat*], I wouldn't have possibly seen any reason for being ashamed."[6]

Many other survivors condemned the *Judenrat* and the Jewish police for corruption and collaboration. Yehushua (Ozjasz) Friedlender related in 2004 that Dr. Seifer of the *Judenrat* "saw the poor as human dust which was meant to satiate the German beast until the bad times would pass, and thereby save those who were 'worthy of rescue.'"[7] The last *Obmann*, Baruch Kramer, came in for the harshest condemnation. An unsigned testimony given in 1945 described Kramer as "a tall and handsome man" who "before the war managed a textile business, was a religious Jew and an active member of the [non-Zionist religious party] Agudah, and had a long red beard." Once he became head of the *Judenrat*, Kramer reportedly removed his traditional clothes, shaved off his beard, and "used to get

drunk together with a number of German policemen posted in the city and have a good time with women." Indeed, this "former hasid" was "a great admirer of the fair sex and frequently favored Jewish girls by not catching [and sending] them to the camps, or sending them to labor, but finding them better accommodation—all 'in return for a favor.'"[8] Shmuel (Samuel) Rosen testified in 1960 that as *Obmann* Kramer not only "celebrated with the Germans and forced young Jewish women to come to these feasts" but also "ran around with a hatchet during the roundups and betrayed the hiding places of the Jews."[9]

Similar bitterness was expressed about the Jewish police. Samuel Rosental, who later fought with the partisans, reported shortly after the war that in supplying the Germans with workers for forced labor camps, the OD, initially commanded by Josef (Józef) Rabinowicz, would "seize . . . only the poorest Jews . . . who could not ransom themselves."[10] Yitzhak Shikhor condemned "the shameful actions of the OD, which, at the height of its degeneration, was headed by Mojżesz Albrecht."[11] The electrician Moshe Wizinger, who later fought with the Polish resistance, wrote scathingly: "The OD are robbing, killing, worse than the Germans; Albrecht walks down the streets in an OD uniform. Like the Germans, he is holding a whip in his hand and woe to whoever will stand in his way."[12] Albrecht died of typhus in winter 1942–1943 and was replaced by the law student Wolcio Wattenberg; the latter was replaced by Lichtenholz, who was eventually shot in June 1943.[13] Dr. Abraham Chalfen wrote from Łódź to Palestine in 1946 that "the *Judenrat* sent those who could not pay ransom to the death camps and the Jewish police hunted down and beat up those who would not obey. The *Judenrat* recognized only dollars and gold. . . . The Jews did not know who is crueler, the *Judenrat* or the Gestapo." Hence, "if any of them is still alive and comes to you" in Palestine, "they deserve 'special treatment.'"[14]

Some Judenrat and Jewish police members eventually turned against the Germans or joined resistance groups in the forests. OD man Janek Anderman attacked the perpetrators during the mass shooting of April 1943; he was beaten and then burned alive in the town square.[15] Yitzhak Bauer, who served in the OD, later became a partisan.[16] Several *Judenrat* members resigned in protest; some provided funds to purchase arms; and some chose direct action. Jankiel Ebenstein, who "during his few months . . . in the *Judenrat* became hated by everyone" and "was called an agent of the Gestapo," eventually "died a hero's death" when he tried to conceal a bunker sheltering Jews in November 1942 and then attacked and was killed by the Gestapo. "That day," as Wizinger put it, "he was forgiven everything."[17]

Unlike the Ukrainian police, Ivan Bobyk, the Ukrainian mayor of Buczacz, was reportedly considerate to the Jewish population.[18] But in the fall of 1941 control over extermination policies in the region reverted to the Security Police (Sipo) based in nearby Czortków. Assisted by several

hundred Ukrainian auxiliary policemen as well as by locally based German gendarmes and Ukrainian police, during the next three years this force murdered approximately 60,000 Jews in the Czortków-Buczacz region. The Sipo outpost's first chief was Kriminalsekretär Fritz-Ernst Blome, who took up this position in September 1941. The following month he was replaced by Kriminalkommissar Karl Hildemann, who remained at his post until October 1942. His successor, Kriminalsekretär Hans Velde, remained at the outpost until March 1943, when he was replaced by Kriminalsekretär Heinrich Peckmann, deputy chief since late 1942. In October 1943 Kriminalkommissar Werner Eisel came in as the last chief of the Czortków Sipo outpost, which was finally dismantled in early 1944. Of these men only Peckmann was tried after the war, but he was acquitted of all charges.[19]

Another notable character associated with the Czortków Sipo outpost was Kurt Köllner, who was in charge of "Jewish affairs" from July 1942 to the dismantling of the outpost. Well known for his brutality was Paul Thomanek, who commanded a labor camp in Czortków as of November 1942 and kept a room in Buczacz, where he participated in mass killings and other brutalities, including rapes. Whereas Richard Lissberg and his successor Walter Hoffer, the Buczacz town administrators, or Landkommissare, were not active in anti-Jewish actions, some of the local gendarmes, and especially Peter Pahl, are recalled by witnesses as having been especially brutal.

Buczacz was also the site of the only railroad tunnel in Galicia, blown up by the Red Army in the summer of 1941. The tunnel and bridge were rebuilt by the German firm Ackermann, using local Jews as forced laborers. Almost all of these were eventually murdered. Subsequent trials of the perpetrators made use of evidence by German civilians associated with this firm, who witnessed at first hand many of the roundups and killings.[20]

Following the first mass shooting in summer 1941, Buczacz was spared from large-scale killing operations for over a year, although hundreds of mostly poor Jewish men were sent to the labor camp of Borki Wielki near Tarnopol, where many died. The first *Aktion*, or roundup, occurred on October 17, 1942, when Gestapo personnel, aided by Ukrainian and Jewish policemen, deported some 1,600 Jews to the Bełżec extermination camp; hundreds of others were shot in their homes and on the streets. A second *Aktion* took place on November 27; approximately 2,500 Jews were deported to Bełżec, and many others were shot on the spot.

Meanwhile Buczacz was being crammed with Jews brought from surrounding towns and villages. In December 1942 a ghetto, or "residential district," was established, which Jews were not allowed to leave without permission, although it was not sealed. The crowded conditions and lack of food, sanitation, and medication caused a typhus epidemic that claimed many lives. People were frantically trying to build bunkers, or hiding places, into which they could flee during a raid, while others sought shelter in the surrounding villages.

In early February 1943 a third *Aktion* took place; this time the approximately two thousand victims were led to the Fedor Hill, a short walk from the town center, where they were shot in front of predug mass graves. The bloodletting was so massive that the town's water supply became polluted. The surviving Jews were then divided between those who remained in the ghetto and others who were incarcerated in a labor camp on the outskirts of Buczacz. Only Jews who could afford to pay large sums of money to the *Judenrat*, as well as members of the *Judenrat* and the OD, were admitted to this camp.

The Baedeker tourist guide of 1943 describes Buczacz as a town of nine thousand inhabitants—distinguished by its castle, town hall, churches, and monastery—on the slope of the Fedor Hill. No mention is made of Jews.[21] On March 1, 1943, the German authorities reported the total number of residents in Buczacz as 8,207.[22] Sporadic killings continued throughout the spring of 1943, followed by a fourth major *Aktion* in April, when some four thousand Jews still living in the ghetto were shot on the Fedor Hill and hundreds of others were killed on the streets.

In mid-May Buczacz was declared *judenrein* and the surviving Jews, with the exception of those in the labor camp, were expelled to other towns in the area. Most of them were either killed on the way or subsequently slaughtered by the Germans, local collaborators, and bandits who attacked the farms on which they were employed.[23] The labor camp in Buczacz was liquidated in mid-June 1943. Some armed OD men resisted the perpetrators; in the course of the fighting, many managed to flee to the nearby forests or villages. The rest, some 1,800 people, were shot and buried on the Baszty Hill, where the Jewish cemetery was located.

The hunt for hidden Jews continued with the assistance of local denouncers. A certain dynamic developed in this last phase, whereby Jews "hiding among the peasants paid high sums for the shelters, and the simple-minded peasants went to town and bought whatever they desired." Consequently, "the Ukrainian murderers . . . began following these peasants . . . and found Jews in attics, cellars, and so on . . . [and] shot them on the spot." This, in turn, unleashed "large-scale denunciations," and "the peasants themselves began to kill the Jews or evict them."[24] In an attempt to stem this upsurge of local killings, a group of local Jewish resisters attacked the notorious "Jew catchers" Kowalski and Nahajoswski.[25] This may be one reason why somewhere between six hundred and a thousand Jews were still alive when Buczacz was liberated on March 23, 1944. Tragically, on April 7, a counteroffensive brought the Germans back to Buczacz, and most of these last survivors were murdered. When the Red Army returned on July 21, 1944, less than a hundred Jews were still alive.

Some of the local Ukrainian residents of Buczacz and its vicinity profited from the genocide by taking over the property of the murdered and finding new employment opportunities. The Ukrainian gymnasium teacher Victor Petrykevych noted in his unpublished diary in early January 1944 that

although most people were living in "unprecedented poverty . . . some of the people live well and comfortably. . . . the war destroys and ruins some, and gives too much to others, often undeservedly." On March 22, the day before the Soviets arrived, he added: "People, merchants, artisans, and so forth, who lived in former Jewish houses . . . are moving out . . . in view of the recent developments in the war. They anticipate Jewish revenge."[26]

The complicity of the local Christian population in the murder of their Jewish neighbors, as well as the brutal ethnic cleansing of the Polish population by Ukrainian nationalists, cannot be understood without a deeper historical perspective. Buczacz and many other towns and villages throughout Eastern Europe had been multiethnic communities for many centuries. The history and memory of what came to be increasingly fraught relations between the Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish populations in Galicia (and other ethnic groups in different parts of Eastern Europe) came to play a major role in World War II and the manner in which Nazi extermination policies were implemented there. They also had a major effect on the nature of memory and its erasure in this part of the world for many decades after World War II.

ORIGINS

Buczacz is located in present-day western Ukraine, 84 miles southeast of L'viv. Its earliest records date back to the thirteenth century. Buczacz flourished as a commercial hub in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It is known to have had Jewish residents since 1500. The Jewish population increased following the establishment of the Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth in 1569, as Polish magnates invited the Jews of central Poland to develop their newly acquired estates in Podolia and Ukraine. The noble Polish Potocki family, which took possession of Buczacz in 1612, granted the Jewish residents numerous economic and political privileges. Thus a pattern was established whereby the Poles constituted the local nobility and some of the urban population; the Jews came to make up a major part of the urban population, managed the estates of the nobles, dealt in trade and commerce, and worked as artisans, moneylenders, tavern keepers, and so forth. The local Ruthenian people were mostly peasant serfs.

The town suffered greatly during the 1648 Khmel'nyts'kyi uprising, in which the Polish and Jewish residents of Buczacz defended it against Cossack and peasant forces.[27] But by 1672 the German tourist Ulrich von Werdum could report that Buczacz had "been largely rebuilt, especially by the Jews, who are very numerous in this town, as they are in all of Podolia and Rus'."[28] That same year the town was the site of the Peace of Buczacz, whereby Poland handed over Ukraine and Podolia to Ottoman rule; for the next few years the Strypa River, which passes right though Buczacz, became the border between these two powers. The contemporary

Frenchman François-Paulin Dalairac, who also visited Buczacz, commented that after several more sieges, in 1676 "the Turks accomplished a lasting destruction" of the town.[29]

Yet Buczacz was restored once more and assumed the former demographic and occupational pattern that would largely characterize it and many other towns in the region until World War II—despite subsequent political and economic changes. As Dalairac noted in 1684, "the [Ruthenian] peasants built . . . their homes . . . next to the gate of the city and under the guns of the castle. Inside the city . . . live only Jews and some Poles."[30] In 1699 town owner Stefan Potocki issued a new charter of privileges to the Jewish community, facilitating the expansion of its economic activity.[31] During the eighteenth century Buczacz developed into an elegant and prosperous town whose population included well over a thousand Jews.[32]

In 1772 southeastern Poland was annexed by the Habsburg Empire and named the Crownland of Galicia. Following Enlightenment principles, the new regime annulled many of the privileges of the Jewish population, greatly limited leasing rights, imposed state rather than feudal taxes (including duties on kosher meat and candles), forbade Jewish residence in villages, and compelled Jews to take up German family names. Eventually some of the more draconian laws were revised or ignored and Jews obtained the right to buy themselves out of military service—which meant that the poor were disproportionately recruited.

Buczacz sustained several calamities in the nineteenth century, including a cholera epidemic in 1831 that took the lives of some six hundred Jews, and a massive fire in 1865 that destroyed the Great Synagogue along with 220 houses, and severely damaged the town's magnificent city hall.[33] But in the wake of the 1848 revolution and the constitutional phase of what became the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, the condition of the Jews in Buczacz also improved. By 1870 the town's 6,077 Jewish residents constituted two thirds of its entire population, the highest recorded ratio in the modern history of Buczacz. And in 1874, in the first municipal elections, 12 Jews, 9 Poles, and 9 Ukrainians were elected to the municipal council. Finally in 1879 the town elected a Jewish mayor, Bernhard Stern, who remained in that position for forty-two years, later also becoming head of the Jewish community and member of the Austrian parliament.[34]

These were all signs of well-ordered relations between the three main ethnic groups in the city under overall control of the Austrian authorities. This period also saw a great expansion in cultural and political activity among all residents, growing Polish and Ukrainian nationalism, as well as a Jewish political awakening. The introduction of elections with universal manhood suffrage to Galicia in 1907 made for various alliances within and between the three main ethnic groups. But while Poles and Ukrainians were vying for control over the region, the Jews could only maneuver between them.

Other rapid changes were taking place in Buczacz in the years leading to World War I. By 1910 the population had grown to 14,286 inhabitants, of whom just over half were Jews. Since 1899 the town had a secondary school (gymnasium), which registered 696 students in 1908, of whom 216 were Jews.[35] Thanks to the gradual industrialization of the region, Jews could also be found as workers in the expanding factories, workshops, and breweries, although most remained artisans of various types. The relative poverty of Galicia meant that many Jews chose to emigrate overseas, explaining the changing demographic ratio. Others veered toward Zionism, whose territorial focus was elsewhere, or toward socialism, which seemed to offer a solution to the vexing question of Jewish existence in an era of integral nationalism.

THE FIRST CATACLYSM

Galicia was devastated in World War I and the ensuing struggle between Poles, Ukrainians, and Bolsheviks. Since it repeatedly changed hands between 1914 and 1917, Buczacz was struck especially severely. Over 60 percent of the houses in the town were destroyed and some two thousand of its Jewish residents fled for fear of the Russian army, whose antisemitic reputation preceded it. Aba Lev, a young Russian Jewish soldier, came to Buczacz just hours after the Russians occupied it in the summer of 1916. The town, he wrote, presented a "terrifying picture of destruction, vandalism, and cruelty." In one house he saw

> a boy of about ten whose hands were broken and next to him his mother with a smashed skull and legs cut off. . . . In the next house there was a dead woman, who had first been raped and then beaten so badly that she died the same day in terrible agony. In the third and fourth houses there were raped Jewish women . . . men with smashed heads and gouged eyes. In the hospice I found five murdered people. . . . They also showed me numerous Jewish houses with dead people who had been strangled, burned, and so on.[36]

The Polish schoolteacher Antoni Siewinski wrote in his unpublished diary that Buczacz, whose prewar years he recalled with fondness—even as he emphasized that to his mind it was controlled by the Jews—was "now totally devastated and ruined." Subsequently Ukrainian nationalist troops also ran riot in the town, which was simultaneously struck by a typhus epidemic that claimed many lives. By 1921, when Buczacz came under Polish rule, its population had diminished to 7,517 inhabitants, of whom half were Jews.[37]

World War I put an end to a regime that had kept the balance and managed the relations between the different ethnic groups, even as it allowed

them to develop their own separate national identities. The war ended by pitting these groups one against the other. The ultimate failure of the Ukrainian attempt to create an independent state left a legacy of bitterness and frustration; the Bolshevik attempt to impose communist rule similarly cast a shadow of suspicion and rage; and the installation of Polish rule after a hiatus of almost 150 years was deeply resented by the majority Ukrainian population. Finally, both Polish and Ukrainian nationalists suspected the Jews of supporting their enemies, associated them with communists, and excluded them from their visions of future ethnically homogeneous states. The seeds of ethnic mayhem two decades later were sown in World War I and its immediate aftermath.

UNDER POLISH RULE

Buczacz never fully recovered from the devastation of World War I. Polish attempts to colonize the region led to Ukrainian resentment and anti-Polish attacks. And the increasing influence of antisemitic sentiments in Poland led to growing limitations on Jewish access to secondary and higher education as well as to the civil service and other prestigious positions in the military, academia, and so forth. Jewish teenagers in Buczacz faced increasing difficulties in being admitted to the local secondary school. Polish police reports from the interwar period indicate the local authorities' fear of nationalist and communist organizations. As the ethnic groups drifted apart, it was almost exclusively in Communist Party cells that one could find Jews, Ukrainians, and Poles associating with each other. Other cultural, educational, and social organizations, of which there was a great number in interwar Buczacz, were split along ethnic, national, and religious lines.

The Jewish community of Buczacz was undergoing a process of decline during these two decades, poignantly described by Nobel Prize laureate Shmuel Yosef Agnon in his novel *A Guest for the Night*, based on his visit to his birthplace in 1930. Politically, the Zionist parties came to dominate the community, especially among the youth. However, manifestations of blatant antisemitism were not common in interwar Buczacz, and many Holocaust survivors who were then children recalled friendships with gentiles. But adults either kept to their own ethnic groups beyond their professional lives or left the city. Apart from Agnon, the town's best-known sons included the historian Emanuel Ringelblum, who later organized the *Oneg Shabbat* archive in the Warsaw Ghetto and was subsequently murdered by the Germans, and Simon Wiesenthal, who spent the rest of his long postwar life hunting down German perpetrators, including those who had annihilated the Jewish community of Buczacz.

That ethnic identity was a crucial component of daily life and politics can be seen from the Polish census of 1931. Despite its appearance as a

highly detailed statistical analysis, the census has all the hallmarks of political manipulation and gerrymandering. The figures indicated that Buczacz had expanded to 23,884 residents, of whom 11,823 were Roman Catholic (Polish), 5,286 Greek Catholic (Ukrainian), and 6,739 Jewish. As many as 13,348 residents gave their mother tongue as Polish. By presumably including Polish villages in the vicinity, the authorities tried to present a predominance of Poles in a region where Ukrainians were the rural majority and Jews the majority or a very high proportion of city dwellers.

Tellingly, no less than 1,975 people polled in Buczacz declared Ruthenian rather than Ukrainian as their mother tongue, whereas 413 residents gave their mother tongue as Hebrew rather than Yiddish. Both cases were clear indications that ethnic assertion was hardly a one-way street. But the census did not reflect other aspects of the seething tensions in the town. Poverty certainly played a role. The decline of the relatively wealthier Jewish community was one clue. Thus, for instance, by 1938 only 383 out of 1,453 Jewish heads of households could afford to pay community taxes.[38] A more disturbing sign of future trouble was political recruitment into radical organizations. A significant number of Ukrainians who later became members of the militia and police under the German occupation and played an active role in murdering their Jewish and Polish neighbors, were members of the Buczacz branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in the 1930s.[39]

OCCUPATION AND GENOCIDE

When the Soviets entered Buczacz on September 18, 1939, many Ukrainians greeted them as liberators from Polish oppression. Similarly, not a few young, working-class, and politically active Jews believed that the new regime would provide them with greater educational and employment opportunities.[40] But Soviet rule in eastern Poland quickly crippled the economy and greatly restricted cultural and religious life. Thousands of citizens were deported to the interior of the Soviet Union. Who the primary targets of Soviet repression policies were was a disputed issue at the time and has remained a bone of contention in memory and historiography.

Thus contemporary Polish reports claimed that whereas deportations of Ukrainians and Jews were "of a clearly political and preventive nature," those of Poles "aimed at the destruction of the nation's substance."[41] But the reality was more complex. On February 10, 1940, no less than 31,640 mostly Polish residents of the Tarnopol region—where Buczacz was located—were deported. But on August 5, 1940, the German embassy in Moscow reported the deportation of 20,000 to 25,000 Jewish refugees from Lwów to Kazakhstan. In Buczacz this entailed the incarceration of 174 Jewish refugees in the Jewish orphanage and their deportation to Siberia.[42] Ukrainians were deported in proportionately smaller numbers. But

massive arrests of nationalist activists throughout the region on the eve of the German attack culminated in the execution of up to 30,000 prisoners, mostly Ukrainians, including several prominent Buczacz residents, as soon as Hitler unleashed Operation Barbarossa.[43]

The Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia in 1939–1941 had a devastating effect on interethnic relations in the region. The massive arrests, deportations, and executions decimated the elites and let loose a wave of denunciations and violence. The Soviets recruited people from among the Jews and the Ukrainians who had been marginalized by the previous Polish authorities. The labeling of Jews as communists, a habit whose roots in the region dated back to the struggle for Ukrainian independence and the widespread pogroms of 1917–1920, was resurrected and magnified in the last phase of the Soviet occupation under the impact of NKVD executions of Ukrainian nationalists and of Nazi propaganda against alleged Judeo-Bolsheviks.[44] Any hope there might have been of Soviet support for Ukrainian independence was quickly dispelled, and the more radical elements of Ukrainian nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera (OUN-B) stood ready to unleash their fury on what they saw as Jewish communists and Polish colonizers as soon as the Soviets withdrew.[45]

This was a crucial element in what transpired in late June and early July 1941, when a wave of pogroms throughout Galicia claimed the lives of thousands of Jews, killed in large part by Ukrainian nationalists, some Polish pogromists, and increasingly German police and army units. It also constituted a fundamental component of the different memories of World War II among Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians and, for that matter, of the split Ukrainian memory with its differing perspectives in the western and east-central parts of the country. That is, the liberation fighters of Western Ukraine were also those who collaborated with the Germans in the murder of the Jews, and they largely on their own initiative perpetrated a campaign of bloody ethnic cleansing against the Poles in Volhynia and Galicia.[46]

This is also why the Jewish memory of events in Galicia includes not only rage and horror at the extermination policies of the Germans but is also imbued with a deep sense of betrayal vis-à-vis the Ukrainian population. The German executioners were thin on the ground; much of the rounding up, plunder, humiliation, and murder was carried out by Ukrainian auxiliary units and policemen. While thousands of Ukrainians (and at least proportionately probably even more Poles) hid Jews, the vast majority either refused them any help or actively denounced them and took over their property. Because so much of the killing occurred in the towns and their vicinity and because so many of the killers and the victims had known each other before the war, the Holocaust in this part of Europe took on a particularly intimate and gruesome character.

Finally, this is also why the three ethnic groups in Galicia saw the end of the German occupation so differently and why it evokes such different memories to this very day. For many Ukrainians, the arrival of the Red

Army was seen as a reoccupation; for those Poles who had not already been evacuated by the retreating Germans, the Soviets provided a last moment rescue from widespread massacres by Ukrainian nationalists; for the Jews, this was liberation, and the encounter with the many Jewish soldiers and officers in the first fighting ranks of the Red Army was perceived as almost miraculous, just as for Ukrainian nationalists it reaffirmed the suspicion that Jews and Bolsheviks were synonymous and united in their determination to once again enslave Ukraine.

The voices of the victims of history are far less often heard than those of the politicians who exploit their victimhood or of the scholars who write about them. When we listen to the victims' voices, we never find precisely what we expect; we are forced to retreat from generalizations and simplifications and to concede that the individual's experience is always more complex than the manner in which it is subsequently presented by others. One such voice, which provides a glimpse of this complexity of individual experience and memory, is that of Edzia Spielberg-Flitman, who recounted her experiences in a videotaped testimony recorded in 1995.

Born in 1930 in Czortków, Edzia remembered her classmates "abusing me . . . calling me 'Jew' . . . I was nine years old. They were . . . throwing rocks [stones] at me. . . . I used to do homework with Christian children but we didn't have any social activities together . . . There was definitely a division between Jews and Christians." And yet she recalls that her upper-middle-class parents "did have a lot of Christian acquaintances . . . attorneys and judges." Even "the police was friendly with my parents." When the Soviets invaded in 1939, Edzia's father was arrested. When he returned home he commented that "the Russians are kind of peasants . . . the Germans are after all civilized people, so how much worse could they be?"

It should be noted that many Jewish accounts of childhood in Galicia mention good relations with Ukrainian and Polish children. Ethnic, religious, and national differences emerged increasingly as children grew older and were most pronounced among adults; tensions were exacerbated toward the end of the interwar period with the radicalization of nationalist rhetoric among Poles and Ukrainians and the strengthening of Zionism and socialism among Jewish youths. Although Jews of a higher social and material status were treated with respect by their neighbors, resentment was clearly not far from the surface. Consequently Jewish children who left Galicia before the war usually had fonder memories of such interethnic relations than those who experienced the Holocaust there. Similarly, Jewish expectations of German conduct were based on the experiences of World War I—which most adults remembered—when the Russian army carried out pogroms and deportations, whereas the Germans and Austrians restored order.[47]

Edzia's experience was radically different. When the Red Army withdrew, the family was staying in a small village in the countryside. That very first night they were attacked by "neighbors, Ukrainian people . . .

who [previously had] bowed and said good morning . . . [who] were very polite . . . the people literally that we knew . . . they came and threw hand grenades and . . . were going to kill us all." But Edzia's family was sheltering at a Christian friends' house. The attackers came there "with axes and guns . . . and they said . . . you have to let them out." But their host refused to betray them. The mob then went on to her uncle's house and killed his wife and two children: "They just split their heads with axes. . . . One of the people who were splitting their heads was a Ukrainian teacher. I knew her very well, she was one of my teachers." Another Jewish family of seven was attacked; three adults and two children were axed to death, only two children survived. All this happened before the Germans arrived in the area.

Following these events Edzia and her family fled to Buczacz. Her recollections of violence by local Ukrainians there are especially poignant. Attacks on the ghetto population, she remarked, were mostly carried out by the

> Ukrainian police, [along with] very few Germans. . . . The Ukrainians would walk around and kill people, every day there were people killed or taken away. . . . We had very few Polish people . . . it was mostly Ukrainians . . . they were influenced very strongly by their parents and grandparents . . . [in their] hatred of Jews. They simply didn't want us around.

At one point Edzia was caught and brought before the Ukrainian police chief, who told this twelve-year-old girl that he was going to kill her. This was almost certainly the former public prosecutor Volodymyr Kaznovs'kyi, mentioned earlier, who subsequently spent many years in Soviet gulags. "There was no question; we knew about him, he was executing people left and right." Edzia mentioned her father, who was making alcohol for local consumption. But the police chief would not relent. She then offered him her mother's wedding ring, but the policeman responded: "No, no, no, you are going to be executed. It's too bad for your dad, everyone . . . [says he] is a nice guy." He then told the girl to walk off: "I was anticipating that . . . he was going to kill me from the back . . . This is something very difficult to describe. . . . You don't breathe and you wait for that bullet to kill you. He didn't. He let me go."

Curiously, Edzia's mother befriended "a German lady whose husband was some kind of an executive, or a leader, in the city . . . they used to discuss German literature . . . [and] became . . . friends." When the family ran out of food in the ghetto, the two women tried to exchange goods for food in the village where the family's former maid was living. But the maid

> called . . . somebody to . . . get the Ukrainian police. . . . And they . . . were going to kill [Edzia's mother] right there. . . . And this German woman said, "I'm not going to come back without this lady."

> Apparently there was [a] horrendous scene [of] begging and pleading. . . . And we didn't get any food . . . and . . . were very desperate.

But the mother was spared thanks to her German friend's intervention.

Edzia remembers that "many [Jewish] families" that still had some valuables "went to Christian homes . . . these farmers would . . . keep them for a few days and . . . [then] call the Ukrainian police. They would march them out and . . . just execute them like cattle." Her aunt and cousins were hiding with one such peasant, but he

> called the Ukrainian police . . . they took them all out . . . they had these two little girls . . . my uncle was pulling out his hair and . . . begging the police, "Just don't kill the two little girls, let them live." They ignored it. And my little cousin who was five years old . . . was holding the policeman's hand. He just pushed her away and took [out] the revolver and killed her first in front of the parents because she was annoying him, she was kissing his hand.

Edzia, her six-year-old brother, and her parents were also hiding with a peasant to whom their mother promised their house and farmland after the war. But the Kafchuks were different. This "was just a poor farmer with a wife and four children. . . . [The wife] was the only one that my mother felt was . . . humane." She said to them: "It doesn't matter how long it takes, we will share our bread and potatoes with you." Edzia's mother helped the woman deliver her fourth child. She remembers them as "very kind, wonderful people."

When Buczacz was liberated in March 1944, Edzia and her family went back to the city. Shortly thereafter the Germans recaptured Buczacz and a German soldier discovered the family hiding in a cellar. The soldier said to them: "I figured out you are definitely Jews . . . and we're going to kill you . . . Jews are not supposed to [live]. . . . Our leader doesn't want any Jews." Edzia's mother told the girl to run to a neighbor "that she knew very well. This man was a big executive, he knew us, he used to come to our house and his mother lived in the neighborhood."

Edzia recounts:

> I went to this Mrs. Husler who knew me as a child; who knew my parents. And I said, "they know we are Jews, they are going to kill us all. My mother told me to come to you." I remember she took me like this by my clothes and threw me out. She said, "You can go," she had some outhouse, "You can go and sit there." . . . [She] wouldn't even offer me a drink of water.

That day Edzia's father was caught on the street and executed by the Germans. Yet it appears that the German soldier had in fact not betrayed

their hiding place, and Edzia, her mother, and her brother managed to slip out of town. As they tried to reach the Soviet lines, Edzia ended up working with Ukrainian girls for a German army unit. But the other girls suspected that she was Jewish and denounced her to the German commander, who then also discovered that her mother and brother were hiding in the vicinity. Rather than killing them, this Wehrmacht officer took them away from the front: "He was a big man . . . and he says, 'Live well.' And he left, and he then turned back with his horse one more time and he says, 'I hope you all live well.' And he left."

Shortly thereafter the Red Army marched in. When Edzia and her family returned to Czortków, there were "just empty walls, there was no furniture. Everybody robbed us, they took everything out—again we had no food, we had no clothing." Edzia liked the Russians: "They were very nice to us . . . [they] showed no antisemitism whatsoever . . . many of the officers and the pilots were . . . Jewish." But, she said, she was

> very happy to get away from the Ukrainians because they had pogroms after the war. They were killing Jews, when a Jew would go to the village or would go to Ukrainian friends . . . They would still kill us, they were still killing us. They were so brutal. I think they were worse than the Germans as far as I am concerned. They left a big scar upon me. And I think my family was mostly killed by them, I would say eighty percent were killed by the Ukrainians who were our friends.[48]

This was the memory of one Jewish girl. It is complex and ambivalent. Like so many others, her family was both saved and betrayed by Ukrainians. In her case, as in several others known to me, more than once Germans also stepped in and saved Jewish lives. This does not change the general picture. The Holocaust would not have happened in Ukraine had it not been for the German determination to exterminate the Jews. And thousands of Ukrainians risked their lives and saved Jews by hiding them, providing them with food, and helping them to escape. But the reality for most Jews in Ukraine was as Edzia summed up. For Ukrainian Jews, it was their neighbors, coworkers, friends, and colleagues who not only frequently turned away from them when they begged for help but denounced and betrayed them, profited from their murder, and, in all too many cases willingly participated in the killing.

AFTERMATH

The Jewish revenge feared by Ukrainians did not occur. The few survivors who returned to Buczacz after the liberation soon left the town and ended up mostly in Israel and the United States. Buczacz became part of Soviet

Ukraine. By the late 1940s the resistance of Ukrainian nationalists was brutally suppressed and Buczacz, now an almost exclusively Ukrainian town, sank back into obscurity. Soviet politics of memory denied any specificity to Jewish victimhood. A memorial to the victims put up in the Jewish cemetery in 1944 was removed. A Soviet tourist guide to Buczacz published as late as 1985 merely mentioned that "the Hitlerites . . . exterminated about 7,500 civilians," avoiding mention of either Jewish victims or Ukrainian collaborators.[49]

The Soviet attempt to submerge the memory of Jewish genocide in a general tale of victimhood and heroism by "Soviet civilians" meant that very few people could learn about what had actually happened to the Jews, let alone find out about the collaboration of local nationalists in the extermination of one ethnic group and the ethnic cleansing of another. The *Black Book of Russian Jewry*, which had been prepared by the Jewish Soviet writers and journalists Ilya Ehrenburg and Vasily Grossman in order to document the crimes of the Nazis, was never published in the Soviet Union. And what came to be known subsequently as the *Unknown Black Book*, a collection of documents that included vast amounts of information on collaborators among the "Soviet people," was set aside by the editors of the *Black Book* themselves because of the sensitivity of the topic. It is only in recent years that this information has become public.[50]

Since Ukrainian independence in 1991, the anti-Soviet fighters who were vilified by the Communists are being glorified. A new memorial to nationalist leader Stepan Bandera has recently been erected in Buczacz. The memory of Jewish life and the manner of their mass murder has not returned. The mass graves are largely unmarked. A modest memorial recently put up by survivors and their descendants at the Jewish cemetery is already deteriorating and serves as an open-air toilet. This landscape of erasure is characteristic of hundreds of other towns in eastern Europe: they remain unrecognized *lieux de mémoire* in lands reluctant to remember both the richness and vibrancy of prewar Jewish life and the manner in which it was torn out and destroyed.

Just as disturbing are denials of the singularity of the fate of the Jews in Ukraine, combined with arguments regarding the alleged complicity of Jews in the persecution and murder of Ukrainians and the resurfacing of the old association between Jews and Communists. Such views, far from uncommon in contemporary Ukraine, whether among politicians or in the media, are even touted by some scholars. The urge to equate Jewish and Ukrainian suffering borrows from the Soviet habit of subsuming all specific fates under that of the "Soviet nation" as a whole, just as much as it borrows from nationalist rhetoric going back to World War I. History and memory, then, are still very much the site of active battles over identity and nationhood, even as the killing fields of the Holocaust remain largely abandoned and unmarked.[51]

NOTES

1. German Federal Military Archive, Freiburg i. Br. [hereafter: BA-MA] RH20–17/32, 5.7.41, 6.7.41; RH26–101/8, 5.7.41; RH24–52/3, Kriegstagebuch (KTB), Heft 2, 40–42, 55; RH20–17/38, 6.7.41, 12.7.41; RH20–17/277, 7.7.41; RH26 257/8, KTB Nr. 5, 20.5.41–12.12.41; RH26–257/10, Anlagen z. KTB Nr. 5, Bd.2, 12.7.41, 13.7.41; RH20–17/33, 11.7.41, 12.7.41.
2. State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in the city of Ternopil' (HAD SBU Ternopil'), Kaznovs'kyi trial (1956–57), spr. 30466, vols. 1–2; 26874; 14050-P; 736; 3713; 14340; 9859-P; 8540-P; 8973-P; 14320-P; Letter by Markus Kleiner, April 10, 1951; Izaak Szwarc, Jewish Historical Institute Archive, Warsaw (AZIH), 301–327 (1945); Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw (IPN), 0192/336, vol. 29, Józef Humeniuk trial (1949).
3. Isidor Gelbart, accounts in Yad Vashem Archives (YVA), 033/640, and Bundesarchiv-Ludwigsburg (BA-L) 208 AR-Z 239/59, Band III, Bl. 1004–1013, Kurt Köllner trial (1965); Józef Kornblüh, AZIH 301/2605 (1945), 301/3279 (1948), 301/3283 (1948); Samuel Rosen, YVA M-49/1935 (1960); Samuel Rosenthal, AZIH 301/2086 (1947); Moshe Wizinger, YVA 03/3799 (1947); unsigned testimony on Baruch Kramer YVA M-1/E, 1726 (1948); "Letter 5," by Jewish physician, signature illegible, June 5, 1946, private collection (courtesy of Maurice Wolfthal).
4. Yitzhak Shikhor (Szwarc), "How It Happened," in Yisrael Cohen, ed., *The Book of Buczacz* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1956, in Hebrew), 238; HAD SBU Ternopil', spr. 240, vol. 3, photos of Police Battalion 320 in Kopyczynce near Buczacz; State Archive of the Ternopol Oblast' (DATO), f. R-174, op. 1, 1283, 3.9.41.
5. Israel Gelbart's testimony in Cohen, *Buczacz*, 273–274.
6. "Letter 5," n. 3, above.
7. Yehoshua Friedlender, private account, 2004 (courtesy of Eyal Ziffer).
8. Unsigned testimony (1948), n. 3, above.
9. Rosen (1960), n. 3, above.
10. Rosental (1947), n. 3, above; see also Shmuel Rosental's testimony in Cohen, *Buczacz*, 260.
11. Shikhor, n. 4, above, 238.
12. Wizinger, n. 3, above.
13. Wizinger, n. 3, above.
14. "Letter from Dr. Abraham Chalfen," in Cohen, *Buczacz*, 233.
15. Shikhor, n. 4, above, 244–245; Zeev Anderman interview with author, 2002.
16. Yitzhak (Ischak, Izio) Bauer, BAB 162/5182, testimony at Albert Brettschneider's trial (1968); Bauer interview with author, 2003.
17. Wizinger, n. 3, above.
18. Gelbart, n. 5, above.
19. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Archives (USHMM) RG-31.003M Reel 1; Fritz Ernst Blome, Berlin Document Center (BDC), RS/BAB; Indictment against Köllner and Heinrich Peckmann, BA-L, DP 3/1645; Werner Eisel, Ludwigsburg Archiv, Baden-Württemberg (LA-BW), GLA-K 309. Zug. 2001_42/881, LG-Man SB. 40.
20. Urteil LG-H 601031 Lfd. Nr. 498, Paul Thomanek, in Fritz Bauer et al., eds., *Justiz und NS-Verbrechen: Sammlung deutscher Strafurteile wegen nationalsozialistischer Tötungsverbrechen 1945–1966* (JNSV) (Amsterdam: University Press Amsterdam, 1968–), 16:727–772; testimony by Henriette Bau (Lissberg), Brettschneider trial (1969), BAB 162/5183; testimony by Walter Hoffer, Köllner and Peckmann trial, BA-L, 208 Ar-Z 239/59 (1960);

Peter Pahl, trial, BAB 162/5167, 5169, 5173 (1966–67); Albert Wachinger, employee of Ackermann, Brettschneider trial (1960), BAB 162/5180.
21. Karl Baedeker, *Das Generalgouvernement* (Leipzig: K. Baedeker, 1943), 235.
22. *Amtliches Gemeinde- und Dorfverzeichnis für das Generalgouvernement* (Krakau: Burgverlag 1943), in Główny Urząd Statystyczny (GUS)—Library.
23. Mojżesz Szpigiel, AZIH 301/3492 (1948); Wizinger, n. 3, above.
24. Eliasz Chalfen, YVA M1/E 1559 (1947).
25. Bauer interview, n. 16, above; Wizinger, n. 3, above.
26. Viktor Petrykevych diary, private (courtesy of Bohdan Petrykevych).
27. Natan Neta Hanover, *Abyss of Despair* (Yeven metsulah), (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1945 [1652], in Hebrew), 63.
28. Ulrich von Werdum, *Das Reisejournal*, ed. Silke Cramer (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1990 [1670–1677]), 210–211.
29. Sadok Barącz, *Pamiątki Buczackie* (Lwów: Nakładem wydawcy, 1882), 12.
30. Ibid., 10–11
31. Nathan Michael Gelber, "History of the Jews in Buczacz," in Cohen, *Buczacz*, 67–73.
32. Ibid., 53.
33. Danuta Dąbrowska et al. (eds.), *Pinkas Hakehillot: Poland*, vol. II, *Eastern Galicia* (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1980, in Hebrew), 83–84.
34. Ibid., 83–85.
35. Ibid.; Gelber in Cohen, *Buczacz*, 62; Stanislaw J. Kowalski, *Powiat Buczacki i jego zabytki* (Biały Dunajec-Ostróg: Ośrodek " Wołanie z Wołynia," 2005), 75.
36. Aba Lev, "The Devastation of Galician Jewry in the Bloody World War," in L. M. Klyachko et al., eds., *Jewish Chronicle*, vol. III (Leningrad-Moscow: "Raduga," 1924, in Russian, trans. from Yiddish), 174. See also S. Ansky, *The Enemy at His Pleasure*, trans. and ed. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2002).
37. Dąbrowska, *Pinkas*, 83, 85.
38. Dąbrowska, *Pinkas*, 86.
39. HDA SBU, Ternopil', sprava no. 26874, 30466.
40. Hoover Institution, Register of the Poland Ministry of Information and Documentation, 1939 L. M. Klyachko et al., 1945 (HI/MID), Box 199/5, 1941; Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (PISM), B I/96 K., 1940.
41. PISM, PRM-K-96, p. 12.
42. 5. August 1940, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA): Botschaft Moskau, 495; British National Archives (BNA) collection from DATO of NKVD questionnaires.
43. Jan T. Gross, *Revolution from Abroad*, 2nd ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Bogdan Musial, *"Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen": Die Brutalisierung des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges im Sommer 1941* (Berlin: Propyläen, 2000). Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 14, cites Soviet documents indicating a total of 8,789 Ukrainian, Polish, and Jewish prisoners executed by the NKVD in Ukraine.
44. Henry Abramson, *A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 28–30, 112–113; Musial, *"Konterrevolutionäre Elemente sind zu erschiessen."*
45. Kai Struve, "The Explosion of Violence: The Pogrom of Summer 1941," in Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz, eds., *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence*

and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 463–484. Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe, "Debating, Obfuscating and Disciplining the Holocaust: Post-Soviet Historical Discourses on the OUN-UPA and Other Nationalist Movements," *East European Jewish Affairs* 42/3 (2012), 203, estimates over 13,000 Jewish victims; Dieter Pohl, "Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Western Ukraine," in Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth Ann Cole, and Kai Struve, eds., *Shared History—Divided Memory: Jews and Others in Soviet-Occupied Poland, 1939–1941* (Göttingen, Germany: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2007), 306, estimates up to 35,000 Jewish victims.

46. Timothy Snyder, "The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943," *Past & Present* 179 (2003): 198–234; Lucyna Kulińska and Adam Roliński, eds., *Kwestia ukraińska i eksterminacja ludności polskiej w Małopolsce Wschodniej w świetle dokumentów Polskiego Państwa Podziemnego 1942–1944* (Kraków: Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego, 2004); Lucyna Kulińska and Adam Roliński, eds., *Antypolska akcja nacjonalistów ukraińskich w Małopolsce Wschodniej w świetle dokumentów Rady Głównej Opiekuńczej 1943–1944* (Kraków: Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego, 2003); Franziska Bruder, *"Den ukrainischen Staat erkämpfen oder sterben!" Die Organisation ukrainischer Nationalisten (OUN) 1929–1948* (Berlin: Metropol, 2007); John-Paul Himka, "Debates in Ukraine over Nationalist Involvement in the Holocaust, 2004–2008," *Nationalities Papers* 39/3 (2011), 353–370; Per A. Rudling, *The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 2011); Marco Carynnyk, "Foes of our Rebirth: Ukrainian Nationalist Discussions about Jews, 1929–1947," *Nationalities Papers* 39/3 (2011), 315–352.
47. In 1995, when I interviewed my mother about her childhood in Buczacz, she could remember only Ukrainian playmates and school friends. But she left in 1935 at age eleven. Her own mother greatly admired German culture and was a refugee in World War I, having fled the Russians. Conversely, see the following two memoirs by women of a similar age who remained in Buczacz during the Holocaust: Etunia Bauer Katz, *Our Tomorrows Never Came* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Alicia Appelman-Jurman, *Alicia, My Story* (New York: Bantam Books, 1988).
48. Edzia Spielberg-Flitman, *USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education* (USCSF), videotaped testimony, 1995. Bronia Kahane, age fourteen at the time, recalled that when she returned to Buczacz four months after its second liberation she was told: "There are not too many Jews here. There's one building; knock and they'll let you in. We have to be under the key [i.e., locked in] because we're afraid during the night they shouldn't kill us." She adds: "I never went back to my house . . . because they said don't you dare go back because they're going to kill you." USCSF, Videotaped testimony, 1995.
49. Igor Duda, *Buczacz: The Guide* (L'viv: "Kameniar," 1985, in Ukrainian).
50. Joshua Rubenstein and Vladimir P. Naumov, eds., *Stalin's Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee*, trans. Laura Esther Wolfson (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001); Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman, eds., *The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German-Occupied Soviet Territories*, trans. C. Morris and J. Rubenstein (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).
51. John-Paul Himka, *Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust: Divergent Memories* (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan: Heritage Press, 2009), and Himka,

"Interventions: Challenging the Myths of Twentieth-Century Ukrainian History," in Alexei Miller and Maria Lipman, eds., *The Convolution of Historical Politics* (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2012), 211–238. For an overall view of the politics of memory in contemporary eastern Europe, see John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic, eds., *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013).

13 Memories of an Exodus

Istria, Fiume, Dalmatia, Trieste, Italy, 1943–2010

John Foot

"A piece of Italy had disappeared." Raoul Pupo.[1]

"*We will return!!!*" Writing on a wall, Istria, 1954.[2]

Between the 1940s and the 1950s more than 250,000 people abandoned Istria, which is now part of Croatia, as well as Fiume and parts of Dalmatia. They were of Italian origin and almost all of them spoke Italian or a dialect linked to Italian. These exiles left behind their houses, their businesses and shops, and their land as well as a history of an Italian presence in that region that went back hundreds of years. Something like 80 to 90 percent of Italians in Istria left forever. A human presence that had marked the territory disappeared from the landscape. Whole villages were abandoned and houses left to slowly crumble and collapse. A diaspora was created. [3]

Various small *esodi* (mass population movements from Yugoslavia to Italy) contributed to the "long exodus" between 1944 and 1956; they were linked to various historical and geographical phases as well as the negotiations over treaties.[4] After heavy bombing in 1944, Zara was more or less deserted. The flight from Fiume occurred in 1945. Pola emptied in 1947. Many areas in Istria did not see a mass exodus until the 1950s. The Paris Peace Treaty was signed on February 10, 1947, and became active on September 15 of that year. Many Istrians (especially those in the so-called Zone B, closest to Trieste) hung on, in the face of discrimination and occasional violence, in the vain hope that the negotiations would go their way. But when it became clear that the borders would remain as they were, the final stage of the exodus began, in 1953–1954.[5] After the peace treaty was signed, Italians were given the chance to choose their citizenship. They had a year to decide. The vast majority opted for the west.

There is much debate about the nature of the *esodo*. Was it a voluntary migration or an expulsion? Probably the truth lies somewhere in between these two extremes, and experiences varied from area to area. There were also those who stayed—the "*rimasti*"—who have been studied in some

detail by Pamela Ballinger and Gloria Nemec.[6] The reasons for leaving were many, including widespread fear of a "return to the *foibe*" (the name usually given to the deportations and executions carried out by Tito's armies in the 1943–1945 period in Yugoslavia and Italy), political and ethnic persecution, and real or imagined economic decline.

Many refugees began their exile in Trieste, a few kilometers away by sea; others made their way to Turin, Venice, and Ancona or other cities across the peninsula. Some 20,000 made the long journey to Australia, and others ended up in the United States or Canada. The refugees took everything they could with them—all kinds of furniture, shop signs, teaspoons, animals, and sometimes even their dead inside coffins. Almost immediately, this population movement was given a biblical name—the great exodus, *il grande esodo*. The Italian political left—but not only the left—treated these exiles with some suspicion. They suffered discrimination, were generically labeled as "fascists," and were criticized for the help they received from the Italian state. Many were condemned to live for years in squalid refugee camps across Italy while they awaited decent public housing.

As if this were not enough, the exodus from Istria was met with an embarrassed (and embarrassing) silence among historians, politicians, and journalists. This was not a *local* silence—the refugee question was and remains a central issue in Trieste—but a *national* silence. History books rarely mentioned the exodus despite its mass nature and historical importance. Very few people beyond Trieste wanted to discuss the exodus or study the refugees. There were many reasons for this silence. For the Communists the exiles were traitors, while for successive governments they encapsulated shameful memories of wartime defeat and postwar impotence as well as of the loss of "Italian" territories to a Communist regime. And the exile question also threatened to unsettle delicate international negotiations.

The Cold War thus imposed a long silence about the exodus on all sides. The only politicians interested in the refugees at a national level were the neofascists. This support was a further factor in the community's political isolation in the postwar period because the neofascists were effectively excluded from power at all levels within the Italian system until the 1990s.[7] Locally, the exile community was a potent political resource, mobilized both by the Christian Democrats and to a lesser extent by the neo-Fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano. Historians in that part of Italy began to study the exodus from the 1970s onward, but this work remained—on the whole—for local consumption, largely ignored at a national level.

Suddenly, however, in the 1990s, the Cold War came to an end. Yugoslavia disintegrated in the course of a vicious civil war. Istria became part of Croatia, a new state. Borders reopened, mentally and physically. The exodus—like the *foibe*—became almost fashionable. A number of books were published around these themes and they found a *national* audience for the first time.[8] One of the key issues for the exiles has always been one of *reception*—of being listened to (or appearing to be so) beyond their own community.

At the same time, the "public use" of this history—always a factor in Italy, particularly on its frontiers—has intensified despite the serious research of historians and writers around the theme of the exodus. Historians began to draw out the contradictions and the painful nature of this mass population movement, which has also inspired some fascinating works of fiction and autobiographical writing. The relative lack of historical research has meant that novels and autobiographical accounts have become crucial to the ways in which the *esodo* has been narrated. As Nemec argues, "perhaps it has been literature and individual biographies, more than historians, which have contributed to the spread of memory linked to the period after the exodus."[9]

INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY, MUSEUMS, AND *MASSERIZIE*

In 2004, a law was passed that assigned February 10 to the memory of the *esodo*—(along with the *foibe*); thus these events obtained national institutional status. The idea of "days of memory" has become popular in recent years in Italy with regard to traumatic events, usually linked to the events of World War II. The exodus and the refugees were also to have a museum in Trieste dedicated to them. Already one of the biggest refugee centers used to house the exiles—within walking distance of the *foiba* in Basovizza—has been opened as a visitors' center. The Centro Raccolta Profughi (CRP), or Refugee Center, represents the first attempt by the exile community to memorialize its own past. A large building on the hills above Trieste, the CRP was used a refugee center for over twenty years.[10] Thousands of people spent time at Padriciano, which was one of the biggest camps of its kind in Italy. Some families stayed there for ten years or more, in the wooden shacks within its extensive walled-off area. Others resided in the main building itself. There was also a small chapel (which is now a garage), a canteen, and a police guard on the door. At that time, tensions with local residents were often high, and the refugees were set apart by their accent, dialect, and also their clothes, which were often donated by Americans. The very position of the site—so close to Yugoslavia—was often viewed as a form of marginalization by the refugees housed there. As with other camps, there were rigid controls on who stayed there and even who visited, and the gates were closed at night.

The CRP museum tells this story and others in various "emotional ways"—through photographs of "unknown" exiles found among the abandoned property as well as information panels and a selection of material left behind in the communal storerooms. But it also tells a more generic exile story: one of loss of identity, marginalization, and victimhood (such as the tale of a girl who, in 1956, died of cold in the camp).

The site itself also preserves something of the exile experience, even if the wooden shacks have long since been knocked down. Personal stories are

used to relate these narratives, including that of Danilo Filippaz, who lived at Padricino from 1955 to 1967. For five of these years Danilo's parents sent him off to a disciplinarian orphanage school in nearby Friuli (despite the fact that he was no orphan). In the summer months, Filippaz would return to the camp.[11] Here, narratives of generosity, dignity, and survival are mixed with those of anger, sadness, and loss. One part of the exhibition involves the recreation of the tiny "box" cubicles where many refugees lived across Italy, which were to divide up generic spaces into family-sized units. According to the CRP catalogue, many visitors have since complained that the reproduced cubicles were "too big." Memories have strong links with these tiny spaces, and there is a debate over what they represent for those who lived there and for future generations. According to one description, "every 'cubicle' represented a family whose name evokes stories linked to daily life, memories of villages and neighborhoods which were forcibly abandoned."[12]

MASSERIZIE—"STUFF"

The images we have tell their own story (while hiding many other aspects). In one, a huge mass of chairs, piled up on top of each other, reaches almost to the ceiling. In another image material is crushed into a small room—picture frames, ovens, table legs, a toilet seat, dishcloths, furniture with names written on it. Scattered photos—with no names attached—show children, old people, houses, shops. All this is what is left of the *masserizie*—the property brought over on carts, in boats, or by lorry in the 1940s and 1950s and abandoned since then in warehouses all over Italy. The Italians use this word to describe what is there—*masserizie*—stuff.[13]

The *Nuovo civico museo della civiltà istriana fiumana e dalmata* (New Civic Museum of Istrian, Fiumian, and Dalmatian Civilization) was opened in September 2009 in a large palazzo near the center of Trieste. Part of the mass of material left behind by the refugees on arrival in Italy, which had been preserved in storerooms ever since, was used in the permanent exhibition in the museum. On reaching Italy, the exiles were usually forced to abandon most of the worldly goods they had brought with them from Istria. They had no space for all their property. The prefect of Trieste stored this material in huge warehouses in the area of the port. Many items were simply never reclaimed. In a number of cases, the exiles emigrated forever and were unable to take with them the furniture or farm tools they had brought from Istria. What happened to all these possessions? The history of the *masserizie* of the refugees from Istria is a fascinating one, which forms part of their identity as "forgotten " and "abandoned" people.

In the first instance, a Naples-based company was awarded the contract for the transport and storage of exile property. This was a costly operation, using storerooms in Trieste and Venice. In 1950, the state took over

through the figure of the prefect of Trieste. Some families reclaimed their property as they moved into houses, while others, for various reasons (emigration, the state of the material itself, death and dispersal), abandoned it altogether. In 1955 there were still some 133,000 items left in store. The material was organized in "cubes." In a typical cube, wardrobes or beds served as walls, with the smaller material inside. These "*cubi*" seemed an echo of the experiences of many exiles, in their tiny "boxes" in the refugee camps, with names and numbers on the outside. With time, much material was ruined—and abandoned—as it was strewn across the ground, amid rats, cockroaches, and pigeons. Because they were moved so many times, many cubes were broken up, with items being lost, stolen, or damaged. At that time, other exile issues were much more pressing—above all the question of housing. In the 1970s, the debates over the Osimo negotiations (which eventually led to a final agreement with Yugoslavia regarding national borders) dominated exile politics. It was not yet time for the creation of a permanent museum of memory. After 1975, when the Osimo treaty legitimated the 1954 borders, things began, slowly, to change. Priorities shifted, as it was clear that there was no way back to Istria for the refugees. The museum itself (first mooted in 1983) is another sign that the old dream of a "return" is over. A museum is a sign of permanence, a signal that the *esodo* is no longer a live issue but is becoming part of history. The fate of the museum since 2009 has confirmed this trend. Although well funded, the museum is rarely open, and it is difficult to gain access to the permanent exhibition there. A small number of special exhibitions have been held, but those attending were above all from within the first generation of the *esodo* community in Trieste. There was little attempt to reach out to those from future generations. It was as if the museum itself, its simple existence, was enough: it reinforced the identity of a group. If anything, the museum (and the day of memory) contributed to the cooling down of divisions after a long period of intense conflict over the past.

After 1977, there were attempts to sell what remained in store, but the cheapest solution seemed to be to destroy everything in a huge fire. This did not happen, however. The issue of the *masserizie* did not inspire much public debate until 1987, when the local press began to publish a series of articles concerning the "poetic" mass of material that was still stored in the city. There were a number of appeals to the *esuli* [exiles] to come and get their stuff, but the state of the material was such, in many cases, that it was no longer usable, thanks to damp and dirt. A study in 1987 found that the material as a whole was "worthless."[14] It was also seen as a health risk. For a time it had appeared that it was all to be destroyed or sold, but after a long debate the material was donated to the exiles' association in 1988. There were still 10,000 items (*colli*) left at that point—the property of hundreds of families and individuals.

Over the years, theft, fire, and loss led to the reduction of the material, but in the 1980s it still took up some 2,500 square meters of space in a

Trieste port warehouse. Most of the material was held for some time in Magazzino 18 before a selection was made and the *masserizie* were moved yet again. This huge quantity of furniture, utensils, agricultural tools, schoolbooks, heaters, toys, pictures, photographs, mirrors, and other possessions forms a kind of natural and symbolic museum in its own right.[15] Many objects were still marked with the numbers, either in chalk or on official labels, that identified the owners.

It was at this point in the 1990s that an extraordinary and far-reaching decision was made. Control of the exile material was handed over to the refugee association for safekeeping and for use in the future museum. The "value" of the *massarizie* began to be seen in terms that were not merely monetary. Apart from its emotional impact—the abandonment of these intimate goods symbolizes the loss of an entire territory, the end of a way of life—this material provides a unique research source for ethnographers, anthropologists, and historians. It is a snapshot of a lost world. A selection of this material has already been seen in smaller exhibitions, and it provides the centerpiece of the new museum in Trieste. A small amount of it was earmarked for the "ethnographic core" of the new museum.[16] Originally the idea had been to use a vast room full of *cubi* of abandoned material as the center of the museum, but this was rejected as being too similar to a mortuary. There has thus been an ongoing debate about the *meaning* of this material, about what to throw away and what to keep, and about what image of the exodus and of the *esuli* today's community wishes to project.[17]

For some, the *masserizie* was, *in itself*, a kind of "testimony to the tragedy of a people, a sort of photo-image of an entire society and its daily lives, at a precise historical moment, at the moment when things were broken down."[18] On its own it was already a "museum." Part of this material was first shown in an exhibition in 2004. Politicians also commented on the significance of the *masserizie*. For Roberto Dipiazza, the mayor of Trieste, that material "bears witness more than any words to the injustices suffered by the exile community." The power of the material is beyond doubt, symbolizing the end of a world which is now very much part of the past.

The museum, which was generously funded, finally opened in 2009. Some of the material had already been put on show in the CRP museum close to Basovizza. Arturo Vigini, who began to take care of this material at the end of the 1980s, had this to say about its importance:

> in those 2000 square meters of the possessions of poor people we can see all the DNA of the position of the exile community. These are objects that capture a society in a moment where it stopped existing, and was uprooted and forcibly moved away from its own land. This type of material is unique in European terms.[19]

The idea that the *masserizie* in itself was somehow a "witness" of history, and from history, was a standard claim in discussions about the fate of

this material.[20] Accounts of the *masserizie*'s odyssey place this story within a wider story of exile—as part of a series of silences, forgettings, neglect, and betrayals on behalf of Italy as a whole as well as the political system. It remains to be seen what impact it will have on a wider public.

Images from the *esodo* still have the power to evoke the drama of that time. In the 1940s cameras captured the "poor people's stuff piled up on carts, the houses left open, broken windows, the 'Toscana' ship which went back and forth between Pola and Venice."[21] Already as the exodus was taking place, the sight of people taking all their belongings with them inspired deep emotions. It also inspired the use of considerable doses of rhetoric. The photos of the exiles are pictures of suffering. Many are crying. All seem traumatized. Women in black leave flowers on their family graves for the last time. Small children wait patiently in the snow beside huge carts piled high with simple possessions. A small group of exiles stands guard by Nazario Sauro's remains, a coffin, on the floor of a ship, covered with an Italian flag. These are photos etched with pain and trauma; they will form a key part of the museum's collection. It appears that the *masserizie* will be used in the exhibition above all in terms of their emotional impact and not in an ethnographic or scholarly sense.

EXILE STORIES

Exile writers compared their fate to other victims of history, like the Jews. Exiles were seen—from within—as exceptional victims of a series of injustices and also as being too weak to make their voices heard (unlike the Jews). Speaking of the case of the *masserizie*, Delbello wrote "if the Jews had this material, they would have created 10,000 museums."[22] Sometimes, this critique contained elements of self-criticism. It was said that exiles had been unable to transmit their memories down the generations, for example. But most of the blame was laid at the door of politicians, the left, and historians. The standard exile stories have continued to reproduce themselves, but they have also changed over time and now will be given permanent, institutional status in the form of the new museum.

Meanwhile, some of the taboos that dogged the exiles for so long are falling away. The rediscovery of the *esodo* is clearly a sign of the end of the Cold War—but the exploitation of those stories and that history for present-day political purposes is always a danger and is something that must be guarded against with care. This section will make reference to the idea of "standard stories." These are, for Tilly, the "sequential, explanatory accounts of self-motivated human action" through which people explain and narrate their experiences. Often, these stories focus on individual experiences that are sometimes but not always seen as part of a collective tale (this is certainly the case in terms of the exiled). Tilly argues that historians should "tunnel under" these "standard stories." I

think that such an approach is useful, but that the stories themselves also carry historical weight in their own right, as oral historians have been arguing for decades now.[23]

SILENCE AND NOISE

Most historians—and certainly the vast majority of the *esuli* themselves—agree that the *esodo* was *forgotten* in postwar Italy. Sometimes a stronger term is used—*rimosso*—repressed, hidden, ignored. More generally, there is talk of *silence*—political silence, commemorative silence, historiographical silence. This silence was certainly not there in Trieste or in the surrounding region, however (although it was at the level of historical study). *There*, the refugees were very noisy indeed, conditioning the politics of the city for much of the postwar period. Nonetheless, the idea of being forgotten became part of their identity as exiles, backed by a number of key and oft-repeated stories, some of which will be analyzed in this chapter. This silence, it is generally agreed, has been broken in recent years. A number of important studies have been published about the *esodo*, and there is the day of memory as well as a series of monuments and a museum. Yet this long silence was not alone. The *esodo* from Istria was just one of many different kinds of mass population movements. Slovenes left Trieste and Italy en masse in the 1920s and 1930s, for example, in a direction opposite to that of the Istrian-Italian exodus.

REFUGEE MEMORIES: THE SILOS—HELL ON EARTH?

> "The biggest housing complex in the city of Trieste." Giovanni Ruzzier, "*Il Silos!*"[24]

Houses were simply not available for the mass of people who arrived during the exodus. Temporary accommodation was thus provided for the exiles right across Italy. Frequently former prison camps were used, or abandoned factories or barracks. Women and men were often divided in different camps. The camps themselves were subject to a rigid series of rules—with identity checks and "opening hours" and nighttime inspections. Children were also often separated, either by being sent to special schools or through the use of seaside summer camps.

Thousands of refugees spent at least some time in the "Silos" building, a huge, cavernous structure formerly used to store grain that was built by the Austrians right next to Trieste's central station. Here a vast area was divided into tiny spaces by temporary walls, with each family area being known as a "box." Inside the Silos, light was scarce, the temperature was "on average, some seven degrees hotter" than outside and washed clothes failed to dry. Water dripped from the ceiling. Between five and ten families

shared each toilet, and the washing facilities were collective. Noise was ubiquitous, the thin walls meant that any sense of privacy was reduced to a minimum, and the bathrooms were communal. The contrast with the beautiful rural towns of many of the refugees was total.[25] In order to eat in the nearby canteen, whole families went out in groups every day to line up.

In addition, living in the Silos carried a heavy social stigma in the city; it was common to hide from others the fact of living there. But even here memories were divided, as many children had happy memories of the high levels of sociability in these spaces.[26] A children's playground stood right in front of the entrance to the Silos, in Piazza Libertà. In 1952 a percentage of all public housing was reserved for Istrian refugees, which led to the slow process of proper housing provision for the *esuli*. In Trieste, whole neighborhoods were constructed for the *esuli*, with their own regional identities, often on the edge of town.

Many exiles have described their memories of the Silos building—it was a kind of rite of passage even for those who did not live there—for a time the center of the refugee world in Trieste. An Istrian flag flew above the Silos (and is now on show in the CRP refugee museum), and the flag, it is said, was damaged by the barbed wire placed around the roof of the building. Many writers have described the Silos as a form of hell. For Marisa Madieri "to enter the Silos was like entering a vaguely Dantesque landscape . . . a dark and smoky purgatory." Madieri felt ashamed of her "address" . . ."I never mentioned the Silos to anyone and I tried to keep my address secret for as long as possible."[27]

At least 350 families were "housed" across the three floors of the Silos at any one time; more than a thousand people (although estimates vary). Each family paid a symbolic sum in rent. For many, this first contact with Italy was traumatic. The exiles had been used to a certain way of life and to "working in a certain manner." For the older generations, "living in the city or in a refugee camp signified death."[28] Exiles were at the same time isolated and stigmatized, and not just in Trieste. But they were also highly visible, given the central position of the Silos.

The Silos had aspects that marked it out as a community: its own newspaper (but just for five months, in the 1950s), a small chapel, and collective activities such as commemoration (of those shot dead by the Allies during a patriotic demonstration in 1953, for example). There were little roads and walkways between the various boxes inside the Silos. These walkways were named after various regions from which the refugees had come.

Slowly, in the 1960s, as houses were constructed for the exiles in Trieste and other parts of Italy, the Silos structure was emptied of its refugees. Today, it has been transformed into a car park. A small plaque, unveiled in 2004, reminds passers-by of the importance of the relationship between the refugee experience and the Silos. Just across the road there is also a much larger monument dedicated to the exodus in general. "Little Istrias" were created all over Trieste and in other parts of the peninsula, where the

memory of the homeland was maintained and reproduced in many ways—through culinary traditions, road names, dialect, and forms of domestic behavior and décor.[29]

A different monument close to the central station, also erected in 2004, across the road from the Silos, now remembers the *esodo* and utilizes the top figure of 350,000 refugees. These two sites are now part of an itinerary of memory linked to the *esodo*, which will soon take in the museum and already includes the "*foiba*" at Basovizza.

EXILES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY: A PROMISED LAND?

> "My first impression when I arrived in Trieste . . . was that of paradise on earth, a promised land." Marisa Madieri, *Verde acqua*, Turin, Einaudi, 1987, p. 45.

The idea of the promised land did not last for very long. To their shock, the refugees were treated, for years, as foreigners "in their own country"—herded into former concentration camps and disused buildings.[30] Often the local population treated them with disdain, and sometimes they were faced with social and ethnic discrimination and forms of prejudice as "Istrians" or as refugees. They had swapped one hostility for another, and their material conditions had worsened considerably, as they had lost their homes and their land. They were citizens, which helped, and the political parties were clearly interested in their fate, or rather their votes. By 1961, after all, about a quarter of the population of Trieste was made up of refugees. The refugees identified themselves with two important personalities in the city who were both originally from Rovigno in Istria: Bishop Antonio Santin and Mayor Gianni Bartoli.

Exiles were distributed throughout Italy, for political, social, and economic reasons. Nobody wanted a massive concentration of angry refugees in Trieste itself, just a short distance from their former homes. On the other hand, the exiles were also used as a kind of ethnic bulwark on the Slovenian border, with refugee centers dotted around the city close to the borderlands.[31] The Italian state directed funds toward the refugee crisis, but it was a time of reconstruction and progress was slow. Often, former internment or concentration camps were used as emergency shelters, creating a strange layering of memories and unexpected links between memory and place. No research has yet been carried out around this division of memories within various camps across Italy.

A bizarre twist of fate led the Risiera San Sabba to be used for years as a camp for refugees. This place, on the edge of Trieste, a former rice-husking factory, had been used during the war by the Nazis as a prison, holding center, and death camp. Jews and political prisoners were held and executed in the Risiera, which also had an oven for the burning of bodies. Others were deported from the Risiera to Auschwitz and elsewhere.[32]

Some of the postwar inhabitants later commented on this tragic history, whereas others complained about the poor living conditions in the camp. According to Francesco, "we arrived in San Sabba . . . where there were small boxlike dwellings. It was traumatic. There were six of us in these small spaces, with my grandmother, who was ninety."[33] This fact created another "standard story," which reinforced narratives of humiliation and victimhood within the exile community. Other accounts of the San Sabba camp talk about the traces of the past use of that site and contribute to a sense of humiliation of victimhood.[34] According to Ballinger, the site was still being used as a refugee camp in 1963, just two years before it was designated as a national monument. I have not been able to find any material concerning the relationship between memorial practices at the Risiera and the people who were actually living there, right into the 1960s. When the Risiera was cleared to prepare the museum, many of those refugees were moved to Padriciano, creating further overcrowding. Thus the creation of a monument at the Risiera had a direct impact on the lives of a number of refugees; it was not just a question of symbols and memory.

Hostility toward the exiles was not unusual. This was political hostility—the exiles as "fascists" or, at the very least, "anticommunists." But there was also social and ethnic hostility. The exiles were not as "Italian" in Italy as they thought they were. Jokes about "stupid" Istrians did the rounds in Trieste. Istrian women were stigmatized for their tendency to dress in a certain way, and for their independence. A mea culpa on the left concerning the *esodo* began to take shape in the 1980s and 1990s. For a long time, the refugees from Istria were rejected for political reasons in the context of the Cold War. This prejudice led to some oft-cited episodes in various Italian cities. Bologna station was host to the best-known moment of hostility toward refugees in 1947—an incident examined in some detail below—but there were other similar events in Verona, for example, and Turin. Narratives emerging from the Bologna incident are a clear case of a "standard story," which in itself encapsulated many aspects of the exiles' identity—their victim status, their political connotation, and their helplessness—the silence concerning these moments was linked to their history.

THE "BOLOGNA INCIDENT": 1947–2007

In 1958, some 83 percent of the refugees were in camps and other forms of temporary housing in the north, nearly 10 percent in central Italy, and about 7 percent in the south. Memories of these sites pervade the vast but largely local, and "memorialistica"—editorial production linked to the *esodo* as well as the few serious studies of the period following the *esodo*. Old camps—such as Fossoli, the Risiera di San Sabba, Bolzano, and many others— were kept open for the refugees. Often, thanks to the poor sanitary conditions in these camps, the children were sent for long periods to

seaside camps. Many refugees remember the hostility toward them from locals, in Trieste and elsewhere—a hostility also seen in political terms. As we have noted, the idea that a refugee equaled a fascist was common. The most famous episode linked to this hostility took place in February 1947 in Bologna station. This was a moment that later became part of collective Istrian refugee memory.[35] The facts of what happened are still contested, but it seems that a train carrying refugees was met by a local Communist protest in the station, which prevented food and milk from getting to the refugees and prevented the passengers from getting off.[36] In 2007 a plaque dedicated to the Istrian refugees was placed in Bologna station, on platform one. However, the first version of the text did not satisfy the *esuli* associations because it made no specific reference to the events of February 1947:

> During 1947 the trains which brought the exiled community of Istrians, Fiumians and Dalmatians, who had been forced to abandon their homes by the violence of the national-communist regime, passed through this station. These people were innocent victims, also, of the aggressive war waged by fascism. Later on, Bologna was able to welcome these people, as it traditionally has done, and many of them became citizens of this city. Today the city wishes to remember those dramatic moments of the nation's history. Bologna 1947–2007.

Following protests, the text was changed:

> During 1947 the trains which brought the exiled community of Istrians, Fiumians and Dalmatians, who had been forced to abandon their homes by the violence of the national-communist regime, passed through this station. These people were innocent victims, also, of the aggressive war waged by fascism. Bologna was able to move from a moment of initial misunderstanding towards the acceptance of these peoples, as it traditionally has with others, and many of them became citizens of this city. Today the city wishes to remember those dramatic moments of the nation's history. Bologna 1947–2007.

But this again failed to satisfy the Unione degli Istriani. Nonetheless the ceremony went ahead on February 10, 2007, attended by Sergio Cofferati, the mayor of Bologna, as well as various representatives of exile associations and others.

This controversy showed at least two things. One the one hand, many exiles refused to accept any version of the past that did not fit exactly with the "standard stories" they had elaborated and passed down over the years. Thus the Bologna station story was one of hostility (it was *the* story, the most repeated and best-known tale, linked to this hostility), and it could not be linked to other possible stories. There was no place for narratives of welcome or solidarity. On the other hand, the first version of the Bologna

plaque completely ignored the famous "hostility" incident, and this was corrected in the second version—within the context of a general "good Bologna" story. That is, "Bologna was able to move from a moment of initial misunderstanding towards the acceptance of these peoples, as it traditionally has with others, and many of them became citizens of this city." Neither standard story was able to break free from its ideological chains. The Bologna plaque also underlined how "days of memory" were open to different interpretations across Italy under the influence of local, historical, and political factors.

CONTRO-ESODO: FROM ITALY TO YUGOSLAVIA

Not all Italians went the same way. In 1947 (as well as before and afterwards) a limited number of workers took the train in the opposite direction, carrying red flags, holding up clenched fists, and singing *L'Internazionale*. This was the *counterexodus*, an ideological countermigration from Italy to Yugoslavia—a country "where the calluses on the hands of the workers have no nationality"[37]—and more specifically to Fiume. In terms of numbers, there was no comparison between the flows of people. A few thousand at most participated in this countermovement as opposed to the hundreds of thousands who went the other way. In March 1946 some of these militants had already changed their minds about the true nature of Yugoslavia, demonstrating, with red flags in their hands, in favor of Italian sovereignty in Fiume.

Many of these counterexiles were convinced communists—radical workers from the Monfalcone shipyards near Trieste. Some had been more or less expelled from Trieste owing to their political militancy. Others were intellectuals from all over Italy, intrigued by the communist experiment in the east. Their experience was generally a disastrous one. Most did not discover socialism, nor were they given any kind of privileged status in relation to other Italians. The bulk of this movement took place in 1947, at the time of the peace treaty controversy.

The Tito-Stalin split in June 1948 shocked the convinced Stalinists (a vast majority among Italian communists at the time), who demonstrated openly against the Yugoslavian government, and in favor of the USSR. Tito's response was repressive, and some of these communists (fifty or so according to some estimates) were taken to the horrific torture camp at Goli Otok, known as the naked island.[38] Most, however, simply returned home to Italy, where their defeat was compounded by discrimination in the workplace.[39] "We still carry the mark of Yugoslavia upon us," one worker said. Back in Italy, the Communist Party on the frontier also backed Stalin against Tito, placing it in a kind of "third position" within the cold war at a local level. By the end of 1948, the dream was over—most of those who had promoted the *contro-esodo* were already back in Italy. Their experience

was largely forgotten until a recent series of studies of Tito's gulag and work on the *contro-esodo* appeared—including a play and a radio transmission based on this story.[40]

EXODUS AND ITALIAN HISTORY: NAZARIO SAURO, HIS MONUMENTS AND HIS BODY

> "Sauro [is] in exile with his people." *L'Emancipazione*, January 27, 1947.[41]

Nazario Sauro was Istria's answer to Cesare Battisti, the Trentino socialist who had joined the Italian army after 1915 and was executed by the Austrians in 1916, thus becoming an Italian war hero.[42] Sauro was born in Capodistria; he joined the Italian navy and was captured by the Austrians after an ill-fated mission in a submarine. Executed at Pola, he became the symbol—with Oberdan—of irredentism in the region. For Ballinger, "Sauro came to represent the sacrifice made for Istria."[43] Sauro, like Battisti, was a contested figure, a traitor to some, a hero to others. Like Battisti again, Sauro's image was manipulated under Fascism. On June 9, 1935, a huge, bombastic, sea-front monument was dedicated to Sauro in Capodistria and inaugurated by the king himself. The first stone of the monument had been laid in August 1926. But in May 1944 this same monument was demolished by the German army, ostensibly for "military reasons." At two different times after that (in 1947 and 1952) the bronze statues that had been part of the monument were melted down by the Yugoslavs.[44]

As they left, the Istrian Italians were worried about issues of memory. Nazario Sauro's body was exhumed and taken back to Italy in 1947, during the mass exodus from Pola. It is said that Sauro's coffin was jeered at and spat upon on arrival in Venice, where he is now buried,[45] and this story is often linked to the other "standard stories" about hostility to the exiles in Italy after the war, such as the Bologna station incident. In the same year the remains of the Sauro monument were sent to be melted down by the Yugoslav government, although other versions of this story claim that this had already been done by the Germans. Meanwhile a bronze monument was dedicated to Sauro in Trieste (1966), the work of the sculptor Tristano Alberti, who had also created the controversial plaque that still stands next to the "*foiba*" in Basovizza. Its inscription is simple—*NAZARIO SAURO—Figlio d'Istria, Eroe d'Italia* (Son of Istria, Hero of Italy). This statue was and is part of the classic exile itinerary during commemorations or protests.

The figure of Sauro and his monuments remained contested after the war and useful in terms of political mobilization in the region. In the 1950s, there were already demands in parliament for the reconstruction of Sauro's monument at Capodistria. The 1980s saw further calls from within the exile

community in Trieste to rebuild the destroyed monument. This campaign was again unsuccessful. Other demands were made in 2004 (around the time of the debates over Slovenia's borders, Schengen, and European integration) for the restoration of Sauro's house in Capodistria and the restoration of the plaque placed there in 1919. Rumors of threats to Sauro's house have surfaced at various times over the years. Anti-Italian activities in Istria under the Yugoslav government were also about memory and identity. In 1946, in Capodistria, for example, various Italian monuments were removed. A whole series of Risorgimento plaques went in 1950.[46] On both sides of the border, memory wars continued throughout the postwar period.

Elaborate ceremonies were organized on the anniversary of Sauro's death, as in 2007, when a whole day of events was dedicated to Sauro in Trieste, including visits to his statue, the naval cemetery, and to the remembrance park, which sports a plaque in his honor. Ceremonies of this type, often involving the exiles, have been held constantly in the city since at least the 1950s.[47] However, Sauro never became a national figure in the same way as Cesare Battisti, and his memory remains important only at a local level. Sauro's statue was shifted from its previous position in 2007 owing to the construction of a car park, and there was some debate over its future. Some called for the statue to be moved to Basovizza as part of a commemorative ensemble linked to the exile community. In the end, the statue was placed on the sea front, close to the center of the city.

THE *RIMASTI* AND THE EXILES: THOSE WHO STAYED BEHIND AND THOSE WHO RETURNED

On returning to Istria, often after many years, many exiles found that the places they remembered were no longer there and existed only in their minds. The present (and also the past) had become a foreign country. Experiences of return have often been bitter and disappointing, having ended in personal or financial failure. Deep divided memories and narratives have emerged over the years between the *esuli* and the so-called *rimasti*. These divisions are often political but also involve respective claims about betrayal (both "groups" claim that the other betrayed *them* and betrayed "Italy") and about who is "really" Italian.

The exodus was made more difficult by the proximity but also instant remoteness of the places that had been left behind. Pamela Ballinger tells the story of an exile who purchased binoculars that enabled him to see his former hometown—and even the tree that stood "at the entrance to the town." This man would go to the hills above Trieste, where, according to his son, he "stayed for hours just looking."[48] Exiles would often dream about the houses and lives they had abandoned.

Tombs, cemeteries, and funerary traditions were—and remain—very important for the exiles. Ballinger has described cases of ritual practices in cemeteries by returning exiles. Detailed research projects have been carried out

with regard to the history of these sites and their use all over the Balkans (in areas where there were Italians). Images and stories of bodies and coffins being taken to Italy by the exiles during the exodus were powerful components of the "standard stories" of humiliation and the complete nature of the population movement. The archive of the IRCI contains a survey that includes some 18,000 photographs of Istrian cemeteries as well as a number of maps.[49]

EXILES: THE CONTRADICTIONS OF IDENTITY AND MEMORY

Exiles had a schizophrenic relationship with the border itself. On the one hand, they never accepted the current drawing of the line; but, on the other, they were active in promoting the idea that the slavs/communists should be kept out of Italy. This schizophrenia was translated to debates over European expansion and the Schengen agreement, which touched on all these issues. The problem of "abandoned property"—which in the end came to nothing (but still rumbles on)—and compensation for the refugees was, for a time, linked to the entry of Slovenia into the European Union. Ex-exiles were thus, for different reasons, both opposed to and in favor of borders.

Contradictions of this kind had been there right from the start. There are photos of exiles in Trieste celebrating—in a car—the permanent award of the city to Italy in 1954. However, these celebrations were tinged with regret, as large sections of Istria had been "lost" in the same agreement. Thus, on the same car, there is also an Istrian flag, marked, however, for mourning. Celebration and mourning at the same time; such was the fate of the exiles in Trieste. Such contradictions remained within the narratives about the past (with changes over time) and in the ways that exiles remembered their history and saw themselves. They were Italian and also "Istrian," but what did the latter mean if they were never to return "home?" Exile memory was also divided within itself, especially after the long dream/promise/threat of a return home—*RITORNEREMO*—faded and then died for ever. Without a hope of return, what did being an exile mean any longer? Increasingly the community began to see its identity as linked to public recognition of its own narratives about the past. In this sense, the museum in Trieste is a point of arrival and a point of departure at the same time. It fixes a version of the past—for public consumption—but it also means that the exile community can now move on. Perhaps "the exiles" are no longer exiles.

NOTES

1. *Il lungo esodo. Istria: le persecuzioni, le foibe, l'esilio*, (Milan: Rizzoli, 2005), 7.
2. Pietro Delbello, *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia. Esodo. Sugli esuli e le loro masserizie ancora depositate nel Porto Vecchio di Trieste per un Museo della Civiltà Istriano-fiumano-dalmata* (Trieste: IRCI, 2004), 40.

3. Here, as in many other cases similar to this, there is much debate over numbers; 250,000 seems to be the most reasonable figure to adopt, although figures range widely from 200,000 right up to 350,000.
4. For the details of the numbers passing through Trieste, see Gloria Nemec, "L'eredità della guerra," in P. A. Toninelli, ed., *La città reale. Economia, società e vita quotidiana a Trieste, 1945–1954* (Trieste: Comune di Trieste, 2004), 84–93.
5. Some 100,000 people left in 1943–1946, followed by 80,000 from Pola, other parts of Istria, and the Gorizian area in 1947 itself. A similar number took up the "option" to leave in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The *esodo* continued right up to the early 1960s.
6. Pamela Ballinger, *History in exile: Memory and Identity at the Borders of the Balkans* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 207–244, Gloria Nemec, *Un paese perfetto: storia e memoria di una comunità in esilio: Grisignana d'Istria (1930–1960)* (Gorizia: Libreria editrice goriziana, 1998).
7. For a fascinating discussion of this and other related issues, see Guido Franzinetti, "Le riscoperte delle 'foibe,'" in: Joze Pirjevec, ed., *Foibe una storia d'Italia* (Turin: Einaudi, 2009), 319–332; and id., "The rediscovery of the Istrian foibe," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteruopas*, VIII (2006): 85–98.
8. R. Pupo, "Gli esodi e la realtà politica dal dopoguerra a oggi," in R. Finzi et al., eds., *Il Friuli-Venezia Giulia* (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 663–758; R. Pupo, "L'esodo degli Italiani da Zara, da Fiume e dall'Istria: un quadro fattuale," in M. Cattaruzza et al., eds., *Esodi. Trasferimenti forzati di popolazione nel Novecento europeo* (Naples: Edizioni scientifiche Italiane, 2000), 183–208.
9. Nemec, *Un paese perfetto*, 299.
10. For the period from the 1950 to the 1970s, see P. Delbello, ed., *C. R. P. Per una storia dei campi profughi Istriani, Fiumani e Dalmati in Italia (1945–70)* (Trieste: Gruppo Giovani dell'Union e degli Istriani, Istituto Regionale per la Cultura Istriana-fiumana-dalmata 2004/2005); and Enrico Neami et al., eds., *C.R.P. Centro Raccolta Profughi. Per una storia dei campi profughi Istriani, Fiumani e Dalmati in Italia (1945–70). Guida all'Esposizione* (Trieste: Gruppo Giovani dell'Unione degli Istriani di Trieste, 2004). The museum was intended as an interactive space, which would also collect material from visitors and build up its own archive. For a collection of messages left by visitors, see Gruppo Giovani dell'Unione degli Istriani, *Padriciano 60. Voci, segni, emozioni da un Centro Raccolta Profughi* (Trieste: 2007).
11. Delbello, *C. R. P.*, 59–60.
12. Delbello, *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia*, 45.
13. P. Delbello, *Arredi domestici, documenti, strumenti di lavoro dei profughi istriani depositati a Trieste* (Trieste: IRCI, Ed. Italo Svevo, 1992).
14. Delbello, *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia*, 31.
15. Barbara Gruden, *Diario della Settimana*, January 29, 2001. The museum was included in the law that instituted the day of memory for the *esodo* and the *foibe*.
16. Delbello, *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia*, 64.
17. However, in 2011 it seems that the mass of the material was still in a warehouse in the port area. The debate is ongoing: "Sgarbi: 'Roportiamo le masserizier istriane al magazzino 26," *Il Piccolo* October 20, 2011. Available at: http://ilpiccolo.gelocal.it/cronaca/2011/10/20/news/sgarbi-riportiamo-le-masserizie-istriane-al-magazzino-26–1.1608839
18. Delbello, *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia*, 32.
19. *Il Piccolo* February 8, 2004, August 22, 2005.

20. See for example "Testimonianze della storia," *Il Piccolo* January 7, 1988.
21. Guido Crainz, *Il dolore e l'esilio. L'Istria e le memorie divise d'Europa* (Rome: Donzelli, 2005), 77.
22. Delbello, *Istria, Fiume, Dalmazia*, 7.
23. For an application of the concept of standard stories to this area of Italy, see T. A. Smith, "Remembering and Forgetting a Contentious Past": Voices From the Italo-Yugoslav Frontier," *American Behavioral Scientist* 51, 10 (2008): 1538–1554. The original concept is laid out in C. Tilly, *Stories, identities, and political change* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 25–42 and passim. For the question of stories and identity, see G. Nemec, "Il ruolo delle fonti orali in una ricerca sulle trasformazioni sociali delle comunità italiane nel dopoguerra (1945–1965)," *La Ricerca. Bollettino del Centro di Ricerche Storiche di Rovigno* 52 (2007): 16–20.
24. In Delbello, *C. R. P.,* 67.
25. Nemec, *Un paese perfetto.*
26. For the Silos see Enrico Miletto, *Istria allo specchio. Storia e voci di una terra di confine* (Milan: Francoangeli, 2007), 221–222 and Ballinger, *History in Exile,* 201.
27. Cited in Crainz, *Il dolore*, 93, a phrase also cited in Annamaria Vinci, "Storia e storie di confine,"' *Qualestoria*, 2 (2007): 113.
28. Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 201.
29. For a description of one Little Istria, the neighborhood of Chiarbola in Trieste, see Mauro Covacich, *Trieste sottosopra. Quindici passeggiate nella città del vento* (Bari: Laterza, 2012), 103–107.
30. Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 168–206 and in particular 198–203.
31. See Pupo cited in: *Naufraghi della pace. Il 1945, I profughi e le memorie divise d'Europa*, ed. G. Crainz (Rome: Donzelli, 2008), 19; S. Volk, *Esuli a Trieste. Bonifica nazionale e rafforzamento dell'italianità sul confine orientale* (Udine: Kappa Vu, 2004).
32. See See John Foot, *Fratture d'Italia* (Milan: Rizzoli, 2009), 148–160.
33. Cited in Nemec, *Un paese perfetto*, 333.
34. From one witness account, "the walls and the beams still bore scratched names, Stars of David, crosses, invocations." Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 141, and for the camp see also 199.
35. Miletto, *Istria allo specchio*, 208–210.
36. For moments of political hostility toward the refugees, see Enrico Galli della Loggia, *La morte della patria* (Bari: Laterza, 1996), 115–116.
37. Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 132.
38. Although Miletto cites a much higher figure—of 300 or so—*Istria allo specchio*, 167.
39. Andrea Berrini, *Noi siamo la classe operaia. I duemila di Monfalcone* (Milan: Baldini & Castoldi 2004), Pupo, *Il lungo esodo*, 130–134; Crainz, *Il dolore*, 79–83; Pupo, "Gli esodi nell'Adriatico orientale," in *Naufraghi della pace*, 12–13.
40. M. Puppini, "Il controesodo monfalconese in Jugoslavia tra Trattato di pace e risoluzione del Cominform," in M. Puppini, ed., *Il mosaico giuliano. Società e politica nella Venezia Giulia del secondo dopoguerra (1945–1954)* (Gorizia: Centro Gasparini-Comune di Monfalcone, 2003). For Tito's concentration camp, see Giacomo Scotti, *Goli Otok. Ritorno all'isola Calva* (Trieste: Lint, 1991). The question of the "*rimasti*" is also often linked to politics. Many of those who remained did so for ideological reasons, as communists, socialists and/or antifascists. It could be argued that the *rimasti* were—simply by remaining—part of the "counterexodus."
41. Cited in Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 179.

42. The literature on Battisti is vast. See John Foot, *Fratture d'Italia*, 161–184.
43. Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 63.
44. Bruno Tobia, "Dal Milite ignoto al nazionalismo monumentale fascista (1921–1940)," in Walter Barberis, ed., *Storia d'Italia*, 18; *Guerra e pace* (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 622–623.
45. And largely forgotten, it seems, although in Palazzo Loredan in the city there is a *masso in pietra d'Istria* and a Roman column taken from the tomb of Sauro at Pola to Venice in 1954.
46. Miletto, *Istria*, 116–117.
47. For the relationship between the exile community and Nazario Sauro, and his myth, see Ballinger, *History in Exile*, 63–65.
48. Ibid., 201.
49. Ibid., 174–182. Delbello notes that the material carried by the exiles "included coffins." *Istria. Fiume. Dalmazia,* 6.

Contributors

Daniela Baratieri is an Honorary Research Fellow in History at the University of Western Australia. She has published a book on memory and Italian colonialism and has recently completed a postdoctoral fellowship researching into the way women responded to and constructed the cult of Mussolini. She is currently investigating the relationship between psychiatry and the Italian Fascist regime.

Omer Bartov is the John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European History at Brown University. He received his D.Phil. from Oxford University in 1983 and is the recipient of fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Academy in Berlin, the Radcliffe Institute at Harvard, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Davis Center at Princeton, and others. He is also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His books include *The Eastern Front, 1941–45* (1985), *Hitler's Army* (1991), *Murder in Our Midst* (1996), *Mirrors of Destruction* (2000), *Germany's War and the Holocaust* (2003), *The "Jew" in Cinema* (2005), and *Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine* (2007). His books have been translated into many languages. Bartov has also written for national magazines in the United States, Europe, and Israel. He is currently completing a new book titled *The Voice of Your Brother's Blood: Buczacz, Biography of a Town*, to be published by Simon & Schuster in 2014.

Christopher Clark is professor of modern European history at St. Catharine's College, University of Cambridge. He is the author of *The Politics of Conversion: Missionary Protestantism and the Jews in Prussia 1728–1941* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1995), *Kaiser Wilhelm II* (Harlow, UK: Longman, 2000), *Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947* (London: Allen Lane, 2006) and *The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

Nicholas Doumanis is associate professor of history at the University of New South Wales (Sydney). His most recent book is *Before the Nation: Muslim-Christian Coexistence and Its Destruction in Late Ottoman Anatolia* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). He has also written on Australian migrant history and Italian colonialism and is currently working on a study of the eastern Mediterranean for the *Blackwell History of the World* series.

Christopher Duggan is professor of modern Italian History at the University of Reading. His books include *Fascism and the Mafia* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), *Francesco Crispi: From Nation to Nationalism* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796* (London: Allen Lane, 2007) and *Fascist Voices: An Intimate History of Mussolini's Italy* (London: Bodley Head, 2012).

Mark Edele is professor of history at the University of Western Australia. He is the author of *Soviet Veterans of the Second World War: A Popular Movement in an Authoritarian Society* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008) and *Stalinist Society 1928–1953* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011); he is currently working on a history of experiencing the Soviet Second World War.

Giuseppe Finaldi teaches history at the University of Western Australia. He has published *Mussolini and Italian Fascism* (London: Pearson, 2008) and *Italian National Identity in the Scramble for Africa, Italy's African Wars in the Era of Nation-Building, 1870–1900* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2009). Currently he is writing a new history of Italian Empire.

Sheila Fitzpatrick is an honorary professor at the University of Sydney and professor emerita of the University of Chicago. Her most recent books include *Tear off the Masks! Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); with Michael Geyer, ed., *Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and a memoir of her Australian youth, *My Father's Daughter* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2010). Her memoir of Moscow in the 1960s, *A Spy in the Archives*, has just been published by Melbourne University Press and I. B. Tauris (UK). She is currently completing a book on Stalin and his team from the late 1920s to the mid 1950s.

John Foot is professor of Italian history in the Department of Italian, University of Bristol. His recent publications include *Italy's Divided Memory* (London: Palgrave, 2010) and *Pedalare, Pedalare. A History of Italian Cycling* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011).

Dick Geary is emeritus professor of modern history at the University of Nottingham. He read history at Cambridge, where he was also a postgraduate, in the mid-1960s and has since published several books on the history of Marxism, European labor history, and the history of modern Germany. Since 2000 he has been working on a study of Brazilian slavery. He has edited, with Stephen Hodkinson, *Slaves, Cults and Religions in the Ancient World and Modern Brazil* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2012); is currently editing a volume on *Free and Unfree Labour from Ancient Greece to the Present Day*; and completing the book of a Leverhulme-funded project on *Atlantic Revolution or Local Difficulty: Europe, Africa and Revolt in Brazil* that seeks to compare artisan behavior in slave and nonslave society between 1780 and 1850.

Robert Gerwarth is professor of modern history at University College Dublin and director of UCD's Centre for War Studies. He has published extensively on twentieth-century European history, most recently a biography of Reinhard Heydrich (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011) and two edited volumes, *Political Violence in Twentieth Century Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010) and *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence after the Great War* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Paul Preston is Príncipe de Asturias professor of contemporary Spanish history at the LSE. He was born in Liverpool in 1946 and has dedicated the bulk of his professional life to writing the history of twentieth-century Spain. He has taught at the Universities of Rome, Madrid, Valencia, Reading, and London and lectured widely in Europe and America. Among his books are *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (1986); *Franco: A Biography* (1993); *Juan Carlos: A People's King* (2004); *The Spanish Civil War: Reaction, Revolution, Revenge* (2006); *We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War* (2008); and *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain* (2012). He has recently completed a biography of Santiago Carrillo, the long-term leader of the Spanish Communist Party. Professor Preston is a Fellow of the British Academy (1994) and holds the Marcel Proust Chair of the Academia Europea de Yuste (2006).

Page Intentionally Left Blank

Index

D